P. D. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a company incorporated in the year 1958 under the provisions of the Companies Act 1956 After setting up its plant the petitioner company went into production in December 1962. By 1972 it had about 2000 employees on its pay-roll. At the material time the respondent was employed in the textile department of the rayon division of the petitioner Company on a monthly salary of Rs. 225. 00. ( 2 ) THE case of the petitioner Company is that during the initial years after commencement of production it made no profit; and that therefore no demand for bonus was made by the workmen for the first few years. During the account years 1963-64 to 1966-67 no profit having been made the petitioner Company was not even otherwise liable to pay bonus to its employees in view of the relevant provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act 1965 (hereafter referred to as The Bonus Act ). The question of bonus was for the first time raised by Baroda Rayon Mazdoor Union for the year 1967. By that time the Bonus Act had come into force. in the course of negotiations it was brought to the notice of the Union that in view of section 16 of the Bonus Act no bonus was payable to the workmen since no profit was earned for the 12 months period ending with December 1967 The Union however pressed for payment of ex-gratia bonus and in the interest of continued cordial relations the petitioner Company agreed to make ex-gratia payment of bonus as a goodwill gesture. The petitioner and the Union therefore entered into a settlement on February 14 1968 and under the said settlement the petitioner agreed to pay ex-gratia bonus at the rate of 4 per cent of the total wages (inclusive of dearness allowance but exclusive of other allowances overtime perquisites and ex gratia payments) for the period commencing from January 1 1967 and ending with December 31 1967 to those workmen who satisfied the conditions laid down in the settlement. The settlement in terms provided that the question of bonus for future years would be considered as and when admissible strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Bonus Act. ( 3 ) ON February 9 1977 the respondent preferred an application under sec. The settlement in terms provided that the question of bonus for future years would be considered as and when admissible strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Bonus Act. ( 3 ) ON February 9 1977 the respondent preferred an application under sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereafter referred to as the Act) in the Court of the Presiding Officer Labour Court Ahmedabad seeking to recover a sum of Rs. 350/per year or such other sum which may be determined by the Labour Court as bonus for the years 1964 1965 and 1966-67 and praying that a certificate be issued for the recovery of the said amount from the petitioner. The substance of the application was that the provisions of the Bonus Act were applicable to the establishment of the petitioner and that therefore the workmen including the respondent employed by the petitioner company were entitled to payment of bonus. In terms the plea was that the petitioner having made huge profit during the relevant period the respondent was entitled to the minimum bonus at the rate of 4 per cent under the provisions of the Bonus Act. The said recovery application was resisted by the petitioner by its written statement dated April 26 1977 In the forefront the petitioner raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the respondents application under sec. 33c (2) of the Act and to grant relief to him as prayed. The petitioner relied upon the provisions of sec. 22 of the Bonus Act and contended that the question whether the respondent was entitled to claim bonus depended upon the determination of a further question viz whether the petitioner was entitled to infancy benefit under sec. 16 of the Bonus Act and that by virtue of the provisions of sec. 22 of the Bonus Act a dispute of such a nature would be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act and that therefore an application under sec. 33c (2) was not maintainable. Certain other preliminary objections as well as contentions on merits were also raised in the course of the said written statement. The Recovery Application came to be transferred to the Presiding Officer Labour Court Surat upon the establishment of the said Court. 33c (2) was not maintainable. Certain other preliminary objections as well as contentions on merits were also raised in the course of the said written statement. The Recovery Application came to be transferred to the Presiding Officer Labour Court Surat upon the establishment of the said Court. The Labour Court tried the aforesaid preliminary objection raised on behalf of the petitioner as a preliminary issue. At the hearing of the said preliminary issue written arguments were submitted on behalf of the petitioner on October 18 1977 Upon a perusal of the written arguments it appears that the petitioner buttressed its preliminary objection also on the ground that a proceeding under sec. 33 of the Act could be instituted only when there is an existing right to an amount or to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and that since the question whether the respondent was entitled to claim bonus for the period in question was seriously in dispute in view of the provisions of sec. 16 of the Bonus Act and such a dispute could only be resolved in the course of an industrial adjudication an application under sec. 33c (2) of the Act was not maintainable. By its impugned decision rendered on November 17 1977 the Labour Court rejected the preliminary objection and held that it had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the individual claim for bonus raised by the respondent notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 22 of the Bonus Act. Hence the present writ petition. ( 4 ) AT the hearing of the petition two contentions broadly speaking were advanced on behalf of the petitioner. First sec. 22 of the Bonus Act enacts that any dispute arising between an employer and the employees with respect to the bonus payable under the Bonus Act shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act and that since in the instant case the petitioners contention is that having regard to the provisions of sec. 16 of the Bonus Act the respondent is not entitled to any bonus for the period in question the dispute could only be resolved by an industrial adjudication under sec. 10 and not in a proceeding under sec. 33 of the Act. 16 of the Bonus Act the respondent is not entitled to any bonus for the period in question the dispute could only be resolved by an industrial adjudication under sec. 10 and not in a proceeding under sec. 33 of the Act. Second having regard to the fact that the very existence of the alleged right of the respondent to claim bonus for the period in question was seriously in dispute in view of the provisions of sec. 16 of the Bonus Act such a dispute affecting a large number of workman employed by the petitioner could only have been resolved by an industrial adjudication and that the question if any of computation of bonus in individual cases would arise only if and when such adjudication results in favour