GURAYYA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1979 DIGILAW 216 (KAR)

N. R. KUDOOR, J. ( 1 ) GURAVVA (the petitioner herein) has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for an appropriate writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order dated 10-5-1977, a true copy of which is at Exhibit-E, passed by the 2nd respondent Land tribunal, Jewargi against him and in favour of Chandramappa (respondent no. 3) granting a temporary injunction restraining him from interfering with the enjoyment of the land by the 3rd respondert comprised in Sy-No. 64 admeasuring 20 acres 19 guntas situate in Birival B village of Jewargi Taluk in Gulbarga District. ( 2 ) THE matter arises in this way:- the 3rd respondent filed an orginal Suit No. 257 of 1974 on the file of the Principal Munsiff, Gulbarga, against the petitioner for permanent injunction to restrain the petitioner from interfering with his possession of the aforementioned land comprised in Sy. No 64 on the ground that he was the exclusive owner in possession of the said land and obtained an order of ad-interim temporary injunction. The pet tioner entered appearance and resisted the suit, questioning the title of the 3rd respondent to the suit land by contending inter alia among other things, that one Somappa Hosur was the owner of the suit land from whom the petitioner obtained the land in question on lease in the year 1961-62 and since then he was cultivating it personally. The Principal munsiff, who heard the matter, vacated the ex-parte order of injunction passed against the petitioner and referred the question of tenancy to the tribunal as required under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') as it stood then for its decision as per his order dated 24-1-1975. Under the same order, the Principal Munsiff also appointed the petitioner herein who was the defendant in the suit as the receiver of the suit property until further orders. ( 3 ) THE 2nd respondent-Land Tribunal, on receipt of the case records from the Court of the Principal munsiff, Gulbarga, took up the matter for enquiry. The petitioner as well as the 3rd respondent filed separate applications on 10-2-1977 seeking injunction against each other in respect of the land in question during the pendency of the matter before the Tribunal. The petitioner as well as the 3rd respondent filed separate applications on 10-2-1977 seeking injunction against each other in respect of the land in question during the pendency of the matter before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, having considered the applications, passed the impugned order Exhibit-E under which it rejected the application filed by the petitioner and allowed the application filed by the 3rd respondent on which, it granted temporary injunction restraining the petitioner from, disturbing the possession and enjoyment of the land in question by the 3rd respondent. It is this order that is under challenge in this writ petition. ( 4 ) THE respondents were duly served with the notice of this writ petition. However, they remained unrepresented, sri T. R. Subbanna, Advocate and a Member of this Bar was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the Court. ( 5 ) ONE of the grounds raised in the writ petition and which was argued as a preliminary point is, that the order Exhibit-E which is under challenge, is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. The ground on which the preliminary point is rested is, that the power conferred on the Tribunal to issue interlocutory orders under S. 48c of the Act is exclusively limited to the land in respect of which an application is made under Sec. 48a and it does not extend to the land involved in a proceeding arising out of a reference case under Sec. 133 of the Act. ( 6 ) SRI T R. Subbanna (amicus curiae) submitted that the preliminary point involved for decision raises two questions for consideration. They are (1) whether Sec. 48c would bring into its fold the proceedings arising out of a reference case under Sec. 133 of the Aet; and (2) if not, whether the Tribunal could otherwise issue interlocutory orders of the nature specified in Sec. 48c. ( 7 ) LET me now proceed to consider these two questions in the order in which they were formulated. ( 8 ) DILATING on the first question, Sri subbanna contended that the duties of the Tribunal under the Act, are enumerated under clause (B) of Sec. 112 and one of the duties of the tribunal specified therein is to issue interim orders under Section 48c. ( 8 ) DILATING on the first question, Sri subbanna contended that the duties of the Tribunal under the Act, are enumerated under clause (B) of Sec. 112 and one of the duties of the tribunal specified therein is to issue interim orders under Section 48c. He further contended that the language employed in Sec. 48c is plain and simple, to conclude that Sec. 48c would not admit within its fold, the proceedings before the Tribunal arising cut of a reference case under sec. 133 of the Act. ( 9 ) THE power of the Tribunal to issue interlocutory orders, is specified in Sec. 48c, the true scope and propel construction of which, arises in this case and I propose to read the same.