JUDGMENT - S.C. PRATAP, J.:---By this petition (directed to be heard by Division Bench of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner, Balkrishna Tukaram Shikhare, challenges the order dated 28th November, 1974, passed by the learned Member (Shri D.S. Sonone) of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in review application filed before him by the respondent herein, Madhukar Ramchandra Pawar. 2. Facts and circumstances of the case are as follows :--- 3. The land in dispute admeasures 14 gunthas plus 3 gunthas potkharab bearing Revision Survey No. 809/A/2 (old Revision Survey No. 742) and situated at Karad District Satara. The land in dispute aforesaid is hereafter referred to as the said land. This land was originally purchased by one Pandurang Vasudev Shikhare (paternal grandfather of the petitioner herein) and one Raghunath Dattatraya Vingakar in July 1917. In a petitioner between Pandurang and Raghunath, the said land came to the share of Pandurang. In the year 1959-60, there took place between the petitioner and the respondent herein proceedings known as R.T.S. proceedings before the revenue authorities. These proceedings related to an entry of the respondent Madhukar herein showing his name as a tenant in respect of the said. These R.T.C. proceedings ultimately reached before the Commissioner and the Commissioner by his order dated 26th December, 1961 came to the conclusion in favour of the petitioner herein and against the respondent herein to the effect that the name of the respondant Madhukar was wrongly shown in the revenue records as tenant of the said land. In consequence of this finding, the Commissioner directed the name of the respondent to be delated from the revenue records in respect of the said land. The dispute, however, did not and at this stage but rather commenced and went on further till the present stage when it has come to this Court. As the respondent started obstructing the petitioners in latters possession and enjoyment of the said land, the police authorities at karad passed an order in December 1962 prohibiting the respondent from entering into the said land. As the respondent started obstructing the petitioners in latters possession and enjoyment of the said land, the police authorities at karad passed an order in December 1962 prohibiting the respondent from entering into the said land. Thereupon, the respondant filed Regular Civil Suit No. 224 of 1962 against the petitioner here in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Karad, for a declaration that the order passed by the police authorities prohibiting the respondent from entering into the said land was illegal and also claiming permanent injunction against the petitioner herein not to obstruct the respondent from his alleged possession and enjoyment of the said land. The suit was contested by the petitioner. The trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 27th July, 1964 dismissed the suit of the respondent on merits. Civil appeal No. 288 of 1964 preferred therefrom by the respondent to the District Court, Satara, also suffered the same fate of dismissal on 5th April, 1965. The respondant thereupon filed Second Appeal No. 1305 of 1965 to this Court. This second appeal was also dismissed in limine by this Court by its order dated 29th January, 1966, Thus, the dispute relating to the wrong entry of respondents name in the revenue records stood resolved in the petitioner herein and the Civil suit including its entire gamut of appeal to the District Court and second appeal to this Court also stood resolved favour of the petitioner herein. But there was yet another litigation instituted by the respondant against the petitioner herein and that was a proceedings under the Bombay Tenancy Act. The respondant had filed Tenancy Application No. 996 of 1961 before the Tenancy Aval Karkun of karad against the petitioner herein under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy Act for a declaration regarding his alleged tenancy rights in respect of the said land. These proceedings were also contested by the petitioner. The Tenancy Aval Karkun by his order 5th July, 1971, however, allowed the respondents application and declared him to be a tenant of the said land. The petitioner preferred Tenancy Appeal No. 51 of 1971 against the aforesaid order of the Tenancy Aval Karkun. The Appellate Authority viz. These proceedings were also contested by the petitioner. The Tenancy Aval Karkun by his order 5th July, 1971, however, allowed the respondents application and declared him to be a tenant of the said land. The petitioner preferred Tenancy Appeal No. 51 of 1971 against the aforesaid order of the Tenancy Aval Karkun. The Appellate Authority viz. the Special Deputy Collector, Tenancy Appeals, Satara, by his order dated 10th March, 1972 allowed the petitioners appeal, set aside the order dated 5th July, 1971, passed by the Tenancy Aval Karkun and dismissed the respondents original application. This order of the Appellate Authority was challenged by the respondent by the preferring against the same revision application to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The said revision application was heard by the learned member, Shri Sonone, of the Revenue Tribunal. And by its well considered judgement and order dated 25th June, 1974, the Tribunal dismissed the respondants revision application for the following concluding observations :--- "Therefore, taking into consideration all the evidence both oral and documentary on record, the findings of the lower Appellate Court seems to be just and legal and I do not find reason to interfere into it." Thus, the respondents original application stood dismissed and the order passed by the tenancy Appellate Authority stood confirmed. Thus, in the third proceedings between the parties also the petitioner succeeded as against the respondent. 