JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the order and decree dated September 3, 1974 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division reversing the order and decree dated August 18, 1969 passed by the Assistant Collector, First Class in a case under Section 229-B U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Shyam Lal had filed a suit seeking declaration that he was the Sirdar of plots No. 1296/1, 1535, 1523, 1494 and 1582 in village Tejpur Tarsauli, and the ejectment of the defendant Natha if found in possession. According to him, Natha was only a Sajhidar and was removed from Sajhidari. Natha, on the other hand, contested the suit claiming that he was a co-Sirdar of the land in suit which was ancestral and that the land had been acquired by the common ancestor Bhola. The trial court dismissed the suit. In appeal, however, the Additional Commissioner has decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff for declaration as well as the relief of possession. Natha has come in second appeal. Meanwhile Shyam Lal having died, his sons Jaswant, Rusan, Mewa Lal and Shri krishna have been impleaded as respondents in this second appeal. 4. In first ground taken in the second appeal is that the suit was filed in 1375 Fasli and according to the plaintiff the defendant was Sajhi in 1370 Fasli. The trial court disbelieved the oral evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff on the question of Sajhidari and it is unintelligible how the learned Additional Commissioner has reversed the finding of the trial court on the question of alleged Sajhidari without dissenting from the assessment of oral evidence of the plaintiff made by he trial court. I see no merit in this contention. The learned Additional Commissioner has discussed the entire oral and written evidence in great detail and has subjected it to a minute judicial scrutiny. The assessment of both oral and documentary evidence by the learned Additional Commissioner is to my mind quite fair and objective. As a matter of fact, the assessment of the oral evidence by the trial court is completely perverse. The assessment of both oral and documentary evidence by the learned Additional Commissioner is to my mind quite fair and objective. As a matter of fact, the assessment of the oral evidence by the trial court is completely perverse. Thus Arjun, D.W. 1 says that the land in dispute is in the possession of Shyam Lal and prag (father of the defendant-appellant Natha) and that he is seeing their possession since twenty to twenty-two years. In the very next breath he admits that Prag died thirty or forty years back. The age of the witness is thirty-five years. It is apparent that this witness has been seeing the possession of a dead person (or a Ghost) over the land. D.W. 2, Chhidda has stated that the land in suit was acquired by Bhola (the great grandfather of the contesting parties). In the very next breath he admits that he does not know when the tenancy was acquired D.W. 3, Maiku who is forty years of age, again has no hesitation in saying that the land in dispute is in the cultivatory possession of Shyam Lal and Prag. In the very next breath he admits that Prag was hanged forty years ago. It is obvious that even after his hanging Prag has been cultivating the land according to this witness. In cross-examination this witness has got to admit that he does not know whether the land was acquired by Shyam Lal alone from the Zamindar, whether Shyam Lal and Prag lived together or separately and when the land in suit was acquired from the Zamindar. He also does not know whether after the death of Prag, the mother of Natha had remarried. D.W. 4, Natha himself is a complete liar and has no hesitation in saying that though after the death of his father Prag (forty years back) he was brought up by his uncle Shyam Lal, yet Shyam Lal had left the village forty-two years ago and had given up the cultivation of the land in dispute but was cultivating the land of his brother-in-law in village Khetari, He makes the further absurd and interesting statement that during this period Prag looked after the land. The absurdity of this statement would be clear if it is seen that Prag had been admittedly hanged in a murder case forty years back and so the implications that Prag (or his Ghost) was managing the land after his death. These absurdities in the oral evidence of the defendant-appellant have got to be highlighted in order to appreciate that the findings of the trial court are completely erroneous and perverse and the learned Additional Commissioner has come to the right conclusions. 