JUDGMENT Chandrasekhara Menon, J. 1. When this suit was presented by the plaintiff invoking the admirality jurisdiction of this Court, the office doubted the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Doubt was also raised regarding the court fee payable. The plaintiff had paid a court fee at a fixed rate of Rs. 200 under S.50 of the Kerala Court Fees Act. In view of this, the matter was placed before the Court for determination. 2. When the case came before me on 21st August 1979, as it was brought to my notice very fairly by the learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioner that the Syndicate Bank and the Vaisya Bank Ltd., Madras have been appointed in a civil action in the Madras High Court as receivers of the vessel concerned, I directed issue of notice to the receivers for hearing them on the question of the entertainability of the claim by this court. On the basis of the notice thus issued, Sri Narayanan Poti, Advocate, appeared on behalf of the receivers. 3. It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff by his learned counsel Mr. J. C. Goho, Barrister-at-law that the receivers have no locus standi to intervene at this stage. The court was only considering the question of the entertainability of the plaintiff's claim, by this court , as put forward in the nature of a suit invoking the admirality jurisdiction of this court. However without deciding the question of the locus standi of the receivers to come in at this stage nothing prevents this court from getting the assistance of an eminent lawyer like Sri Narayanan Poti in deciding the questions before it. Mr. Poti had also very rightly submitted that he would be arguing the matter only on the basis of the facts stated in the plaint and no disputed questions of fact would be relied upon to sustain his contentions. I might at the very outset state that both the learned counsel Mr. Goho and Mr. Poti between themselves placed the relevant law on the matter and the decisions bearing on the same before me. 4. The plaintiff is a Finance Company constituted under the laws of Kuwait and having its office there. It is represented in the suit by a duly authorised agent. Goho and Mr. Poti between themselves placed the relevant law on the matter and the decisions bearing on the same before me. 4. The plaintiff is a Finance Company constituted under the laws of Kuwait and having its office there. It is represented in the suit by a duly authorised agent. The defendants are the owners and parties interested in the Vessel M. V. "Lakshmi Sagar" at present lying berthed at the Port of Cochin. It is alleged that in the usual course of its business, the plaintiff placed orders for shipment of quantities of Fabricated Steel Components and Structures with one Indo Japanese Steel Ltd., carrying on business at No. 11, Government Place (East), Calcutta. Pursuant to and in terms of the order placed as aforesaid by the plaintiff the Indo Japanese Steel Ltd. shipped a quantity of Fabricated Steel Structure and Components. By a contract contained in a Bill of Lading dated 11th September 1978, the defendants acknowledged the shipment on board the Vessel M. V. "Lakshmi Sagar" in apparent good order and condition 88 packages weighing 89.181 metric tonnes of Fabricated Steel Structure and Components for carriage to and delivery at Dammam, Saudi Arabia, in like good order and condition for an agreed freight of U.S. Dollars 4,096.25. The agreed freight as per the said Bill of Lading and in respect of the shipment was alleged to have been duly paid upon completion of loading of the said cargo and the payment was duly endorsed on the Bill of Lading. The plaintiff is still the owner of the cargo aforementioned. The Vessel with the cargo represented by the Bill of Lading mentioned earlier along with other cargoes sailed from Calcutta on or about 15th September 1978 intending to go to her port and / or ports of destination amongst Kifoo/Dammam, Saudi Arabia. But, subsequent to the sailing from the Port of Calcutta, the said Vessel for reasons not known to the plaintiff went to the Port of Colombo. Instead of proceeding further towards her port and / or ports of destination, the Vessel arrived at the Port of Cochin with the plaintiff's cargo on board. The plaintiff alleges that the Vessel failed and neglected after reaching Cochin to proceed to her port and / or ports of destination; as a matter of fact it is still lying berthed at Port of Cochin. The plaintiff alleges that the Vessel failed and neglected after reaching Cochin to proceed to her port and / or ports of destination; as a matter of fact it is still lying berthed at Port of Cochin. By directing the Vessel to proceed from Colombo to Cochin and thereafter by allowing her to remain idle at Cochin without completing the contract of carriage by carrying the cargo belonging to the plaintiff to its port of destination, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants had acted wrongfully and in breach of the contract of carriage. The plaintiff would further allege that the defendants have committed conversion of the plaintiff's cargo. In breach of the defendants' duty under the Bill of Lading, the defendants failed and neglected to deliver the cargo belonging to the plaintiff in like good order and condition when shipped and have converted the same. The plaintiff is alleged to have suffered loss and damages by reason of the wrongful acts and conduct of the defendants. It is also alleged that the conduct of the defendants as a carrier amounts to deliberate attempt to commit fraud and conspiracy to the detriment of the interest of the cargo owners having cargoes on board including the plaintiff. 