4. It is what happened thereafter before the Revenue Tribunal that is the subject matter of this petition. As started above, the Revenue Tribunal by its order dated 25th June, 1974 had already dismissed respondents revision application on its own merits and after considering the record of the case and after finding that the order of the Appellant Authority was just and legal and after holding that there was no reason to interfere therewith. It seems that the said order dated 25th June, 1974, passed by the Revenue Tribunal, was not challenged by the respondent by any writ petition to this Court against the same. The respondent, however, filed before the Revenue Tribunal an application for review of the Tribunals aforesaid order of 25th June, 1974. Notice of the said review application was given to the petitioner herein. The respondent, however, filed before the Revenue Tribunal an application for review of the Tribunals aforesaid order of 25th June, 1974. Notice of the said review application was given to the petitioner herein. After hearing the respective advocates of the petitioner and the respondent, the learned Member of the Revenue Tribunal, who had himself heard and dismissed the original revision application, however, allowed this review application by his order dated 28th November, 1974, set aside the Tribunals previous order dated 25th June, 1974, also set aside the order of the Tenancy Appellate Court and restored the original order of 5th July, 1971, passed by the Tenancy Aval Karkun. It is against this order dated 28th November, 1974 passed by the Revenue Tribunal in the review application aforesaid that the petitioner herein has come to this Court by way of the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 5. In support of the petition, we have heard Mr. N.D. Hombalkar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner. The respondent is represented before us by his learned Counsel, Dr. B.R. Naik. Mr. Hombalkar, the learned Advocate, vehemently submitted that the impugned order passed by the Revenue Tribunal in the review application was unwarranted and unsustainable and the same was liable to be set aside and quashed. Dr. Naik has, on the other hand, equally vehemently submitted that the said order was correct and consequently not liable to be interfered with. 6. Carefully considering the rival submissions of the respective Advocates and going through the judgments of the authorities below including, of course, the judgment in the review application as also going through the record of the case (for receipt of which record this matter was once adjourned), we are of the view that this is pre-eminently a case which requires our interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Tribunal has, in our considered view, totally exceeded the bounds of its limited jurisdiction in a review proceeding as of the present nature Though conscious of the fact that it was a review proceeding with which it was dealing, yet the Tribunal has considered the same not as a review proceeding as such, not even as a revision application but as if it was a virtual appeal on facts and evidence before it. Indeed, going through the review judgment we are, if one may use the expression aghast at the way in which the Tribunal went on to deal with and decide a review application. It is not that the Tribunal had no power to review its own order of judgment but this power must, in the very nature of things, be exercised in a case which warrants such exercise on legitimate grounds appropriately established. As the very words suggests it is a review which is contemplated and review, as understood in the context, is not the same as a full re-hearing of a matter, or a full reconsideration of all the questions involved or a full re-appreciation of the evidence on record and drawing therefrom inferences and conclusions altogether contrary to those drawn earlier. Mr. Hombalkar, the learned Advocate, drew our attention to the provisions of section 322 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, and submitted that the impugned order was a clear violation of the legislative intent and mandate embodied therein. He particularly emphasised the first proviso to section 322 of the Code; "Provided that no such application made by any party shall be entertained, unless the Tribunal is satisfied that there has been discovery of new and important mater or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of such party or could not be produced by him at the time when its decision was made, or that there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason". These words are, indeed, clear, equivocal and definite. We see no ambiguity therein. A review is thus possible only if; (i) there is discovery of new and important matter of evidence; or (ii) there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason which expression as indicated by the Supreme Court in M.M.B. Catholics case, infra, must mean a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule. Now, going through the review judgments we find that review power has been exercised on the ground of there supposedly being in the instant case "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record". Now, going through the review judgments we find that review power has been exercised on the ground of there supposedly being in the instant case "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record". This, therefore, is not a case where review power has been exercised because of discovery of any new and important matter or evidence. This is also not a case where this power is exercised for any other sufficient reason but this on the Tribunals own judgment is a case where there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. 