-"48c. Interim orders: - (1) The tribunal may, when it considers it just and proper and subject to such terms and conditions as it may impose, issue interlocutory orders in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of receiver concerning the land in respect of which an application is made under sec. 48a- (2) The Tribunal may at any time revoke or modify the order issued by it under sub-section (1 ). (8) Subject to the provisions of sub-section C2) the order of the tribunal shall be final. " ( 10 ) THE object, of the Act as adumbrated in its preamble, is to enact a uniform law in the State of karnataka relating to agrarian relations, conterment of ownership on tenants, ceiling on land holdings and for certain other matters mentioned therein. Undoubtedly the Act is a welfare legislation to relieve the genuine agricultural tenants, from the uncertainties of their right in the land which they till, to place a ceiling on the land holdings and to distribute the surplus lands among certain categories of weaker sections of the society, including the landless agricultural labourers and other categories of persons specified in Sec. 77 of the Act. It is well recognised that the provisions of a welfare legislation should receive beneficial construction from the courts. ( 11 ) THE Act underwent innumerable changes since 2-10-1965, the date on which the original Act was brought into force, the details of which will be unnecessary for our present purpose. It is well recognised that the provisions of a welfare legislation should receive beneficial construction from the courts. ( 11 ) THE Act underwent innumerable changes since 2-10-1965, the date on which the original Act was brought into force, the details of which will be unnecessary for our present purpose. However, I shall refer to some of the important changes brought about in the Act, as it was originally brought into force, which are very material for our purpose to understand the true scope and the proper construction to be placed on Sec. 48c. ( 12 ) SEC. 48a which deals with the enquiry on an application made by a claimant to the Tribunal for registration of occupancy was inserted by the karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973 (Act 1/1974) which will be ,hereafter referred to as the act 1/1974. Sec. 112 was substituted by the same amending Act for Sec. 112 as it. stood prior to the said amendment by Act 1/1974. Certain amendments were also effected in Sec. 133 as it stood then by the same amending act. It may be noted that there was no provision in the Act authorising the Tribunal to issue interlocutory orders of the nature specified in Sec. 48c of the Act. ( 13 ) ONCE again certain important changes have been brought about in the Act by the Karnataka Land reforms (Second Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 27 /1976) which will be here bafter referred to as the Act 27, 1976, with effect from 16-12-1975. Sec. 18c was placed on the statute for the first time under the said amendment Act. Sec. 133 was also substituted by the same amendment Act, for Sec. 133 as it stood prior to 16-12-1975. Sec. 18c was placed on the statute for the first time under the said amendment Act. Sec. 133 was also substituted by the same amendment Act, for Sec. 133 as it stood prior to 16-12-1975. Cons quent upon these changes, addit onal duties of the Tribunal were also engrafted to clause (B) of Sec. 112 by inserting new sub-clauses (bb), (bbb and (bbbb) Under these 3 sub- clauses, the additional duties of the Tribunal specified are (1) to decide whether the land in respect of whic an application under Sec. 48a is made or in respect of which any quest on of tenancy is raised or involed, is or is not agricultural land sub-clause (bb); (2) to decide quest ons referred to it under Sec. 133 ( sub-clause (bbb) and (3) to issue interim orders under Sec 48c (sub-Clause (bbbb) ( 14 ) UNDOUBTEDLY there was no provition the Act prior to the inser on of Sec. 48c by Act 27 /1976 with effect from 16-12-1975, empowering the. Tribunal in issue interlocutory orders concerning the land involved in tho procecdings before it. eithet in the matter of praming occupeney right under Sec. 48a or in a refeerence case under Sec. 133 as it stood prior to the coming into force of At 27 1976 The insertion of Sec. 48c, The substitution of Sec. 133 and the in sertion of the additional duties of the Tribunal enumerated in sub- claunse (1) (bbb), and (bbbb) to clause (P) of Sec. 112, were all brought about with effect from 16-12- 1975 under Act 27/1976 whereas sec. 45a was inserted with effect from 1-3-19 4 under Act 1 1974 Before Act 1 1974 came into force with effect from 01-3-1974, there was a provision in the Act incorporated in Sec. 133 as it stood then under which a 'civil court' was required to refer any issue arising for decision in a suit instituted before it which requires to be settled, decided or dealt with by the 'court' under the Act to such 'court'. Sec. 133 as it stood then was amended by act 1/1974 by substituting the 'tribunal' in the place of the 'court'. Sec. 133 as it stood then was amended by act 1/1974 by substituting the 'tribunal' in the place of the 'court'. It is manifest from a reading of the provisions contained in the Act as it stood prior to the coming into force of Act 27/1976, there was no provision in the Act empowering the Tribunal to issue any interlocutory orders concerning the land in respect of which occupancy right was claimed or in respect of the land involved in a proceeding arising out of a reference case under Sec. 133 of the Act. The scope of Sec. 48c shall have to