V. S. MALIMATH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner Sri A. N. Kesari has challenged in this writ petition Exhibit B dated 26-8-1977 the order made by respondent-1 the House Rent Controller, bangalore City, in No. HRC. V. DL. 66/75 rejecting the declaration of the petitioner made under Section 31c of the karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and for consequential reliefs. The petitioner is admittedly in occupation of premises bearing No. 37, First floor, 'suryalaya', Shankarmutt Road, shankarapuram, Bangalore-4, '-which premises is owned by Sri C. D. Gopal- krishna, respondent-2, Respondent-1 initiated proceedings in HRC. Misc. 451 of 1975 against the petitioner and respondent 2 alleging that the petitioner has occupied the premises unauthorisedly and in contravention of S. 4 of the Act. After holding enquiry, respondent-1 made an order on 7-6-1976 holding that the petitioner has in his occupation the premises in contravention of sub-sec- (2) of section 4 of the Act, and that, therefore, he is liable to be evicted. Against the said order the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Special Deputy Commissioner, bangalore, in HRA 125 of 1976-77 under s. 12 of the Act, which appeal came to be dismissed on 26-8-1976. The appellate authority while dismissing the appeal granted three months' time to the petitioner to vacate the premises. Before the said period of three months expired, karnataka Ordinance No. 29 of 1976 was promulgated by the Governor making certain amendments to the Act. By S. 3 of the said Ordinance new part VA has been inserted, which part contains the newly added sections 31a to 31d. Taking advantage of this Ordinance, the petitioner filed a declaration in accordance with S. 31b stating that he is in occupation of the premises in question in contravention of S. 4 of the Act, and that, therefore, he is entitled to regularisation of his unauthorised occupation. The declaration was presented by the petitioner on 17-11-1976. By Act 66 of 1976 the aforesaid Karnataka Ordinance 29 of 1976 and another Ordinance, were replaced and substantially the same provisions were re-enacted with retrospective effect from 13-10-1976. Respondent-1 after hearing both the parties made the impugned order on 26-8-1977 rejecting the declaration filed by the petitioner seeking regularisation of his unauthorised occupation of the premises. By Act 66 of 1976 the aforesaid Karnataka Ordinance 29 of 1976 and another Ordinance, were replaced and substantially the same provisions were re-enacted with retrospective effect from 13-10-1976. Respondent-1 after hearing both the parties made the impugned order on 26-8-1977 rejecting the declaration filed by the petitioner seeking regularisation of his unauthorised occupation of the premises. Respondent-1 further directed the petitioner to vacate the premises finally by 10-9-1977 failing which he would evict the petitioner forcibly in accordance with the provisions of S. 10a (b) of the Act. Being aggrieved of the said order, the petitioner has approached this Court for appropriate relief. Respondent-1 has taken the view that as no procedings was pending before any court or authority under the Act, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of ordinance 29 of 1976 and Act 66 of 1976, which replaced that Ordinance. Section 8 of Act 66 of 1976 corresponds to section 4 of the said Ordinance and reads as follows :"8. Certain pending proceedings: all proceedings including appeals pending before any court or authority, (i) on the 20th day of August 1976 shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by sections 2,3,4, and 6 of this Act, (ii) on the 13th day of October 1976 she 11 be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by sections 5 and 7 of this Act. "the contention of respondent-2 before respondent-1 that no proceedings were pending on the date on which the Ordinance came into force was rejected on the ground that the appeal presented by the petitioner under S. 12 of the Act before the Special Deputy Commissioner came to be dismissed on 26-8-1976, whereas the Ordinance was promulgated much later i. e. 13-10-1976. As three months' time was given by the Special Deputy commissioner for vacating the premises with effect from the date of disposal of the appeal i. e. 26-8-1976, the petitioner appears to have contended that the appeal must be deemed to have been pending for a period of three months from 26-8-1976. The contention of the petitioner was, in my opinion, rightly negatived by respondcnt-1. Sri H. N. Narayan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, also did not pursue the line of argument that was pursued by the petitioner before respondent-1 in this behalf. The contention of the petitioner was, in my opinion, rightly negatived by respondcnt-1. Sri H. N. Narayan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, also did not pursue the line of argument that was pursued by the petitioner before respondent-1 in this behalf. He rightly conceded that it cannot in the circumstances be asserted that any proceedings was