M. N. RAY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner No. 1, Shri Ganga Cold Storage Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the said Company), is a public limited Company and registered under the Companies Act, 1956, the petitioner No. 2 is one of the Directors of the said Company and the petitioner No. 3 is its Secretary. They moved and obtained the Rule, in which the concerned application for further directions dated 31. 5. 79 and the prayer for renewal of appropriate interim orders, is being made, pursuant to the liberty as granted on 2. 5. 79, against the purported inaction of the police authorities to render to them necessary help and assistance, in due discharge of their duties and obligations under the relevant statute, even in spite of the applications made under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. ( 2 ) ON the pleadings, to which reference would be made hereafter, the main point for consideration in this case would be, whether after the statutory lapse of a proceeding under section 144 as mentioned above, a writ application, which was obtained during the currency of such proceeding and for the inaction of the police authorities, would be maintainable. ( 3 ) IT has been alleged by the said Company that its employees started agitating in or about February 1979, over some of their purported demands, without duly submitting a charter of demand. It has been stated that on and from 6th March, 1979, some of the employees of the said Company started abusing the managerial staff and disobeying the orders and directions of the authorities concerned, which were duly given and announced. On such happening, it has been stated that on or about 7th March, 1979, a written complaint was lodged with the officer-in-charge, Chitpore Police Station, by the Manager of the said Company. It is the case of the said Company that for the protection of its properties inside the factory premises, which include amongst others plant, machineries and records, they, on 9th March 1979, had engaged some Security Guards. It is their case that there was interference with the discharge of the duties of these Security Guards by respondent Nos. 5 to 14, their friends, associates and aids. In fact, the allegations, as mentioned hereinbefore, according to the said petitioners, were also directed against these persons. It is their case that there was interference with the discharge of the duties of these Security Guards by respondent Nos. 5 to 14, their friends, associates and aids. In fact, the allegations, as mentioned hereinbefore, according to the said petitioners, were also directed against these persons. These respondents would hereafter be termed as employee respondents, for convenience. ( 4 ) SINCE the said Company found that obstructions were being created in the due discharge of the duties of and by the concerned Security Guards, they on 9th March, 1979, lodged another complaint with the officer-in-charge as mentioned above, against the wrongful activities of the said employee respondents. It has also been alleged that on and from 11th March, 1979, the factory premises of the said Company were forcibly controlled by the said employee respondents and the Secretary of the said Company, on being abused with filthy language, another written complaint was filed with the officer-in-charge concerned on 11th March, 1979. On the said date, it appears that the said Company filed a further complaint with the officer-in-charge, for granting necessary aid, help and assistance to the Security Guards, who were appointed in the manner and for the purpose as mentioned above. ( 5 ) IT appears from the pleadings in this proceeding that on 12th March, 1979, one Shri Kalyan Kumar Roy, an employee of the said Company moved an application before the learned Executive Magistrate at Sealdah, whereupon the said learned Executive Magistrate, directed the Officer-in-charge concerned, to enquire and report by 7th April, 1979 and also directed that, in the meantime, the said Company should not remove the plant, machinery and the documents from the factory premises. This Kalyan Kumar Roy, as mentioned hereinbefore is an employee of the said Company and he has alleged that intentionally and without any intimation, the said Company has closed the Gate of the Cold storage and were not allowing him and other employees from doing any job. It was further the allegation of the said Shri Roy that attempts were being made by the said Company to remove all materials from the Cold Storage, with a view to cause harassment to the employees concerned and to deprive them of their legitimate right to have their employment and more particularly when they were employed with the said Company for more than 20 years. It appears that on the same day, the said Company, through its Manager Shri Srinath Mohta, also moved the Court of the learned Executive Magistrate, Sealdah for an order of restraint upon the said employee respondents, from causing obstructions to the free ingress and egress for the Directors, Managerial staff and other loyal staff/employees including the Security Guards, whose reference has already been made hereinbefore. On this application, it appears that the learned Executive Magistrate, directed the Officer-in-charge concerned to see that ingress and egress of the said Company's directors and managerial staff and workers including Security staff, are not obstructed by the employees concerned. ( 6 ) THEN on 23rd March, 1979, another complaint was lodged by the said Company with the officer-in-charge concerned through its Cashier Shri J. N. Rathi. In this complaint, it has been alleged that the said Shri Rathi was prevented from attending his duties and that apart, other allegations have been made to the effect that some of the employees belonging to the group of the said employee respondents, forcibly took away files containing various cash vouchers of the said Company, for the months of January and February, 1979 from his possession, apart from alleging that Sarbashree R. P. Singh, Kalyan Singh and Baleswar Misra, amongst