of the workmen; and that therefore an application under sec. 33c (2) of the Act was even otherwise not maintainable and that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to grant any relief to the respondent in such a proceeding. ( 5 ) THE contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner raise interesting questions of law. We have heard both the sides on the two contentions set out above. Having given our anxious consideration to the matter we are of the view however that for the purposes of the present case it is not necessary to express any opinion on the first contention which does not appear to be capable of a straight answer in view of certain observations made in SANGHVI JEEVRAJ V. M. C. G. and K M. W. UNION A. I. R. 1969 SUPREME COURT 530 on the competing scope and ambit of secs. 22 and 39 of the Bonus Act. The present case in our opinion can be conveniently disposed of in favour of the petitioner even on the strength of the second point raised on its behalf without deciding the true scope and ambit of sec. 22 of the Bonus Act. ( 6 ) BEFORE we proceed to deal with the rival contentions one aspect needs to be clarified. The present case in our opinion can be conveniently disposed of in favour of the petitioner even on the strength of the second point raised on its behalf without deciding the true scope and ambit of sec. 22 of the Bonus Act. ( 6 ) BEFORE we proceed to deal with the rival contentions one aspect needs to be clarified. Although in the recovery application made by the respondent there is a specific averment that he was entitled to minimum bonus at the rate of 4 per cent under the provisions of the Bonus Act for the period in question there are certain other and further averments which are capable of giving an impression that a claim to more than the minimum bonus was laid on behalf of the respondent. At the hearing of this writ petition however it was specifically conceded on behalf of the respondent that in the instant proceeding the claim was confined to the minimum bonus only. As a result of this clarification made on behalf of the respondent the entire controversy between the parties lies in a narrow compass. The only question which falls for consideration is whether claim to minimum bonus under sec. 10 of the Bonus Act advanced by an individual employee who is a workman within the meaning of the Act can be said to be founded on an existing right which merely requires to be worked out by process of computation in a proceeding under sec. 33c (2) of the Act even when the question of exemption under sec. 16 of the Bonus Act will require to be considered before granting a relief or whether in schu a situation an industrial dispute affecting a large number of workmen arises which requires to be adjudicated upon under sec. 10 of the Act and consequently the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under sec. 33c (2) of the Act is ousted ? ( 7 ) REFERENCE may now be made to a few of the relevant provisions of the Act. Those provisions are too familiar; and we would not reproduce all of them. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is an industry and that the respondent is a workman within the meaning of the Act; and it is therefore not necessary to refer to the definitions of those terms occurring in sec. 2 of the Act. Those provisions are too familiar; and we would not reproduce all of them. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is an industry and that the respondent is a workman within the meaning of the Act; and it is therefore not necessary to refer to the definitions of those terms occurring in sec. 2 of the Act. An industrial dispute is defined in sec. 2 (k) to mean any dispute or difference inter alia between employers and workmen which is connected with (a) the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or (b) the conditions of labour of any person. The definition is very wide taking in as it does any dispute or difference connected with the employment terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person. The dispute between an employer and workmen on the question of bonus would ordinarily be an industrial dispute. Indeed there is high authority for the proposition that a dispute on a general question such as bonus would be an industrial dispute. In D. N. BANERJI V. P. R. MUKHERJEE A. I. R. 1953 SUPREME COURT 58 it was observed as follows in paragraph 13:-"the words industrial dispute convey the meaning to the ordinary mind that the dispute must be such as would affect large groups of workman and employers ranged on opposite sides on some general questions on which each group is bound together. by a community of interests such as wages bonuses allowances pensions provident fund number of working hours per week holidays and so on. "sec. 10 of the Act provides for a reference of industrial disputes to Boards Courts or Tribunals; and the power in that behalf is conferred on the appropriate Government. Under sec. 10 (1) (d) a dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second or Third Schedule is required to be referred to a Tribunal for adjudication. Bonus is listed at item No. (5) of the Third Schedule. The dispute relating to bonus including minimum bonus can therefore appropriately form the subject matter of a reference under sec. 10 of the Act. Many disputes on bonus have come to be referred to the Industrial Tribunals in the past. Bonus is listed at item No. (5) of the Third Schedule. The dispute relating to bonus including minimum bonus can therefore appropriately form the subject matter of a reference under sec. 10 of the Act. Many disputes on bonus have come to be referred to the Industrial Tribunals in the past. Indeed the whole law on the question of bonus was developed prior to the enactment of the Bonus Act in the course of adjudication before the Industrial Tribunals. Even after the enactment of the Bonus Act disputes on the question of bonus have continued to be referred to the Industrial Tribunals in matters governed by the Act and those de hors the Act. In matters governed by the Act reference appears to have been made either by virtue of the provisions contained under sec. 22 or sec. 39 of the Bonus Act. Next is sec. 33 which has two sub-sections. We are herein concerned with sec. 33c (2) which in substance provides that where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed then the question may be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified by the appropriate Government. On the question of the true interpretation of this sub-section there has been a catena of decisions. Before we turn to those decisions however we must refer to the relevant provisions of the Bonus Act as it stood at the relevant time. ( 8 ) THE preamble of the Bonus Act stated that it was enacted to provide for the payment of bonus to persons employed in certain establishments and for matters connected therewith. Sub sec. (4) of sec. 1 provided that the Bonus Act shall have the effect in respect of the accounting year commencing on any day in the year 1904 and every subsequent year. Secs. 8 and 9 dealt with the eligibility for bonus and disqualification for claiming bonus respectively. Sec. 10 provided for the payment of minimum bonus and it read as under:"10. Payment of minimum bonus:- Subject to the