N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition by a one-time Mamlatdar in the States service challenging the order Annexure M dated 25-8-1976 passed by the State of Gujarat removing him from services on the ground that the petitioner was found to be lacking in integrity in so far as he issued a certificate under sec. 32 M of the Bombay Tenancy Act to a tenant for 103 acres and 34 gunthas of land against the permissible limits and against the order passed by the competent authority in the proceedings under sec. 32 G of the Act which were confined to only four survey numbers in all admeasuring 46 acres and 33 gunthas of land. ( 2 ) A few facts require to be stated. The petitioner was functioning as the Mamlatdar Dhari from 14-7-1959 to 6-7-1962 Proceedings under sec. 32 G of the Bombay Tenancy Act resulted into the fixation of purchase price of the lands S. Nos. 34 47 48 and 62 in all admeasuring 46 acres and 33 gunthas situated at village Mithapur (Nakki) in Dhari taluka of Amreli District. The lands belonged to one landlord Chunilal Kapurchand and the tenant in whose favour the said purchase price was fixed was one Jivraj Pitamber. Said Jivraj Pitamber insisted on the statutory sale of all 103 acres and 34 gunthas (including those 4 survey numbers) and he had therefore preferred an appeal against the rejection of his claim by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal in those 32 G proceedings. He had however withdrawn the appeal subsequently. Said tenant had then made an application to the Mamlatdar Dhari the petitioner to issue him a sale certificate under sec. 32 M of the Act. On that application this petition has made a specific endorsement that the proceedings for fixation of purchase should be kept with the application and a notice also be issued to the parties. Accordingly a notice was issued to the said tenant who is alleged to have appeared and given a statement in respect of those survey numbers. It however then appears that a certificate came to be issued by this petitioner in favour of that tenant not with respect to 46 acres and 33 gunthas of land but for all the 103 acres and 34 gunthas of land. It however then appears that a certificate came to be issued by this petitioner in favour of that tenant not with respect to 46 acres and 33 gunthas of land but for all the 103 acres and 34 gunthas of land. Thereafter the petitioner was transferred from Dhari and the matter came to the notice of the Prant Officer Rajula who moved the Government and the Government issued the notice to the petitioner Annexure A on 7-8-68 as the preliminary step. The petitioner perused the original record in the office of the Collector and elsewhere and submitted his long reply dated 24 which is Annexure B on the record. He stated that the certificate of the nature could not have been issued by him who was a man who knew the tenancy law in fullest details. He therefore alleged that some-body had conspired with the tenant and the blame was then sought to be laid at his doors. The Government then conducted some other preliminary enquiry and the chargesheet Annexure C came to be issued. The allegation against the petitioner in a nutshell is as follows :when he was working as Mamlatdar Dhari District Amreli in 1962 he had shown gross negligence amounting to lack of integrity in the performance of his duties in the matter of grant of certificate dated 16-4-1962 of purchase under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 to Shri Jivraj Pitamber. The second charge also is there but we are not concerned with it because he has been exonerated of the same. The statement of the imputation that was part of the chargesheet elaborated the above-mentioned charge. The petitioner then entered into some correspondence with the Government in respect of inspection of documents and supply of copies. That correspondence is to be found at Annexures D E F G and H and then on 20-7-74 the petitioner submitted his written statement to the chargesheet. A full-fledged enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer who was a special officer for the departmental enquiries at Palanpur. The said officer gave his report which is to be found at Annexure K and is dated 20-12-75. With respect to the said charge the Enquiry officer observed as follows :"this leads to an inference that some persons in the Office were interested in issuing the certificate and at the same time keeping the Mamlatdar in dark. . . . The said officer gave his report which is to be found at Annexure K and is dated 20-12-75. With respect to the said charge the Enquiry officer observed as follows :"this leads to an inference that some persons in the Office were interested in issuing the certificate and at the same time keeping the Mamlatdar in dark. . . . These instructions of Shri Pandya were not complied with and after a lapse of 17 months the certificate was put up for his signature along with that of Shri Kana Ratna of Bharad (another tenant aspiring for such certificate) on 16-4-1962 when Shri Pandya was very busy as seen from his diary for that day which reads as under. . I am of the opinion that Shri Pandya had no mala fide intention in signing the certificate. ( 3 ) THE report obviously was