other employees, threatened and asked him not to come again to the office and in case of his failure to act on such dictates, he would have to face dire consequences. On the said day, Sarbashree Suraj Ratan Motha and Srinath Motha, a Director and Manager of the said Company respectively, informed the Officer-in-charge concerned that the basis on which Shri Kalyan Kumar Roy, as mentioned hereinbefore, had obtained the restraint order against the said Company, was not due and proper, as the said Company had not as yet declared any lock out. Such letters were addressed as there was necessary enquiries by the officer-in-charge concerned, on the basis of the order as was made, on the application of the said Shri Kalyan Kumar Roy. ( 7 ) SINCE there were threats held out to the Manager of the said Company, on 24th March, 1979 another complaint was lodged to that effect with the officer-in-charge concerned and it has also been alleged that on 24th March, 1979, Shri J. M. Motha, the Secretary of the said Company had resigned due to continuous threats and feeling insecurity. Thereafter, on 25th March, 1979, the Supervisor of the Security staff of the said Company against lodged a complaint with the officer-in-charge concerned on the threats to them by the said employees respondents. This again, was followed up by requests of the said Company on 31st March, 1979, to the officer-in-charge concerned, for necessary police protection in order to enable the Manager of the said Company to go to the factory premises for the purpose of disbursing salaries or wages for the month of March, 1979. Even thereafter, on 5th April, 1979, another written complaint was lodged by the Chairman of the said Company with the officer-in-charge of Bhawanipore Police Station, that he was being threatened by one Shri B. N. Roy and other employees belonging to the group of the said respondent employees. Such complaint was lodged with the officer-in-charge Bhawanipore Police Station, as the threat as mentioned above was given at the residence of the complainant, which is within the said Police Station. ( 8 ) I think the circumstances, which is the reason for the trouble, if any, or if at all, should be mentioned at this stage. The said Company, which is in cold storage business, apart from its business at its Head Office at 1, Chitpur Ghat Lane, Calcutta - 2, found that it was no longer possible to continue with its business activities in the cold storage business economically, effectively and conveniently and as such they decided to close down the business activities of the cold storage, the ice manufacturing unit and the office relating thereto on and from 10th April, 1979. The said Company also by its notice dated 9th April, 1979 informed that the services of all the workmen/employees would stand terminated on and from the said date. It has also been informed that the Management, may however, temporarily retain the services of certain employees, required for the purpose of effecting closure and/or matters incidental thereto, by issuing separate letters to that effect. It has also been informed that the Management, may however, temporarily retain the services of certain employees, required for the purpose of effecting closure and/or matters incidental thereto, by issuing separate letters to that effect. The workmen concerned, whose services were so terminated, were also informed that in pursuance of the concerned closure, they would be paid in lieu of notice, compensation and other legal dues, if any, in accordance with the provisions of section 25fff read with section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the date, time and place of payment of compensation and other legal dues as above would be duly notified to them. Such decision was taken in terms of the resolution of the meeting of the Board of Directors of the said Company, held on 9th April, 1979, which would be available from the Annexure ?m? to the petition. It also appears that in terms of section 146 of the Companies Act, 1956, the said company gave the necessary notice to the Registrar of Companies of West Bengal on 9th April, 1979. ( 9 ) AS the said Company found that the said employee respondents unauthorisedly carrying on a tea stall inside the factory premises No. 1, Chitpur Ghat Lane, Cossipore, Calcutta-2, so on 21st April, 1979, they also brought that matter to the knowledge and notice of the Officer-in-charge concerned and thereafter on 1st May, 1979, another written complaint was lodged with the said Officer-in-charge regarding illegal and arrogant of rents from some of the tenants of the said Company. It should be alleged that the said employee respondents have collected rents from them unauthorisedly. After the series of complaints as mentioned above on 2nd May, 1979, this Court was moved for a Rule, alleging (a) that even in spite of the series of complaints to the Officer-in-charge concerned and the order as made by the learned Executive Magistrate, Sealdah, the police authorities are inactive and in fact they are not rendering necessary aid and assistance for the protection, either of the properties belonging to the said Company or the threats committed to the officers and employees as mentioned above and (b) that by such inaction of the police authorities, the fundamental right of the said Company to carry on its business, has been interfered with or jeopardised. It should also be noted that while issuing the rule, no interim order was granted. It should also be noted that while issuing the rule, no interim order was granted. But liberty was given to the said Company to ask for appropriate interim order on the same application, after serving the copy of the same on the respondents concerned. Thereafter, the prayer for interim order came up for consideration on the 15th May, 1979, when by consent of parties, the consideration of such prayer was adjourned till 5th July, 1979 and in the meantime the learned Advocates appearing had agreed that nobody would enter the factory and also the office premises at No. 1, Chitpur Ghat Lane, Calcutta-2. That