Indra & Company v. Comm. of Income-tax, Rajasthan, Jaipur
1979-07-02
C.M.LODHA, M.C.JAIN
body1979
DigiLaw.ai
C.M. LODHA, C.J.—These are two connected writ petitions which can be conveniently disposed of by a single order. The petitioner in both the cases is the same i.e. Messrs Indra & Company, a registered firm carrying on business in iron and steel: Writ Petition No. 791 of 1973 pertains to the assessment year 1962-63, whereas writ petition No. 1392 of 1973 is with respect to assessment year 1969-61. The Income-tax Officer imposed penalty on the petitioner for both the years for not filing the return within time. 2. We may take up the facts of writ petition No. 791 of 1973. The assessee did not file return of its income for the assessment year 1961-62 within the time specified in the notification under sec 22(1) of the Income-tax Act of 1922. A notice was accordingly served on it under sec. 22(2) on May 30, 1961. It should have filed the return by July 4, 1961, but it actually filed it on December 28, 1962 after a delay of more than 17 months. The assessment was completed on April 19, 1963 and a notice was issued to the assessee on the same day calling upon it to show cause why a penalty should not be levied under sec. 271(l)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Income-tax Officer was not satisfied that the assessee had any reasonable cause for not filing the return by July 4, 1961 and accordingly he levied penalty of Rs 12,336/-under sec. 271(1)(a)(i) of the Act of 1961, by his order dated April 8, 1964. The assessee appealed to the Assistant Appellate Commissioner, who dismissed the appeal. The assessee then filed an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, which reduced the penalty to Rs 5,000/-. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the assessee as well as the revenue get a reference made to this Court on certain questions of law. This Court by its order dated February 9, 1972, in Income-tax Reference No. 7 of 1969, held that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal could not have reduced the penalty below the minimum prescribed by sec. 271 (1) (a) (i) of the Act. In this view of the matter, the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was quashed. 3. Thereafter sub-sees. (4A) and (4B) were inserted in sec. 271 by the Income-tax Amendment Act, 1965 with effect from March 12, 1965. Consequently, the petitioner filed an application under sec.
271 (1) (a) (i) of the Act. In this view of the matter, the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was quashed. 3. Thereafter sub-sees. (4A) and (4B) were inserted in sec. 271 by the Income-tax Amendment Act, 1965 with effect from March 12, 1965. Consequently, the petitioner filed an application under sec. 271(4A)of the Act before the Commissioner of Income-tax, Rajasthan. Jaipur, praying that the amount of the penalty may be waived or suitably reduced However, the Commissioner by his order dated January 27/29, 1973 (Ex.1) refused to entertain the application on the ground that the penalty had been imposed prior to the coming into force of sec. 271 (4A) of the Act. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order Ex.1, the petitioner has filed this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying that the order Ex. 1 be quashed and the Commissioner of Income-tax be directed to entertain the the petitioners application under sec. 271 (4A) of the Act and dispose it of according to law. 5. We do not consider it necessary to narrate in detail the facts giving rise to petition No. 1392 of 1973 as the facts are almost the same except that the assessment year and the amount of penalty are different. 6. The short point involved in these cases is whether the Commissioner of Income-tax has no power to entertain a prayer for reduction of penalty imposed in respect of the period prior to coming into force of sub-sec. (4A) of sec. 271 of the Act, i.e., before March 12, 1965. Sub-sec. (4A) of sec 271 reads as under:— "(4A) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (i) or clause (iii) of sub-sec. (1) the Commissioner may, in his discration— (i) reduce or waive the amount of minimum penalty imposeable on a person under clause (6) of sub-sec. (1) for failure, without reasonable causes, to furnish the return of total income which such person was required to furnish under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 138, or (ii) reduced or waive the amount of minimum penalty impossible on a person under clause (iii) of sub-sec. (1), if he is satisfied that such person— (a) in the case referred to in clause (i) of this sub-section has, prior to the issue of notice to him under sub-sec. (2) of sec.