be considered against this back. ( 15 ) CRAIES on Statute Law, Seventh edition at page 84, dealing with the "golden Bule of Construction," quotes the obsenation of Lord Blackburn in Caledonian Railway v. North british Railway which reads thus-"there is not much doubt about the general principle of construction. Lord Wensleydale used to enunciate (I have heard him many and many a time) that which he called the golden rule for construing all written engagements. T find that he stated it very clearly and accurately in Grey v. Pearson in the following terms: 'i have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universelly adopted - at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall - that in construing wills, and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sease the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsisitency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency but no further. "the Supreme Court in Kanai Lal v. Parammdhi, AIR 1957 SC. 907 . laid down the rule of construction of a statutory provision which has been succinctly summarised in Head Note (a) read thus: -"the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the Act purports to remedy and correct. "dealing with the same topic this is what the Supreme Court observed in sheikh Gulfan v. Sanat Kumar, AIR 1965 SC. 1839 . at page 1845:--"normally, the words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning; but in many cases, judicial approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary meaning of words does not meet the ends of a fair and reasonable construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of words may not necessarily assist a proper consruetion of the statutory provision in which the words occur. Often ehough n interpreting a statutory provision, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve. That is why, in deciding the true scope and effect of the relevant words in any statutory provision, the context in which the words occur, the object of the statute in which the provision is included and the policy underlying the statute assume relevance and become material. " ( 16 ) NOW turning to Sec 48c, what it stipulates is that when the Tribunal considers it just and proper to issue interlocutery orders in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of receiver concerning the land in respect ot which an application is made under Sec 48a, it may issue such orders subject to such terms and conditions as it may impose. The power of the Trilunal, the nature of the interlocutory orders and the land in respect of which interlocutory orders may be issued, are all specified and laid down in clear and unambiguous terms ir Section 48-C. The words used are simple and their meaining is plain which admit of no ambiguity at all. The only construction admissible from thp language employed in Sec 48c will be that the Tribunal is empowered to issue interlocutory orders in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of receiver only in relation of the land in respect of which an application is made under sec. 48a and no other In other words, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to issue interim orders of the nature specified in Sec. 48c will be only during the pendency of the application filed under Sec 48a for granting of occupancy right in respect ot the land over which occupancy right is claimed. No alternative construction is feasible or possible from the words employed in sec. 48c. I have arrived at this conclusion by adhereing to the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words and the context in which they are employed in Sec. 48c. In my opinion, this construction v/hich I propose to place on Sec. 48c will not lead to any absurdity or repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the provisions of the Act. A proceeding arising out of a reference case under Sec. 133 would not fall within the ambit of Sec. 48c, since S 48c specifically refers to the land in respect of which an application is made under S. 48a of the Act. It must by noticed that Sec. 133 in its presen form was substituted by Act 27/1976 urder which Sec. 48c was also placed on the statute viz. , the Act, for the first time. If the legislature had intended that Sec. 48c also should embrace in its fold, the lands involved in a proceeding arising out of a reference case under Sec. 133, certainly they would have constructed Sec. 48c in a quite different way so as to include specifically the land involved in the proceedings arising out of a reference case under Sec. 133 as they did in the case of land in respect of which an application is made under sec. 48a of the Act. 48a of the Act. Thus, I hold that the Tribunal is not empowered to issue interim orders of the nature specified in Sec. 18c in respect of the land involved in the proceedings arising out of a reference case under Sec. 133 of the Act. ( 17 ) THIS conclusion could be reached by another route. As observed earlier, sec. 48a was inserted by Act 1/1974 with eflect from 1-3-1974. It deals with the enquiry by the Tribunal on an application made by a person entitled to be registered as an occupant under sec. 45 of the Act. It provides for making an application to the Tribunal and lays down the full scope of the enquiry on such an application, to determine the claim and grant the relief to a person entitled to be registered as an occupant under