apart, it was directed that no one would also be entitled to bring out any materials, Since the parties felt some difficulties, on 17th May, 1979, in their presence it was further directed and that too on there agreement that the officer-in-charge, Chitpur Police Station should take steps to have the orders as made, carried on. Then on 8th June, 1979, in the presence of all concerned, the injunction as was issued on 15th May, 1979, was directed to continue till Tuesday following and this matter, as mentioned hereinbefore, was heard on 12th June, 1979. ( 10 ) IN between this period, the said Company has further alleged that there were steps taken by the said respondent employees, who even in spite of the Court's order as mentioned above, were and are inside the premises in question, manipulated or interfered with the supply of drinking water to the tenants and as such another complaint was lodged on 17th May, 1979 with the officer-in-charge concerned. This was followed by a further complaint on 24th May, 1979 that the said respondent employees were squatting and/or staying in the corridor of the factory premises of the said Company. The said Company has alleged that on 24th May, 1979 again, one Shri Raj Kumar Rajendra Kumar, addressed a letter to the said Company pointing out about the illegal and unauthorised collection of rents by the said employee respondents. Shri Raj Kumar Rajendra Kumar incidentally is a tenant under the said Company. Such letter has also been alleged to have been received on the same day from one Shri Ballab Sales Agency. Shri Raj Kumar Rajendra Kumar incidentally is a tenant under the said Company. Such letter has also been alleged to have been received on the same day from one Shri Ballab Sales Agency. That apart, it has been alleged on 26th May, 1979, to the Secretary of the said Company requesting him to take necessary steps so that they could get due supply of water to the office of the Postal Stores Depot. On these happenings or receipt of letters, on 28th May, 1979, another complaint was lodged with the officer-in-charge concerned, soliciting his immediate intervention, help and assistance against such irregular activities. The said Company has alleged that thereafter, on 15th May, 1979, another petition under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code was moved and the same is pending. It should be noted that the present rule was obtained, not against the subsequent proceeding under section 144, but the earlier one as mentioned hereinbefore and the same has admittedly lapsed after the expiry of the statutory period. ( 11 ) THE respondent Nos. 1 to 4 have not filed any opposition either to the prayers for injunction as made or against the application for further directions. But there has been an affidavit filed by the respondent Nos. 5 to 14 thorugh Shri Kalyan Kumar Roy, claiming to be working as a Clerk under the said Company. ( 12 ) THE said Shri Roy has claimed the writ application in question to be not maintainable inasmuch as the entire case relating to the disputes between the employer and the employees has been placed before the Labour Directorate, Government of West Bengal. That apart, he has stated that there being no case of any breach of peace, there would be no cause or any occasion for interfering with the peaceful situation as is prevailing now. It has been alleged that the entire action of the said Company in moving this Court, is motivated and is regulated or directed for the purpose of crushing the demand of the said employee respondents, to form a Trade Union. In fact, the deponent has alleged that the action in moving this Court or in taking the divergent stops as mentioned above, were not bonafide. It is his case that the said employee respondents have duly formed a valid Trade Union, for the purpose of facilitating the cause of the workmen concerned. In fact, the deponent has alleged that the action in moving this Court or in taking the divergent stops as mentioned above, were not bonafide. It is his case that the said employee respondents have duly formed a valid Trade Union, for the purpose of facilitating the cause of the workmen concerned. The complaints as have been alleged to have been lodged by the said Company with the officer-in-charge concerned, have been claimed to be unreal and untrue and have also been stated to be vindictively initiated or taken for the real purpose of harassing the employees concerned and to crush their attempt to form the concerned Trade Union. The deponent has further stated that the employees have been, without any just, bonafide and due reason, kept out of employment or attempts are being made to deprive them of their legitimate rights and as such, they are agitating over the issues, which are now, as mentioned above, pending before the appropriate authorities. The lock out as alleged to have been declared by the said Company has also been claimed to be fictitious, not bonafide and baseless, apart from being irregular. This deponent has stated that the order on the said Company, not to remove the plant, machineries and documents, as was passed on the application of Shri Kalyan Kumar Roy, was due, just and bonafide. He has further stated that since the learned Executive Magistrate was satisfied with the report and on the basis of the circumstances prevailing, he duly passed such restraint order and as such, or in any view of the said matter, the said Company should not be allowed to remove or take out plant, machineries or records from the premises in question. It has been alleged that the said Company has created circumstances, for which it would not be possible for the said respondent employees, not only to discharge their duties bonafide, but also to earn their livelihood duly. The shifting of the factory and the Head Office of the said Company has also been claimed to be motivated. It has been alleged that the said Company has created circumstances, for which it would not be possible for the said respondent employees, not only to discharge their duties bonafide, but also to earn their livelihood duly. The