(1) of sec. 138, or (ii) reduced or waive the amount of minimum penalty impossible on a person under clause (iii) of sub-sec. (1), if he is satisfied that such person— (a) in the case referred to in clause (i) of this sub-section has, prior to the issue of notice to him under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 139, voluntarily and in good faith, made full disclosure of his income; and in the case referred to in clause (ii) of this sub-section has, prior to the detection by the Income-tax Officer, of the concealment of particulars of income in respect of which the penalty is impossible, or of the inaccuracy of particulars furnished in respect of such income, voluntarily and in good faith, made full and true disclosure of such particulars; (b) has co-operated in any enquiry relating to the assessment of such income; and (c) has either paid or made satisfactory arrangements for payment of any tax or interest payable in consequence of an order passed under this Act in respect of the relevant assessment year : Provided that if in a case the minimum penalty impossible under clause (i) or, as the case may be, clause (iii) of sub-sec. (1) in respect of the relevant assessment year, or where such disclosure relates to more than one assessment year, the aggregate of the minimum penalty impossible in respect of these years exceeds a sum of rupees fifty thousand, no order reducing or waiving the penalty shall be made by the Commissioner unless the previous approval of the Head has been obtained." 7. Even sub-sec. (4A) was omitted by the Taxation Law (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from October 1, 1975 and a new sec 273A, inserted by the Finance Act of 1976 with effect from June 1, 1976. We may also usefully reproduce the relevant position of sec. 273 A,— "273A. Power to reduce or waive penalty etc. in certain cases.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Commissioner may, in his discration, whether on his own motion or otherwise ; (i) reduce or waive the amount of penalty imposed or impossible on a person under clause (i) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 271 for failure, without reasonable cause, to furnish and return of total income which he was required to furnish under sec. (1) of sec.
(1) of sec. 271 for failure, without reasonable cause, to furnish and return of total income which he was required to furnish under sec. (1) of sec. 139; or (ii) reduce or waive the amount of penalty imposed or impossible on a person under clause (iii) of sub-sec. (1) of sec 271; or (iii) reduce or waive the amount of interest paid or payable under sub- sec. (2) of sec. 139 or sec. 215 or sec. 217 of the penalty imposed or imposs-ible under sec. 273; Xx Xx Xx Xx Xx" In the old sec. 27l(4A), the words used in this context were "penalty impossible" even then, it would not be correct to assume that the Commissioners power under sec. 271(4A) could be invoked by the assessee only before penalty was imposed upon him and not after any penalty was actually imposed. The words "reduce" in the section also gives clue that the Commissioner could not reduce the penalty which is likely to be imposed or which may not be imposed at all. Consequently, the word impossible" has to be given a wider import. In this view of the matter, under old sec 271(4A), the Commissioner had jurisdiction to grant relief in respect of penalty already imposed prior to insertion of s. 271(4A). 8. In Fairdeal Motors vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (1), it was observed that though sec. 271 (4A) came into force in 1965 after the close of the assessment year 1964-65, the section will still apply to assessment year 1964-65 because the amendment being a beneficial provision in a procedural law, will apply to the proceedings pending at the time the section came into force. 9. It is significant to point out that the Amending Act of 1976 has deeted the existing sub-secs. (4A) and (4B) of sec, 271 of the Act relating to the powers of the Commissioner to reduce or waive penalty in certain cases and re-enacted this provision with several modification in new sec. 273A. We are not concerned with other points of difference, but one of the main points of difference between sec. 271(4A) and new section 273A is that under the new section, the Commissioner will have powers to reduce or waive the penalty even after such penalty has been imposed of levied. The object of the Legislature in introducing sec.
273A. We are not concerned with other points of difference, but one of the main points of difference between sec. 271(4A) and new section 273A is that under the new section, the Commissioner will have powers to reduce or waive the penalty even after such penalty has been imposed of levied. The object of the Legislature in introducing sec. 273A clearly appears to be to give substantial concession to the assessee and, therefore it must be construed liberally in favour of the subject. It appears to us that whatever doubt may have been entertained prior to introduction of sec. 273A, the position now under sec. 273A is that the Commissioner has been empowered to waive or reduce the amount of penalty even for previous years. No period of limitation for making an application for waiver or reduction was prescribed under the old law nor there is any limitation for such an application under the new law. Such applications can be made also after confiscation of penalty order by the appellate authorities. Hence, we are of the opinion that the Commissioner of Income-tax has jurisdiction to entertain an application to waive or reduce the amount of penalty even in respect of years prior to introduction of sec. 273A. 10. Accordingly, we allow both the writ petitions, set aside the impugned order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax and hereby direct him to dispose of the application made by the assessee for reducing or waiving the amount of penalty, as the case may be, according to law. There will, however, be no order as to costs.