5. The prayer in the plaint in the circumstances is for specific delivery of the cargo at the contracted port of delivery, to arrest, appraisement and sale of the Vessel along with her tackle, apparel and furniture, save the cargo on board the vessel, for appointment of a receiver for the vessel and consequential" reliefs. Along with the plaint, an application has also been filed for the issue of warrant to arrest the vessel under the admirality jurisdiction of the court. The plaint invokes the admirality jurisdiction of this court. 6. The first question that has to be tackled is whether this Court could exercise the admirality jurisdiction at all. Is such jurisdiction inherent in a High Court of any State which has got a sea coast line with ports thereon. Or is such jurisdiction one to be specifically conferred by statute or existing in a court on account of ancient practice. The jurisdiction of a court is generally limited to matters which have some sort of connection with the country in which the court sits. Or is such jurisdiction one to be specifically conferred by statute or existing in a court on account of ancient practice. The jurisdiction of a court is generally limited to matters which have some sort of connection with the country in which the court sits. A court in a State will assume jurisdiction over disputes concerning land in that State or between persons, natural and artificial (created by legal fiction), resident or doing business in that State. Admirality jurisdiction has always been different. Many matters which come before maritime courts concern events which occur outside any country on the high seas. In England, admirality jurisdiction began in the Court of the Lord High Admiral, whose original function was to deal with crimes that were committed on the high seas and thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary court. Today jurisdiction of the High Court, acting through the Admirality Court of the Queen's Bench Division, is governed by Part I of the Administration of Justice Act, 1956, which was passed in the light of the two Brussels Conventions of 1952 on the Arrest of Seagoing Ships and Civil Jurisdiction in Collisions. The history, the story of how in England, the admirality jurisdiction with its ancient origin had passed through several vicissitudes during the past several centuries and came to be fixed on statutes, primarily and mostly based on principles previously adopted by the Admirality Court from general law of the sea, observed by the western nations is, indeed interesting but for the purpose of this case an excursion into that region is not called for. 7. As far as Indian Courts are concerned, admirality jurisdiction was conferred on the Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts by the various Letters Patent of 1862 establishing them. The Letters Patent of 1862 was superseded by that of 1865 but by Clause.32 of the said Letters Patent, the admirality jurisdiction in the same form was retained. When Patna High Court was formed in 1916, by Clause.24 of the Letters Patent constituting that Court, the admirality jurisdiction that was exercisable by the Calcutta High Court as regards the then Province of Bihar and Orissa was to be exercised by the Patna High Court. 8. The State of Kerala was formed as per S.5 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, Act 37 of 1956. 8. The State of Kerala was formed as per S.5 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, Act 37 of 1956. The State was to comprise - (a) the territories of the existing State of Travancore Cochin, excluding the territories transferred to the State of Madras namely that comprised in the Agastheeswaram, Thovala, Kalkulam and Vilavancode Taluks of then Trivandrum District and the Shencottah Taluk of the Quilon District and (b) territories comprised in Malabar District, excluding the islands of Laccadive and Minicoy and (c) Kasaragod Taluk of South Canara District. As per the said Act, corresponding new State in relation to the then existing State of Travancore Cochin was the new State of Kerala and corresponding State in relation to the new State of Kerala was the then existing State of Travancore Cochin. As per S.49 of the same Act, the High Court of Kerala was formed for the State of Kerala. S.52 of the Act provided: "The High Court for a new State shall have, in respect of any part of the territories included in that new State, all such original appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, is exercisable in respect of that part of the said territories by any High Court or Judicial Commissioner's Court for an existing State." 