ORDER In this application the petitioners, who are several in numbers, are the employees holding the post of Senior Assistants in the Unit of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. They were originally the employees of the Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. prior to its natinalisation and taking over by the Government of this insurance business. The petitioners complain in this application under Article 226 if the Constitution that all Special Assistants should be categorized as Superintendents under the General Insurance (Rationalisation and Revision of Pay Scales and Other Conditions of Service of Supervisory. Clerical and Subordinate Staff) Scheme, 1974. The main grievance of the petitioners seems to be that there has been violation of Clause (5) of the said Scheme. The said Scheme, as amended, now provides as follows : " (5) Categorisation of employees : (1) The employees shall be categoriesd into the appropriate categories on the basis of their substantive positions and nature of work as on the 1st day of January, 1975 as specified in sub-paragraphs (2) to (4). (2) (a) Superintendents : Subject to sub-paragraph (4) the following shall be eligible to be considered as Superintendents, namely : (i) All those designed as Superintendents, Section Heads, Assistant Superintendents, Staff Assistants, Head Clerk’s or Supervisor and working in a supervisory capacity ; (ii) (iii) all those employees with specific scales or qualifications specially recruited in a position equivalent to one of those mentioned in sub-clause (1) or sub-clause (ii)." Therefore, in order to be designated as Superintendents, which the petitioners claim, the petitioners must, in the facts and circumstances be working either as Superintendents, Section Heads, Assistant Superintendents, Staff Assistants. Head Clerks or Supervisors and must be working in the supervisory capacity. The petitioners contend that the petitioners nature of work were in the nature of supervisory work and therefore they were working in the supervisory capacities. This position is factually disputed by the respondents. For the purpose of this application, it is not necessary for me to go into this question. It is necessary to consider whether the petitioners had been designated is Superintendents, Section Heads, Assistant Superintendents, Staff Assistants, Head Clerks or Supervisors. None of the petitioners, it is the admitted case, were designated as such on the relevant date. For the purpose of this application, it is not necessary for me to go into this question. It is necessary to consider whether the petitioners had been designated is Superintendents, Section Heads, Assistant Superintendents, Staff Assistants, Head Clerks or Supervisors. None of the petitioners, it is the admitted case, were designated as such on the relevant date. Therefore, whether, they did work in the supervisory capacities or not is, in my opinion, is sufficient to defeat the claim of the petitioners agitated in this case. The petitioners have further contended that three was a modification of this Scheme and the modification was not placed for the assent of the President. This allegation has been made in paragraphs 17 & 18 of the petition and it is not necessary for me to go into this aspect of modification. 2. It was then contended that there was a discrimination. It is difficult to appreciate this allegation of discrimination in the scheme because certain categories of workmen, who were given certain designations and had been performing certain types of work were given this right. On behalf of the respondents it was urged that the petitioners were not performing the work of the supervisory functions. As I have mentioned before, it is not necessary, in the view I have taken to go into this aspect of the matter. 3. It is secondly urged that all the necessary parties were not before this Court, whose rights would be affected, if the petitioners grievances were accepted. On the other hand, on behalf of the petitioners, it was submitted that the petitioners were not agitating against any particular employees or were asking for a placement above any particular employee. Therefore, there was no question of not joining all the necessary parties. On the other hand, on behalf of the petitioners, it was submitted that the petitioners were not agitating against any particular employees or were asking for a placement above any particular employee. Therefore, there was no question of not joining all the necessary parties. In this connection reliance was placed on certain observations of the Supreme Court in the case of G.M.S.C. Railway v. A.V.R. Siddhanta, AIR 1974 SC 1755 where the Supreme Court observed that where a validity of policy decisions of the Railway Board Regulation seniority of the railway staff was challenged on the ground of there being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the relief was claimed only against the railway, it was sufficient if the railways had been made parties and non joinder of the employees likely to be affected by the decision in the case was not fatal to the writ petition. But the learned Advocate for the respondents pointed out that unless the strength of the cadre of the Superintendents was increased, it was not possible to designate all the petitioners as Superintendents without affecting others. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to go into this aspect of the question in the absence of the parties who would be affected. In the view I have taken on the first aspect of the matter, it is not necessary for me to rest my decision on this question. 4. It was, then, contended on behalf of the petitioners (respondents ?) that no writ lay against the respondents. But the petitioners relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Sukdev Singh v. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1342 where the Supreme Court, on construing the expression "authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution had held that the Oil & Natural Gas Commission Insurance and Industrial Finance Corporation were the authorities with in the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. It was also urged that where a private company was obliged to perform certain statutory functions. reliefs under Article 226 were available against such company and in this connection reliance was placed on certain observations of Mr. It was also urged that where a private company was obliged to perform certain statutory functions. reliefs under Article 226 were available against such company and in this connection reliance was placed on certain observations of Mr. Justice D. Basu in the case of A.B Biswas v. Hindustan Cables, 72 CWN 410 where His Lordship observed that standing orders had the force of law A private party or a company might be compelled by mandamus to perform the duties imposed upon it by statutes. Where an Act was a self contained code and itself provided for adequate remedy for 3 particular situation that remedy bad to be resorted to before making a writ application With great respect. if the occasion arises, I cannot accept this view Today the Statute imposes many obligations on the Individuals. If the position is that imposition of obligation by the statute. on private individuals or private companies would make them amenable to writ jurisdiction then violation of a Municipal Act by a private individual would make him liable to open to the writ jurisdiction. But it is not necessary for me to dissent from this view as I find that this view is now concluded by the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamil & anr. v. lakshmi Narain & Ors, Air 1976 SC 888 where Fazal Ali, J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed, inter alia, as follows : “It is therefore, clear that there is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the stature and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words, the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe very existence to a statute which would be the fountain head of his powers“ It is only in respect of these bodies that a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie and would come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution. This aspect was exhaustively examined by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of M.L. Nohria, Branch Manager National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. The General Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. in CWP No. 3389 of 1978 judgment delivered on 26th February, 1979 (unreported). This aspect was exhaustively examined by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of M.L. Nohria, Branch Manager National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. The General Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. in CWP No. 3389 of 1978 judgment delivered on 26th February, 1979 (unreported). Had it been necessary for use of rest my decision on this aspect of the matter, I have taken in the first aspect of the matter, it is not really necessary for me to rest my decision on this aspect of the matter. 5. For the aforesaid reasons, this application must fail and is accordingly dismissed. The Rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Stay asked for is refused. Application dismissed.