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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1979 DIGILAW 216 (MP)

Prem Pandhi v. Mahesh Garg

1979-07-30

G.L.OZA

body1979
ORDER Oza, J : - 1. This revision petition bas been filed by the petitioners against an order dated 30th October 1978 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore directing issue of process in a private complaint filed by the non-applicant against the petitioners under sections 273 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioners are Directors of the Cad burry India Limited, Bombay and partners of Model Agencies, Indore. 2. The non-applicant-complainant filed a complaint against these petitioners on 18-10-1978 alleging that on 3rd August 1978 complainant purchased a piece of Cadburry chocolate from the shop Super Selection Departmental Stores. New Palasia, Indore owned by one Bharat Kumar Bhandari who has not been joined as an accused but bas been examined as a witness for the prosecution, it was alleged by the complainant that on opening the wrapper he found that red ants were sticking to the chocolate which according to the complainant was unfit for human consumption. It is also alleged that the complainant would not have purchased it if he had known that the chocolate is in that state. After filing of the complaint the complainant examined himself and also Bharat Kumar Bhandari and produced one Panchnama Ex. P-1 and a certificate Ex. P-2 written by Bbarat Kumar Bhandari on the basis of the evidence of these two witnesses the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order issuing process to the petitioners and against this order the present revision petition has been tiled by the petitioners. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the offences under sections 273 and 420 or the Indian Penal Code are not even made out on the basis of allegations contained on the complaint and supported by the evidence of the witnesses examined by the com91ainant and the learned Magistrate without examining the matter just issued the process against the petitioners which will put the petitioners in great hardship, expenditure and inconvenience. It was also contended that the complainant purchased the article from Bharat Kumar Bhandari and if at all he had any grievance it could only be against him but according to the learned counsel curiously enough the complainant has chosen not to make him an accused in the case but has examined him as witness for the prosecution. It was also contended that the complainant purchased the article from Bharat Kumar Bhandari and if at all he had any grievance it could only be against him but according to the learned counsel curiously enough the complainant has chosen not to make him an accused in the case but has examined him as witness for the prosecution. He further contended that even if what is alleged in the complaint and stated by the complainant in evidence is taken for granted still there is no evidence against anyone of the petitioners. 4. Learned counsel for the non-applicant-complainant contended that the order passed by the learned Magistrate is an interlocutory order and no revision petition is competent. It was also contended that what is alleged in the complaint clearly makes out a case against the petitioners although the facts alleged by the complainant at present may not be sufficient but at present what was required to be seen by the Magistrate was that it is a fit case for an inquiry. It was also contended by the learned counsel that when any products proclaimed to be for human consumption are sold there is an implied representation that it is in a state fit for human consumption and therefore by this representation the complainant was induced to purchase the article and prayed that ingredients of the offence under section 420 IPC are made out. He also contended that the article being noxious and not fit for human consumption the ingredieuts for the offence under section 273 are also made out. Learned counsel placed reliance On the decisions reported in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Pratap and others ( 1974 JLJ 436 =1974 MPLJ 454); Bhupinder Kumar Bhatnagar v. State (1975 Cr. L.J. 1185); Sultanuddin Ahmed and another v. Abdul Salam Dewor and others (1977 Cr. L.J. Short Note 38); Bhiku Ram Jain and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others (1977 Cr. L.J. 1995) and Shah Ashu Jaiwant v. State of Maharahtra ( AIR 1975 SC 2178 ). Learned counsel also referred to certain passages from Introduction to Criminal Law by Cross and Jones and to the decisions in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kent and Sussex Contractors, Limited (1944 King's Bench 146) and Rex v. I.C.R. Haulage Limited and others (1944 King's Bench 551). 5. Learned counsel also referred to certain passages from Introduction to Criminal Law by Cross and Jones and to the decisions in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kent and Sussex Contractors, Limited (1944 King's Bench 146) and Rex v. I.C.R. Haulage Limited and others (1944 King's Bench 551). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners as regards the preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the non-applicant at out the maintainability of the revision referred to the decision reported in Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others ( AIR 1977 SC 2185 ) and contended that in view of this decision it is now well-settled that against such an order a revision petition is competent. He also contended that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that a revision petition is not competent, this Court can exercise inherent powers to quash the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Learned counsel also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Babulal v. Ghanshyamdas Birla and others (Criminal Revision No. 328 of 1974 decided on 19-4-1976). 