JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition is directed against, the order of the Industrial Tribunal (1), Jaipur dated 6-10-1977. 2. The brief facts of the case which are relevant for the disposal of the present petition are that the respondent No. 1 was employed as a labourer in the Civil Engineering Department of the petitioner's Lakheri Cement Works. The contention of the petitioner is that at about 6 a.m. on July 5, 1976, the respondent No. 1 wanted to go out of the gate without a proper gate pass and without any authority. Watchman Shri Sura Singh was on duty at that time. Havildar Amba Lal was also there. As the respondent was going out of the gate without any authority or proper gate pass, he was asked not to do so. The contention of the petitioner is that the respondent No. 1 got provocated and caught hold of the person of the Watchman, and attempted to assault him by hitting him with the helmet which he was wearing on his head. In this process, the helmet hit the forehead of the Havildar Amba Lal and he received some injuries. The respondent No. 1 was suspended and charge-sheeted. After domestic inquiry, he was dismissed from service on 8-9-1976. An application under Section 32 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was made before the respondent No. 2, Industrial Tribunal, for getting approval of the dismissal of the workman concerned. 3. The respondent No. 1 was charge-sheeted on July 5,1976,to which he submitted a reply on July 6, 1976. He denied the allegations of the charge-sheet. On July 12, 1976, the respondent No. 1 was served with a notice of inquiry informing him that the inquiry will be conducted by Shri R. R. Singh, Personnel Officer, in the office on July 16, 1976 at 2.30 p.m. Shri Singh conducted the inquiry as contemplated. The contention of the petitioner is that the respondent No. 1 wanted that he should be assisted by a co-worker Shri Ramjiwan. He was allowed to be so represented. On July 16, 1976, the respondent No. 1 was asked to state what he had to say against the charge. The respondent No. 1 admitted the charge. The proceedings were drawn up in his presence and were written by Madan Lal Dixit, a Clerk in the office. These proceedings were signed by respondent No. 1 and his co-worker Ramjivan. On July 16, 1976, the respondent No. 1 was asked to state what he had to say against the charge. The respondent No. 1 admitted the charge. The proceedings were drawn up in his presence and were written by Madan Lal Dixit, a Clerk in the office. These proceedings were signed by respondent No. 1 and his co-worker Ramjivan. The Personnel Officer also signed the proceedings. As the respondent No. 1 had admitted the misconduct committed by him the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on July 19 1976. This report was sent to the General Manager who dismissed the respondent No. 1 on Septmeber 8, 1976. When the matter came before the Industrial Tribunal, the respondent No. 1 raised the plea that the petitioner is guilty of corrupt labour practices as the domestic inquiry held by the Personnel Officer attached to the petitioner's Company was neither fair nor proper. It was also contended by the workman that at the time of the inquiry no witness on behalf of the petitioner was present. It was also contended by the workman that before examining the witnesses of the petitioner the admission of the misconduct by the workman was recorded by the Inquiry Officer, which was contrary to all settled principles of equity and justice. It was also contended that the Personnel Officer is an employee of- the petitioner, and as such impartial inquiry could not be expected from him. It was also contended that the admission of misconduct was obtained by the petitioner on an assurance that the workman would not be dismissed from service, and that no action will be taken against him if he made a clean admission of the guilt. It was on this assurance of the Personnel Officer that the workman confessed misconduct. Under these circumstances, it is contended on behalf of the workman that the petitioner is guilty of corrupt labour practices, and that the order of the Tribunal does not call for any interference by this Court. It was also contended that the order passed by the Tribunal is only an interlocutory order, and this Court, while exercising the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not interfere with the order of the Industrial Tribunal. 4. It was also contended that the order passed by the Tribunal is only an interlocutory order, and this Court, while exercising the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not interfere with the order of the Industrial Tribunal. 4. On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that no assurance was given to the workman by the Personnel Officer that if the workman admits or confesses the misconduct then no action would be taken against him. As a matter of fact, the confession of misconduct by the workman was a voluntary act. There was no pressure or coercion on him and that the petitioner had not in any way extended any assurance to the workman for obtaining the confession of misconduct. It was also contended that no procedural irregularity has been committed in asking the workman what he has to say against his misconduct. If the workman admits his misconduct, then the question of leading evidence on behalf of the petitioner did not arise. It was also contended that merely because the inquiry has been conducted by an officer of the company it cannot be said that the inquiry was not fair, impartial and just. It was also contended that the workman did not examine Gafoor, through whom, it is alleged, the Personnel Officer had called the workman. Samsuddin and Nasir are alleged to have gone with Gafoor along with the workman to the Personnel Officer Shri Singh. None of these persons have been examined. It was also contended that the workman had approached Shri Pandey who was the General Secretary of the Union. The workman gave an unconditional apology to Pandey to be sent to the management of the petitioner's Company. It is said that on behalf of the workman that Shri Pandey tried to contact the management and told the worker that his unconditional apology would be accepted and that no action would be taken against him. Shri Pandey has also not been examined on behalf of the workman. Under these circumstances, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the learned Industrial Tribunal acted illegally and in excess of his jurisdiction in holding that the domestic inquiry conducted by the petitioner was not fair and proper, and that the petitioner is guilty of corrupt labour practices. 