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1979 DIGILAW 217 (RAJ)

Jorawar Singh v. State of Rajasthan

1979-06-28

M.B.SHARMA

body1979
JUDGMENT 1. - This Revision-petition is directed against judgement dated 27th July, 1976 of learned Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu and arises out of the proceeding under Section 245 Cr. P. C. 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Code). 2. Khasra No. 621 measuring 1 bigha 2 biswa in village Todi P. S. Gudha Godji was in possession of the petitioner Jorawar Singh for the last many years. This land was having boundary wall and few wooden cabins as well as residential house belonging to the petitioner Jorawar Singh. Some how ignoring the rights of Jorawar Singh the land in dispute was allot ed to Patasa non-petitioner No.1, for cultivation on 17th June, 1970. The petitioner challenged that allotment and succeeded in the Revenue Appellate Authority who set aside the allotment in favour of Patasa on 18th June, 1973. It was held by the Revenue Appellate Authority that as the petitioner was in the possession of the land in dispute, the land was not unoccupied and should not be allotted to Patasa under the Rules, A revision-petition was filed by Patasa against the judgement of Learned Revenue Appellate Authority in the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer and the learned Chairmau of the Board of Revenue vide his judgement dated the 8th August, 1968, copy of which has been filed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner in this court, dismissed the revision. It will be observed that after the decision in favour of the petitioner was made by the Revenue Appellate Authority the mutation of the land in dispute was also made in favour of the petitioner. 3. Some-how it appears that on April 25, 1974 Patasa moved an application under Section 145 Cr. P.C. in the Court of learned S. D. M., Nawalgarh and the learned S.D.M., Nawalgarh being satisfied that there is likelihood of the breach of peace of the land in dispute made a preliminary Order under sub sec. (1) of a Section 145 Cr.P.C. on April 29, 1974 and further being satisfied that the case was one of emergency attached the subject of the dispute by making an ex parae attachment Order on the same day. The attachment was effected on April 30, 1974. The petitioner appealed in the Court of the learned S.D.M. and submitted an application under sub sec. The attachment was effected on April 30, 1974. The petitioner appealed in the Court of the learned S.D.M. and submitted an application under sub sec. (5) of sec, 145 of Code that the land had always been in his peaceful possession and there never had been apprehension of the breach of peace and there was no justification for making an ex parte Order of attachment. The learned Magistrate, somehow on the material then available dismissed that application. The petitioner went in revision to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Jhnujhunu who accepted the same and directed the learned Magistrate to take evidence of the parties and then to decide the question of possession. No evidence was produced by Paiasa inspite of several adjournment and ultimately his evidence was closed by the learned S.D,M. on May 26, 1975. Again Patasa went in revision before the learned Session Judge but the same was dismissed. 4. Patasa moved an application on December 2, 1975 praying that as the subject of dispute has been attached under Sub Sec. (1) of Section 146 of the Code the proceedings should be dropped as the Magistrate was not competent to proceed with the enquiry. The petitioner also submitted an application under Sub-Sec. (5) of Section 145 of the Code to the learned S. D. M bringing his notice that there is no longer likelihood of breach of peace with regard to the subject of dispute and one never existed, and, therefore, attachment made should be withdrawn. The learned S. D. M. dismissed the application of Patasa for dropping the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code, but accepted the application of the petitioner holding that the petitioner was in possession of the land in dispute, there never existed any likelihood of the breach of peace with regard to the land in dispute, he, therefore, withdrawn his attachment issued on 26th of April, 1974, under Sub Sec. (1) of Section 146 of the Code. Patasa preferred a revision against that order to the learned Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu who accepted his revision-petition and the order of the learned Magistrate passed under the provision to Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 146 of the Code was set aside. The order of attachment was restored and was to ensure till the respective rights of the parties were decided by a competent Court. 5. Mr. The order of attachment was restored and was to ensure till the respective rights of the parties were decided by a competent Court. 