pending on the date on which Ordinance 29 of 1976 was promulgated. Sri Narayan however maintained that even though S. 8 of Act 66 of 1976 is not applicable and even though no proceedings of the petitioner was pending on the date on which Ordinance 29 of 1976 came into force, the petitioner is still entitled to regularisation of his unauthorised occupation in accordance with the provisions of Ordinance 29 of 1976 and the provisions of Act 66 of 1976, which replaced it. Sri Mirle L. Krishnamurthy, learned counsel for respondent-2, however maintained that as the final order was passed by the Special Deputy commissioner on 26-8-1976 in the appeal of the petitioner before Ordinance 29 of 1976 came into force, the petitioner is not entitled to claim any relief either under Ordinance 29 of 1976 or under Act 66 of 1976 which has replaced the Ordinance. He maintained that having regard to the provisions of the Ordinance and the amending Act, it is not possible to take the view that orders which have become final and conclusive before the promulgation of the Ordinance can be rendered nugatory. It is in the light of the above rival contentions that I have to examine as to whether the petitioner can claim regularisation of his unauthorised occupation. As the provisions of Act 66 of 1976 which has replaced Ordinance 29 of 1976 have been given retrospective effect i. e from 13-10-1976 the date of promulgation of the Ordinance, it is enough for me to advert to and consider the relevant provisions of the amending Act. By the amending Act a new Chapter VA was introduced which added Ss. 31a to 31d to the principal Act. S. 31a provides that the provisions of Part VA shall apply to residential buildings to which Part II applies. It is not disputed that Part II applies to the residential premises in question. Ss. 31b, 31c and 31d which are relevant for the purpose of discussion read thus :"31b. 31a to 31d to the principal Act. S. 31a provides that the provisions of Part VA shall apply to residential buildings to which Part II applies. It is not disputed that Part II applies to the residential premises in question. Ss. 31b, 31c and 31d which are relevant for the purpose of discussion read thus :"31b. Voluntary declaration: (1) not-withstanding anything in this Act, (i) any landlord who has occupied or let out a residential building ; or (ii) any person who has occupied such building as a tenant, in contravention of section 4 or section 5, may, within sixty days from the date of coming into force of this section, make a declaration in this behalf to the prescribed authority : provided that the prescribed authority may entertain the declaration after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the declarant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the declaration in time. (2) Such declaration shall contain the following particulars, namely : (3) Name and address of the declarant; (b) Name and address of the landlord and tenant, if any ; (c) Location of the building along with its municipal Number ; (d) Date on which it was occupied or let out ; (e) Whether such landlord or tenant or any member of his family owns any residential building in the same city, town or village and if so details thereof; (f) The person in occupation of the building referred to in clause (e ). 31c. Regulation of occupation : (1) on receipt of the declaration under section 31b, the prescribed authority shall, if so satisfied pass an order declaring that the occupation or letting out from its inception is lawful: provided that no such order shall be passed in favour of a declarant who owns either in his own name or in the name of his family any residential building in the same city, town or village in which the building referred to in the declaration is situated. (2) On the passing of an order under sub-seed on (1), the declarant if he is a tenant shall be deemed for all purposes of the Act to be a person in whose favour the building is ordered to be leased under section 5. (2) On the passing of an order under sub-seed on (1), the declarant if he is a tenant shall be deemed for all purposes of the Act to be a person in whose favour the building is ordered to be leased under section 5. (3) The provisions of sub-section (3) of section 4 and section 10a shall not apply when an order under sub-section (1) is made. 31 D. Regularisation not to affect other remedies. Any order passed under subsection (1) of section 31c, shall not in any way prejudice any action taken or to be taken by any person under section 21. "it is clear from S. 31b that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act it provides for making a declaration seeking regularisation of premises occupied in contravention of S. 4 or S. 5 of the Act. The declaration is required to be made within sixty days from the date of coming into force of S. 31b of the Act to the prescribed authority. The proviso enables the prescribed authority to entertain a declaration presented after the expiry of the prescribed period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the declarant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the declaration in time. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 31b enumerates the particulars which the declaration should contain. One of the important particulars to be furnished by the declarant is as to whether the landlord or tenant or any member of his family owns any residential building in the same city, town or village, and if so to furnish the details thereof. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 31c provides that the prescribed authority shall if so satisfied pass an order declaring that the occupation or letting out from its inception is lawful. The proviso further makes it clear that no such order shall be passed in favour of the declarant if he owns either in his own name or in the name of his family any residential building in the same city, town or village in which the building to which the declaration refers to is situate. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 31c provides that once an order is made under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31c in favour of a person, he shall be deemed to be a tenant for all purposes of the Act as if the building had been ordered to be leased under section 5 of the act. Sub-sec. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 31c provides that once an order is made under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31c in favour of a person, he shall be deemed to be a tenant for all purposes of the Act as if the building had been ordered to be leased under section 5 of the act. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 31c provides that when an order is made under sub-sec. (1), provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 4 and S. 10a shall not apply. Section 31d declares that any order made under sub-sec. (1) of Section 31c shall not in any way prejudice any action taken or to be taken by any person under Section 21 of the Act. The object of the Legislature in enacting Part VA of the Act is to enable persons who have occupied residential premises to which Part II of the Act applies, in contravention of Section 4 or section 5 of the Act, to seek regularisation of their un-authorised occupation of the premises. If the provisions of S. 31b and 31c of the Act are analysed, it follows that in order to get the benefit of regularisation the following conditions have to be satisfied ; (1) that the premises is in the occupation of a tenant in contravention of section 4 or Section 5 of the Act; (2) that he makes a declaration seeking regularisation to the prescribed authority within the prescribed time and furnishes the prescribed particulars ; and (3) that the person seeking the benefit of regularisation or any member of his family does not own any residential building in the same city, town or village. If the prescribed authority is satisfied that the person has occupied the premises in contravention of Section 4 or Section 5 of the Act and neither he nor any member of his family owns any residential building in the same city, town or village, he will be entitled to regularisation of his occuption. Once such an order is made under sub-sec. (1) of Section 31c, the declarant if he is a tenant shall be deemed to be a tenant in whose favour the building is ordered to be leased under section 5 of the Act. If the conditions specified for seeking regularisation are satisfied, the petitioner would undoubtedly be entitled to an order of regularisation in his favour. (1) of Section 31c, the declarant if he is a tenant shall be deemed to be a tenant in whose favour the building is ordered to be leased under section 5 of the Act. If the conditions specified for seeking regularisation are satisfied, the petitioner would undoubtedly be entitled to an order of regularisation in his favour. In this case, there is already an adjudication by the Special Deputy Commissioner in the appeal of the petitioner that he is in occupation of the premises in contravention of Section 4 of the Act. It is not disputed that neither the petitioner 'nor any member of his family owns any residential building in the City of Bangalore, where the premises in question is situate. On the date on which the petitioner presented the declaration under S. 31b of the Act he was admittedly in occupation of the premises. Hence it follows that all the conditions specified in S. 31b of the Act are satisfied in this case. If all the conditions specified in S. 31b of the Act are satisfied, the petitioner would be entitled to an order in his favour, under sub-sec. ( ) of S. 31c of the Act. But it was maintained by Sri mirle Krishnamurthy appearing for respondent-2 that even if all the conditions specified in Section 31b ofthe Act are satisfied, no order can be made in favour of the petitioner regularising his occupation under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31c of the act, as a final order has been passed against him under S. 10a of the Act, for summary eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he is in occupation of the premises in contravention of sub-sec. (2) of S. 4 of the Act. He