5. Learned counsel for the parties were heard at length. 6. Under these circumstances, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the learned Industrial Tribunal acted illegally and in excess of his jurisdiction in holding that the domestic inquiry conducted by the petitioner was not fair and proper, and that the petitioner is guilty of corrupt labour practices. 5. Learned counsel for the parties were heard at length. 6. In Central Bank of India v. Karunamoy Banerjee (1967) 2 Lab LJ 739: (1968 Lab IC 219) (SC) , on the question as to whether the inquiry proceedings can be considered to have been conducted in violation of the rules of natural justice, it was held that rules of natural justice as laid down by the Supreme Court will have to be observed in the conduct of the domestic inquiry against a workman. If the allegations are denied by the workman it is needless to state that the burden of proving the truth of these allegations will be on the management; the workers called by the management must be allowed to be cross-examined by the workman and the latter must also be given an opportunity to examine himself and adduce any evidence he might choose, in support of his plea. But if the workman admits his fault, to insist upon the management to let in evidence about the allegations will only be an empty formality. In such a case it will be open for the management to examine the workman himself in the first instance so as to enable him to offer any explanation for his conduct or to place before the management any circumstances which will mitigate the gravity of the offence. But even then the examination of the workman should not savour of an inquisition. 7. In view of this authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court if the workman admits his guilt, then there is no obligation on the management to lead evidence in the first instance as tendering of evidence in such contingency would be a mere empty formality. 8. The other contention of the workman is that the inquiry conducted by the Personnel Officer who is an employee of the Company cannot be said to be a fair and impartial inquiry. This contention of the workman has no force. A domestic inquiry has to be conducted by a person who is employed in the Company. 8. The other contention of the workman is that the inquiry conducted by the Personnel Officer who is an employee of the Company cannot be said to be a fair and impartial inquiry. This contention of the workman has no force. A domestic inquiry has to be conducted by a person who is employed in the Company. Simply because a person is employed in the Company, it does not mean that he cannot act in an impartial and upright manner. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Labour Court (1970) 1 Lab LJ 23 (SC) , it was contended that the enquiry officer was an employee of the management and the was bound to decide the case in their favour. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no such assumption can be made. It was also contended that according to the settled practice the Supreme Court will not, in appeal with special leave, re-appreciate the evidence on which the Labour Court has recorded its conclusion. The Supreme Court, however, held that the evidence was not being re-appreciated, but the Court was only seeking to determine whether the Labour Court has transgressed its limits of its jurisdiction. The legislature has not conferred upon the labour court power to sit in appeal over the judgment of the management. The Labour Court is, therefore, not competent to substitute its own judgment for that of the management arrived at after consideration of the report of the enquiry officer. 9. It was also contended on behalf of the workman that in the domestic inquiry Rule 17 (d) of the Certified Standing Orders was not complied with and as such, the inquiry conducted was against the principles of natural justice and in violation of Rule 17 (d) of the Certified Standing Orders. 10. On behalf of the petitioner, it has been contended that there was complete compliance of Rule 17 (d) of the Certified Standing Orders, and that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. The workman was charge-sheeted, and an opportunity was given to him to meet the charges. He filed a list of witnesses. His request for giving him an assistance of co-worker Ramjivan was also accepted. He appeared before the inquiry officer accompanied by the coworker Ramjiwan. The workman was charge-sheeted, and an opportunity was given to him to meet the charges. He filed a list of witnesses. His request for giving him an assistance of co-worker Ramjivan was also accepted. He appeared before the inquiry officer accompanied by the coworker Ramjiwan. Before the Inquiry Officer he confessed his misconduct and as such there was no occasion for recording any further evidence either on behalf of the worker or on behalf of the management. If 'the workman confesses the misconduct, then, no duty is cast upon the management to lead evidence. If the workman is asked by the Inquiry Officer whether he confesses his misconduct, then, this does not in any way constitute violation of Rule 17 (d) of the Certified Standing Orders, or, any infringement of principles of natural justice. In a domestic inquiry, it is not incumbent upon the management initially to lead evidence when the workman confesses that he was guilty of misconduct. Reference may be made to Motor Industries v. D. Adinarayanappa, 1978 Lab IC 1178 (Kant) . 11. The contention of the workman that he confessed the misconduct on an assurance by the management of the petitioner's Company, is without force. The assurance was alleged to have been given to the workman by the Inquiry Officer Shri Singh in the presence of Gafoor, Samsuddin and Nasir. The workman has not produced any of these persons. The workman also alleged that he had contacted the General Secretary of the Labour Union Shri Pandey; but he has also not produced Shri Pandey. The confession of the workman was recorded on 16-7-1976 ,and the order of dismissal was passed on 8-9-1976. The workman has raised this plea for the first time in the Tribunal that he admitted his misconduct on an assurance given by the Inquiry Officer. During this long interval, the workman did not complain about the admission having been obtained from him on a false assurance. This clearly appears to be an afterthought. 