the provisions of the Act. It is an original proceeding to be initiated before the Tribunal by making an application under sub-section (1) of Sec. 48a and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in dealing with such an application is absolute and conclusive. In other words, the proceedings before the tribunal under Sec. 48a commence on an application made under Sec. 48a (1) and terminate with the grant or rejection of the said application. Now coming to the scope of the proceedings arising cut of a reference case under sec. 133 ot the Act as it stood then, the enquiry before the 'tribunal' was a limited one i. e. , to say to decide the questions referred to it by the 'civil court' and communicate its decision to the 'civil Court' which made the reference and the 'civil Court' thereupon to dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto. Admittedly there was no provision in the Act empowering the Tribunal to issue interlocutory orders of the nature specified in Sec. 48c in either of the above referred proceedings prior to the insertion of sec. 48c which was with effect from 16-12-1975. ( 18 ) AS I stated earlier, S. 48c was enacted and placed on the statute viz. , the Act, by Act 27/1976 with effect from 16-12-1975 Simultaneously with the insertion of Sec. 48c, Sec. 133 as it now stands, was also substituted in the place of Sec. 133 as it stood then, by act 27/1976. However, the legislature thought of bringing into the ambit of sec. , the Act, by Act 27/1976 with effect from 16-12-1975 Simultaneously with the insertion of Sec. 48c, Sec. 133 as it now stands, was also substituted in the place of Sec. 133 as it stood then, by act 27/1976. However, the legislature thought of bringing into the ambit of sec. 48c only the land in respect of which an application is made under sec. 48a for the registration of occupancy and not the land involved in the proceedings arising out of a reference case under Sec. 133 of the Act. That it is so, is clear from a bare reading of sec. 48c. It appears to me that 1he framers of the Act, in their wisdom, included only the land in respect of which occupancy right is claimed within the ambit of Sec. 48 C and excluded the land involved in a proceeding arising out of a reference case under Sec. 133, because the scope of the enquiry by the Tribunal in respect of the latter is a very limited one, since the Tribunal is required to decide the questions referred to it under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of sec. 133 and communicate its decision on the questions so referred to it, to the 'court', 'officer' or 'authority' as the case may be by which those questions were referred, under clause (iv) of sub-section (1) and thereupon it was for the 'court', 'officer' or 'authority' to dispose of the matter pending before them finally on the basis of the decision of the Tribunal on the questions referred to it. ( 19 ) SRI Subbanna submitted that clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 133 which stipulates that all interim orders issued or made by a Court, officer or authority whether in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of a receiver or otherwise concerning the land shall stand dissolved or vacated as the case may be would not throw any light to place a construction upon Sec. 48c in a different way than the one discussed above. He maintained that all the four clauses of sub-section (1) and the two sub-sections (1) and (2) of sec. 133 shall have to be read together for the proper understanding of the scope of each of them. He maintained that all the four clauses of sub-section (1) and the two sub-sections (1) and (2) of sec. 133 shall have to be read together for the proper understanding of the scope of each of them. It seems to me that the way suggested by Sri subbanna for understanding the scope of each clause of sub-section (1) and also the two sub-sections of Sec. 133, will be the correct approach to construe a provision in a statute. ( 20 ) IN Madanlal v. S. Changdeo sugar Mills Ltd, AIR 1962 SC. 1546. the Supreme court while construing sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 76 of the Indian companies Act, 1956 (Act 1 of 1956) before the amendment of sub-section (2) in 1960, observed as follows:"the first rule ot construction which is elementary is that the words used in the section must be given their plain grammatical meaning. Since we are dealing with two sub-sections of S. 76, it is necessary that the said two subsections must be construed as a whole "each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest". The two sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being interdependent; an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy. If repugnancy cannot possibly be avoided, then a question may arise as to which of the two should prevail. But that question can arise only if repugnancy cannot be avoided. " ( 21 ) KEEPING in view the above enunciation of the Supreme Court, let me new consider the scope of Sec. 133. Clause (i) of sub-section (1) provides that no court - civil or criminal or officer or authority shall decide the question concerning a land in any suit, case or proceeding before them whether such land is or is not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1-3-1974. If such questions arise for consideration then it is provided in clause (ii) that such court, officer or authority shall stay