shifting of the factory and the Head Office of the said Company has also been claimed to be motivated. In fact, it has been stated that the employees concerned, at all material times were ready and willing and still they are so, to co-operate with the said Company, to have their business run or perform, from the premises in question and the said employee respondents are willing to render all help and assistance to the said Company but they in their turn, in the background as mentioned hereinbefore, would not allow such services to be rendered by the employees concerned. Regarding the running of a Tea stall and collection of rents as alleged by the said Company, the deponent has candidly admitted such happenings. But he has stated that whatever amount, the collecting officer viz, Shri S. K. Banerjee has collected, on account of rent, are lying with him, and he is ready and willing to hand them over to the said Company, if asked for or directed by this Court. It is the case of the deponent that the said Shri S. K. Banerjee, at all material time was incharge for collection of rents and he has performed his duties and obligations, as there was no order directing him not to act as such collecting officer. It is the case of the said deponent that the officer-in-charge concerned, has not rendered any help and assistance to the said Company even in spite of its repeated complaints, as there was not cause or any occasion for the same. He has stated that if there was really any just and bonafide cause, the officer-in-charge concerned would have certainly given the necessary help and assistance. He has stated that if there was really any just and bonafide cause, the officer-in-charge concerned would have certainly given the necessary help and assistance. ( 13 ) SHRI Amal Kumar Dutta and Shri Mukul Gopal Mukherjee, who are appearing for the answering respondents, strongly relied on the fact that since the proceeding of section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code has lapsed after the due expiry of the statutory period, so the rule which was obtained on the basis of the refusal or neglect of the authorities concerned in not rendering necessary help and assistance and thereby refusing to discharge their obligations under the statute, no interference by this Court should at this stage be made. ( 14 ) MR. A. K. Sen, appearing for the said Company contended that even if the refusal to grant necessary help and assistance by the officer-in-charge concerned, and thereby his failure to discharge his obligation under the statute fails, this application would be maintainable because the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on their business is in jeopardy and in this rule protection for such right, has been asked for Mr. Sen, in support of his submission took me through the series of complaints, which have been filed with the officer-in-charge concerned and the relevant application under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He could not, of course, deny that such proceeding under section 144 had lapsed after the expiry of the statutory period. He also could not deny the fact that over the closure and the validity or bonafide of the same, proceedings have been duly taken and are pending before the appropriate authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. These apart, he relied on the 2 reports filed by the officer-in-charge Chitpur Police Station. In the report dated 27th March, 1979, the said officer-in-charge has without any doubt and unequivocally stated that there has been interference with the Management's functions by the opposite parties, meaning thereby the said employees respondents. In the second report which is dated 2nd May, 1979, and made after the one as referred to hereinbefore the said officer-in-charge has also stated that there would be apprehension of the breach of peace, if the opposite parties, meaning thereby the said employee respondents, obstruct the petitioners and the Security Guards to ingress and egress at the Company. In the second report which is dated 2nd May, 1979, and made after the one as referred to hereinbefore the said officer-in-charge has also stated that there would be apprehension of the breach of peace, if the opposite parties, meaning thereby the said employee respondents, obstruct the petitioners and the Security Guards to ingress and egress at the Company. He has also stated that the closure of the Company was started from 10th April, 1979, apart from stating that if the said Company was started from 10th April, 1979, apart from stating that if the said Company removes machineries and goods there would be apprehension of breach of the peace. On the basis of the 2 reports, Mr. Sen appropriately submitted that there is no doubt that there would be apprehension of breach of peace, in case necessary police help and assistance, is not received by the said Company. The learned Advocates appearing for the answering respondents of course contended that in the report dated 2nd May, 1979 the word used is ?for? and as such, no order on the basis of such report, directing the officer-in-charge to render necessary help and assistance need be given in this jurisdiction, as ?if the records, machineries and goods are not removed? there would be no question of any breach of peace. The records as are lying in the premises in question. Mr. Sen argued, would be required for the purpose of complying with the statutory obligations of the said Company under the Companies Act, 1956 and Income-Tax Act, 1961, apart from other relevant statutes imposing obligations to produce, maintain in and prepare necessary documents and records. He submitted that unless the records are made available to the said Company, it would not be possible for them to comply with or discharge their obligations under the relevant statutes, the result whereof may be disastrous. In fact, he submitted that Income-Tax returns will have to be filed, apart from statutory returns under the Companies Act and the preparation of the Balance-sheet, for which the records, which are