ORDER Oza, J.- 1. This is a reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge Ratlam, for quashing the order dated 23rd February 1976 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Ratlam. 2. The applicants before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who are citizens and owners of houses in New Road Ratlam submitted an application before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 1-5-1972 under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a direction against the Municipal Council Ratlam and Town Improvement Trust Ratlam for removal of nuisance. The nuisance alleged by the applicants has been categorized by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate after consideration of the matter in his conditional order dated 2-8-1972 :- (1) That the Nala which flows in the middle of Ward No. 12 should be so maintained that the rain-water does not collect and does not spread into the houses of the locality. It should be so maintained that the water flows out of the town. It also should be maintained so that the alcohol-plant's dirty water which is full of nauseating smell should not be left in this Nala as it passes through inhabited locality. (2) That in the alleged area the drains which are incomplete be made in such a manner that the dirty water flows out and does not collect. (3) That between the college boundary and on the road-side there are big pits-kachha drains where dirty water collects and becomes a breeding centre for mosquitoes which should be stopped. In response to this order the parties were given opportunity of hearing and to lead evidence. It is strange that in a proceeding of this nature which is for removal of nuisance it took four yeas for the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to pass the final order as the proceedings disclose that the public authorities who were expected to come forward in straight-forward manner for clearance of nuisance only raised all kinds of objections and filed replies which reflect on the authorities managing the municipal councils at that time. Ultimately the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passing the order dated 23-2-1976 and against this order two separate revision petitions were filed before the Court of Sessions by the Municipal Council as well as by tile Town Improvement Trust, Ratlam and by a common order the learned Sessions Judge has made this reference. Ultimately the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passing the order dated 23-2-1976 and against this order two separate revision petitions were filed before the Court of Sessions by the Municipal Council as well as by tile Town Improvement Trust, Ratlam and by a common order the learned Sessions Judge has made this reference. Before passing this order, in spite of a number of opportunities given to the parties i.e. the Municipal Council and the Town Improvement Trust, no evidence was led. 3. One of the grounds made by the learned Sessions Judge for making this reference is that in the conditional order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under section 137 (3) Cr. P.C. some moditification has been made when the learned Magistrate ultimately passed the final order and according to the learned Additional Sessions Judge this is therefore an error which is sufficient to set aside the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also found that the order which is passed finally in which directions have been given to the non-applicants is vague and he therefore felt that it is not possible to carry it out; and for that reason also the learned Judge felt that the order deserves to be set aside. 4. So far as the question of modification of the conditional order is concerned, the learned Additional Sessions Judge felt that Direction No.1 which was contained in the conditional order and is also contained in the final order has been substantially modified. In fact, there is hardly any modification in substance. Direction No.1 in the conditional order and the final order remains the same and it could not be contended that it was modified so as to make a new direction of which the petitioners before the Sessions Court had no notice. In fact, there is hardly any modification in substance. Direction No.1 in the conditional order and the final order remains the same and it could not be contended that it was modified so as to make a new direction of which the petitioners before the Sessions Court had no notice. Direction No.1 contained in the conditional order reads: ^^ƒ- tks ukyk ckMZ uacj ƒ„ ds e/; cgrk gSa mls bl izdkj nq:Lr dj O;ofLFkr djs fd blesa ls cjlkr dk ikuh vksOgjYQksa ugha gksdj lM+dksa ij ugha Qsys o ukxfjdksa ds edkuksa esa ugha ?kqlsA cfYd O;ofLFr <ax ls cgdj xkao ds ckgj fudy tkrk jgsA bl ukys esa vydksgy IykaV dk xank o nqxZU/k ;qDr ikuh NksM+uk caUn&gsrq laEcf/kr dks uxj ikfydk }kjk fy[kk tkosA^^ Similary, Direction No.1 in the final order reads :- ƒ- ‘kkL=h dkyksuh rFkk U;w jksM+ ds e/; cgus okys ukys ds cgko dks lqO;ofLFkr djus ds fy;s uxj lq/kkj U;kl ,d LFkkbZ :I dh ;kstuk uxj ikfydk ls vko’;d lg;ksx izkIr djds ˆ ekg dh vof/k esa rS;kj dj mls ewrZ&:I nsus dh dk;Zokgh djsaA A reading of these two directions clearly shows that except that what was stated in Direction No.1 of the conditional order bas been clarified in the Direction No.1 of the final order, there is hardly any modification; and it also appears that this clearification must have been done after hearing the petitioners Municipal Council and the Town Improvement Trust. The rest of the directions are practically the same except that one of the directions in the conditional order which was Direction No.3 has been dropped in the final order, and it appears that it was dropped because it must have been found that it is beyond the control or the Municipal Council. Looking to these two orders, therefore, it could not be said that there is any modification of the order or substantial change in the directions contained in the final order as compared with the conditional order passed by the Magistrate, This question under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gobindsingh v. Shanti Sarup, AIR 1979 SC 143 and it was felt that if any part of the final order has gone beyond the conditional order it could be modified so as to make it consistent with the conditional order. While considering this question their Lordships observed: "The learned Magistrate has however gone beyond the scope of the conditional order which he had passed on December 16, 1969, by which he required the appellant to demolish the said Oven and the chimney within a period of 10 days from the issue of the order. The final order passed by the learned Magistrate is to the effect that the appellant shall cease to carryon the trade of a baker at the particular site and shall not lit the oven again. Preventing the appellant from using the oven is certainly within the terms of the conditional order but not so the order requiring him to desist from carrying on the trade of a baker at the site. While, therefore, upholding the order of the learned Magistrate and the view of the High Court, we consider it necessary to clarify that the proper order to pass would be to require the appellant to demolish the even and the chimney constructed by him within a period of one month from today. It is needless to add that the appellant shall not in the mean while use the oven and the chimney for any purpose whatsoever." In a matter of this kind, their Lordships also considered how the matter should be approached and it was observed: "It is true that the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not agree with the findings of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, but considering the evidence in the case, the reasons given by the Magistrate, in support of his order and the fact that the High Court was unable to accept the recommendation made by the Additional Sessions Judge, We are of the opinion that in a matter of this nature where what is involved is not merely the right of a private individual but the health, safety and convenience of the public at large, the safer course would be to accept the view, of the learned Magistrate, who saw for himself the hazard resulting from the working of the bakery." 