placed before the Government and its Joint Secretary in the Revenue Department differed from the assessment of the material on record. The Joint Secretary therefore gave the notice to the petitioner which is another part of very Annexure K and is dated 5 The said Joint Secretary inter alia mentions as follows :"as regards charge no. (1) Government does not fully agree with the findings of the Enquiry officer for the reasons mentioned below:. . . This procedure must have been known to Shri Pandya who bad worked as Tenancy Avalkarkun Tenancy Mahalkari as well as A. L. T. It as has been claimed by him he was too busy on 16-4-62 to verify all this there was no reason why he issued the certificate on that day. It could have been issued later when he had time for necessary personal verification. The certificate of purchase is an important document which removes the entry of encumberance from village records. Issue of such certificate without careful verification is gross negligence of his duties. There was no circumstances which would have compelled Shri Pandya to issue the certificate on 16 itself the day on which he was said to have been very busy. In the absence of such compelling circumstances issue of such important certificate without verification does raise the presumption of lack of integrity". The said notice dated 5-12-75 therefore informed the petitioner that Government is unable to agree with the findings of the enquiry officer in respect of Charge no. In the absence of such compelling circumstances issue of such important certificate without verification does raise the presumption of lack of integrity". The said notice dated 5-12-75 therefore informed the petitioner that Government is unable to agree with the findings of the enquiry officer in respect of Charge no. (1) and Government holds that Shri Pandya issued a false certificate and was guilty of gross negligence of his duties amounting to lack of integrity and thus the charge no. (1) against Shri Pandya is proved. ( 4 ) THE petitioner submitted his reply to this finding of the Joint Secretary by his reply of January 1976. which is Annexure L. He reiterated various arguments of his and ultimately the Government passed the impugned order Annexure M on 25-8-76 to remove the petitioner from Government service with immediate effect. It is this order passed by the Government that is impugned in this petition by the petitioner. ( 5 ) MR. H. B. Shah the learned advocate for the petitioner assailed this order on two grounds: (1) The finding of lack of integrity is inconsistent with the finding of gross negligence and the said finding about lack of integrity is without any evidentiary material and therefore bad at law; (2) The petitioner was not extended reasonable opportunity to meet the charge and therefore the enquiry was vitiated and consequently the impugned order is required to be annulled ( 6 ) THE above-mentioned short synopsis of the evidentiary material goes to show that the petitioner was fully conversant with the provision of the Bombay Tenancy Act which did not permit a tenant to be a statutory purchaser of the land beyond the ceiling limit which was 48 acres for that village in Dhari taluka. Even in his first reply to the preliminary notice the petitioner tried to plead his ignorance on the ground that he as a man knowing the law on the point would not be foolish enough to issue the certificate under sec. 32 M of the Bombay Tenancy Act in respect of the land above the ceiling area. The second important thing to be noted is that the petitioner himself had on the earlier occasion made an order that the executive act of issuing a certificate under sec. 32 M of the Bombay Tenancy Act in respect of the land above the ceiling area. The second important thing to be noted is that the petitioner himself had on the earlier occasion made an order that the executive act of issuing a certificate under sec. 32 M of the Bombay Tenancy Act by him in his capacity as the Mamlatdar was the corollary of the earlier adjudication proceedings under sec. 32 G of the Act and it is because of this that he had made a specific endorsement on Jivrajs application for the certificate that the original record should be kept with the application. When a man knowing the provisions of law and himself being conscious of the fact that he is required to issue a certificate in his capacity as the Mamlatdar as a corollary of the order passed in the proceedings under sec. 32 G of the Act does not look to those proceedings and issues a certificate not in respect of four survey numbers but many more the inference can well be raised that this sort of action may not be innocent or the outcome of sheer inadvertence. This High Court dealing with such departmental proceedings is not a court of appeal. Its powers are confined to rectifying the errors of law apparent on the face of the record. If a particular inference from the admitted or established facts is logically and reasonably possible this High Court would not be entitled to disturb that finding even though this High Court may be inclined to reach a different and even diametrically opposite conclusion on its own appreciation of that material. I reiterate therefore that when the Government in