such suit or proceedings in so far as such question is concerned, and refer the same to the Tribunal for its decision. If such questions arise for consideration then it is provided in clause (ii) that such court, officer or authority shall stay such suit or proceedings in so far as such question is concerned, and refer the same to the Tribunal for its decision. Clause (iv) provides that the tribunal shall decide the question referred to it under clause (i) and communicate its decision to such court, officer or authority. It also provides that the decision of the tribunal on such question shall be final. Clause (iii) provides that all interim orders issued or made by such court, officer or authority whether in the nature of temporary injunction or appoinument of a receiver or otherwise concerning the land shall stand dissolved or vacated as the case may be Sub-sec. (2) of S. 133 provides that nothing in sub-sec. (1) shall preclude any of the aforesaid authorities from proceeding with the suit, case or proceeding in respect of any matter other than that referred to in subsection (1 ). This is in consonance with clause (ii) of sub-section (1) which stipulates that the Court, officer or authority shall stay such suit or proceedings in so far as such question as referred to in clause (i) concerning the land is concerned and they need not stay the whole of the suit or the proceedings initiated before them. This would clearly demonstrate that the suit or the proceedings would still be pending before the concerned authorities for final disposal, whereas the question before the tribunal on a reference, will be a very limited one i. e. , to decide the question referred to it and communicate the decision to the authority that referred the question to it. This would clearly demonstrate that the suit or the proceedings would still be pending before the concerned authorities for final disposal, whereas the question before the tribunal on a reference, will be a very limited one i. e. , to decide the question referred to it and communicate the decision to the authority that referred the question to it. As laid down in Madanlal's case (3) sub-ections (1) and (2) of S. 133 shall have to be read as parts of an integral whole for the proper understanding of the scope of each of them and if 1 hey are so read, it would be clear that clause (iii) of sub-section (1) will come into operation concerning the land involved in a reference case only when the tribunal gives its finding that the said land is an agricutural land and the person claiming to be in possession of it, is a tenant within the meaning of the Act from prior to 1st March 1974 and till such a finding is given, clause (iii) would not apply and the interim orders of the nature referred to therein passed by any of the authorities referred to in clause (i) would hold the field. If, this is not the proper interpretation to be placed on Sec. 133 read as a whole and it were to be held that the interim orders referred to in clause (iii) concerning the land passed by the Court, officer or authority would automatically stand dissolved or vacated the moment a reference is made by them under clause (ii) for the decision of the Tribunal regarding the quesion referred to therein, it would lead to anomalous position which, in my view, the legislature never intended. It is clear to my mind that it is impermissible to read clause (iii) of sub-section (1) in isolation, removing it from out of the context of the other provisions contained in sec 133. ( 22 ) IT is undisputed that unless the 'land' involved in any suit, case or proceedings before the Court, officer or authority is an agricultural land and the person claiming to be in possession of it is a 'tenant' within the meaning oi the Act, the provisions of the Act would not apply. ( 22 ) IT is undisputed that unless the 'land' involved in any suit, case or proceedings before the Court, officer or authority is an agricultural land and the person claiming to be in possession of it is a 'tenant' within the meaning oi the Act, the provisions of the Act would not apply. However, in a suit, case or proceeding concerning a land before any of the aforementioned authorities, the question whether such land is or is not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession of it is or is not a tenant from prior to 1st march 1974 arises for consideration, the aforesaid authorities have no other option but to refer that question to the decision of the Tribunal, by staying the suit or proceeding in so far as such question is concerned. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 133 provides that nothing in sub-section (1) shall preclude any of the aforesaid authorities from proceeding with, in respect of any matter other than that referred to in sub-section (1 ). If the Tribunal holds on the reference being made to it for its decision under clause (ii), that the land involved is an agricultural land and the person claiming to be in possession of it is a tenant from prior to 1st March 1974, then alone the provisions of the Act would apply to such land and all interim orders issued or made by such Court, officer or authority, whether in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of a receiver or otherwise shall stand dissolved or vacated as the case may be If, on the other hand, clause (iii) is made applicable automatically the moment a reference is