6. The complainant in his complaint has alleged that witness No.1 Super Selection Departmental Stores, New Palasia Indore had purchased the chocolate from Model Agencies, Indore of which the partners have been joined as accused persons and has sold to the complainant one piece of chocolate on 3rd August 1978. It is also alleged that Cadburry Chocolates are manufactured by Cad burry India Limited and therefore he has joined the Director& of that company also as accused persons. The main (actual allegation made in the complaint is that on 3rd August 1978 the complainant purchased one piece of chocolate from witness No.1 and according to him when to opened the wrapper he found that red ants were sticking to it and therefore, according to him it was not fit for human consumption and as it was sold as an eatable and he paid the price, according to him all these petitioners are gui1ty. He has also alleged that he opened the wrapper at the shop itself and found this state of affairs. He has also alleged that he opened the wrapper at the shop itself and found this state of affairs. It is not alleged that prosecution witness No.1 is an agent either of the Cad burry India Limited or of the Model Stores In fact the allegation of the complainant is that he purchased this piece of chocolate from Bharat Kumar Bhandari (P.W. 1) and found it in the state of affairs as described by him which according to him was not fit for human consumption. 7. In the statement made by the complainant he has alleged the same thing that when he purchased the piece of chocolate from Rharat Kumar Bhandari and after opening the wrapper he discovered that there were red ants. He showed it to Bharat Kumar Bhandari and Bharat Kumar Bhandari told him that these ants have come from the company and he further states that therefore he drew-up a memorandum and as Bharat Kumar told him that he had purchased them from Model Agencies he gave notice to the Model Agencies as well as to the Cad burry India Limited. He has further alleged that as he bad purchased the chocolate after payment of full price and as there were ants sticking to it, it would have been detrimental to his health if he had ate them. Bharat Kumar Bhandari in his statement has stated that he sold this piece of chocolate to the complainant. He also supports the complainant that on opening it was found that red ants were sticking to it. He has even gone to the extent of saying that these ants were sticking since it was manufactured by the company and it was in the same state that the Model Agencies sold this commodity to him; although there is nothing in his statement to indicate that he made any grievance to the Model Agencies or lodged any protest with the Cadburry India Limited. It is also not his statement that he had examined this chocolate when they were manufactured in the factory of the Cadburry India, Limited nor he claims to have seen them when he purchased them from Model Agencies. His statement only indicates that he wants to suggest that it was not because of any fault of his that the complainant received the chocolate in that state, 8. His statement only indicates that he wants to suggest that it was not because of any fault of his that the complainant received the chocolate in that state, 8. Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishment for offence of cheating and the offence has been defined in section 415. Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code reads: "Whoever, by deceiving any person fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intention ally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would Dot do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person In body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat". This definition clearly indicates that if one by deceiving any person fraudulently or dishonestly induces that person to deliver him any property then he commits offence of cheating. In the explanation it is also stated that dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. So far as the facts of this case as alleged by the complainant in his complaint and his statements are concerned he purchased a piece of chocolate from Bharat Kumar Bhandari (P.W. 1). It is not the case of the complainant that Bharat Kumar made any representation to the complainant and if at all anything could be said it can be said that he did not disclose the real situation i.e. dishonest concealment of fact as Bharat Kumar in his statement stated that the chocolate had the ants since he purchased them from Model Agencies and according to his version they were in the same state since they were manufactured. If this statement of Bharat Kumar is taken on the face value and it is believed that he knew it then at best it could be suggested by the complainant that he dishonestly concealed these facts which he was bound to disclose when the complainant purchased this piece of chocolate There is no suggestion that to the complainant either the Model Agencies or the Cad, burry India Limited made any represention or either they concealed any facts which were within their knowledge. In fact there is no allegation of any transaction by the complainant with either the Model Agencies or the Cadburry India Limited. Looking to these facts alleged by the complainant if at all any case could be suggested against anyone at best the complainant could only say against Bharat Kumar Bhandari hut the complainant has chosen for the reasons best known not to say so and learned counsel appearing for the complainant before me also did not contend that atleast a case of cheating does appear against Bharat Kumar Bhandari. 9. Section 273 of the Indian Penal Code provides: "Whoever sells, or offers or exposes for sale, as food or drink, any article which has been rendered or has become noxious, or is in a state unfit for food or drink, knowing or having reason to believe that the same is noxious as food or drink, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both" The starting words of this section indicate that the offence committed by person who sells, offers or exposes for sale any food article which has been rendered or has become noxious or is in a state not fit for human consumption knowing or having reasons to believe that the same is noxious as food. Apparently the complainant purchased the chocolate from Bharat Kumar Bhandari and therefore if the complainant's version is accepted that the article was noxious, it was sold to him by Bharat Kumar Bhandari. It is not the case of the complainant that he purchased the same article from Model Agencies or from the Cad burry India Limited. Apparently the complainant purchased the chocolate from Bharat Kumar Bhandari and therefore if the