JUDGMENT - S.C. PRATAP, J.:---This appeal is directed against the order of acquittal dated 31st August, 1976, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Aurangabad, in Criminal Case No. 7497 of 1975. The proceedings arise out of a prosection under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the article in question is milk. 2. Case of the prosecution is that on 29th August, 1975 at about 7.30 in the morning, the complainant, who is the Food Inspector, had gone with panch Ramesh to Bungalow No. 5 to purchase milk. The accused was coming from Village Mitmita, to seel milk of cow and buffalo at Aurangabad. The Food Inspector purchased milk of cow and buffalo from the accused after disclosing his intention. After completing his formalities and after receipt of report of the Public Analyst and after sanction, the present prosecution was filed against the accused for having committed an offence punishable under section 2(i)(a) read with section 16(1-A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Holding that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused sold adulterated cow and buffalo milk to the complainant, the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused. This acquittal is challenged before me in this appeal filed by the original complainant. 3. In support of the prosecution case, prosecution witness No. 1, the Food Inspector, in question was examined. The panch Ramesh was also examined as prosecution witness No. 2. Going through their evidence as also the report of the Public Analyst and considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the legal position involved, it is, in my opinion not possible to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Magistrate in favour of the accused. Evidence on the record shows that the complainant took milk not at one time but at three times and put it in three separate bottles. This is not a case where sample was taken and then divided into three separate parts and put into three separate bottles in question. On the contrary, this is a case where samples can be said to have been thrice taken independently and put into three separate bottles. This is not a case where sample was taken and then divided into three separate parts and put into three separate bottles in question. On the contrary, this is a case where samples can be said to have been thrice taken independently and put into three separate bottles. No good reason has been given by the witnesses as to why he took the different samples and put them in three separate bottles and as to why he did not take one sample and divide it into three different parts as is the usual procedure under the Act and Rules. The Food Inspector cannot in the circumstance be said to have strictly followed the procedure of section 11(1)(b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Though this by itself may not be a very crucial circumstances against the prosecution, it can alongwith the other circumstances of the case prevent this Court from interfering in an appeal against an acquittal. 4. The other circumstance in the present case is that the Food Inspector personally went and handed over the samples of the cow and buffalo milk and the specimen impression of the seal to the Public Analyst stating that between the delivery of the two articles, he had observed an interval of ten minutes. It is to an extent slightly doubtful whether this can be said to be a proper compliance with the provisions of Rules 17 and 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules which makes provision in the matter of the manner of despatching containers of samples as also enjoins that the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal should be sent separately. 5. The crucial factor against the prosecution, however, is the lacuna in the report Exhibit 23 of the Public Analyst. Looking at the report, it is clear that it does not, at any place, indicate the date of the analysis nor does it give any indication of the time of the analysis. Though time may not be very relevant factor, date certainly is. Nowhere in the report we find the date on which the sample was analysed. In this context, it is relevant to note that the sample was taken on 29th August, 1975 and sent to the Public Analyst on 30th August, 1975, whereas the report of the Public Analyst is dated 3rd October, 1975. Nowhere in the report we find the date on which the sample was analysed. In this context, it is relevant to note that the sample was taken on 29th August, 1975 and sent to the Public Analyst on 30th August, 1975, whereas the report of the Public Analyst is dated 3rd October, 1975. No evidence has been led by the prosecution to show that the constituents of the milk would not undergo any change due to lapse of time running into several days. In the absence of any date of analysis of the sample in the report of the Public Analyst, the sample could as well have been analysed on the date of the report which is 3rd October, 1975 or perhaps a day or two earlier. Analysis of the sample several days after its receipt cannot be safely ruled out. It is, therefore, difficult and unsafe to base a conviction, inter alia, placing reliance on such a report which contains a very important lacuna as aforesaid. 6. The other factor to be taken into consideration in this case is that the report in question shows that the percentage of solid not fat found in the sample was less than 8.5%. Actually it was 7.6%. Thus, on the basis of the report itself, it is clear that the deficiency was very nominal and marginal, and even slightly less than 1 per cent. Taking this factor into consideration along with the other factors and circumstances, it is clear that this cannot be said to be a case for convicting the accused on the basis of such weak evidence. If this deficiency in the percentage of solids not fat is connected with the probability of the sample being analysed several days after the receipt thereof, then this is clearly a case of genuine and authentic doubt. All in all, the order of acquittal passed by the learned trail Magistrate is, in my opinion, based on sound grounds and cogent reasons. It is, in my opinion, impossible to interfere with the said order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Magistrate. 7. In the result, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 8. Bail bond of the accused shall stand cancelled. -----