lying at the concerned premises, would be necessary and at least the said Company must have an opportunity to have the necessary records and documents brought out of the premises in question. The learned Advocates appearing for the respondents of course stated that such documents can be looked into or inspected and dealt with at the premises in question, where they would extend their full co-operation. When the relationship of the parties have become strained particularly in the circumstances as disclosed above. I am of the view that no useful purpose would be served by making orders or passing directions in the manner or in the light as suggested by the learned Advocates appearing for the respondents. So, if this application ultimately succeeds, then I feel that the said Company must be given the opportunity to take out the necessary documents and records at least and not the plants and machineries. ( 15 ) ON the question whether this application, in view of the circumstances as disclosed would be maintainable, Mr. Sen, in support of his submissions that it is maintainable even in spite of the statutory lapse of the proceedings under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, firstly relied on the Special Bench determination of this Court (1) Jay Engineering Works Limited and Ors. , v. State of West Bengal and Others, AIR 1968 Calcutta 407. In this case the petitioners, Jay Engineering Works Limited, was a limited Company. Its principal business consisted of the manufacturing of sewing machines and Fans. It has its Sales Office known as ? eastern India Usha Corporation? at No. 26, R. N. Mookherjee Road, Calcutta. This office employed apart from the management staff, approximately 365 workmen. The respondent No. 8, the Jay Engineering Workers Union was a registered Trade Union and respondents No. 9 to 16 and 18 to 28 were its members. On or about 17th January, 1967, 18 employees of the Sales Office, including the concerned employees respondents were retrenched. On 27th January, 1967 the retrenched employees along with 70 others blocked the said Corporation's premises, completely obstructing the passage of personnel and goods, including food staff for the barricated person inside, who were wrongfully confined therein. This blockade was lifted on 28th January, 1967 after police intervention. On 1st March, 1967, the then Government of West Bengal came into office. On 2nd March, 1967, the retrenched workers together with other employees numbering about 200 persons gheraod the Manager and other officers at the office premises and this continued for 33 hours. The gherao was lifted on 3rd March, 1967. On 1st March, 1967, the then Government of West Bengal came into office. On 2nd March, 1967, the retrenched workers together with other employees numbering about 200 persons gheraod the Manager and other officers at the office premises and this continued for 33 hours. The gherao was lifted on 3rd March, 1967. It was alleged that these persons confined the Manager and others, tempered with the Company's property, spoiled the walls and continuously shouted insulting humiliating slogans against the confined persons. The supply of food to those confined was permitted inside for a normal quantity at the will of the besiegers. It was alleged that even in spite of information duly given to the police authorities, no action was taken. On 17th April, 1967, the said retrenched workers, together with other employees numbering about 100 to 150 ghearoed the Manager and other officers at the office and kept them under wrongful confinement. The besiegers trespassed into the office, tampered with property and shouted insulting and humiliating slogans against the confined persons. Only the minimum amount of food was allowed to be taken in at the will of the besiegers. It was alleged that even in spite of the information to the police, no action was taken and subsequently, an application was made before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta under section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code, who ordered the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station concerned, to search and secure the confined persons and produce them before him. The confined persons were accordingly rescued on 18th April, 1967. This gherao was again resorted to on 29th May, 1967 and the officers were wrongfully confined in the office. It was alleged that even in spite of the information, no action was taken by the police. ( 16 ) AT this stage, the petitioner Company obtained a rule with the corresponding injunction that no effect should be given to a Circular issued by the Government on 27th March, 1967 alleging that the primary reason for the total inaction of the police, was due to the fact that the State Government, through its Joint Secretary, in its Home and Political Department, had issued 2 circulars on 28th March, 1967 and 12th June, 1967 respectively to all the District Officers and the Commissioner of Police at Calcutta, and the inaction was due to those circulars. This determination did not arise out of a proceeding under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the petitioners then in fact threw a challenge to the authority of the State Government to suspend by an executive fiat the operation of the laws of the land, which imposed various duties upon the authorities in-charge of the maintenance of law and order. Mr. Sen made specific reference to para 268 of the determination and contended that on the analogy of such determination, the availability of other remedy under the Criminal Procedure Code and through the provisions of section 144 would not certainly be a bar in a proceeding like this, where claims have been made for infringement of the fundamental rights of a citizen or person. ( 17 ) MR. Sen then referred to the determinations of the Mysore High Court in the case of (2) Mysore Machinery, Manufacturers Ltd. v. State of Mysore and Anr. , (1967) 2 LLJ 853 . In that case, after the first shift, the workmen refused to leave the premises and they continued to remain inside, in