provisions of secs. Secs. 8 and 9 dealt with the eligibility for bonus and disqualification for claiming bonus respectively. Sec. 10 provided for the payment of minimum bonus and it read as under:"10. Payment of minimum bonus:- Subject to the provisions of secs. 8 and 13 every employer shall be bound to pay to every employee in an accounting year a minimum bonus which shall be four per cent of the salary or wage earned by the employee during the accounting year or forty rupees whichever is higher whether there are profits in the account year or not. PROVIDED that where such employee has not completed fifteen years of age at the beginning of the accounting year the provisions of this section shall have effect in relation to such employee as if for the words forty rupees the words twentyfive rupees were substituted. "sec. 11 which has since been omitted dealt with payment of maximum bonus. Secs. 12 and 13 dealt with calculation of bonus with respect to certain employees and proportionate reduction in bonus in certain cases. Sec. 16 made special provisions with respect to certain establishments; and the material part thereof read as under:"16. Special provisions with respect to certain establishments:- (1) Where an establishment is newly set up. whether before or after the commencement of this Act the employees of such establishment shall be entitled to be paid bonus under this Act only; (a) from the accounting year in which the employer derives profit from such establishment:- or (B) from the sixth accounting year following the accounting year in which the employer sells the goods produced or manufactured by him or renders services as the case may be from such establishment whichever is earlier;provided that in the case of any such establishment the employees thereof shall not save as otherwise provided in sec. 3 be entitled to be paid bonus under this Act in respect of any accounting year prior to the accounting year commencing on any day in the year 1964. Explanation I: -. . . . . . . . . . . 3 be entitled to be paid bonus under this Act in respect of any accounting year prior to the accounting year commencing on any day in the year 1964. Explanation I: -. . . . . . . . . . . Explanation II:- For the purpose of clause (a) an employer shall not be deemed to have derived profit in any accounting year unless: (A) he has made provisions for that years depreciation to which he is entitled under the Income-tax Act or as the case may be under the agricultural income tax law; and (B) the arrears of such depreciation and losses incurred by him in respect of the establishment for the previous accounting years have been fully set-off against his profits. Explanation III : -. . . . . . (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Provided that. . . . . . . . . " sec. 18 dealt with deduction of certain amounts from bonus payable under the Act. Sec. 21 provided:"when any money is due to an employee by way of bonus from his employer under a settlement or on award or agreement the employee himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf or in the case of the death of the employee his assignee or heirs may without prejudice to any other mode of recovery make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him and if the appropriate Government or such authority as the appropriate Government may specify in this behalf is satisfied that any money is so due it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrears of land revenue:"we are not concerned with the other parts of the said section. Sec. 22 dealt with reference of disputes under the Act. It read as under:-"22. Sec. 22 dealt with reference of disputes under the Act. It read as under:-"22. Reference of disputes under the Act:- Where any dispute arises between an employer and his employees with respect to the bonus payable under this act or with respect to the application of this Act to an establishment in public sector then such dispute shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (14 of 1947) or of any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in a State and the provisions of the Act or as the case may be such law shall save as otherwise expressly provided apply accordingly. "under sec. 23 there was a presumption about accuracy of balance sheet and profit and loss account of corporations and companies when any dispute of the nature specified in sec. 22 has been referred to any arbitrator or tribunal under the Act or under any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in a State. Sec. 32 excluded from the application of the provisions of the Bonus Act certain categories of employees and certain establishments specified therein. Sec. 34 provided for the over riding effect of the provisions of Bonus Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the terms of any award agreement settlement or contract of service made before the 29th May 1965 Sec. 36 empowered an appropriate Government having regard to the financial position and other relevant circumstances of any establishment or class of establishments if it is of opinion that it would not be in public interest to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act thereto to exempt for such period as may be specified by it such establishment or class of establishments from all or any of the provisions of the Act. Sec. 39 provided as follows:-"39. Application or certain laws not barred:- Save as otherwise expressly provided the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (14 of 1947) or any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in a State. " ( 9 ) BEFORE proceeding further it would be advantageous to closely analyse the provisions of secs. " ( 9 ) BEFORE proceeding further it would be advantageous to closely analyse the provisions of secs. 10 and 16 of the Bonus Act and their interaction. Sec. 10 opens with the words Subject to the provisions of secs. 8 and 13; and it would therefore prima facie give an impression that once the conditions laid down in the said section and the requirements of secs. 8 and 13 are satisfied the employees would be entitled as of right to get a minimum bonus. In other words on a cursory reading of sec. 10 an impression might be left that sec. 16 is not relevant or material for the purpose of considering the applicability of sec. 10. On this question however there is an authoritative pronouncement in WORKMEN H. M. T. V. PRESIDING OFFICER N. T. CAL A I. R. 1973 SUPREME COURT 2300 It was there held that though sec. 10 has not been made subject to sec. 16 the two provisions will have to be read harmoniously so as to give effect to the purpose of the Act. The Supreme Court further observed :"sec. 16 in our opinion has to be read as an exception to sec. 10. . Sec. 16 (1) gives a total exemption to the establishments in the circumstances. mentioned therein from payment of bonus which includes minimum bonus also. . According to us if sec. 16 (1) applies however hard the result may be sec. 10 will not entitle an employee to get even the minimum bonus under sec. 10. "this decision clinches the issue that there is nothing like an absolute or unfettered right to minimum bonus under sec. 10 and that the grant of minimum bonus is subject inter alia to the exemption granted to certain establishments under sec. 16 (1 ). In a case where sec. 16 (1) is attracted therefore the employees are not entitled to minimum bonus; indeed the very right to minimum bonus is non existent in such a case. ( 10 ) AGAINST this background we might next turn to sec. 16 (1) for a close scrutiny. 