5. The second ground taken in the appeal is that it was not the case of the plaintiff that the defendant was Sajhi from 1363 Fasli to 1368 Fasli and that at the end of 1368 Fasli the Sajha was terminated, and the lower appellate court acted illegally in setting up a case not pleaded by the plaintiff. I do not find that the lower appellate court has, in any manner, set up a new case not pleaded by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had only stated in the plaint that he had employed Natha as a Sajhi in the land in suit for five years and this Sajhidari was terminated in last June. As the plaint was filed in May 1968, the implication would be that the Sajhidari was terminated in June, 1967. Now the finding of the lower appellate court is that from 1363 Fasli to 1368 Fasli the defendant appellant Natha cultivated the land jointly with the plaintiff but from 1369 Fasli he started cultivating the land exclusively and adverse to the interest of the plaintiff. This finding is a perfectly sound one and is based on the evidence. It is true that this finding implies that the possession of the defendant appellant over the land whether joint or exclusive has been from 1363 Fasli to 1374 Fasli, that is to say, for a period longer than stated by the plaintiff. But it does not change the legal position. Possession of a Sajhi does not affect the legal rights. It is only from 1369 Fasli to 1374 Fasli that the defendant appellant had exclusive and adverse possession and this does not confer any rights on him. It can also not be claimed, as the appellant has done in para 3 of his appeal, that the suit was barred by limitation. 6. The last ground taken in the appeal is regarding the contract of tenancy. It can also not be claimed, as the appellant has done in para 3 of his appeal, that the suit was barred by limitation. 6. The last ground taken in the appeal is regarding the contract of tenancy. This matter may be examined in some detail here. Now, it is interesting to note that whereas the defendant appellant Natha has clearly stated in his written statement that the land had been acquired by the common ancestor Bhola who was his great grandfather, the trial court has recorded the finding that the land was acquired somewhere in 1303 Fasli. Yet not a single extract from any revenue record has been filed to show that the land was ever recorded in the name of Bhola or his four sons, Bhikha, Umrai, Tika and Khayali. On the other hand, the earliest extract from the Khatauni which has been filed is of 1311 Fasli which records the land in the name of Shyam Lal. In Khasra of 1311 Fasli also the name of Shyam Lal has been recorded. In the Khatauni of subsequent years also the name of Shyam Lal is recorded. The age of Shyam Lal is recorded to be nine years in 1311 Fasli, and the learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that a child of nine years cannot be conceived to have entered into a contract of tenancy. There is certainly no law in the Country and there never was any such law prohibiting the contract of tenancy in favour of a minor. Thus the creation of tenancy in favour of a minor by the Zamindar cannot be doubted or challenged on this ground. On the other hand, if the tenancy was really ancestral, the Khatauni and Khasra of 1311 Fasli should have shown the name of the grandfather (Bhola) or the name of the father and uncles of Shyam Lal as the tenants of the land. The learned Additional Commissioner has correctly held that at that time Shyam Lal who was a minor could not have acquired the tenancy as a representative of the joint family of Bhola and Bhikha but only in his own individual capacity. The learned Additional Commissioner has correctly held that the proposition that the property was the joint acquisition for the benefit of the whole family applied only when it was acquired by the Karta of the joint family. 7. The learned Additional Commissioner has correctly held that the proposition that the property was the joint acquisition for the benefit of the whole family applied only when it was acquired by the Karta of the joint family. 7. That the land in suit was exclusive tenancy of Shyam Lal is further proved from a large number of rent receipts in his favour as well as the oral evidence. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the presumption is that the land was acquired by Bhikha in the name of this minor son Shyam Lal for the benefit of the joint Hindu family is neither here nor there. It was never the case of the defendant appellant that the land in suit was acquired by Bhikha. His case clearly was that it was acquired by Bhola. This Bhola had four sons, Bhikha being only one of them and so there is an obvious contradiction between the claim of the appellant given in his written statement in the trial court and now stated in the memo of second appeal. Both these conflicting claims have not the slightest oral or documentary evidence to support them and are merely based on unsubstantiated presumption the fallacy of which has been correctly exposed by the lower appellate court. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to two decisions in support of his case. The first is Tirkha v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1978 R.D. 42 in which it has been held that a person without title in continuous possession for more than the statutory period acquires rights of his own. This decision in no way helps the appellant. The appellant's case never was that he acquired rights in this manner. His case all along has been that he was a co-Sirdar by virtue of the fact that the land had been acquired by the common ancestor Bhola. Having utterly failed to show even the slightest basis for his claim, the appellant cannot be allowed to adopt a hit or miss policy in order to challenge the verdict of the first appellate court. 