complainant's version is accepted that the article was noxious, it was sold to him by Bharat Kumar Bhandari. It is not the case of the complainant that he purchased the same article from Model Agencies or from the Cad burry India Limited. It is also significant that only selling or offering for sale is not enough, it is with knowledge or having reason to believe that the article is noxious then alone the seller or one who offers or exposes for sale can be alleged to have committed this offence If Bharat Kumar's evidence is accepted as it is he who knew that this article of food was noxious and was not fit for human consumption and be sold this article to the complainant, then on the facts alleged in the complaint if at all any offence IS indicated that is against Bharat Kumar Bhandari and none else but the complainant does not want to proceed against Bharat Kumar as is clear that he has not been joined al an accused. So far as the petitioners are concerned neither there is any allegation that they sold any article to the complainant or sold it knowing or having reason to believe that it is noxious. Apparently therefore on the facts alleged in the complaint and the statements made by the complainant and his witness there is nothing to connect the petitioners with the offence alleged. 10. It was vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the non-applicant that Cad burry India Limited are well-known manufacturers of eatables and therefore it being a cognizable offence, when they sold it to Model Agencies and Model Agencies to Bharat Kumar Bhandari the offence is completed. This argument of the learned counsel is a hypothetical argument as there is nothing to indicate that the complainant had anything to do with the transaction between the Cadburry India Limited and the Model Agencies or has anything to do with the manufacturers. The plane facts alleged by the complainant on the basis of his own personal knowledge are that he purchased this article from Bharat Kumar Bhandari and according to Bharat Kumar he knew it that this was noxious and not fit for human consumption. The plane facts alleged by the complainant on the basis of his own personal knowledge are that he purchased this article from Bharat Kumar Bhandari and according to Bharat Kumar he knew it that this was noxious and not fit for human consumption. This statement of Bharat Kumar Bhandari if at all is of any help it could only be of help if he is prosecuted for that offence but it is apparent that he has made that statement because he bas not been made accused by the complainant. 11. Learned counsel for the non applicant-complainant also wanted to import the concept of constructive liability under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act but even that is of no help as it is nobody's case that Bharat Kumar was selling this article on behalf of either Model Agencies or the Cadburry India Limited as it is not alleged that he is an agent of anyone of the petitioners. Apart from it the concept which has been specially incorporated in the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act can not be incorporated in the Indian Penal Code when there is no such provision and apparently the present prosecution is not under the provisions contained in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. An attempt also was made by the learned counsel for the complainant to suggest that it may also fall within the ambit of section 272 of the Indian Penal Code although in the complaint there is no allegation to make out a case under section 272 nor this section is alleged nor a process under that sought and it is not issued also under section 272. Section required that :- "Whoever adulterates any article of food or drink, so as to make such article noxious as food or drink, intending to sell such article as food or drink, or knowing it to be likely that the same will be sold as food or drink, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months. or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both" A positive assertion about adulteration of any article of food and it appears that the complainant and his counsel understood the difficulty of making an assertion about the adulteration and also alleging that the article of food is adulterated it is therefore not alleged nor pressed but only a passing suggestion was thrown by the learned counsel which apparently cannot be accepted. It is therefore clear that the allegations made in the complaint and the statements made by the complainant and his witness did not make out even a prima facie case under both the sections so far as the present petitioners are concerned. Even if the complainant's statement is taken for granted and the assertions made in the complaint are accepted still, as discussed above, no offence is alleged against these petitioners. The order passed by the learned trial Court appears to have been passed without application of mind. The order even does not disclose as to how the allegations made in the complaint or the statements made by the complainant and his witness make out the ingredients of the offence alleged or even suggested to make out of an offence. The learned Magistrate it appears in routine manner without application of mind passed an order issuing process. 12. This petition bas been filed as a revision petition under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (2) of this Section provides that :- 397... … … … … … (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. This provision clearly bars devision petition against an interlocutory order and this provision came-up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Arnar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others ( AIR 1977 SC 2185 ). While considering the term 'interlocutory order' used in this sect on their Lordships observed :- "Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of S. 397 against the historical back• ground of these facts. While considering the term 'interlocutory order' used in this sect on their Lordships observed :- "Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of S. 397 against the historical back• ground of these facts. Sub-section (2) of S. 397 of the 1973 Code may be extracted thus; "The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings." The real question which falls; for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub-S. (2) of S. 