Judgment M. P. Singh, J. 1. This is an application under Sec.438 of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 by one Sheonandan Mandal for the grant of anticipatory bail. Tha alleged offence is under Sec.396 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner is an accused in Ghanshyampure P. S. Case no.1 (4)/78/g. R. Case no, 681 of 1978 pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Darbhanga. The prayer is for a direction that in the event of arrest he shall be released on bail. 2. The prosecution case is that on 2-4-1978 at about 1 p. m.200 to 3oo persons variously armed with deadly weapons came to Tole Rampur which is on the border of the distirct of Saharsa and Darbhanga and they looted properties worth lacs of rupees and also injured a large number of persons. Satyanarain chaudhry one of the injured is the informant of this case. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that it was not a case of professional dacoity ; that the petitioner was the Mukhia Gram Panchayat and has recently been elected as Pramukh of Nauhatta Prakhan and he is also the founder member of Loknayak Jai Prakash Narayan High School, Bakunia and is also the secretary of that school ; that he is also the President of Zila Pichhra Barg sangh. He father urged that two more cases in respect of the same occurrence were instituted by the police officers one being Nauhatta P. S. Case no.1 (4)/78 under Secs.147, 148, 149, 353, 341, 323, 436 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and another being Ghanshyampur P. S. Case no.2 (4)/78 under Secs.147, 148, 149, 307, 353, 332, 336, 337 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. It was also argued that the petitioner has not been named as accused in Ghanshyampur P. S. Case no.2 (4)/78 whicn was instituted by the Officer Incharge of Ghanshyampur police Station and that the petitioner has been granted anticipatory bail by the sessions Judge of Saharsa in Nauhatta P. S. Case no.1 (4)/78. Counsel further contended that no specific overt act has been attributed to the petitioner in tae first information report. In my opinion, these are not sufficient grounds for issuing a direction under Sec.438 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure for the grant of anticipatory bail. Counsel further contended that no specific overt act has been attributed to the petitioner in tae first information report. In my opinion, these are not sufficient grounds for issuing a direction under Sec.438 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure for the grant of anticipatory bail. Counsel appearing for the State has pointed out that 23 persons were injured and properties worth lacs of rupees were looted ; that the petitioner has been named in the first information report as one of the accused armed with bow and arrow. Eleven injured persons named him as one of the miscreants. On the basis of the case diary it has been pointed out by the state counsel that out of the injured persons Mol Narain Chaudhry and Gulab jha made statements to the police during investigation that they were injured by arrow shot by the petitioner.40 houses were ransacked and looted. The mob consisted of 200 to 300 persons variously armed with deadly weapons and the henious and horrierd crime was committed in broad daylight. Helpless and unarmed persons were injured, all their properties, grains, cattle, cash and ornaments were looted away. Counsel further drew my attention to the fact that when on information the police party reached village Bakuniya and went to the darwaza of Babua Mandal who was the leader of the mob they were surrounded by a large number of persons and the members of the mob were crying kill the police, snatch the rifle and. rescue the arrested criminals. Counsel cited the cases of Balchand V/s. "state of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 366 and Gurbaksh singh Sibia V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1978 Punjab and Haryana 1 (F. B.) for the purpose of showing that the power under Sec.438 of the new Code of Criminal procedure is of an extraordinary character and must be exercised sparingly and only in exception and special cases. In my opinion, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the State is sound. In Balchands case ( AIR 1977 SC 366 ) at page 369 Bhagwati, J, observed : "now this power of granting "anticipatory bail" is somewhat extraordinary in chracter and it is only in exceptional cases where it appears that a persons might be falsely implicated, or a frivoiuus case might be launched against him, of. In Balchands case ( AIR 1977 SC 366 ) at page 369 Bhagwati, J, observed : "now this power of granting "anticipatory bail" is somewhat extraordinary in chracter and it is only in exceptional cases where it appears that a persons might be falsely implicated, or a frivoiuus case might be launched against him, of. "there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, that such power is to be exercised. And this power being rather of an unusual nature, it is entrusted only to the higher echelons of judicial service, namely, a Court of Session and the High Court. " In the same case at page 375 S. M. Fazal Ali, J, said : "it would thus appear that while the Law Commission recommended that provision for an order of anticipatory bail to be effective when a person is arrested should be made, at the same time it stressed that this being an extraordinary power should be exercised sparingly and only in special case. " These principles were followed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the Full Bench case aforesaid. In Somabhai Chaturbhai Patel V/s. State of Gujarat, 1977 Cr. LJ 1523 at 1524 it was enunciated : "the Court will not exercise the power to enlarge on bail at the stagt of pendency of investigation in cases where the court would be slow to do so after investigations have been completed or closed. In other words, the court will not be hustled into exercising these powers in cases where the offence is one which is punishable with death or imprisonment for life. " 4. In the facts and circumstances of this case I am of the opinion that no case under Sec.438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is made out. The merits of the case do not satisfy the test laid down in the aforesaid cases. I am not, therefore, inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. The petition is dismissed. Petition allowed.