made under clause (ii) to the Tribunal for its decision on the question referred to in clause (i) and if the tribunal were to hold finally that the land in question is not an agricultural land and the person claiming to be in possed. on of it is not a tenant thereof, then it would amount to the application of clause (iii) to a matter falling outside the scope of the Act, furtht r, under sub-section (2), the court, officer or authority is not precluded from proceeding with the suit, case or proceeding pending before them in respect of any matter, other than that referred to in sub-sec. (1) The only proper construction that could be placed upon clause (iii) would be that all interim orders issued or made by a Court, officer or authority, o the nature referred to therein conceing the land would stand dissolved 01 vacated as the case may be if 1 the Tribunal finally decides that the land in question is an agricultural land and the person claiming to be in possession of it is a tenant within the meaning of the Act and communicates its decision to the Court, officer or authorty which made the reference. Once the Tribunal holds that the land in qustion is an agricultural land and that is was held by or was in the possession of a tenant immediately prior to 1-3-1974, then such land would vest in the State Government with effect from -3-1974 whether the tenant who is enttled to be registered as an occupant n respect of such land makes an application under Sec. 48a (1) of the act or not within the time allowed under the Act. If the tenant who is entitled to be registered as an occupant of such land makes an application under Sec. 48a (1) of the Act for grant oi occupancy right to the Tribunal, then Sec. 48c would apply to such a case and the Tribunal is empowered to grane interim orders of the nature referred to therein. If no application is made under Sec. 48a (1) of the Act in respect of such a land, then since the land in question is vested with the government, there is no need for the tribunal to make any interim orders since the interest of all other persons in respect of such land would cease to have any effect on and from the date of vesting of the land in the State government. That is why the legislature did not think it necessary to make any provision for interim orders in a proceeding under Section 133 of the Act. However, if an application under Section 48a is made to any tribunalin respect of a land, which is also the subject matter of a reference case before the Tribunal under S. 133, then by virtue of clause (iii) of sub- sec. However, if an application under Section 48a is made to any tribunalin respect of a land, which is also the subject matter of a reference case before the Tribunal under S. 133, then by virtue of clause (iii) of sub- sec. (1) of S. 133, all interim orders issued or made by the authorities who had referred the suit, case or proceedings to the Tribunal shall stand dissolved and that is, not because of the reerence, but because of S. 48c under which exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the tribunals to issue interlocutory orders concerning the land in respect ot which an applicafion is made under S. 48a. This would be the irresistible conclusion one could reach if both sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 133 of the Act are read together in the context of S. 48c and it must be so read as laid down by the Supreme Court in madanlal's case (3 ). No decision of this court or that the Supreme Court was brought to my notice to place a different construction than the one I propose to place on S. 133 of the Act. ( 23 ) THE intention of the legislature that the Tribunal should be invested with the exclusive power of granting interim orders of the nature specified in S. 480, concerning the land, only in a procceuing under S. 48a and not in a proceeding arising out of a reference case under S. 133 of the Act, is also clear from the statement of objects and reasons contained in the Bill that preceded Act No. 27/1976 replacing the ordinance No. 24 of 1975 under which s. 48c was inserted and S. 133 was substituted. It reads thus:"in the absence of specific provision in the Land Reforms Act investing the Tribunals constituted under s. 48 with powers to issue interlocutory orders in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of receivers concerning the land is respect of which an application was made to the Tribunal under Section 48a the civil courts continued to exercise these powers and there was confusion due to orders issued by the civil courts, not always taking into consideration the matters which were being agitated before the Tribunal. To remove this parallel jurisdiction a new Section 48c is being inserted investing the Tribunals with the powers to issue interlocutory orders in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of Receiver in respect of any land which is the subject matter of an application under Section 48a by a tenant. Section 112 is also proposed to be amended to empower the tribural specifically to decide whether the land in respect of which an application under Section 48a is made, is agricultural land or not as it was ruled that in the absence of specific power to the Tribunal to decide this matter, regular civil courts can entertain an application and decide whether any land is agricultural land coming within the purview of the Land Reforms Act amendments