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well known legal significance and does Dot present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webstor's New World Dictonary "interlocutory" has been defined as; an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in S. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sence and not in any artistic or broad sence. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revisioa to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. Thus for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court," In this case their Lordships were considering the question of issue of process against the appellants in that case and it was observed that: "Applying the aforesaid tests let us now see whether the order impugned in the instant case can be saide to be an intorlocutory order as held by the High Court. In the first place, so far as the appellants are concerned, the police had submitted its final report against them and they were released by the Judical Magistrate, A revision against that order to the Additional Sessions Judge had failed. Thus the appellants by virtue of the order of the Judicial Magistrate as affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge acquired a valuable right of not being put on trial unless a proper order was made against them. Then came the complaint by respondent No.2 before the Judical Magistrate which was also dismissed on merits. The Sessions Judge in revision, however, set aside the order dismissing the complaint and orderd further inquiry. The Magistrate on receiving the order of the Sessions Judge summoned the appellants straightway which meant that the appellants were to be put on trial. So long as the Judicial Magistrate had not passed this order, no proceedings were started against the appellants, nor were any such proceedings pending against them. It was only with the passing of the impugned order that the proceedings started and the question of the appellants being put up for trial arose for the first time This was undoubtedly a valuable right which the appellants possessed and which was being denied to them by the impugned order. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellants were not at all prejudiced or that any right of their's was not involved by the impugned order. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellants were not at all prejudiced or that any right of their's was not involved by the impugned order. It is difficult to hold that the impugned order summoning the appellants straightway was merely an interlocutory order which could not be revised by the High Court under sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 397 of 1973 Code. The order of the Judicial Magistrates summoning the appellants in the circumstances of the present case, particularly having regard to what had preceded was undoubtedly a matter of moment and a valuable right of the appellants had been taken away by the Magistrate in passing an order prima facie in sheer mechanical fashion without applying his mind. We are, therefore, satisfied that the order impugned which was a matter of moment and which involved a decision regarding the rights of the appellants If the appellants were not summoned, then they could not have faced the trial at all, but by compelling the appellants to face a trial without proper application of mind cannot be held to be an interlocutory matter but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial." Learned counsel for the non-applicant complainant refered to certain decisions of the High Courts on the question of interpretation of the term "interlocutory order" occurring in sub-section (2) of section 397 but the ultimately very frankly conceded that after the decision of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in the case quoted above it is not necessary to go into those decisions. It is therefore apparent that the revision is not barred as this order according to the view expressed by their Lordships does not fall within the ambit of the interlocutory order as used in sub-section (2) of section 397. 13. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Bhivalingappa Konjalali and others ( AIR 1976 SC 1947 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the scope of the order passed by a Magistrate under section 204 issuing process. 13. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Bhivalingappa Konjalali and others ( AIR 1976 SC 1947 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the scope of the order passed by a Magistrate under section 204 issuing process. Their Lordship observed: "It would thus be clear from the two decisions of this Court that the scope of the inquiry made under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is extremely limitted-limitted only to the acertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the com plaint-(i) on the materials placed by the complaintant before the Court: (ii) for the limitted purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. In fact it is well settled that in proceedings under section 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is Dot entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should not be issued against him or not" and ultimately their Lordships laid down the tests "thus it maybe safely held that in the following cases an order of Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside; (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are potently absured and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible, and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like." and their Lordships further observed that: The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings. " Applying these tests the present case as discussed ear tier test No. (1) is fully statisfied that no case at all against the present petitioners is disclosed even if the allegations in the complaint and the statements made by the complainant and his witness are taken on their face value. It is therefore clear that this order of issue of process cannot be allowed to stand. 14. Consequently the revision petition is allowed. The order passed by the learned Magistrate issuing process against the petitioners is hereby quashed.