16 (1 ). In a case where sec. 16 (1) is attracted therefore the employees are not entitled to minimum bonus; indeed the very right to minimum bonus is non existent in such a case. ( 10 ) AGAINST this background we might next turn to sec. 16 (1) for a close scrutiny. It is clear on a plain reading of the material part of this section that where an establishment is newly set up the workmen employed in such establishment are entitled to be paid bonus under the Bonus Act only (a) from the accounting year in which the employer derives profit from such establishment or (b) from the sixth accounting year following the accounting year in which the employer sells goods produced or manufactured by him or renders service as the case may be from such establishment whichever is earlier. We are herein concerned with clause (a) referred to above; and it would be profitable to concentrate our attention on the same. Explanation II to sec. 16 (1) enacts a fiction for the purpose of clause (a); and accordingly an employer shall not be deemed to have derived profit in any accounting year unless (a) he has made provisions for that years depreciation to which he is entitled under the Income-tax Act or the agricultural income-tax law and (b) the arrears of such depreciation and losses incurred by him in respect of the establishment for the previous accounting years have been fully set-off against his profits. The fiction enacted in Explanation II provides as it were a special meaning to the word profit which has not to be construed for the purposes of sec. 16 (1) according to its ordinary commercial sense that is to say profit earned during the accounting period after deducting inter alia depreciation computed according to one of the several recognised methods. The Explanation embodies a clear legislative mandate that while determining for the purpose of sec. 16 (1) (a) whether the employer has earned profit From the establishment in any accounting year deductions have to be made under the abovementioned two heads. It is only if any profit remains after providing for that years depreciation under the or agricultural income-tax law and after fully setting off arrears of such depreciation and losses incurred in the previous accounting years that the employer can he said to have derived profit for the purpose of sec. It is only if any profit remains after providing for that years depreciation under the or agricultural income-tax law and after fully setting off arrears of such depreciation and losses incurred in the previous accounting years that the employer can he said to have derived profit for the purpose of sec. 16 (1) (a ). The determination of the question therefore whether an employer has derived profit from his newly set up establishment in any accounting year will require investigation into several questions. Some of the matters which will require investigation are:- (1) whether provision for that years depreciation has been made in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act or the agricultural incometax law as the case may be (2) whether depreciation was provided on the same basis for the previous accounting years and whether arrears if any of such depreciation were carried forward from year to year upto the accounting year in questions (3) whether such arrears were fully set off against the profits of the accounting year in question and (4) whether losses incurred in the previous accounting years were similarly fully setoff against the profits. It would thus appear that in determining whether the employer derived any profit in the accounting year in question the figures given in the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the employer would not be necessarily determinative. In a given case if the profit is ascertained and shown in the balancesheet and profit and loss account after deducting depreciation say by following the straightline method of calculating depreciation the profit shown accordingly in the record of the employer would not be determinative. (See CENTRAL COAL WASBERY V. WORKMEN A. I R. 1978 S C. 1424 ). If the same method is followed even while adjusting depreciation allowances during the previous accounting years and the profits or losses have been ascertained on that basis that would also not be conclusive. An exercise will have to be undertaken afresh to determine profit after computing depreciation allowances in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act or the agricultural income-tax law. But this is not all. Even though under see. An exercise will have to be undertaken afresh to determine profit after computing depreciation allowances in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act or the agricultural income-tax law. But this is not all. Even though under see. 23 of the Bonus Act there is a presumption as to the correctness s of the statements and particulars contained in the balance-sheets and (profit and loss account of a company if they had been properly audited by a qualified auditor it would still have to he seen if dispute arises whether for example an item of expenditure was correctly shown as expenditure. As held in WORKMEN W. J and CO. V. W. J. and CO. A. I. R 1971 SUPREME COURT 1821 the presumption under sec. 23 is confined to the accuracy of the statements and particulars contained in the balance sheet and the profit and loss account. However if any item in the accounts is wrongly shown as expenditure when on the face of it it is not so the Court is not bound to hold that the method adopted in preparing the accounts is correct simply because the auditors raised no objection. If this is the true legal position qua the amount which has actually gone out of the funds of the Company and debited as expenditure in its books of account it cannot possibly be disputed that when the genuineness of the entries in the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the Company is disputed the Court will be entitled to entertain and decide such a dispute. The determination of such a dispute would in its turn have effect on the ascertainment of the true profit or loss as the case may be earned or incurred in an accounting year and ultimately on the decision of the question as to whether the exemption contained in sec. 16 (1) (a) is or is not attracted. Surely all this does not involve mere computation that is to say calculation estimation or accounting In case of a dispute the Court in exercise of its judicial power will have to determine these questions after affording to the parties affected an opportunity of being heard and in certain cases it might even require evidence to be recorded and submitted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. It is only after a hearing is accordingly afforded in respect of the matters in issue that the respective contention of the parties can possibly be decided; and more particularly the central question whether the employer who has a newly set up establishment is entitled to exemption under sec. 16 of the Bonus Act can appropriately be determined. This is the