to Section 133 are consequential to enable the civil courts to refer to the Tribunal all matters in respect of which powers are now vested in the Tribunal. " ( 24 ) ON a proper construction of Sec. 48c and a fair analysis of the other relevant provisions of the Act and circumstances, I am inclined to hold that the Tribunal is not empowered to issue interim orders of the nature specified in Sec. 48c concerning the land involved in a proceeding arising out of a reference case under Sec. 133 of the Act. ( 25 ) THE next point that arises for consideration will be whether the tribunal could issue interim orders of the nalure specified in Sec. 48c under inherent powers. This point raises the question whether the Tribunals constituted under Sec. 48 possess inherent powers. The land tribunals constituted under Sec. 48 of the Act are quasi-judicial authorities. The source of their power is the act under which they are constituted. The duties, to be performed by them are regulated by the provisions contained therein. Section 112 (B) enumerates the duties of the Tribunal. Sub-clauses (a) to (c) give the details. Sub-clause (d) provides that the tribunal shall perform such other duties and functions as are imposed on it under the provisions of the Act or under any rule made thereunder. It is the duty of the Tribunal to decide the question referred to it under Section 133 [sec. 112 (B) (bbb)] and also to issue interim orders under Sec. 48c [sec. 112 (B) (bbbb) ]. It is the duty of the Tribunal to decide the question referred to it under Section 133 [sec. 112 (B) (bbb)] and also to issue interim orders under Sec. 48c [sec. 112 (B) (bbbb) ]. It is specifically provided under Sec. 48c that the tribunal is empowered to issue interim orders of the nature specified therein concerning the land in respect of which an application is made under section 48a. There is no provision, either in the Act or in the Rules made thereunder, empowering the Tribunal to issue interim orders of the nature specified in Sec. 48c concerning the land involved in a reference case under Sec. 133 of the Act. Section 113 stipulates that except as otherwise expressly provided in the act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central act V of 1908) shall be applicable in respect of all applications and proceedings under the Act before the "court". Section 2 (A) (9a) defines "court" as "court means the Court of Munsiff within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situate". Provision is made under the Act to refer certain questions to the decision of the "court" [see Sec. 21 (1) (ii) (e) proviso and Sec. 48b (2) ]. No provision is made in the Act for the app] cation of the Civil Procedure code to the proceedings before the tribunal. We do not find any provision corresponding to Sec. 151 CPC, sec 482 Cr. P. C. and Sec. 25 of the karnataka Land Revenue Act 1964, in the Act. The decision of this Court in virupax Krishnaji v. Land Tribunal, ron, (1978) 2 Kar. L. J. 41. to which my attention was drawn in the course of the argument, does not lay down that the Land Tribunals constituted under S. 48 of the act possess "inherent powers". No other authority either of this Court or of the supreme Court was brought to my notice in support of the proposition that the Land Tribunals constituted under the provisions of the Act possess inherent powers. I shall close my discussion on this aspect by quoting a passage from Administrative Law by H. W R. Wade (Fourth Edition) at page 39. It reads:"it is cardinal axiom, therefore, that every power has legal limits, however wide the language of the empowering Act. I shall close my discussion on this aspect by quoting a passage from Administrative Law by H. W R. Wade (Fourth Edition) at page 39. It reads:"it is cardinal axiom, therefore, that every power has legal limits, however wide the language of the empowering Act. If the Court finds that the power has been exercised oppressively or unreasonably, or if there has been some procedural failing, such as not allowing a person affected to put forward his case, the act may be condemned as unlawful. Although lawyers appearing for Government departments often argue that some Act confers unfettered discretion, they are guilty of constitutional blasphemy. Unfettered discretion cannot exist where the rule of law reigns. The notion of unlimited power can have no place in the system. The same truth can be expressed by saying that all power is capable of abuse and that the power to prevent abuse is the acid test of effective judicial control. " ( 26 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, I am inclined to hold that the Land Tribunals constituted under S. 48 of the act possess no inherent powers and they cannot grant interim orders of the nature specified in S. 48c concerning the land in a reference case under S. 133 of the Act. ( 27 ) FROM what has been stated above, it follows, that the impugned order Ext. F passed by the 2nd respondent - Land tribunal, is without jurisdiction and as such liable to be interfered with. ( 28 ) IN tne result, for the reasons stated supra, the rule is made absolute and the impugned order Ext-E is quashed. In the circumstances of the case, I direct each party to bear his own costs ( 29 ) BEFORE parting with this case, I feel it my duty to place on record the valuable assistance rendered by Sri T. R. Subbanna in deciding this case. --- *** --- .