spite of warning. The employers approached the authorities of the Police for help and for the removal of the workmen from the factory premises as the workmen concerned according to them were indulging in unlawful acts, threatening the supervisory staff and other employees, who were prepared to work. A writ petition was moved and a Rule obtained against the alleged inaction of the Police authorities to discharge their obligations under the provisions of Mysore Police Act, 1963 and sections 154, 155 and 156 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1898. Since the issues as involved or the bonafides or otherwise of the same, were pending adjudication by an Industrial Tribunal, an there was no likelihood of any breach of peace and the strike was peaceful, the Police authorities took the plea that there was no breach of any statutory duty cast on them, which would entitle the petitioner to claim an order for a writ of Mandamus and that too when the petitioner, before approaching the Court, failed to approach the Magistrate concerned, for necessary orders and relief. It has been observed amongst others that the failure of the petitioner to approach the Magistrate, in the facts of the case would be no bar and such inaction or failure would not debar the High Court from exercising their discretionary power of issuing a writ. It has been observed that in cases of cognizable offences, the law requires the Police to take action without waiting for orders of the Magistrate. Mr. Sen relied on this determination for supporting his contentions that in view of the above power of the High Court, even if a proceeding under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has lapsed, the High Court would not be powerless to issue the necessary or required writ, for protection of the petitioners' right, which has been infringed. ( 18 ) THE next case on which Mr. Sen relied is that of (3) Excel Wear v. Union of India and Ors. , AIR 1979 SC 25 , wherein it has been observed that right to carry on business would include the right to close down the same. Mr. Sen contended that when in the instant case, resort to such power has been taken by the petitioner, unless otherwise, is duly and appropriately proved or established, such closure must be deemed to be valid and in the event of such bonafide and valid closure, the said employee respondents have earlier no right to be within the premises in question or to interfere with the activities of the petitioner and interference in any manner or in any kind, would be an infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioners to have a bonafide closure and in the event of such infringement, the Police authorities, are bound under the relevant statutes, to take cognizance of the matter, when complaints have been duly lodged and thus to render the necessary and required help and assistance to the petitioners. ( 19 ) MR. Majumdar, who assisted Mr. Sen, in reply, referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (4) Md. Gulam Abbas and Anr. v. Md. Ibrahim and Ors, 1978 Cr. LJ 496, for the nature of the orders, which can be passed under sec. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the scope and applicability of the same. Sen, in reply, referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (4) Md. Gulam Abbas and Anr. v. Md. Ibrahim and Ors, 1978 Cr. LJ 496, for the nature of the orders, which can be passed under sec. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the scope and applicability of the same. In this case it has been observed that the kind of orders mentioned in S. 144 (3) are obviously intended only to prevent dangers of life, health, safety or peace and tranquility of members of the public. They are only temporary orders which cannot last beyond two months from the making thereof as is clear from section 144 (6) of the Code. Questions of title cannot be decided here at all. But, previous judgments on them may have a bearing on the question whether, and, if so, what orders should be passed under section 144. It has also been observed that it may sometimes happen that a person may be prevented from doing something even upon his own property provided the doing of perfectly legal act constitutes a danger to human life, health or safety of others or to public peace and tranquility. But it is only where it is not practicable to allow them to do something which is quite legal, having regard to the stat of excited feelings of persons living in an area of frequenting, a locality, that any action may be taken under section 144, which may interfere with what are, otherwise, completely legal and permissible conduct and speech, and the Magistrate is not concerned with individual rights in performing his duty under section 144 but he has to determine what may be reasonably necessary or expedient in a situation of which he is the best judge. In this case it has further been observed that if any community or sect is disposed to transgress the rights of another in a particular property habitually, the remedy lies by way of a civil suit for an injunction. Where both sides before the Court make conflicting assertions on such questions, it is impossible to decide them for the first time either on a writ petition or in a proceeding under section 144. If public peace and tranquility or other objects mentioned there are not in danger the Magistrate concerned cannot act under section 144. Where both sides before the Court make conflicting assertions on such questions, it is impossible to decide them for the first time either on a writ petition or in a proceeding under section 144. If public peace and tranquility or other objects mentioned there are not in danger the Magistrate concerned cannot act under section 144. He could only direct parties to go to the proper forum. On the other hand, if the public safety, peace, or tranquility are in danger, it is left to the Magistrate concerned to take proper action under section 144. No hard and fast rules can be laid down for guidance in exercising a power on which decisions must necessarily be governed by