true scope and ambit of sec. 16 (11 (a) read with Explanation II. ( 11 ) WE may now revert to sec. 33c of the Act. This section has been the subject matter of a host of decisions; and yet in every arguable case which has come up before the Court its scope and ambit is required to be considered. ( 12 ) THE leading decision on the true ambit and scope of sec. 33c is CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA V. RAJAGOPALAN A. I. R. 1964 SUPREME COURT 743. It was there observed that in construing sec. 33c (2) two relevant considerations have to be borne in mind. First the construction should not be so broad as to bring within the scope of sec. 32c cases which would fall under sec. 10 (1) of the Act and secondly having regard to the fact that the policy of the Legislature in enacting sec. 33c is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute his existing right it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workmen. Therefore whenever an industrial dispute arises between the employees acting collectively and their employer such a dispute must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act as for instance by reference under sec. 10 (1) of the Act. If however it is merely a question of enforcement or execution of an existing right of an individual worman the remedy under sec. 33c should not be denied to him. Proceeding further it was observed in that case that so far as sec. 33c (2) is concerned it is not merely confined to cases where the right claimed by the workmen is admitted. It is clear that if the workmans right to receive the benefit claimed by him is disputed such a dispute might have to be determined by the Labour Court. 33c (2) is concerned it is not merely confined to cases where the right claimed by the workmen is admitted. It is clear that if the workmans right to receive the benefit claimed by him is disputed such a dispute might have to be determined by the Labour Court. The precise observations of the Supreme Court in this connection are as follows:"the claim under sec. 33c (2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may in some cases have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must he held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-sec. (2 ). "as regards the true nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Labour Court under sec. 33c (2) it was held:-". . . IT is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is of course true that the executing court cannot go behind the decree nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limita -. tions apply also to the Labour court; but like the executing court the labour court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman basis his claim under sec. 33c (2 ). Therefore we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under sec. 33c (2) it would in appropriate cases be open to the Labour court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workmans right rests. "proceeding further it was pointed out that the claims not based on settlements awards or made under the provisions of Chapter VA may also be competent under sec. 33c (2) and that may illustrate its wider scope. Therefore the scope of sec. 33c (2) is wider than sec. 33c (1) and cannot be wholly assimilated with it. ( 13 ) IN BOMBAY GAS CO. V. GOPAL BHIVA A. I. R. 1964 SUPREME COURT 752 it was again emphasised that the proceedings contemplated by sec. 33c (2) and that may illustrate its wider scope. Therefore the scope of sec. 33c (2) is wider than sec. 33c (1) and cannot be wholly assimilated with it. ( 13 ) IN BOMBAY GAS CO. V. GOPAL BHIVA A. I. R. 1964 SUPREME COURT 752 it was again emphasised that the proceedings contemplated by sec. 33c (2) are in many cases analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court which is called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by an industrial employee is in such cases in the position of an executing Court; like the executing court in execution proceedings governed by the Court of Civil Procedure the Labour Court under sec. 33c (2) would be competent to interpret the award on which the claim is based and it would also be open to it to consider the plea that the award sought to be enforced is a nullity. In other words the Labour Court would be justified in refusing to implement an award if it was satisfied that the direction in the award on which the applicants claim is based is without jurisdiction. ( 14 ) IN EAST INDIA COAL CO. V. RAMESHWAR A. I. R. 1968 SUPREME COURT 218 the workmen of the appellant Company claimed bonus under the scheme framed by the Central Government under the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act 1948 and railway fares and leave wages under the award of the Industrial Tribunal which had come into effect. The said claim was allowed by the Labour Court in a proceeding under sec. 33c (2) of the Act. Two contentions inter alia before the Supreme Court were (1) that sec. 33c (2) contemplates recovery of money benefit under an award settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act only and not under any other statute or scheme framed thereunder and (2) that the proceedings under sec. 33c (2) being in the nature of execution proceedings substantial questions between an employer and his employee cannot be adjudicated by the Labour Court under the said section. 33c (2) being in the nature of execution proceedings substantial questions between an employer and his employee cannot be adjudicated by the Labour Court under the said section. The Supreme Court rejected both these contentions holding that (a) the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one that is to say already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer (b) the scope of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 33c is wider than that of sub-sec. (1) and the former is not confined to cases arising under an award settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A and (c) there is no reason therefore to take the view that a benefit provided by a Statute or a Scheme made thereunder being an existing right without there being anything contrary under such Statute or sec. 33c (2) cannot fall within sub-sec. (2 ). ( 15 ) IN NAMOR ALI V. THE CENTRAL INLAND WATER TRANSPORT CORPORATION LTD. A. I R. 1978 S. C. 275 the provisions of sec. 33c (2) again fell for consideration. It was there pointed out that there are two parts of the sub-section as it exists after its amendment by Act 36 of 1964. The first part is concerned with the money claim simpliciter and the second part speaks about computation in terms of money of any benefit to which the workman is entitled. As regards first E8art of the sub-section it was observed:"the expression if any question arises as to the amount of money due embraces within its ambit any one or more of the following kinds of disputes: (1) Whether there is any settlement or award as alleged ? (2) Whether any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money at all under any settlement or an award etc. ? (3) If so what will be the rate or quantum of such amount ? (4) Whether the amount claimed is due or not ?a dispute as to all such questions or any of them would attract the provisions of sec. 33c (2) and make that remedy available to the work. men concerned. ( 