9. Mr. Goho's contention was that in the light of secation 52 of the Sates Recorganisaciton Act, as far as the Cochin Port is concerned the admirality jurisdiction that was being exercised by the Madras High Court before the Act in respect of that area could be exercised by this Court -the Kerala High Court. In reliance of his contention that the Madras High Court. In reliance of his contention that the Madras High Court had jurisdiction over the Cochin Port area is concerned he placed before this Court the decisions reported in- A.I.R 1915 Madras 833 (Kariadan Kumber v. B.I.S.N Co.) A.I.R. 1924 Madras 885 (Clan Line Limited v. Srinivasa Pai) A.I.R. 1931 Madras 115 (Madura Co. Ltd., Alleppey v. Xavier) and A.I.R. 1933 Madras 7 (Pathraj v. New Bombay Steamships) These are cases where in respect of with certain civil action where the cause of action arose in fort Cochin area, appeals are seen to have been taken to Madras High Court. 10. Ltd., Alleppey v. Xavier) and A.I.R. 1933 Madras 7 (Pathraj v. New Bombay Steamships) These are cases where in respect of with certain civil action where the cause of action arose in fort Cochin area, appeals are seen to have been taken to Madras High Court. 10. The argument of the learned counsel is based on some confusion identifying the area of what is known as Fort Cochin, formerly also called British Cochin which was part of the erstwhile Malabar District of Madras State with the present area of the Modern Cochin Port. Fort Cochin which was a small Municipal Town at the time of the formation of the Kerala State continued for some time as the smallest municipal town of Kerala till it became part of Cochin Corporation. As the learned author of the Ernakulam District Gazetteer states the development of Cochin into a modern Port is a romance of work and vision. It could not, until four decades back, take its rightful place as a modern deep sea Port because of a rock-like barrier of sand which blocked the approach to the Port from the sea. would further quote from the District Gazetteer: "For centuries the Harbour was only a roadstead and boats and lighters took cargo to ocean - going steamers waiting outside and brought back rice, the principal import and other goods. For more than a hundred years there were proposals of developing the Port by cutting a deep channel for ships to enter and come inside. Probably no dredging proposition since the days of the Suez Canal project has aroused so much technical interest as the opening up of the Cochin Harbour. For 70 years one engineer after another discussed the project, but there was no agreed solution. At last what was first thought an illusory dream was brought within the realm of reasonable hope. There were people who persevered in the hope that an improved dredging apparatus would render the through channel practicable. In 1920 the Madras Government, which was then in control of the Port, clinched the matter by starting the work on a small scale. After many daring experiments and surveys the cutting of an approach channel from the deep sea across the bar to the Harbour was accomplished. The work was made possible by using a suction dredger - Lord Willingdon - with pipe line. After many daring experiments and surveys the cutting of an approach channel from the deep sea across the bar to the Harbour was accomplished. The work was made possible by using a suction dredger - Lord Willingdon - with pipe line. The performance of this dredger had created a world record for speed, cheapness and continuity of work. In three working seasons, by 1929, the approach channel, 450 feet wide and 3 1/2 miles long, was cut across the bar, connecting the Harbour mouth with the deep-sea. During 1930-31 the Port was thrown open for vessels upto 30 feet draft. It had become accessible for deep water traffic in the worst monsoons, providing a splendid anchorage at all times of the year. Then began the conversion of the Harbour into a major Port. The development was divided into four stages. The first stage consisted of all preliminary works of an investigatory nature before 1920 when Mr. R.G. Bristow (later Sir Robert Bristow), the pioneer architect of the Port, was appointed for development of the Harbour. The second stage consisted mainly of foreshore protection, a part of the reclamation wall and the experimental dredging inside and outside which cost Rs. 9 lakhs. The third stage consisted of the major dredging operations inside and outside, the moorings, a few residences, a large area of reclamation, and a dry dock. On this reclamation of about 780 