7. However, when we go through the impugned judgment, we are at a loss to find out and discover as to what exactly was the mistake or error apparent on the face of the record sought to be rectified in the review. Indeed, even Dr. Naik, the learned Counsel for the respondent, was at a loss in this behalf. He, no doubt, took us through the evidence of the parties and made a valiant attempt to show that some evidence was not correctly appreciated or that some evidence had not been correctly read. Now, this obviously cannot by any stretch be said to be a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. Appreciation of evidence lay within the jurisdiction of the trial Court and later on the Appellate Authority. If appreciation and re-appreciation of evidence can from part of a review proceeding based on "error apparent on the face of the record" then what indeed can be the difference between an original proceeding, an appellate proceedings, a revisional proceeding and a review proceedings? Indeed, on the approach of the Revenue Tribunal, there would be no difference at all. Legislative mandate is, however, otherwise and altogether different. 8. Review jurisdiction is invoked and exercised to correct mistakes or errors apparent on the face of the record and even in the case of such mistakes or errors, to review or not to review is yet discretionary. Having gone a little deeper into the matter and having also gone through the record of the case, we are of the further view that even assuming a case for review had at all been made out, even so discretion, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, pre-eminently required rejection of the review application. Having gone a little deeper into the matter and having also gone through the record of the case, we are of the further view that even assuming a case for review had at all been made out, even so discretion, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, pre-eminently required rejection of the review application. The conduct of the respondent is replete with various elements and features which even in a revision application would prevent a Tribunal from exercising its revisional jurisdiction in his favour. Stricter still would be the position against him in a review application. With not a title of title in his favour; with a clear admission of not even knowing who is his landlord; with a further clear admission of not having been paid any rent to any one at any time; with the undisputed position that his name does not find any place even in the record of rights at any time (except the disputed entry duly cancelled) with all these fatal infirmities the respondent still claimed, and indeed succeeded in persuading the Tribunal to hold, that though he failed on merits in appeal and though he failed on merits in his revision therefrom, he should some how or the other be granted relief on appreciation and re-appreciation once again of the entire evidence and that too in a review application. Grant of such claim and relief in a review application is, in the facts and circumstances of the cases, nothing but a travesty of justice. If there have been cases which require interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, the present is pre-eminently one of that nature. If a Tribunal exceeds the legitimate limits of its jurisdiction and/or wrongly interferes with its own orders in the supposed exercise of its review powers, justice will be a casualty and at half mast. A judicial Tribunal is not expected to be at the mercy even of its own whims and caprices. 9. Having considered the record and the evidence, having heard the arguments of the parties, having applied its own mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and having given a considered judgment, it is surprising, indeed shocking, to find the Revenue Tribunal setting aside, in the manner done, its own judgment upon a review. The impugned judgment in review reads like one in a regular first appeal. The impugned judgment in review reads like one in a regular first appeal. Evidence and documents are re-appreciated, re-considered and gone into once again as if it was a first appeal that the Tribunal was hearing. One finds consideration of documents including a miraspatra as also appreciation of different boundaries, locations, dividing lines etc. One also finds reference to certain receipts alleged to have been given to the respondents grandfather. The Tribunal then proceeds to consider notes of site inspections. It thereafter goes on to consider a 1960 panchanama. It, therefore, considers certain documents relating to one Apte and purported implications thereof. It then consider different entries in various records. It also thereafter goes on to consider the effect of inudation and denudation and as to how the area of Survey No. 742 can increase or decrease due to flood of the river. It then goes ahead to consider the evidence of the parties and as to what they had to say on various aspect either of possession or of boundaries or of increase or decrease of land. It also chooses to have a look at the maps as also at some kharedi khats and mortgage documents. It also goes into the question as to upto where did a particular road on the east extend and as to what could be the implication of acquisition