16 ) IN PUNJAB BEVERAGES V. SURESH CHAND A. I. R. 1978 SUPREME COURT PAGE 995 it was reiterated that a proceeding under sec. 33c (2) and make that remedy available to the work. men concerned. ( 16 ) IN PUNJAB BEVERAGES V. SURESH CHAND A. I. R. 1978 SUPREME COURT PAGE 995 it was reiterated that a proceeding under sec. 33c (2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. Then follow the following pertinent observations:"but the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one that is to say already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman and his employer. . . . . . It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under sec. 33c (2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under sec. 10 of the Act. "the question in that case was whether an order of dismissal passed in contravention of sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act was void and inoperative so that the aggrieved workman would be entitled to maintain an application under sec. 33c (2) for determination and payment of the amount of wages due to him on the basis that he continued in service despite the order of dismissal. It was held that an order of discharge or dismissal passed in contravention of sec. 33 was not rendered void and inoperative. The Supreme Court further observed:-". . . IF that be so the only remedy available to the workman for challenging the order of discharge or dismissal is that provided under sec 33a apart of course from the remedy under sec. 10 and he cannot maintain an application under sec. 33c (2) for determination and payment of wages on the basis that he continues to be in service. The workman can proceed under sec. 33c (2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under sec. 33a or on a reference under sec. 10 and he cannot maintain an application under sec. 33c (2) for determination and payment of wages on the basis that he continues to be in service. The workman can proceed under sec. 33c (2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under sec. 33a or on a reference under sec. 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. " ( 17 ) IN NIZAMUDDIN V. NEW SHORROCK MILLS LTD 20 G. L. R. 290 a Full Bench of this Court considered the scope and ambit of sec. 33c in the light of various decisions of the Supreme Court. In the context of sec. 33 the Full Bench observed that so far as the workmen is concerned he must proceed on the footing of an existing right; the existing right may be under the terms of the settlement or an award or the right may have been provided for either by custom or by law or by agreement but there must be an existing right and so long as there is that existing right which is claimed by the workman he can apply to the Labour Court under sec. 33c (2) and the Labour Court will have jurisdiction to deal with the application on merits. The Full Bench further pointed out that sec. 10 of the Act was wide enough to cover all industrial disputes including those which would fall under sec. 33c (2 ). However sec. 33c (2) provides a speedier remedy for the recovery of the dues of a workman against his employer in certain specified type of cases and the basis is thai there must be an existing right. In terms it was observed:"sec. 33c (2) is obviously not meant for creation of any new rights or fresh rights. All that it deals with is an existing right which as we have observed above may arise because of an adjudication in an earlier proceeding or which has been provided for either by custom or by law or by agreement. "the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Indias case (supra) was held to provide an illustration of the dispute which would legitimately fall within sec. "the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Indias case (supra) was held to provide an illustration of the dispute which would legitimately fall within sec. 33c 2 It was held that once the workman concerned bases his claim on an existing right e. g. on an adjudication the question whether the workman falls within the award or the adjudication is a matter which can be dealt with and should be dealt with by the Labour Court under sec. 33c (2 ). The Full Bench emphasised that so long as there is no dispute on the showing of the workman on the workmans application under sec. 33c (2) that the relationship of employer and employee has not ceased to exist and the claim which the workman puts forward in his application under sec. 33c (2) is based on an existing right the application under sec. 33c (2) is maintainable. Therefore once the workman s case as disclosed in his application to the Labour Court shows that the existence of the relationship of employer and employee is not put in dispute by the workman himself and that claim rests on the basis of an existing relationship of employer and employee and on the basis of existing right which may arise out of an adjudication or which may be provided for by custom or law or agreement the application under sec. 33c (2) is maintainable. The fact that the employer by his plea raises some dispute does not mean that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to deal with the question is taken away. ( 18 ) WE now come to the crux of the matter or the crust of the problem. Against the background of the aforesaid statutory provisions and the decided cases can the claim to minimum bonus by an individual employee who is admittedly a workman within the meaning of the Act be said to have been founded on an existing right which merely requires to be worked out by the process of computation in a proceeding under sec. 33c (2) of the Act even when the question of exemption under sec. 16 of the Bonus Act is inevitably involved in considering whether or not to grant the relief ? 33c (2) of the Act even when the question of exemption under sec. 16 of the Bonus Act is inevitably involved in considering whether or not to grant the relief ? ( 19 ) HAVING given our anxious consideration to the question it appears to us for reasons which follow that the question must inevitably and necessarily be answered in the negative. We are conscious of the fact that having regard to the policy of the Legislature in enacting sec. 33 it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of the said section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by the individual workmen. However in our considered judgment in a case which falls within the mischief of the question posed above the remedy under sec. 33c (2) would not be available broadly speaking for the reasons that; (i) when a workman claims money alleged due to him as minimum bonus under sec. 10 read with sec. 16 (1) of the Bonus Act from his employer whose establishment is newly set up he cannot be said to be asking merely for quantification or computation of bonus payable to him under an existing right or a right the existence of which can be enquired into as incidental to the main function of execution which has been assigned to the Labour Court under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 33c of the Act and (ii) a dispute of such nature involving as it does in substance and effect the employer on the one hand and the entire labour force having community of interest on the other would appropriately fall within the meaning of an industrial dispute to be