the existing situation in each case. It has to be judged on facts and circumstances existing at a particular place at a particular time. It was in short urged by and on behalf of the said Company that the complaints as lodged, having disclosed cognizable offence, the authorities concerned, meaning thereby the officer-in-charge, Chitpore Police Station in this case, should have taken appropriate steps to give necessary protection, help and assistance to them and thereby to discharge the obligations as imposed on him by statutes. ( 20 ) MR. Dutt contended that since there was no cognizable offence therefore there was or has been no question of any protection to be granted to the said Company and as such there was no failure or inaction on the part of the officer-in-charge concerned or any other authority to discharge the necessary obligations. In fact, Mr. Dutt contended that no specific case or charge was established on the basis of the complaints as lodged. That apart, he reiterated that since conciliation proceedings, over the purported dispute, is pending before the appropriate authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, so no interference should be made, when complaints, if any has been filed on the basis of such dispute or disputes or differences have arisen on the basis of the same. Mr. Dutt, of course in usual fairness, contended that in appropriate cases, interference can be made even after the lapse of the statutory period under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But he contended that such interference should be made sparingly and not as a matter of course. ( 21 ) MR. Mukherjee, appearing for the Respondents, other then those for whom Mr. But he contended that such interference should be made sparingly and not as a matter of course. ( 21 ) MR. Mukherjee, appearing for the Respondents, other then those for whom Mr. Dutt has appeared, after placing his client's affidavit in opposition, adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Dutt. Both Mr. Dutt and Mr. Mukherjee contended that in view of the lapse of the 144 proceedings after the statutory period, no interference should or need be made by this Court, as because of such lapse, the very basis of the challenge has extinguished or has become nonest. Mr. Mukherjee, on a refernce to Chapter XI and XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sought to supplement his argument that since there was no disclosure of or proper filing of any action for a cognizable offence, so the Police authorities had no obligation to take any preventive action or steps. ( 22 ) SECTION 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has application in cases of urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger and confers very wide powers to pass and issue orders on emergent occasions for directing a person (1) not to do certain act or (2) to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management and such directions can be given for preventing (i) obstruction, annoyance, or injury to any person lawfully employed, or (ii) danger to human life, health and safety or (iii) a disturbance of the public tranquility or a riot, or any affray. In terms of the determination in the case of (5) Madhu Limaya v. S. D. M. Monghyr and Ors. 1970 (3) SCC 746 , the provisions of section 144 or the powers thereunder are directed against those, who attempt to prevent or interfere with the exercise of legal rights by others or endanger the public safety and health. The learned Magistrate, dealing with such a proceedings should resort to such extraordinary powers under the section as observed in the celebrated decisions, only when he is satisfied that the other powers, with which he is entrusted or clothed, are insufficient. The learned Magistrate, dealing with such a proceedings should resort to such extraordinary powers under the section as observed in the celebrated decisions, only when he is satisfied that the other powers, with which he is entrusted or clothed, are insufficient. ( 23 ) THE protect and preserve the life and property of a citizen or to ensure the Constitutional guarantees relating thereto is the first and foremost duty of the Government and to secure such compliance, powers under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are conferred on the learned Magistrate in addition to the other remedies available. But this power, subject to the conditions as mentioned above, must be used sparingly, in exceptional and emergent circumstances or situations. Under section 144, the learned Magistrate is clothed with the power and authority to suspend the exercise of rights recognized by law, when such exercise, as observed, may conflict with other rights of the public or endangers public peace. The power under section 144 is an extraordinary power, which can be exercised in certain given circumstances or cases and that too subject to scrutiny by higher Courts. The provisions of section 144 are not in conflict with the Constitutional guarantee. By or under such power, the learned Magistrate can deal with a situation effectively and expeditiously. The power under section 144 is required to be used or applied in cases amongst others of grave emergency, where immediate prevention or speedy remedy is required in the interest of the public. ( 24 ) THAT fact that orders made under section 144 are temporary in nature, appears not only from the action itself but also from the heading of the chapter viz. , urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger?. The section prohibits the grant or issue of a perpetual injunction or any order having such effect or as observed in the case of (6) Remji v. Luchman Prosad, 7 Calwn 140, an order to be in force until the happening of a certain event. In terms of section 144 (4), order as made is presumed to be limited to two months. In terms of section 144 (4), order as made is presumed to be limited to two months. The State Government may extend by notification the period not exceeding six months from the date of the expiry of the order, if it thinks the same to be necessary