ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. The petitioner was issued notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act and he filed objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority and certified copy of the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 29-5-1976 has been appended to the writ petition and marked as Annexure 1. Thereafter an appeal was filed and the same was dismissed by the Civil Judge, Jalaun at Orai by his Judgment dated January 29, 1977 and a certified copy whereof has been annexed to the writ petition and marked as Annexure 2. Now the petitioner has come up in the instant writ petition and in support thereof I have heard Sri R. B. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the Petitioner and in opposition, the learned Standing Counsel has made submissions. 3. Sri Mehrotra, contended that the finding recorded by the Ceiling Authority in respect of the non-existence of a minor daughter on 8th June, 1973 was legally erroneous. The learned counsel in this connection contended that the certified copy of the Kutumbh Register should have been relied upon by the authorities below and that it was wrongly discarded on the ground that it was issued by the Pradhan of of the Gaon Sabha. Learned counsel contended that the certified copy under the rules was bound to be issued by the Pradhan and therefore, the same was no ground for discarding the probative value of the said document. Learned counsel next contended that the State merely relied on the statement of the Lekhpal, whose statement was ih the nature of hearsay. The learned counsel placed reliance on the following cases: Bujhawan Singh v. Smt. Shyama Debi ( AIR 1964 Pat 301 ); Parashu Ram Tiwari v. Bhanu Pratap Tiwari ( 1974 RD 176 ) (All) wherein it has been laid down that the entries in a Birth and Death register are public documents and are admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 4. The learned counsel in this connection also drew my attention to the rules contained in Chapter 1 (b) which prescribes the manner and the mode in which the register of the members of the Goan Sabha is to be maintained. The learned counsel in this connection also drew my attention to the rules contained in Chapter 1 (b) which prescribes the manner and the mode in which the register of the members of the Goan Sabha is to be maintained. It should be seen that these rules are at present those which are described as U. P. Panchayat Raj (Maintenance of Family Registers) Rules, 1970 and they were issued by notification Number 6534-B/XXXIII-59-69 dated 5th June, 1970. Formerly, there was another set of rules contained in Chapter 1 (b). The learned counsel also placed reliance on Sections 74, 75, 76, 77, 79 and 114 of the Evidence Act. 5. On the other hand the learned Standing Counsel contended that in the writ jurisdiction this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding which was recorded by the Ceiling Authority and which is a pure finding of fact based on the appraisal of the evidence on record. He also invoked in his support the two cases on which reliance was placed by the lower appellate court and which are Ram Baran v. Nurul Haq (1959 RD 82) and Babu Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( 1959 RD 144 ). 6. It should be seen that the controversy in the instant case was about the date of birth of the daughter in dispute. The prescribed Authority emphasised that no independent evidence, which could be relied on, was forthcoming in support of the petitioners contention that she was born in 1967. In this connection the Prescribed Authority pointed out that there was contradiction in the evidence which was led on behalf of the petitioner. D. W. 5 Ganga Singh stated that the daughter was born in 1971, whereas the family register purported to show that the daughter was born in 1967. The testimony of the Pradhan was not relied on because he was held to have been guilty of having prepared a fake horoscope of one Narendra, who was claimed to be the major son by the petitioner on the material date i.e. 8th June 1973. The said contention was rejected by the Prescribed Authority and in this connection the statement of the Pradhan was discussed and the horoscope, which was prepared by him, was held to be not a genuine document. The said contention was rejected by the Prescribed Authority and in this connection the statement of the Pradhan was discussed and the horoscope, which was prepared by him, was held to be not a genuine document. The appellate court affirmed the finding recorded by the trial court and it seems to me that taking into consideration the limited jurisdiction, which I am exercising, I cannot interfere with the finding recorded by the authorities below even if I were to hold the said finding erroneous. I am not exercising appellate jurisdiction and it cannot be said that the authorities below had no jurisdiction to discard the testimony contained in the family register. Learned counsel himself conceded that it was not his contention that there was any conclusiveness about the probative value to be attached to an entry in the Kutumbh Register but he contended that there is a presumption about the correctness of the entries made in such a public document and that the State did not produce any evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness attaching to an entry in such document. It should be seen that so far as Section 79 of the Evidence Act is concerned, that will in term not apply to a certified copy of the Kutumbh Register. Such register is not prepared by a State Government Employee or Central Government Employee. However, the important point is that the question whether a particular presumption which is rebuttable, has been rebutted or not in the facts of a particular case, is a I matter which cannot be said to be a, question of jurisdiction. It was open to the authorities below to say that no reliance could be placed on the testimony of the Kutumbh Register. There is no law which makes it obligatory for a court or authority to accept the testimony forth-coming from a Kutumbh Register. The Division Bench pronouncement reported in Babu Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( 1959 RD 144 ) is clear. It has been clearly laid down there that the entries in the register of members are not conclusive and that the Sub-Divisional Officer is competent to decide the question about the correct age of the person elected and is not bound to accept the entries in the register of members as correct. It has been clearly laid down there that the entries in the register of members are not conclusive and that the Sub-Divisional Officer is competent to decide the question about the correct age of the person elected and is not bound to accept the entries in the register of members as correct. In this view of the matter, the authorities below were entitled to hold that no reliance could be placed on the entry contained in the Kutumbh Register. 7. So far as my own decision reported in Parashu Ram Tiwari v. Bhanu Pratap Tiwari ( 1974 RD 176 ) (All) is concerned, I only held that the entries in birth-death and Marriage registers are admissible in evidence and their certified copies could be produced in proof of such entries. I do not think that there is anything in the said pronouncement of mine which can be said to lay down that it was not open to the ceiling authority not to have placed reliance on the entries of the Kutumbh Register. It should be emphasised that the appraisal of evidence and the particular probative value which is to be attached to individual piece of evidence, is a matter which rests in the domain of the trying authority and the appellate court in the ceiling proceeding, and as have stated above, within my limited jurisdiction on the writ side of this Court, I cannot reappraise such evidence or find fault with the authorities below for having attached a particular probative value of having failed to attach such probative value to particular pieces of evidence. That is a matter which pertains to the appraisal of evidence and the authorities below, as has been emphasised repeatedly by the Supreme Court, have clear jurisdiction to decide the controversy and even if such decision is grossly erroneous, this court in its writ jurisdiction cannot interfere. 8. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.