adjudicated upon by the regular machinery provided under sec. 10 of the Act. ( 20 ) WHILE analysing the provisions of secs. 10 and 16 of the Bonus Act and considering the interaction of those two sections we have earlier pointed out that the law is well settled that both sections have to be read harmoniously so as to give effect to the purposes of the Act and that sec. 16 has to be read as an exception to sec. 10. Sec. 16 (1) gives a total exemption to the establishments in the circumstances therein mentioned from payment of bonus which includes maximum bonus also. 16 has to be read as an exception to sec. 10. Sec. 16 (1) gives a total exemption to the establishments in the circumstances therein mentioned from payment of bonus which includes maximum bonus also. It would be pertinent at this stage to once again extract and reproduce the relevant observations of the Supreme Court in Workmen H. M. T. s case (supra):"when the section says that an employee of the establishment referred to in sec. 16 shall be entitled to be paid bonus under this Act only if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied it is idle to contend that notwithstanding the exemption granted under sec. 16 the establishment referred to therein is still bound to pay a minimum bonus. . According to us if sec. 16 (1) applies however hard the result may be see. 10 will not entitle an employee to get even the minimum bonus under sec. 10. " (Emphasis supplied ). IT would thus appear that in all situations the right to claim minimum bonus cannot be said to be an existing right and that in cases to which sec. 16 (1) applies sec. 10 will confer no right on an employee to get even the minimum bonus. Since sec. 16 (1) gives a total exemption to a newly set up establishment until the conditions therein laid down are satisfied there is in the eyes of law no existing right to minimum bonus in a workman employed in such an establishment. If there is no existing right it cannot possibly be disputed having regard to the decisions referred to above that no remedy could be sought by such a workman in a proceeding under sec. 33c (2) of the Act. . ( 21 ) ON behalf of the respondent it was strenuously contended that the correct perspective in which the matter must he viewed is that sec. 10 entitles an individual workman including a workman employed in an establishment which is newly set up to a minimum bonus and that if the employer seeks to defeat such a right by pleading exemption say under sec. 10 entitles an individual workman including a workman employed in an establishment which is newly set up to a minimum bonus and that if the employer seeks to defeat such a right by pleading exemption say under sec. 16 (1) it would be open to him to plead such an exemption and for the Labour Court to determine the dispute arising out of such a plea since such a dispute arises out of the contention of the employer and it is incidental to the main function assigned to the labour Court under sec. 33c (2) of the Act. We are afraid the argument is over simplified and overlooks many relevant aspects. In the first place it is not permissible to view secs. 10 and 16 in isolation and to proceed on the footing that sec. 10 confers a right which has come into existence and which might be defeated if sec. 16 (1) is attracted. The provisions of a statute have to be read Ex visceribus actus and both secs. 10 and 16 will have to be read simultaneously and their provisions will have to be harmonised; and if that is done in cases where sec. 16 (1) is attracted there will be no right in an employee to get even the minimum bonus under sec. 10 of the Bonus Act. In the next place whenever a question as to payment of minimum bonus arises in a proceeding under sec. 33c (2) in the context of an establishment which is admittedly newly set up and which on the facts disclosed in the application under sec. 33 (2) itself as in the instant case brings into sharp focus the provisions of sec. 16 (1) (a) on account of the plea of the workman himself to the effect that the establishment having made profits in the relevant period he is entitled to minimum bonus the question as to jurisdiction cannot be decided on the basis that the dispute arises out of a plea raised by the employer. The germ of the dispute in such a case is to be found in the application under sec. 33c (2) itself; and it cannot therefore be said to arise only out of a plea if any claiming exemption under sec. 16 (1) raised by the employer. In the last place it cannot be successfully contended that an enquiry into the question of exemption under sec. 33c (2) itself; and it cannot therefore be said to arise only out of a plea if any claiming exemption under sec. 16 (1) raised by the employer. In the last place it cannot be successfully contended that an enquiry into the question of exemption under sec. 16 (1) is only incidental to the computation or quantification of the amount of minimum bonus which is the subject matter of the main determination under sec. 33c (2) of the Act. Indeed looked at from the correct angle the question of exemption is the main question; and not only is it the main question but it is also not one which is capable of resolution without proper and regular adjudication. While analysing the provisions of sec. 16 (1) we have pointed out above the various aspects of the case which will require to be considered and determined before deciding whether a newly set up establishment has earned profit during the particular period so as to attract the provisions of sec. 10. Those are not matters which involve mere question of interpretation of a statutory provision on which the claim to computation or calculation of minimum bonus is founded. They also involve substantial questions which can only be determined by proper adjudication in a competent from in the exercise of judicial powers during the course of which evidence might have to be submitted and scrutinised and decision reached whether the right to minimum bonus exists. The Labour Court exercising powers under sec. 33c (2) being in the position of an executing Court cannot legitimately perform such function for the question in substance and reality is not merely whether any amount of money is due as minimum bonus to the workman but whether there is any existing right at all to claim minimum bonus having regard to the combined operation of secs. 10 and 16 of the Bonus Act. In other words the question is not merely one as to what is the amount due on the basis of an existing right claimed under the Statute; the question really is whether there is any right at all to claim any amount under the Statute ? As pointed out in Central Bank of Indias case (supra) and Bombay Gas Companys case (supra) it might be open to the Labour Court under sec. As pointed out in Central Bank of Indias case (supra) and Bombay Gas Companys case (supra) it might be open to the Labour Court under sec. 33c (2) to interpret an award or settlement and for that matter even the statutory provisions upon which the right to claim the amount is founded. However in the context of secs. 10 and 16 (1) (a) while considering the question whether liability to pay minimum bonus arises at all what the Labour Court would be required to do is not merely to interpret the provisions of secs. 10 and 16 but to