for preventing danger to human life, health or safety or for preventing a riot or an affray, but, as observed in the case of (7) Chanan v. The Emperor, 42 Cr. LJ 90, such power cannot resusciate an order no longer in force. This extension can be directed from the date of the expiry of the order. The orders made under section 144 can be interfered with, in appropriate cases by the High Court in its appropriate Revisional jurisdiction and the High Court is not required ordinary to interfere in such jurisdiction, if the order as made, has already spent its force. ( 25 ) THE fact that the concerned 144 proceeding in this case has lapsed after the statutory period of two months is not in dispute. So following the above findings, this Court in its Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction would not ordinarily be or except in exceptional circumstances, would not be entitled to interfere in the matter. I think the power of interference as mentioned above may also be inferred in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when such proceedings arise of proceedings initiated under section 144 and the orders passed thereon. The terms of the decision in the case of (8) Purna Chandra Tewari v. Saogat Ali Mallick and Ors, AIR 1960 SC 715, the High Court should be loath to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate in passing an order under section 144 unless it be satisfied that such order was not legal or strictly proper. The same principle should also be applied when from such proceedings, proceeding for the issue of writs as in this case has been taken. ( 26 ) THE case of Jay Engineering Works Ltd. , and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , (Supra), on facts, is distinguishable from the facts of the present case and the determination as made therein would not help to have the arguments of Mr. ( 26 ) THE case of Jay Engineering Works Ltd. , and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , (Supra), on facts, is distinguishable from the facts of the present case and the determination as made therein would not help to have the arguments of Mr. Sen, on maintainability of an application of Article 226 after the statutory lapse of a proceeding under section 144, even though claim has been made for violation of fundamental rights. If the arguments of Mr. Sen are accepted, then that would have an indirect effect of having the provisions of section 144 made nugatory and in that event, the powers of the learned Magistrate under section 144 would be curtailed. Thus, I am of the view that in view of the challenges as in this case, an application under Article 226 would be maintainable and that too on the claims as made, but before moving such application, the person seeking such order or any interference in this jurisdiction, must establish that an application under section 144 was made and even in spite of the order made therein, the authorities concerned are not performing obligations or discharging their duties duly and in accordance with law. ( 27 ) ON application of the above rule, I am of the view that the instant writ application is maintainable and as such, orders as are prayed for now, may also be made. Then comes the question for consideration of the relief and more particularly, if the reliefs as claimed, can be granted in view of the lapse of the concerned 144 proceedings. The ordinary effect of such lapse and the extraordinary circumstances, where even in spite of such lapse, the power may be resorted to have been mentioned hereinbefore. Thus, in appropriate cases, the High Court may interfere even after the statutory lapse of proceedings under section 144, if there is admitted danger to life and property. From the reports of the officer-in-charge concerned, as mentioned hereinbefore and more particularly the one dated 27th March 1979, it is apparent that the necessary threat or such danger to life and property in terms of the requirement of section 144 were and are present in this case and that would entitle the said Company, an order directing the authorities concerned to discharge their functions and obligations duly and in terms of the requirements of the statute viz. , to give necessary help, assistance and protection to maintain peace, tranquility and property. This case, in my view, because of the admitted position as mentioned hereinbefore, would come within the exceptional circumstances of authorizing this Court to interfere even after the statutory lapse of the concerned 144 proceedings. ( 28 ) SO after hearing the learned Advocates, I direct that the officer-in-charge, Chitpur Police Station, Respondent No. 4 or the other relevant authorities, who are Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, should take necessary steps to render the required help, aid, assistance and protection to the said Company or its authorities for the purpose of protecting their properties, assets and records lying at 1, Chitpur Ghat Lane, Calcutta-2 and to see that no disturbance is created to their ingress to and egress from there. They should also give the said Company and its authorities, necessary protections to bring out the relevant records and documents and not the machineries, plants or other furniture or fixtures from the said premises, apart from securing that Respondent Nos. 5-14 or any of their friends, associates and supporters should not be allowed to come within 50 yards of the said premises or to create any disturbance or obstacle therein. These authorities as mentioned hereinbefore, are also required to clear off all or any obstructions created in and around the premises as mentioned above. The prayers as made are thus allowed as above. There will be no order for costs. I direct that removal of documents and records must be made on proper inventories being made by the officer-in-charge concerned. After hearing the learned Advocate, I treat this Rules (by consent) on day's list and have the same disposal of in the terms as indicated above. Parties, of course, will have liberty to mention, if such or any occasion arises. Rules disposed of.