Judgment 1. The Provident Fund Inspector appointed under the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the complainant of the Criminal Case No. 97 (M) of 1977, in which the opposite parties were arrayed as accused has come to this Court in criminal revision for setting aside the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, dated 20-5-1978 by which recalling his previous order dated 12-1-1977 passed in that case taking cognizance against the opposite parties, he dismissed the complaint. 2. On 12-1-1977, the petitioner, as complainant filed a complaint against the opposite parties, all connected with the Bihar State Electricity Board, for their prosecution under Sec.14 of the Act read with para 96 of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Scheme) alleging infraction of the relevant provisions on 25-10-72, 25-11-72 and 25-12-72. In receipt of the complaint, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna took cognizance in the case on that date itself, namely, 12-1-1977, under Sec.14 of the Act and ordered for issue of processes against the opposite party. On 18-5-1977, the Chief Judicial Magistrate transferred this case for disposal before a Judicial Magistrate 1st Class. Some of the opposite parties appeared before the transferee court while others did not and steps were taken by the transferee court for issue of warrant against them. On 15-3-1978, the transferee court adjourned the case to 25-4-1978 for the presence of the accused On 25-4-1978, the Chief Judicial Magistrate as it appears, recalled this case to his file from the transferee court and ordered for its being put up on 5-5-1978 for hearing and subsequently he adjourned it to 20-5-1978 for hearing. 3. On 20-5-1978, a petition was filed on behalf of the opposite party raising the plea that cognizance having been taken beyond the period of limitation as provided in Sec. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) the order dated 12-1-1977 was illegal and bad in law. A prayer was, therefore, made to hear this petition on the point of limitation, dismiss the case and discharge the petitioner. A prayer was, therefore, made to hear this petition on the point of limitation, dismiss the case and discharge the petitioner. Although a copy of this petition appears to have been served on the other side on 19-5-1978, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that without hearing the petitioner the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the impugned order and holding therein that cognizance having been taken on 12-1-1977 after the period of limitation this order was void ab initio and shall be deemed to be non-existent, he recalled that order and dismissed the complaint and the petitioner has challenged this order in this criminal revision. 4. The sole contention raised by Shri Hari Kishore Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, was that there being no provision in the Code empowering the Chief Judicial Magistrate to recall the previous orders passed by him, the impugned order was bad in law and must be set aside by this Court, the contention of Shri Birendra Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the opposite party, being to the contrary. 5. The contention of Shri Hari Kishore Thakur is well founded and it must prevail. It is undisputed that the order dated 12-1-1977 was a judicial order though the learned counsel for the opposite party described it as illegal. Obviously this judicial order was passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in the usual way that is generally followed after registering the complaint. It is further un-disputed that, by the impugned order, the Chief Judicial Magistrate recalled the order dated 12-1-1977. There is no provision worth the name in the Code empowering a Magistrate to review or recall an order passed by him and Shri Sinha has failed to point out a single provision therein to this effect. The question of exercise of the inherent powers by the Magistrate under Sec. 482 of the Code obviously cannot arise as Sec. 482 of the Code empowers only the High Court to exercise such powers in appropriate circumstances mentioned therein. In those circumstances law does not permit a Magistrate to recall a judicial order even if the Magistrate feels that there are justifiable grounds for the same. In those circumstances law does not permit a Magistrate to recall a judicial order even if the Magistrate feels that there are justifiable grounds for the same. If a Magistrate is permitted to recall a judicial order against the provisions of statute the effect may be disastrous and such lapses cannot be ignored or overlooked and this Court is within its jurisdiction to correct such illegality in its revisional jurisdiction apart from the exercise of its inherent powers. Shri H. K. Thakur referred in this connection to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bindeshwari Prasad Singh V/s. Kali Singh, reported in AIR 1977 SC 2432 in support of his contention and, in my opinion, rightly. 6. The contentions of Shri Sinha, learned counsel for the opposite party were twofold. According to him the Chief Judicial Magistrate was justified in passing the impugned order, in view of the provisions of Sec. 410 of the Code. Sub-section (1) of Sec. 410 empowers a Chief Judicial Magistrate to withdraw any case which he has made over to any Magistrate subordinate to him and further authorises him to inquire into or try such case himself, or refer it for inquiry or trial to any other such Magistrate competent to inquire into or try the same. This power of a Chief Judicial Magistrate cannot be disputed but the purpose for which he can exercise such powers has been well emphasised in the section and it is for enabling him to inquire into or try the case himself or refer it for inquiry or trial to any other Magistrate. This section does not authorise a Magistrate to recall a case transferred by him to any other Magistrate for the purpose of recalling an earlier order passed by him. This contention has, therefore, no force and it must fail. The second contention of Shri Sinha was that the taking of cognizance on 12-1-1977 being patently illegal, this Court should not allow such an illegal order to stand by setting aside an order by which the mistake has been Corrected. Prima facie, this argument is attractive but on a deeper analysis it has to be negatived. 7. There would be a presumption about the judicial acts having been regularly, performed unless it is shown or proved to the contrary. Prima facie, this argument is attractive but on a deeper analysis it has to be negatived. 7. There would be a presumption about the judicial acts having been regularly, performed unless it is shown or proved to the contrary. The bar of limitation under Chapter XXXVI was created under the new Code, there being no such provision in the earlier Code. The bar created by Sec. 468 of the Code, as will appear from the subsequent sections of that Chapter, is qualified by the other provisions of this Chapter and Sec. 473 of the Code particularly provides that notwithstanding anything contained in foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. Although in para 5 of the application for revision the petitioner has tried to make out circumstances justifying extension of the period of limitation under the provisions of S. 473, no such point appears to have been made out in the printed complaint filed by the petitioner on 12-1-1977. But it is to be noted that Sec. 473 of the Code does not necessarily require the Magistrate to record any reason for taking cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation nor does it specifically provide that the filing of an application for condonation of delay by the party concerned is necessary. In such circumstances it was improper on the part of the Magistrate to decide the question of limitation without allowing any opportunity to the complainant to be heard in the matter. If the impugned order illegally recalls a judicial order passed earlier having the presumption of its having been passed regularly, it cannot be justified by looking to the purpose for which the order of recall is passed particularly when the grievance, if any, of the opposite party to this effect can be agitated and remedied in other ways in accordance with law. 8. Shri H. K. Thakur cited before me an unreported decision of this Court in Criminal Revn. Nos. 881 and 900 of 1978, decided by the Hon ble Mr. 8. Shri H. K. Thakur cited before me an unreported decision of this Court in Criminal Revn. Nos. 881 and 900 of 1978, decided by the Hon ble Mr. Justice Manoranjan Prasad on the 11th of September, 1979 which appears to be on all fours with the facts of the present case and supports the view that I have taken in this case. 9. The result is that the criminal revision is allowed and the impugned order dated 20-5-1978 is set aside. It would, however, be open to the members of the opposite party to agitate the question of limitation in accordance with law.