SRINIVASA IYENGAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is against the order in W. P. No. 5642 of 1975 dated 10 11 1975, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. He filed the writ petition challenging the order of the Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore confirming the order of the special Deputy Commissioner for Inams abolition, Bangalore, rejecting his claim for registration of a plot of land measuring 94 x 66 feet forming a part of Sy. No. 18 of Hanumanthapura Village, which subsequently got included in the Corporation area of Bangalore City and became part of Gandhinagar extension. The claim was made under S. 12 of the mysore (Religious and Charitable) inams Abolition Act, 1955. It was common ground that the land had been taken for the purpose of carrying on business in fuel and charcoal depot in the year 1943 on a monthly rent of Rs. 8 and conversion of the land into non-agricultural purposes was not void or illegal under any law at the time of such conversion. The lease is evidenced by a document dated 28 10-1943, (Ext. 'd') a copy of which was annexed to the writ petition. The contention of the appellant was that he was a holder of the land and entitled to keep the land for himself. The Special Deputy Commissioner, before whom the claim was made, rejected it on the ground that the land was wholly non-agricultural land and the claim of the petitioner was untenable. Virtually on the same ground the Revenue Appellate tribunal dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Special Deputy commissioner for Inams Abolition, Bangalore. In the writ petition it was urged that the reasoning of the Revenue Appellate tribunal as well as the Special Deputy commissioner, for rejecting the claim, was untenable. It is apparent that the learned Single Judge did not uphold the order on that reasoning but considered the other arguments put forth in support of the claim and rejecting the contentions, dismissed the Writ Petition. The main argument of Sri Gundappa, learned counsel for the Appellant, is that the interpretation sought to be placed on s. 12 of the Act, and the reasoning adopted by the Single Judge are not correct. The main argument of Sri Gundappa, learned counsel for the Appellant, is that the interpretation sought to be placed on s. 12 of the Act, and the reasoning adopted by the Single Judge are not correct. S. 12 of the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act is as follows :-"right to agricultural land used for non-agricultural purposes :- 'where any land used for agricultural purposes has been converted for any purpose unconnected with agriculture, the holder of such land shall be entitled to keep the land provided that such conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time. "the expression 'holder' has not been defined in this Act. S. 2 (1) of the Act, provides, "in this Act unless there is any thing repugnant in the subject or context -"all words and expressions defined in the Land Revenue Code shall have the same respective meanings as in that code with the modifications, made by the Act. "the expression 'holder' had been defined under Section 3 (10) of the Mysore land Revenue Code, 1888. The learned judge referred to that sub-section and also to sub-section (9) and'came to the conclusion that the appellant would not come within the meaning of the expression 'holder' mentioned in Section 12 of the act. Sub-sections (9) and (10) of Sections of the Mysore Land Revenue Code are as follows:- (9) "to hold land" means to be legally invested with a right to the possession and enjoyment or disposal of such land, either immediate or at the termination of tenancies legally subsisting". (10) "holder" or "land holder" signifies the person in whom, a right to hold land is vested, whether solely on his own account or wholly or partly in trust for another person, or for a class of persons or for the public. It includes a mortgagee vested with a right to possession. " the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is -, that he is a holder as defined under sub-section (10) and for interpreting it i nvoking of the definition under Sub-section (9) was not justified. His argument is that the appellant was a person in whom the right to hold land was vested, as stated in Sub-section (10) and the expression 'to hold land' must be understood in the popular sense as merely a person in lawful possession. His argument is that the appellant was a person in whom the right to hold land was vested, as stated in Sub-section (10) and the expression 'to hold land' must be understood in the popular sense as merely a person in lawful possession. It is also argued that sub-section (10) by itself does not make sub-section (9) applicable for understanding it and the definition in sub-sec. (10) does not say that the expression to hold land must be as defined under Subsection (9 ). In our opinion this submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is not sound. As the expression 'holder' used in S. 12 of the Act has not been defined therein, by virtue of the provision under S. 2 (1), the meaning of the expression has to be sought from the Mysore land Revenue Code, where that expression has been defined. In order to understand the provision in sub-section (10) regard must be had to the definition of the expression 'to hold land' in sub-section (9), As the latter expression has been defined under sub-section (9), wherever such expression occurs subsequently, it should be read in accordance with that definition. As the expression 'to hold land' occurs in sub section (10), out of legislative necessity its definition under sub-section (9) must be adhered to. Definition of certain expressions which are to be used in a legislative enactment more than once is a convenient method of drafting an enactment. That avoids the repetition of the expressions in several parts of the enactment. When once the expression has been defined unless the subject or context otherwise requires, the meaning attributed to it in the definition must be read as part of the Section in which (he defined word is used. Therefore in our opinion the learned Single judge properly read sub-sections (9) and (10) together in order to under-stand the meaning of the word 'holder' used in S. 12 of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant sought to rely upon passages in Craies on statute Law 7th Edn. on page 69, under the heading 'causus Omissus' not to be created or supplied :-"a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly end undoubtedly not been made. The learned counsel for the appellant sought to rely upon passages in Craies on statute Law 7th Edn. on page 69, under the heading 'causus Omissus' not to be created or supplied :-"a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly end undoubtedly not been made. Where a literal reading of statute produces an intelligible result there is no ground for reading in words or changing words according to what may be the supposed intention of parliament. "the reliance sought to be placed on the above passages to our mind is of no avail. There is no omission which is sought to be supplied by the Court. A specific reference to sub-section (9) in sub-section (10) of S. 3 of the Mysore Land Revenue Code was wholly unnecessary and in fact would be superfluous. The next argument of Sri Gundappa, was that even on the basis that the definition in sub-section (9) has to be read into sub-section (10), his client would answer the description of a holder, as he had a legal right to the possession and enjoyment of the land during the subsistence of the lease. This submission would not be correct as it ignores the other salient requisites in that sub-section. The right referred to therein is of the person who has that right immediately or in the case of there being tenancies at the termination of tenancies legally subsisting. As in the instant case there was a tenancy in respect of the land, the right referred to would obviously be of the person who would have the right of possession and enjoyment or disposal after the termination of the tenancy. Where there was a legally subsisting tenancy the tenant cannot be said to have a right to hold the land, and the only person who is entitled to be in possession and enjoyment at the termination of the tenancy, would be the person who would have a right to hold the land. Therefore on a true construction of the expression 'holder' in S. 12 of the Act read with the definition under sub-sections (9) and (10) of S. 3 of the Mysore Land revenue Code, 1888, the appellant was not a person who was entitled to claim the right to the land under S. 12 of the act, and the learned single Judge was right in dismissing the writ petition. While dismissing the writ petition he observed that the order of dismissal would not prejudice any right of the petitioner under any other law. Sri Gundappa submitted that the dismissal of this appeal should not affect this observation. All that we may say is that it does not. In the circumstances steted above this appeal fails and accordingly it is dismissed. --- *** --- .