JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C.J. - This revision is directed against a decree for ejectment and recovery of rent and mesne profits. 2. It appears that in 1957 the plaintiff opposite parties granted a lease to the predecessor-in-interest of the applicants. The lease consisted of house and the land appurtenant to it. It appears that the lessee was continuing as a tenant from before. In the lease deed it was stated that the lessee has constructed some tin-sheds and that on termination of the lease he would be entitled to remove the materials within a month. 3. The landlords applied for permission to file a suit for the eviction of the tenants under Sec. 3 of the Rent Control Act of 1947. The permission was granted by the District Magistrate on 1st Oct., 1971. The revision filed by the tenants was dismissed by the Commissioner on 18th Nov., 1971. The tenants went up in revision to the State Government under Section 7-F of the Rent Control Act, but the same was dismissed on 29th April, 1972. 4. Meanwhile the landlords served a notice to quit on the tenants on 27th Nov., 1971. They filed the present suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits on the 12th May, 1972. 5. The present applicants contested the suit on a variety of grounds, but they all failed and the suit was decreed for ejectment, and recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits. Aggrieved, the defendants have come up in revision. 6. Pandit Gopinath Kunzru, learned counsel appearing for the tenant-applicants has raised submissions which were never urged in the pleadings or in the court below. He submitted that the permission granted under the old Rent Control Act was invalid, because the Rent Control Act of 1947 was applicable only to buildings and not to open land. The permission in so far as it extended to open land was hence beyond the purview of the Rent Control Act and was invalid. 7. Though the permission granted by the District Magistrate was challenged in revision before the Commissioner and the State Government, this ground was not raised. It was not even urged in the pleadings of the present suit. It is hence not permissible for the applicants to raise this ground for the first time in this revision. 8. Moreover the ground has no substance. It was not even urged in the pleadings of the present suit. It is hence not permissible for the applicants to raise this ground for the first time in this revision. 8. Moreover the ground has no substance. The Rent Control Act of 1947 was applicable to buildings as well as the appurtenant land. Admittedly the lease executed by the parties in 1957 consisted of house as well as the land appurtenant to it. It was a single lease for the demised property. It could not validly be split up into a lease for the house and a lease for the land separately. The term in the lease that the tenant had made some tin-sheds which he was entitled to remove on termination of the lease shows that the open land was used for better enjoyment of the building. It is clear that the lease was not for vacant land alone. The Rent Control Act of 1947 was hence applicable and the permission was valid for the entire subject-matter of the lease. 9. As a natural corollary of this submission it was urged that since the permission was not valid, the suit for ejectment was itself outside the purview of the Rent Control Act, and hence could not be transferred to the small cause court side. 10. In view of the finding that the main submission is not sustainable, this question does not arise. Moreover, the suit is for ejectment from house and its appurtenant land. It was clearly a suit of small cause court nature. Hence it was liable to be tried on the small cause court side. The submission has no merit. 11. It was next urged that the term of the lease granting to the tenant a right to make constructions made the transaction into a licence which, on the licencee making the constructions, became irrevocable. Since the transaction was of a licence, no suit for ejectment on the basis of a lease was maintainable. 12. The submission is untenable. The document of lease shows that it was a monthly tenancy. The rent was payble monthly. Clause (7) of the deed of lease provided that the tenant had made some tin-sheds, which he was entitled to remove within a month of the termination of the tenancy. This clause in the lease deed shows that the tin-sheds constructed by the tenant were temporary structures. The rent was payble monthly. Clause (7) of the deed of lease provided that the tenant had made some tin-sheds, which he was entitled to remove within a month of the termination of the tenancy. This clause in the lease deed shows that the tin-sheds constructed by the tenant were temporary structures. They were not permanent constructions, so as to make the alleged licence irrevocable. 13. The court below has referred to a statement made by the original tenant, Krishna Chand, who was the predecessor of the present applicants. He stated that he was a tenant from month to month; in proceedings under Section 7-F of the Rent Control Act as well as in his statement recorded in suit No. 22 of 1960. The successors of Krishna Chand cannot change the stand. 14. Pandit Kunzru then submitted that the tenant-applicants were protected by Section 29-A of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act No. 13 of 1972. 15. This section was inserted in the Act by Amending Act No. 28 of 1976. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 29-A provides - "(2) This section applies only to land let out, either before or after the commencement of this section, where the tenant, with the landlords consent has erected any permanent structure and incurred expenses in execution thereof." The other sub-sections of this section then go on to provide some specific protections to such a tenant. In my opinion the section does not apply to the present case. As already noticed, the structures erected by the tenant were not permanent in nature. They were purely temporary structures. The tenant in the deed of lease reserved the right to remove them within a month of the termination of the tenancy. Section 29-A is not attracted to land on which temporary structures have been erected by the tenant. 16. In the next place, this section applies "only to land let out." As already seen, the lease in question was of a building and its appurtenant land. The lease was not in respect only of land. For this reason also the section is not attracted. 17. No other point was pressed. 18. The revision fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.