maintained that as the order came to be passed before the Ordinance 29 of 1976 came into force, the same is not rendered nugatoty by the subsequent promulgation of Ordinance 29 oi" 1976. He maintained that it is only if there was a pending proceeding the petitioner could have taken the benefit of the ordinance and the Act, which replaced it. It is necessary to point out that S. 31b of the Act prevails notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the act as it starts with a non-obstante clause. He maintained that it is only if there was a pending proceeding the petitioner could have taken the benefit of the ordinance and the Act, which replaced it. It is necessary to point out that S. 31b of the Act prevails notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the act as it starts with a non-obstante clause. There is nothing in the language of S. 31b or 31c of the Act from which an inference can be drawn that if a final order had been made under S. 10a of the Act, the parson who is in actual possession of the premises in contravention of sub-sec. (2) of S. 4 of the Act on the date on which the Ordinance came into force, will not he entitled to the benefit of the Ordinance. In this connection sub-sec. (3) of S. 3lc of the Act puts the matter beyond all doubt. It provides that provisions of sub- sec. (3) of S. 4 and Sec. 10a of the Act shall not apply when an order under sub- sec. (1) S. 31c of the Act is made. S. 10a of the Act provides for eviction by the controller of a person who has occupied the premises in contravention of sub-sec. (2) of S. 4 of the Act. It is under sub- sec. (2) of S. 10a of the Act that the Controiler can make an order after holding appropriate enquiry directing the person in occupation in contravention of sub-sec. (2) S. 4 of the Act to vacate the building within the specified time. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 10a provides that every person against whom an order is made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 10a of the Act shall vacate and deliver possession of the building to the Controller. It further provides that if the building is not so vacated and its possession delivered to the Controller, the Controller may summarily dispossess the person in occupation and take possession of the building. Now sub-sec. (3) of s. 31c of the Act provides that once an order is made under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31c of the Act, the provisions of S. 10a of the act shall not apply. It, therefore, follows that even if there is an order against the person in occupation in contravention of sub-sec. Now sub-sec. (3) of s. 31c of the Act provides that once an order is made under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31c of the Act, the provisions of S. 10a of the act shall not apply. It, therefore, follows that even if there is an order against the person in occupation in contravention of sub-sec. (2) of S. 4 of the Act, made under sub-sec (2) of S. 10a of the Act, the same cannot be enforced once an order is made under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31c of the Act. In my opinion sub-sec. (3) of S. 31c of the Act enures for the benefit of those persons who have suffered an order under sub-sec. (2) of S. 10a of the Act, but who have not yet delivered possession to the controller in accordance with the said order on the date on which the Ordinance came into force. The intention of the legislature is clearly to the effect that persons like the petitioner who have suffered an order under sub-sec. (2) of S. 10a of the Act and who have not yet been dispossessed of the residential building should also get the benefit of the provisions ss. 31b and 31c of the Act. It is not, therefore, possible to accede to the contention of Sri Mirle Krishnamurthy that merely because an order under sub-sec. (2) of S. 10a of the Act was made on 26-8-1976, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of Ss. 31b and 31c of the act. It is necessary to point out that though an order as aforesaid was made on 26-8-1976, he was given three months' time to vacate the premises, by the. Spl. Deputy Commissioners. On the date on which Ordinance 29 of 1976 came into force he was admittedly in possession of of the premises which he has occupied in contravention of sub-sec. (2) of S. 4 of the act. I have, therefore, no hesitation to take the view that the petitioner is clearly entitled to the benefit of Ss. 31b and 31c of the Act. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of the Rent Controller Exhibit 'b' is hereby quashed and respondent-1 is directed to make an approptiate order under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31c of the Act in the light of the observations made in the course of this order. 31b and 31c of the Act. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of the Rent Controller Exhibit 'b' is hereby quashed and respondent-1 is directed to make an approptiate order under sub-sec. (1) of S. 31c of the Act in the light of the observations made in the course of this order. No: costs. --- *** --- .