acres in area arose Willingdon Island, the nerve centre of Port activities. It cost about 79 lakhs. The fourth stage included all works necessary to convert Cochin into a first class modern Port, like the provision of bridges, wharf, quay berths, cranes, warehouse and transit sheds, offices, a reserve light and power plant, roads, residences, port railway, water supply and a number of small works. Its cost came to nearly Rs. 117 lakhs. The further programme of works for the Harbour and Willingdon Island was based on an anticipated growth of the trade to 2 million tons in 1960 with an ultimate target of 4 million tons in about 30 or 40 years ahead. In 1936, the Cochin Port was declared as a Major Port and the Government of India took direct control of its administration. The provision of facilities of a first class terminal Port was completed by the end of 1939. The first ship came along the new wharf on 2nd June, 1939. In 1936, the Cochin Port was declared as a Major Port and the Government of India took direct control of its administration. The provision of facilities of a first class terminal Port was completed by the end of 1939. The first ship came along the new wharf on 2nd June, 1939. At first the Port started with 2 wharf berths and due to the intervention of the war, improvements had to be temporarily kept in abeyance. However, one more berth was added during the war. As part of the Post - War Development Scheme, the wharf was extended by another berth. By 1951, the Port had four wharf berths capable of accommodating four vessels of 450 ft. in length, in addition to the Boat Train Pier which was meant for passenger ships and as a coal berth, 13 stream moorings in the Mattancherry channel in the western side and three stream moorings in the Ernakulam channel in the eastern side. The stream moorings in the Ernakulam channel were mainly intended for use of oil tankers and the rest for steamers carrying general cargo." 11. Before the development of the Port when it was only a roadstead and boats and lighters took cargo to ocean-going steamers waiting outside and also brought back goods from the ship, the Fort Cochin area of the erstwhile Malabar District served as the Port area. The later development of the harbour was the joint contribution of four Governments, namely the Government of India, the Government of Madras and the Government of the Princely States of Travancore and Cochin. The partnership between these four Governments was embodied in an agreement known as the Four Party Agreement, published in G.O. No. 468, Finance (Marine) Department of the Government of Madras, dated 31st July, 1925. The reclaimed area from the backwaters of the Cochin Port and the big sketch of back waters surrounding the Island of Venduruthy and the reclaimed area are all areas which were in the erstwhile Cochin State. At no time before independence, Cochin State had given up its sovereignty over those areas to the Indian Government which would have invited the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court over the areas. No doubt the Fort Cochin area was within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court till the State of Kerala was formed. At no time before independence, Cochin State had given up its sovereignty over those areas to the Indian Government which would have invited the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court over the areas. No doubt the Fort Cochin area was within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court till the State of Kerala was formed. In the circumstances it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the admirality jurisdiction which the Madras High Court had exercised over the Port of Cochin stood transferred to the Kerala High Court. The Madras High Court had no jurisdiction over the area which forms the major portion of the present Port of Cochin. Its jurisdiction was limited to Fort Cochin area. 12. It was also hazily submitted that the Cochin High Court and the successor Travancore Cochin High Court and then the Kerala High Court with its jurisdiction stretching over a large coast line with a major port had/has the admirality jurisdiction inherent in itself without conferment by any statute even though occasions might not have arisen for exercise of it. It is extremely doubtful whether the Indian Courts without specific conferment of such power by the positive act of the State could exercise such power adopting the principles from the general law of the sea which had been observed by the western nations. It was contended by Mr. Goho that the absence of any such jurisdiction for a Port like Cochin might create difficulties commercially and otherwise. However, I need not go into that question in any detail because according to me this court cannot entertain this suit even assuming it has got the admirality jurisdiction on the following grounds. 