determine substantial and complex question requiring adjudication which cannot possibly be done by that Court whose only function is one of computation. ( 22 ) STRONG reliance however was placed on behalf of the respondents on the decision in East India Coal co. s case (supra); and it was urged that that decision concludes the question and that recovery of money payable as bonus can be made in a proceeding under sec. 33c (2) although substantial questions between the employer and employee might arise in the course of such proceeding. We are afraid the argument is advanced without appreciating the basic distinction between the two situation viz. one before the Supreme Court and the other before this Court and the relevant statutory provisions governing both the cases. The claim to bonus in East India Coal Co. s case was based upon a scheme framed under the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act 1948 The provisions of the said scheme are not before us nor are they elaborately discussed in the judgment. A mere look at the provisions of the said Act however makes it clear that the Central Government is thereunder authorised to frame a scheme for the purpose of payment of bonus to the workmen employed in the coal mines and that provision has to be made under the scheme for all or any of the matters specified in the Second Schedule (see sec. 5 ). When we turn to the Second Schedule it appears that the scheme to be framed under the said Act has to provide for the payment of bonus dependent on the attendance of an employee during any period. 5 ). When we turn to the Second Schedule it appears that the scheme to be framed under the said Act has to provide for the payment of bonus dependent on the attendance of an employee during any period. It would thus appear that bonus under such scheme would necessarily involve computation of the amount due as bonus to an individual workman on the basis of his attendance during any period. Besides the other matters to be provided for in the scheme such as eligibility rate and manner in which the bonus shall be calculated conditions debarring an employee from getting bonus in whole or in part time and manner of payment of bonus etc. indicate that the enquiry into a disputed claim of bonus under the scheme would necessarily be incidental to the main determination. The Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act 1948 did not certain at the relevant time any provision relating to exemption such as the one we have in secs. 16 and 36 of the Bonus Act; nor did it contain any provision similar to sec. 32 of the Bonus Act making provisions of the Act inapplicable to certain class of employees and establishments. The matters to be provided for under the Coal Mines Bonus Scheme as prescribed in the Second Schedule to the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act 1948 also do not indicate that any similar provision could have been made in the Scheme itself. It would thus appear that a claim to bonus based on the provisions of the Scheme under the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act 1948 could not possibly involve investigation into questions such as those with which the Labour Court might have to deal under sec. 33c (2) of the Act in the context of a claim under the Bonus Act. The instant case with which we are dealing itself is an illustration on the point. In our view therefore the decision in East India Coal Companys case (supra) cannot be treated as an authority for the proposition that a claim to minimum bonus under the circumstances such as those which exist in this case can be legitimately entertained and allowed in a proceeding under sec. 33c (2) of the Act. In our view therefore the decision in East India Coal Companys case (supra) cannot be treated as an authority for the proposition that a claim to minimum bonus under the circumstances such as those which exist in this case can be legitimately entertained and allowed in a proceeding under sec. 33c (2) of the Act. ( 23 ) WE wish to emphasise that in taking the view which we are taking herein we have been considerably influenced by the fact that in the history of our industrial jurisprudence a dispute on the question of entitlement to bonus has been treated as affecting a large number of workmen who are ranged against the employer and one which requires determination of certain general questions on which the workmen are bound together by a community of interest. Even after the enactment of the Bonus Act and even in the context of minimum bonus payable to employees in a newly setup establishment it appears to us that this essential characteristic of the dispute remains unchanged. Such a dispute cannot be resolved upon an application made by an individual workman in a proceeding under sec. 33 (2) and any decision arrived at in such a proceeding might more often than not hurt the entire body of workmen for an individual workman will not in the very nature of things have the capacity equipment and resources which a collective body of workmen would have to espouse the cause. We wish to make it clear at the same time however that our decision in this case is confined to and governs only such cases where a demand for minimum bonus has been raised by employees of a newly setup establishment which is prima facie entitled to the benefit of exemption under sec. 16 (1) (a) of the Bonus Act and dispute in respect of which has not been previously adjudicated upon in an appropriate forum. This decision should not be taken as an authority for the proposition that even in a case where a plea of exemption has been rejected in a regularly instituted adjudication proceeding no application made by an individual workman under sec. 33c (2) for computation and recovery of bonus consequent upon such adjudication would lie. ( 24 ) THE decision of the Labour Court proceeds entirely on the basis of sec. 22 of the Bonus Act. 33c (2) for computation and recovery of bonus consequent upon such adjudication would lie. ( 24 ) THE decision of the Labour Court proceeds entirely on the basis of sec. 22 of the Bonus Act. The Labour Court has not examined the aspect from the angle from which we have looked at it. It is therefore not necessary to deal with the reasoning contained in the order of the Labour Court or with the decisions cited in its order. ( 25 ) IN the result the writ petition suceeds; and it is allowed. We hold that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the instant application under sec. 33c (2) of the Act. Accordingly the impugned order of the Labour Court is quashed and set aside. Rule made absoute accordingly with no order as to costs. ( 26 ) ON behalf of the respondent an oral application was made for a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution of India. We are not inclined to grant the certificate because in our view though the case can be said to involve a substantial question of law of general importance the said question does not require to be decided by the Supreme Court in view of the fact that our decision on the question turns upon the legal principles which are well settled by several decisions of the Supreme Court. The oral request made on behalf of the respondent for certificate is therefore rejected. Petition allowed: Certificate of fitness refused. .