5. Mr. P. N. Datta, learned Advocate for the petitioner, has challenged the order of the learned Sessions Judge on the ground that firstly he has placed reliance on Abdul Rauf v. Mohd Shaft : A. I. R. 1956 All. 337 which was decanted in Ganga Singh v. Raj Bahadur : A. I. R. 1958 All. 803 and was over ruled by Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Gajrat and Ors. v. Collector Singh Cr. L. J. 1975 P. 1026 and secondly on the ground that the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge that the proviso to Section 146 of the Code will not apply, is not correct. According to him it was a fit case in which on material on record the the proviso to Sub Sec. (1) of Section 146 of the Code was applicable, and, therefore, the Order of attachment was rightly withdrawn. It is further contended that Patasa lost the case from the Higher Revenue Court i. e. the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer and the allotment which was made in his favour was cancelled. It was also observed that the petitioner was through-out in possession. 6. It may be observed that notwithstanding that the subject of dispute has been once attached under Sub, Sec. of Section 146 of the Code a Magistrate has powers under its proviso to withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of peace with regard to the subject of dispute. The only effect of any attachment under sub section 1 of Section 146 of the Code is that no further enquiry with regard to the fact um of possession is made and to that extent the proceedings under section 145 of the Code to come an end, but it does not mean that the Magistrate is not empowered in a fit case to withdraw the attachment under the proviso to sub section 146 of the Code. It may further be observed that under sub section 4 of Section 145 of the Code any party can show to the Magistrate that no such dispute as envisaged under sub section 1 of Section 145 of the Code exists or existed and ones the Magistrate is so satisfied then he has powers to cancel the order made under sub section 1 of Section 145 of the Code. The learned Sessions Judge in his order referred to Umrao v. Sheonarain R. L. W. 1975 P. 353 but he has failed to observe the observations made in para 8 of the same judgment which are to the following effect: "In such circumstances, a Magistrate has jurisdiction to pass an order raising an attachment but this does not mean that the order of attachment passed by him in case of emergency is an interlocutory order, because the attachment of the subject of dispute does not automatically cease upon there having been no longer any likelihood of a breach of peace". The above observations were made while referring to proviso to sub section 1 of sec.. 146 of the Code. It will, therefore, be clear that even in this authority it has been observed that on being satisfied that there is no longer likelihood of a breach of peace with regard to the subject of dispute, an attachment made under sub. section 1 of Section 145 of the Code can be withdrawn. All that has been decided in that authority is that once an attachment order is made and the property is attached there can be no further enquiry with regard to a right to possess subject of dispute and the same is to be determined by the competent Court. 7. A similar view was taken in Sua Lal v. Nanchu and Ors. WLN (UC) 1975 P. 544 and it was held that Magistrate can withdraw attachment order but he cannot determine the right of the parties in respect of possessions. In Manpukhram appellant v. The State and other Cr. L. J. 1977 P. 563 and Umrao's 143 case (Supra) was followed and the powers of the Magistrate under Sec, 145 (5) of the Code and under proviso to sub sec. (1) of Section 146 of the Code were recognised. In Ganga Singh v. Rai Bahaaur : A. I. R. 1953 All. L. J. 1977 P. 563 and Umrao's 143 case (Supra) was followed and the powers of the Magistrate under Sec, 145 (5) of the Code and under proviso to sub sec. (1) of Section 146 of the Code were recognised. In Ganga Singh v. Rai Bahaaur : A. I. R. 1953 All. 807 while interpreting the provisions of sub sections 4 and 5 of Section 145 of the old Code it was held that Magistrate has powers to withdraw the attachment Order once he was satisfied that no quarrel had taken place regarding the possession of the disputed land. A reference may also be made to Gajraj Singh's case (Supra) in which it has been held that when a party to the proceeding raises a plea that no dispute exists or existed the Magistrate cannot proceed to pass a final order without considering the plea and making an Order in respect thereof. 8. It will, therefore, be clear that even inspite of the fact that an attachment order has been made under sub Section 1 of Section 146 of the Code the Magistrate has powers to withdraw the attachment order in the case at any stage of the proceeding when he satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of the breach of peace with regard to the subject of dispute. It can also be said that sub-sec. (5) of Section 145 of the Code is a non-obstante clause and any party to the proceeding or any other Person interested can show to the Magistrate that no dispute has envisaged under sub sec. (1) of Section 145 of the Code has existed and if the Magistrate is satisfied he can cancel his preliminary Order. 9. The learned Sessions Judge has placed reliance on a ruling of Allahabad High Court which was over ruled perhaps because Cr. L. J. 1976 p. 1026 (Supra) was not brought to his notice.The result of the above discussion is that the revision-paction succeeds. The judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu dated 27, 1976 is set aside and that of the S.D.M. dated 2.6.1976 is restored. *******