12. There is the version of the workman on the one hand and that of the Inquiry Officer on the other.The workman has not shown any reason as to why the version given by the Inquiry Officer should not be accepted. As a rule of prudence, whenever there is a conflict of versions, the version given by the Inquiry Officer should normally be accepted. 13. As a rule of prudence, whenever there is a conflict of versions, the version given by the Inquiry Officer should normally be accepted. 13. The learned counsel for the workman has strenuously contended that this Court, while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, should not interfere with the order of the Industrial Tribunal refusing to give approval for dismissal of the workman. It is also contended that this Court cannot sit in appeal over the order of the Industrial Tribunal. Reliance has been placed on Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Ram Dayal, (1973) 1 Lab LJ 538 : 1974 Lab IC 25 (Raj) ; Workmen of S.R.V.S. Ltd. v. S.R. V. S. Ltd., Kumbakonam, (1972) 2 Lab LJ 386 (Mad) , Mysore Steel Works v. Jitendra Chandra Kar, (1971) 1 Lab LJ 543 (SC) ; State Bank of India v. R.K. Jain, (1971) 2 Lab LJ 599 : (1972 Lab IC 13) (SC) and Punjab National Bank v. All India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 . 14. The limited nature and extent, of inquiry permissible under S. 33 J ,(2) (b) is that all that the authority can do in dealing with the employee's application is to consider whether a prima facie case for according approval is made out or not. If before dismissing an employee, the employer held a proper domestic enquiry, and proceeded to pass the impugned order as a result of the said inquiry, all that the authority can do is to inquire whether the conditions prescribed in Section 33 (2) (b) and the proviso are satisfied or not. It is conceivable that even in holding an enquiry under S. 33 (2) (b) if the authority is satisfied that the finding recorded at the domestic inquiry is perverse in the sense that it is not justified by any legal evidence whatever, only in such a case it may be entitled to consider whether approval should be accorded to the employer, or not; but it is essential to bear in mind the difference between a finding which is not supported by any legal evidence and a finding which may appear to be not supported by sufficient or adequate or satisfactory evidence. If the interpretation placed by the Labour Court on a standing order is reasonably not correct, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the Labour Court even though such interference amounts to interference with the decision of the Labour Court on preliminary issue. 15. The extent of jurisdiction exercisable by the approving authority under S. 33 (2) (b) is very limited, and in the instant case, all the essential pre-requisites of the proviso to S. 33 (2) (b) of the Act have been fulfilled. The Tribunal was not justified in withholding its approval. In the instant case, the Tribunal has held that the domestic inquiry being not fair and proper, the management should be given an opportunity to prove the charges before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was persuaded to come to this conclusion on the ground that at the time when the workmen confessed his guilt, the witnesses on behalf of the Company were not present, and that no representative of the Company was present. It has also been held that R. 17 (d) of the Certified Standing Orders has not been complied with. 16. Having given my most anxious consideration to the reasoning adopted by the learned Tribunal it is exceedingly difficult to hold that the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction. The Tribunal is not a Court of appeal over the management. The workman applied that he should be given the assistance of co-worker Ramjiwan. This request of the workman was considered by the management and Ramjiwan was allowed to assist the respondent No. 1. The proceedings wherein the misconduct has been confessed by the workman has been signed by the workman himself and his co-worker. It is not the case of the workman that he never confessed. His plea is that he was made to confess on an assurance given by the Inquiry Officer that if he confesses the misconduct, no action would be taken against him. This assurance is said to have been given in the presence of Gafoor, Samsuddin and Nasir who have not been produced by the workman. The Secretary of the Labour Union, Shri Pandey also got an unconditional apology written by the workman. Does it stand to reason that even the Secretary of the Labour Union would act in collusion with the management ? 17. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal has been carefully examined. The Secretary of the Labour Union, Shri Pandey also got an unconditional apology written by the workman. Does it stand to reason that even the Secretary of the Labour Union would act in collusion with the management ? 17. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal has been carefully examined. The reasoning is based mostly on conjectures and surmises, and is contrary to the record. The Tribunal has acted perversely in making out a case for the workman which is not supported by any evidence whatsoever, on record. The Tribunal had a very limited jurisdiction, and cannot substitute its own findings in place of the findings arrived at by the management in the domestic inquiry. The Tribunal might have taken a different view if there was some evidence on record in favour of the workman. It is a case of no evidence on behalf of the workman. Thus, the Tribunal has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in holding that the: domestic inquiry held by the management was not fair and proper. As the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction and has acted beyond the scope of Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is a fit case in which the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India should be invoked. 18. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order dated 6-10-77 passed by the Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Rajasthan, Jaipur is hereby quashed. The Industrial Tribunal was not correct, on the facts and circumstances of this case, in refusing to accord approval for dismissal of the respondent No. 1. The facts and circumstances of the case justify according of such an approval by the Tribunal. 19. Looking to the facts and circumstance of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Writ petition allowed. *******