proceedings by the Karad Municipality. The Tribunal thereafter observes that the respondent (petitioner herein) has admitted (which, as we shall presently see, is factually erroneous) the cultivation and possession of Madhukar. It thereafter proceeds to consider as to what the talathi reported and then as to what is the position of crops and then as to who has taken the crop. And after such full-fledge and full-scope appellate approach to the matter, the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that all these are mistakes and errors apparent on the face of the record. The whole situation is, (though one may normally not like to use the expression) indeed, perverse. Even in a revision application such could not have been the manner of appreciation and re-appreciation of evidence. Even in a second appeal such could not have been its legitimate scope. And when we find this approach in a review application, not only is one non-plussed but one also feels sorry to note the learned Members conception of his review powers. 10. Even in a second appeal such could not have been its legitimate scope. And when we find this approach in a review application, not only is one non-plussed but one also feels sorry to note the learned Members conception of his review powers. 10. Before proceedings further, we must mention that Mr. Hombalkar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has shown us the original deposition of the petitioner herein, Balkrishna, with specific reference to the observations of the learned member of the Tribunal, which observation is to the effect indicated above, viz., that the petitioner Balkrishna has admitted cultivation and possession of the land by the respondent herein. Now, when we see that particular evidence, we find that what the petitioner has stated in his deposition is just the contrary to what the learned member of the Tribunal has observed. In definite and clear terms the petitioner Balkrishna has stated that it is not true that respondent Madhukar Pawar was in possession of and had cultivated the land in 1961-62. Again, in definite and clear terms the petitioner Balkrishna has further stated that it is not true that the crops shown in the said land in the year 1962-63 are not shown by him but that the same are sown by the respondent Madhukar Pawar. Therefore, even a bare persual of the evidence by the Revenue Tribunal is contrary to the record. Admissions are put in the mouth of the petitioner not only when there is no such admission by him but also when what he has actually stated is exactly to the contrary. 11. It is also significant to note that having decided to go through the evidence and re-consider and re-appreciate the same, the learned member of the Tribunal has not chosen to consider the damaging admission of the respondent herein, Madhukar Pawar to which admission the very learned member of the Tribunal had himself referred to in his earlier judgment in the revision application. The respondent Madhukar Pawar admitted in his evidence that he is not a tenant of the petitioner Balkrishna. He also admitted that he was aware of the fact that his name had not been entered in respect of the suit land even as a tenant. He has in his evidence actually disowned the petitioner Balkrishna as his landlord though he has sought to claim tenancy rights under him. He also admitted that he was aware of the fact that his name had not been entered in respect of the suit land even as a tenant. He has in his evidence actually disowned the petitioner Balkrishna as his landlord though he has sought to claim tenancy rights under him. These are admissions which the Tribunal has itself referred to in its judgment in the revision application and yet at the time of review, it has conveniently chosen to ignore the same. Again, in its earlier judgment, the Tribunal had observed that Madhukar Pawar was not in possession of the suit land either on the date of the application or even before it for so many years. It had also referred to 7/12 extracts right from the year 1936 and had observed that the land in dispute is all long shown as "gavat pad" thereby indicating that Madhukar Pawar was in possession. It had also observed in its own previous judgment that on Apte had never tried to establish his rights over the land in dispute up-till now and still further that, though Apte had been examined as a witness in these proceedings, yet he had not taken any step to enter his name in the disputed land or any action even to recover any rent in respect thereof from Madhukar Pawar. It had also in its earlier judgment referred to the suit (being Civil Suit No. 224 of 1962) and the finding of the Civil Court that Madhukar Pawar had failed to prove his possession. It had also thereafter referred to Madhukars appeal being dismissed by the District Court and his second appeal being dismissed by the High Court. It had also further observed that though the case had been twice remanded, Madhukar Pawar had not produced any evidence to show that some land was left over with him after the acquisition of 1 acre and 19 gunthas by the Karad Municipality. The Tribunal had then gone on to hold in its said earlier judgment that identification of the suit land is held by the Civil Court to belong to the petitioner herein Balkrishna. The Tribunal had then gone on to hold in its said earlier judgment that identification of the suit land is held by the Civil Court to belong to the petitioner herein Balkrishna. Now, we would have thought that this earlier judgment was, indeed, a well considered judgment of the Revenue Tribunal which even in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction had gone a little out of its way to consider the evidence, appreciate the record and adjudicate the dispute. This being the position, there was no this ground also no warrant and no justification for the Tribunal to review in a proceedings as if the instant nature its previous well considered judgment and set it aside. 