5. As regards the vagueness the learned Additional Sessions Judge has Dot been able to make out precisely as to what is the vagueness in the order so that it is not possible to carry it out the role to be played by the Town Improvement Trust as in the direction it was mentioned that the Town Improvement Trust shall render such co-operation as is necessary to carry out the directions and apparently the responsibility of carrying out the direction was on the Municipal Council. Learned counsel for the Municipal Council, frankly conceded that now that question also does not arise as the part of the locality which at the time of the trouble was being developed by the Town Improvement Trust has now been taken by the Municipality and nothing remains to be done by the Town Improvement Trust and the matter is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council alone. Even for the other part of the directions as they stood, it could not be said that they are vague as apparently the Municipal Counsel could insist on the Town improvement Trust to do the needful which is necessary for maintenance, cleanliness and safety. On this ground also the learned Additional Sessions Judge was wrong in recommending the quashing of this order. 6. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also felt that the Municipal Council would only proceed with the work under the provisions contained in the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 and while proceeding under this provision it may be difficult for the Municipal Council to carry out the directions. These observations made by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge appear to be curious. In fact, section 123 of the M. P. Municipalities Act itself provides the duties of the Municipal Council and the directions given by the learned Magistrate clearly fall within the ambit of clause(b) of sub-section (1) of section 123 of the Act: 123. (i) … … … … (b) cleansing public streets, places and sewers, and all places, not being private property, which are open to the enjoyment of the public whether such places are vested in the Council or not; removing noxious vegetation, and abating all public nuisances;… It is therefore clear that what the learned Magistrate wanted the Municipal Council to do by removing the public nuisance was nothing but what was the duty of the Municipal Council under the Municipalities Act. 7. 7. A grievance was made by the learned counsel that it is not possible to carry out the directions within the time specified in the order as it involves financial implications and as the Municipal Council at present is not an elected council but is maintained by an Administrator. It is unfortunate that such contentions are raised in 1979 when these proceedings have been pending since 1972. If in seven years' time the Municipal Council intended to remedy such a small matter there would have been no difficulty at all. Apart from it, so far as the directions are concerned, the learned Magistrate, it appears, was reasonable. So far as direction No. 1 is concerned, the learned Magistrate only expected the Municipal Council and the Town Improvement Trust to evolve a plan and to start planning about it within six months; the learned Magistrate has rightly not fixed the time limit within which that plan will be completed. Nothing more reasonable could be said about direction No.1. As regards directions No.2 and 3, which are for improving the gutters and making or repairing them in such a manner that the dirty water does Dot collect, the learned Magistrate gave six months' time and as regards closing of the pits where dirty water collects and makes a breeding centre for mosquitoes, learned Magistrate gave two months which for the Municipal Council does not appear to be difficult. Apart from it, there has been no attempt by the Municipal Council to place before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate the objection about the time. Unfortunately, at any stage in the proceedings the Municipal Council did not come out with a case saying that it was necessary to do but they did not do it because of financial difficulties. The stand the Municipal Council took was that as the owners of houses have chosen to take the plots of land in this locality knowing that it was in this state of affairs, now they cannot turn round and want the Municipal Council to remove the nuisance. They should be prepared to suffer it. This is rather a curious stand which is not expected of a Municipal Council having the duties enumerated in section 123 of the Municipalities Act quoted above. The Municipal Council never prayed before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that they only need more time to do the needful. They should be prepared to suffer it. This is rather a curious stand which is not expected of a Municipal Council having the duties enumerated in section 123 of the Municipalities Act quoted above. The Municipal Council never prayed before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that they only need more time to do the needful. f have no doubt that the learned Magistrate would have granted reasonable time if a prayer was made in that behalf saying that the time granted is not sufficient to perform the directions but no such attempt was made. Even in this Court learned counsel for the Municipal Council pleaded that directions Nos. 2, 3 and 4, which are very ordinary matters connected with the sanitation of the locality could be done within a reasonable time and ultimately a reply has been filed which does not give any indication of time but only states that they are in financial difficulty and it will be done as and when possible. Such assurances, it appears, are of no avail as unfortunately these proceedings for petty little things like clearing of dirty water, closing of pits and repairing of drains have taken more than seven years and if these seven years are not sufficient to do the needful, one could understand that by granting some more time it could not be done. In any event, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not right in recommending the quashing of this order. It appears that the learned Judge felt that section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not made for enforcement of such civil rights which apparently fall within the ambit of public nuisance 8. In this view of the matter, the reference is rejected. The order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Ratlam is maintained. As it is already made clear that now the Municipal Council admits its sole liability to comply with the directions there is no occasion for any direction against the Town Improvement Trust.