the light of the admitted and established facts concluded that the petitioners action in issuing the certificate under sec. 32 M of the Bombay Tenancy Act was not a sheer inadvertence on his part or was not outcome of his blind faith in the subordinates working under him but was an act executed by him with ulterior motive the inference cannot be at any rate branded as untenable altogether. ( 7 ) MR. H. B. Shah however with appreciable force submitted that when there was a finding of gross negligence by necessary implication the mala fide or dishonest intention was eliminated. ( 7 ) MR. H. B. Shah however with appreciable force submitted that when there was a finding of gross negligence by necessary implication the mala fide or dishonest intention was eliminated. A student of jurisprudence would normally know the fine distinction between different kinds of mens rea which are (1) guilty intention (2) guilty knowledge and (3) gross rashness or negligence. Each one of the three is distinct from the other and one cannot be the other. It may therefore at first blush appear reasonable to hold that the Government was guilty of non-application of mind when it roped two inconsistent and incompatible mental attributes into one for the purpose of finding the petitioner guilty. 1 however have carefully gone through the allegedly contrary finding recorded by the Joint Secretary of the Government which is part of Annexure K to the petition. The said officer in this connection has observed as follows :" In other words he (enquiry officer) has held that negligence on the Part of Shri Pandya did not amount to lack of integrity. While Government fully agrees with the enquiry officer that Shri M. L. Pandya signed the certificate himself Government is unable to accept the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer that the action of Shri Pandya did not amount to lack of integrity. The Mamlatdar before issuing the certificate is required to verify the fact of full payment of the purchase price from the relevant ledger which inter alia mentions details of the land purchased by each tenant. He is also required to sign the ledger in token of having issued the certificate of purchase. This procedure must have been known to Shri Pandya who had worked as Tenancy Avalkarkun. Tenancy Mahalkari as well as A. L. T. If as has been claimed by him he was too busy on 16-4-62 to verify all this there was no reason why he issued the certificate on that day. It could have been issued later when he had time for necessary personal verification. The certificate of purchase is an important document which removes the entry of encumbrance from village records. Issue of such certificate without careful verification is gross negligence of his duties. There were no circumstances which would have compelled Shri Pandya to issue the certificate on 16 itself the day on which he was said to have been very busy. The certificate of purchase is an important document which removes the entry of encumbrance from village records. Issue of such certificate without careful verification is gross negligence of his duties. There were no circumstances which would have compelled Shri Pandya to issue the certificate on 16 itself the day on which he was said to have been very busy. In the absence of such compelling circumstances issue of such important certificate without verification does raise the presumption of lack of integrity. (emphasis supplied by me)". ( 8 ) THOUGH the Joint Secretary of the Government has reiterated the original words of the charge referring both to gross negligence and lack of integrity together even on this conclusion his paramount idea is to impute lack of bona fides on the part of the petitioner. The last words from the passage already quoted above go to show that issue of such an important certificate without verification was held to be raising the presumption of lack of integrity. The Joint Secretary further stated that the Government did not agree with the opinion of the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner had no mala fide intention in issuing such a wrong certificate. So for all practical purposes the Governments finding is the one regarding the lack of integrity on the part of the petitioner and reiteration of gross negligence of his duties is to be ignored as the loose expression resorted to by the non-legal man like the Joint Secretary of the Government. It appears that this gross negligence is referred to as a circumstance from which according to the said officer the presumption of guilty mind of the petitioner should be invariably drawn. I therefore interpret the order as the one charging the petitioner essentially with a dishonest intention styled as lack of integrity in the notice as well as in the findings and in the impugned order. I however would wish that highly placed public Officers like the Joint Secretaries and Secretaries of the Government are imparted some lessons in basic law so that they do not employ such loose language and give an opportunity to the delinquent officers to pick up such points. ( 9 ) MR. I however would wish that highly placed public Officers like the Joint Secretaries and Secretaries of the Government are imparted some lessons in basic