9. The second decision cited is Sukharam v. Dukharam, 1978 R.D. 247 in which the following observations have been made: "According to Section 22 of Act 1901 right of non-occupancy tenancy was heritable. 9. The second decision cited is Sukharam v. Dukharam, 1978 R.D. 247 in which the following observations have been made: "According to Section 22 of Act 1901 right of non-occupancy tenancy was heritable. Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 created a new tenure of statutory tenant and the non-occupancy tenants of Act 1901 were declared as statutory tenants as per Section 19 of the Act. The statutory tenants were entered in Class VIII of a part of the Khatauni. Sub-para 3 of the para 75 of the Land Records manual in respect of non. Z.A. areas clearly provides that when the rent is varied then the terms of cultivation shall be computed from the date of the said variation. From Khatauni 1308 Fasli, it is clear that the rent Rs. 7 and 8 annas. 1334 Fasli Khatauni shows that the plots are recorded in class VIII as statutory tenant with a rent of Rs. 26/- with one year's duration. This it appears that the terms of cultivation has been calculated from the date of the variation in land revenue. Likewise the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 created a new tenure of hereditary tenants recorded in Class VIII under the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926, as hereditary tenants. Thus, the mere recording of a change in the year of tenure does not establish that the continuity has been broken. At least it cannot be argued in respect of plot No. 842 which was admittedly acquired by the common ancestor Mangroo. Thus this plot must be held to be as belonging to the common ancestor in which the plaintiff and the defendants should be held to be co-tenants." This decision also does not help the appellant inasmuch as whereas in the above case it had been held that the land was recorded in the name of the common ancestor (Mangroo) in 1360 Fasli as non-occupancy tenant, while in the present case there is no entry at all in the name of the common ancestor. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents has cited Ganesh Govind Rai v. Bhola Govind Rai, 1942 R.D. 379, Mohammad Fazil v. Abdul Hai Ashraf, 1942 R.D. 411 and Jaisri v. Sukhraj, 1942 R.D. 701 on the question of the claim of co-tenancy on the ground of the holding being ancestral. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents has cited Ganesh Govind Rai v. Bhola Govind Rai, 1942 R.D. 379, Mohammad Fazil v. Abdul Hai Ashraf, 1942 R.D. 411 and Jaisri v. Sukhraj, 1942 R.D. 701 on the question of the claim of co-tenancy on the ground of the holding being ancestral. It has been rightly held in these decisions that in order to entitle a party to claim co-tenancy in a holding on the ground of its being ancestral it is essential that the identity of the holding must have remained unchanged throughout the period. If the identity has changed by sub-division of the holding, the claim cannot succeed. That mere fact that the land comprised in several holdings belonged to a common ancestor is not enough to hold that it belongs to all the descendants of the common ancestor." 11. The learned counsel for the respondents has also referred to Haji Mohammad Saeed v. Mohammad, 1965 A.L.J. 324 in which it has been observed that estimates as to age and time are very frequently inaccurate and before an argument on a matter vitally affecting the rights of the parties and the result of a case can be founded on the basis of a statement made as to age or time by party or a witness the question of age or time, as the case may be, should be specifically raised or at least brought into prominence so that a statement in regard to that matter may be made with care and sense of responsibility and such in accuracy as may be due only to imperfect recollection or mental indolence may be avoided. The implication of the ruling is that the trial court has unnecessarily been misled in rejecting the contract of tenancy in favour of the plaintiff Shyam Lal on the ground that he would have been seven years of age at the time of the acquisition of tenancy as he gave his age to be 80 years at the time of his statement in the trial court. As I have discussed above, the question of age is not at all material because under the law a tenancy could have been created in favour of a minor of any age. 12. The findings of the lower appellate court are quite sound and the Judgment is in accordance with law. As I have discussed above, the question of age is not at all material because under the law a tenancy could have been created in favour of a minor of any age. 12. The findings of the lower appellate court are quite sound and the Judgment is in accordance with law. I find no force in this second appeal and hereby dismiss it with costs.