13. It might be considered what was the ambit of the admirality jurisdiction of the Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras where admittedly from the 19th century onwards such jurisdiction was being exercised. Clause.32 of the Letters Patent of 1865 which superseded the Letters Patent of 1862 had provided as follows:- "And we do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at ................................ shall have and exercise all such civil and maritime jurisdiction as may now be exercised by the said High Court, and also such jurisdiction for the trial and adjudication of prize causes and other maritime questions arising in India as may now be exercised by the said High Court." 14. shall have and exercise all such civil and maritime jurisdiction as may now be exercised by the said High Court, and also such jurisdiction for the trial and adjudication of prize causes and other maritime questions arising in India as may now be exercised by the said High Court." 14. In 1890 the British Parliament passed the Colonial Courts of Admirality Act, 1890 (53,54 Victoria, Chapter 27 which enabled the colonial legislature like that of the Legislature of British India to declare certain courts to be colonial courts of admirality and the courts so declared shall have the admirality jurisdiction declared under the Act. The relevant provision in the Act of 1890 about the ambit of jurisdiction is as follows:- " The Jurisdiction of a colonial of a admirality shall.......... be over the like places, persons, matters and things as the admirality jursdiction whether existing by virtue of a statute or otherwise." 15. In exercise of powers coferred by the 1890 Act; the Indian Legislature passed Act 16 1891. Section 20 of the Act declared the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay as colonial courts of admirality jurisdiction as was exercised by the High Court of Admirality in England under any statute or otherwise. 16. If might be pointed out here that in 1890 the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admirality was governed by the Admirality Court Act of 1861. 17. Question had arisen in cases regarding the meaning of the provision in the Colonial Courts of Admirality Act that the jurisdiction of a colonial court of admirality shall be as the admirality jurisdiction of the High Court of England whether existing by virtue of a statute or otherwise. The question was whether the word "existing" means existing at the point of time when the Colonial Courts of Admirality Act, 1890 became law. After exhaustive consideration of the question, the Privy Council said in the case of The Yuri Maru The Waron (1927 AC 906 at 915 and 916): "The present case arises upon an enlargement by the Imperial Parliament of the admirality jurisdiction of the High Court in England. After exhaustive consideration of the question, the Privy Council said in the case of The Yuri Maru The Waron (1927 AC 906 at 915 and 916): "The present case arises upon an enlargement by the Imperial Parliament of the admirality jurisdiction of the High Court in England. But the fact cannot be overlooked that during the last half-century the distribution of business in the High Court in England has been the subject of very numerous enactments, and there is involved in the question now presented for determination the further question whether the withdrawal of any cause of action from admirality process in England would ipso facto operate a corresponding diminution in admirality jurisdiction in the Court overseas. A construction of the statute of 1890, which would have the singular effect of introducing by any automatic process unasked changes in the jurisdiction and procedure of the Courts of self governing dominions, with possible power in the local legislature by a cumbrous process to revoke an extension of jurisdiction in rem, but no power to undo an unwelcome abatement, manifestly could not be adopted unless the words of the statute should be found to leave no alternative. Neither the early history of the overseas Courts, the course of modern legislation, continuity of policy, nor practical convenience appear to their Lordships to require that the jurisdiction defined in the Act shall be declared to be that "from time to time existing" in the High Court in England. On the whole, the true intent of the Act appears to their Lordships to have been to define as a maximum of jurisdictional authority for the Courts to be set up thereunder, the admirality jurisdiction of the High Court in England as it existed at the time when the Act was passed. What shall from time to time be added or excluded is left for independent legislative determination." It is on this basis Justice P. B. Mukerji as he then was said in the Jayaswal Shipping Co. v. S. S. Leelavati ( AIR 1954 Cal. 415 ) that the admirality jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court in respect of a claim for necessaries is the same as used and exercised in England as defined by S.5 of the Admirality Court Act, 1861. 