law so that they do not employ such loose language and give an opportunity to the delinquent officers to pick up such points. ( 9 ) MR. H. B. Shah in this regard however submitted that there was no evidence worth the name to speak of lack of integrity particularly when at the first available opportunity the petitioner himself spoke of his injured innocence and implored the Government to find out the real culprit but the circumstances relied upon by the Government are self-eloquent and they are already adverted to by me above. In short a man fully knowing that there could not be a statutory sale under sec. 32 G of the Tenancy Act in respect of the land exceeding the ceiling limit and also knowing that the issuance of certificate under sec. 32 M of the Act is the corollary executive step flowing from the judicial order passed by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under sec. 32 G of the Act cannot be necessarily said to have taken this action in an innocent fashion. ( 10 ) MR. H. B. Shah however urged that had there been any evil design present in the mind of the petitioner he himself would not have put an endorsement on Jivrajs application for the certificate to the effect that the original record of 32 G proceedings should be kept with the application. This is one facet of the argument which if found to be appealing might have led to the conclusion the petitioner wanted to go by law. However it is not a circumstance inconsistent with the guilt of the petitioner. What is the use of this endorsement when it was totally ignored when the actual occasion arose for its consideration ? No doubt the Enquiry Officer did find that on 16-4-62 the petitioner was too busy to peruse the whole record. As rightly emphasised by the Joint Secretary in his dissenting note the issuance of a certificate was not such a peremptory business that was required to be attended to that very day and it could certainly brooke delay. No doubt the Enquiry Officer did find that on 16-4-62 the petitioner was too busy to peruse the whole record. As rightly emphasised by the Joint Secretary in his dissenting note the issuance of a certificate was not such a peremptory business that was required to be attended to that very day and it could certainly brooke delay. At any rate the reasoning of the Government regarding the guilt of the petitioner therefore cannot be said to be in any way perverse or such as can never be reached by a reasonable and prudent man. The first ground urged by Mr. Shah therefore fails. ( 11 ) THE second ground that was put forward by Mr. H. B. Shah with equal vehemence is the non-compliance with the principles of natural. justice Mr. Shah made grievance that when the chargesheet was given the original certificate issued to the tenant was not on the file and when petitioner insisted on a look at the original some officer of the Government told that the Government was not relying on the original certificate. This reply given by some officer al-beit carelessly if I use this harsh word was sought to be made a capital of by Mr. Shah for the petitioner. There was an office copy of that very certificate on the file of the Government. There was another copy of that very certificate on the record of the Talati which was there at the stage when the enquiry was mooted and initiated. At that stage the original certificate issued to the tenant was not with the Government and therefore some officer took up a stand that the Government was not relying on that certificate. However during the course of the enquiry the original certificate was procured. It was given to the Government hand-writing expert for examination his reasons and opinion were made available to the petitioner who had not only inspected the document himself but had done so in the company of his advocate and an expert who was examined on his behalf as his defence witness in the enquiry proceedings. When the petitioner had availed himself of this opportunity it does not lie in his mouth now to contend that initial non-reference of the original certificate vitiates the enquiry. In this connection Mr. When the petitioner had availed himself of this opportunity it does not lie in his mouth now to contend that initial non-reference of the original certificate vitiates the enquiry. In this connection Mr. H. B. Shah invited my attention to Rule 9 (3) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal ) Rules 1971 which lays down a duty on the enquiry officer to furnish to the petitioner the substance of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior of each article of charge together with the statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government servant and the list of documents by which and a list of witness by whom the articles of charges are proposed to be sustained. I fail to understand what relevance this Rule 9 (3) has got in the present case. Nowhere has it been provided for that after the chargesheet is given the record is frozen and no other document can thereafter ever be brought into the arena. Even in criminal prosecutions the prosecution is permitted an opportunity to lead further evidence. Only safeguard that is to be kept in mind is that the concerned delinquent is not taken by