12. Dr. Naik, the learned Counsel for the respondent, cited two decisions, the first being that of a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of (Burma Shell Oil Storage Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. Labour Appellate Tribunal)1, A.I.R. 1955 Calcutta 92. The principle one which a review can proceed has been laid down therein as follows :--- "........... Where a judgment proceeds on an erroneous assumption as to the material fact, that amounts to a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record". Now, there can hardly be two views on this proposition. Difficulty in the way of the learned Counsel, however, is application of the said principle to this case, because even accepting and applying, it hereto, the decision in the present petition must without doubt go in favour of the petitioner herein and the decision of the Revenue Tribunal in the review proceedings must, again without any doubt, go against the respondent herein. 13. The next decision referred to by Dr. Naik, is one by the Supreme Court (Moran Mar Baselious Catholious and another v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanosius and others)2, A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 526. Here again there is no quarrel with the tests and or norms laid down by the Supreme Court. Indeed, these are binding on us. But once again here as in the earlier case, the difficulty of the learned Counsel before us is application of these principles to the facts herein; for doing so the conclusion once again is the same viz. the Tribunal has, in a manner most unwarranted and unsustainable, interfered with its own previous judgment. Indeed, these are binding on us. But once again here as in the earlier case, the difficulty of the learned Counsel before us is application of these principles to the facts herein; for doing so the conclusion once again is the same viz. the Tribunal has, in a manner most unwarranted and unsustainable, interfered with its own previous judgment. Moreover, the pertinent observations of the Supreme Court actually go against the respondent herein : "It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal ...... The Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definite limits fixed by the language used". 14. We must also refer to yet another decision of the Supreme Court which is relied upon by Mr. N.D. Hombalkar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner viz. the one in (Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hedge and other v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale)3, A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 137. The Supreme Court has in clear and succinct terms expounded therein the expression "error apparent on the face of the record" : "An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an illegal error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ". Though the aforesaid observations was in the context of the High Courts jurisdiction, it applies with greater force to the powers of review by the Revenue Tribunal particularly when the relevant condition of review by the Revenue Tribunal in this case has been the same viz. "error apparent on the face of the record". 15. Indeed, as already indicated, the learned member of the Revenue Tribunal was himself well aware of the limitation on his review powers. "error apparent on the face of the record". 15. Indeed, as already indicated, the learned member of the Revenue Tribunal was himself well aware of the limitation on his review powers. He has himself referred to an unreported decision of this High Court and has in his own judgment quoted observations therefrom indicating that it is not every error of law that can justify a review and that the error must be one apparent on the face of the record and going to the root of the matter. The unfortunate part, however, is that though well aware of the limits of his power, the learned member of the Tribunal has gone ahead to commit, if one may say so, flagrant breach thereof. 16. The Tribunal has also mentioned one further circumstance viz. that the very order passed by the Tenancy Aval Karkun on 5th July, 1971 was not an order from which any appeal lay under any of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act. Even here the Tribunal is wrong. There is a Division Bench ruling of this Court directly on the aforesaid question in (Ibrahim v. Abdul Razak)4, A.I.R. 1977 Bombay 22 holding that even orders, such as the one dated 5th July, 1971 in this case, are appealable orders and appeals against the same would lie under section 74 of the Tenancy Act. In the circumstances, even this finding of the Tribunal that no appeal lay is also not correct and not sustainable. Appeal very much lay against the order of the Tenancy Aval Karkun and the said appeal had been rightly entertained decided. 17. In the result, this petition succeeds. The judgment and order dated 28th November, 1974, passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in Review Application No. MRT. NS. VIII-9/74 is set aside and quashed and the judgment and order dated 25th June, 1974, passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No. MRT. NS. 350/72 is restored and confirmed. 18. Rule earlier issued on this petition is made absolute with costs. -----