18. Justice Shah in Kamalakar Mahadev v. S. S. Navigation Co., Ltd. ( AIR 1961 Bom. v. S. S. Leelavati ( AIR 1954 Cal. 415 ) that the admirality jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court in respect of a claim for necessaries is the same as used and exercised in England as defined by S.5 of the Admirality Court Act, 1861. 18. Justice Shah in Kamalakar Mahadev v. S. S. Navigation Co., Ltd. ( AIR 1961 Bom. 186 ) (where the learned Judge has dwelt at length on the scope and nature of the admirality jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay) said that Bombay being one of the colonial courts of admirality under Act 16 of 1891 today exercises the same admirality jurisdiction as was exercised by the High Court of Admirality in England in 1890 when the Colonial Courts of Admirality Act was passed by the British Parliament. The learned Judge further said that one will have to examine and ascertain as to what was the scope and nature of jurisdiction of the High Court of Admirality in England either under any statute or otherwise in the year 1890, because it would be just that jurisdiction which is exercisable by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay down to date. The same view is reiterated by Justice Kantawala in Sahida Ismail v. P. R . Salvejkove ( AIR 1973 Bom. 18 ). 19. With this background let us look into the claim of the plaintiff" in the matter. In effect the basis of his claim is that the defendants had acted wrongfully and in breach of the contract of carriage. It is alleged that the defendants committed breach of the duty under the Bill of Lading and failed and neglected to deliver the cargo belonging to the plaintiff and had converted the same. 20. Under the. In effect the basis of his claim is that the defendants had acted wrongfully and in breach of the contract of carriage. It is alleged that the defendants committed breach of the duty under the Bill of Lading and failed and neglected to deliver the cargo belonging to the plaintiff and had converted the same. 20. Under the. Admirality Court Act, 1861, claims for damage to cargo is under S.6, which states: "The High Court of Admirality shall have jurisdiction over any claim by the owner or consignee or assignee of any bill of lading of any goods carried into any Port in England or Wales in any ship, for damage done to the goods or any part thereof by the negligence or misconduct or for any breach of duty or breach of contract on the part of the owner, master, or crew of the ship, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that at the time of the institution of the cause any owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales: Provided always that if in any such cause the plaintiff do not recover twenty pounds he shall not be entitle to any costs, charges, or expenses incurred by him therein, unless the judge shall certify that the cause was a fit one to be tried in the said Court." Claims for necessaries is under S.5 of the Admirality Court Act while the Court is given jurisdiction over any claims for damage done by any ship under S.7. "5. The High Court of Admirality shall have jurisdiction over any claim for necessaries supplied to any ship elsewhere than in the Port to which the ship belongs, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that at the time of the institution of the cause any owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales: Provided always, that if in any such cause the plaintiff do not recover twenty pounds he shall not be entitled to any costs, charges, or expenses incurred by him therein, unless the judge shall certify that the cause was a fit one to be tried in the said Court. 7. The High Court of admirality shall have jurisdiction over any claim for damage done by any ship." It is pointed out by Mr. 7. The High Court of admirality shall have jurisdiction over any claim for damage done by any ship." It is pointed out by Mr. Poti that as S.6 is the relevant provision this court will have jurisdiction in the matter only if the owner or part owner of the ship is not domiciled in India. As per S.2 of the Colonial Courts of Admirality Act, in place of the words 'England and Wales' we have to read the word 'India' there. Admittedly in this case the owner of the ship is an Indian Company, which is a Company with its domicile in India. Mr. Goho contended that S.7 of the Admirality Act would be applicable in this case. I find it difficult to accept this contention. It is S.6 that would directly be applicable here. "Under the Admirality Court Act, 1840, jurisdiction is conferred where damage is "received by", and under the Admirality Court Act, 1861, where damage is 'done by' a ship. In The Robert Pow (1863) Br. and L. 99 the word 'damage' in the Act of 1840 was limited by Dr. Lushington to what was stated to be the well understood meaning of the term in the Admirality Court, namely, damage caused by a collision between two ships. In later cases, however, the expression has been interpreted in its widest sense to cover any damage done by or received by a ship or vessel." Price - The Law of Maritime Liens - Page 38) But damage should be one which must be caused by the ship itself, not by the direct action of those who control her. In Curie v. McKnight ((1897) AC 97) the crew of Dunlossit, which was in danger of collision with the vessels between which she lay, cut the mooring ropes of the Easdale, thereby causing the latter vessel to be driven ashore. It was held that this was not such an act to give rise to a maritime lien for the damage sustained, as the Dunlossit was not the instrument of mischief. Lord Watson said in that case at pages 106 and 107: "I think it is of the essence of the rule that the damage in respect of which a maritime lien is admitted must be either the direct result or the natural consequence of a wrongful act or manoeuvre of the ship to which it attaches. Lord Watson said in that case at pages 106 and 107: "I think it is of the essence of the rule that the damage in respect of which a maritime lien is admitted must be either the direct result or the natural consequence of a wrongful act or manoeuvre of the ship to which it attaches. Such an act or manoeuvre is necessarily due to the want of skill or negligence of the persons by whom the vessel is navigated, but it is, in the language of maritime law, attributed to the ship, because the ship in their negligent or unskilful hands is the instrument which causes the damage." Lord Herschell said in that case at pages 107 and 108: "In the Admirality Court in England a maritime lien has frequently been enforced, in cases of collision, against the vessel which was in fault, but no case could be cited which was at all similar to the present one. In all the cases referred to the damage had been caused either by a collision with the vessel which was to blame, or by that vessel having driven the other into collision with some third vessel or other object. The doctrine was originally asserted in cases of damage by collision with the vessel which was declared subject to the lien. It has since been applied in cases in which the damage did not result from a collision with the vessel in fault, but in which, owing to the negligent navigation of that vessel, the injured ship was driven into collision with some other vessel or object. Whether the circumstances have always warranted the conclusions arrived at, it is not necessary to inquire. I express no opinion upon it; but the ground of the decision was in all cases this, that the vessel on which the lien was enforced had, in maritime language, done the damage. Here the Dunlossit did not damage. It was not by reason of the negligent navigation of that vessel that the disaster occurred. It arose simply from the wrongful act of the master in cutting the Easdale adrift. Here the Dunlossit did not damage. It was not by reason of the negligent navigation of that vessel that the disaster occurred. It arose simply from the wrongful act of the master in cutting the Easdale adrift. I am not prepared to extend the doctrine of maritime lien to such a case." Price in his well known book of law of Maritime Liens says at page 100: "Damage to cargo and breach of contract.- The Court of Admirality first obtained jurisdiction in relation to the carriage of goods under the Admirality Court Act, 1861. By S.6 of this Act jurisdiction was given over claims by the owner, consignee or assignee of the bill of lading of any goods carried by a ship into any Port in England or Wales for damage caused by negligence, or any breach of contract or breach of duty, unless at the time of the institution of the cause the owner or part-owner was domiciled in England or Wales. The jurisdiction is confined to claims for damage to cargo, for the breach of contract or duty must be in relation to goods and connected with damage to them. No maritime lien arises under the section, only a right in rem, since the right to proceed in the court depends on a condition prevailing at the time of the institution of the suit, whereas a maritime lien attaches at the moment when the damage is done." 21.It might be noted that in the case of the St. Elefterio ((1957) P. 179) Willmer J. held that the words 'any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship' were wide enough to cover such claims whether based in contract or in tort. 22.If the plaintiff cannot have recourse to S.6, there is no other provision under the Admirality Act of 1861, by which he could invoke the admirality jurisdiction. The ship being an Indian ship which has its domicile in India, the plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the admirality jurisdiction of this court. In this view I hold that in this case the plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the admirality jurisdiction. The suit is one that cannot be entertained by the court. In the circumstances the plaint may be returned to the plaintiff.