surprise and that he is given ample opportunity to meet that document or additional evidence. As already elaborated by me above the petitioner was given the inspection of that original certificate he had inspected it in the company of his advocate and his expert and he bad even examined his own expert witness to counter the evidence of the Governments expert regarding hand-writing. It is therefore too late in the day for Mr. Shah for the petitioner to urge that belated appearance of the original document on the scene vitiated the inquiry. ( 12 ) MR. Shahs second submission was that there was an enquiry held against one Mr. M. K. Mehta who had certified the two entries. One entry related to S. No. 28 which was certified by that officer in the year 1962 a little prior to the issuance of the impugned certificate. Though the sale of that S. No. 28 was said to have been effected jointly by the tenant and the landlord as back as in the years 1958 this very S. No. 28 also was the subject matter of the certificate under sec. 32 M of the Act. Though the sale of that S. No. 28 was said to have been effected jointly by the tenant and the landlord as back as in the years 1958 this very S. No. 28 also was the subject matter of the certificate under sec. 32 M of the Act. The second entry pursuance to the issuance of the certificate under sec. 32 M was certified by the very officer. Both these entries were certified by him without waiting for the period of one month which is a period of notice to be given to the interested parties. Because of this dubious circumstance of over-haste on the part of Mr. Mehta even the Enquiry Officer in the present case made the following observations"this also leads to an inference that Shri Mehta had a hand in this fishy transaction". This Mr. Mehta was once cited as a witness in these departmental proceedings but he was dropped and some other officers had come to be examined. Mr. Shahs grievance was that by keeping back this Mr. Mehta and not furnishing the petitioner with the report of the enquiry against him the petitioner was deprived of a valuable opportunity to show to the enquiry officer that the blame for this admitted fraud-which is the subject matter of charge against the petitioner-lay squarely at the doors of Mr. Mehta and others and not at the doors of this petitioner. The report of the Enquiry Officer in this case amply bears out that Mr. Mehta and two other officers were cited as witnesses only to prove various documents as having been signed by this petitioner. Some other two officers were then produced to do the job. At no stage of the enquiry the petitioner appears to have taken any exception to this dropping of Mr. Mehta as a witness. So the first part of the contention of Mr. Shah does not hold good. The enquiry report against Mr. Mehta was not furnished to the petitioner despite his demand because the Government did not want to rely on it. Mr. Shahs submission was that that report might be referring to the liability of Mr. Mehta for the subject matter of the charge in this case. A report is ultimately the opinion of the officer as the judgments of the courts are in one sense opinions. They would not furnish any evidence or direct material. Mr. Shahs submission was that that report might be referring to the liability of Mr. Mehta for the subject matter of the charge in this case. A report is ultimately the opinion of the officer as the judgments of the courts are in one sense opinions. They would not furnish any evidence or direct material. Whatever was attributable to Mr. Mehta actually was brought on the record of the present proceedings also namely his having acted with undue haste on both the occasions when he proceeded to certify the two entries. The petitioner did not even allege any other role to Mr. Mehta. So whatever could be said against Mr. Mehta and therefore to the advantage of the petitioner was brought on the record by the petitioner himself and I fail to understand how the report against Mr. Mehta and some other independent proceedings could have helped the petitioner. As a matter of fact the affidavit-in-reply filed by the State mentions that the whole record pertaining to the departmental proceedings against Mr. Mehta was given inspection of to the petitioner and he had actually availed himself of it. The present enquiry proceedings show that material or any other conceivable material against Mr. Mehta was put on the record of the present proceedings by the petitioner. It therefore appears that non-giving of the report pertaining to Mr. Mehta is picked up by the petitioner only for the purpose of making good his submission that he was denied a reasonable opportunity of defence. ( 13 ) MR. Shahs next submission was that when the chargesheet was given to him his diary of the year 1962 the reasoning of the hand-writing expert and the original certificate were not made available to the petitioner and the subsequent availability of these documents did not mend the matters in any way. Principles of natural justice are not a matter of any strait jacket formula. All that is required to be done to afford a reasonable opportunity to the delinquent is to be done in the facts and circumstances of each individual case and that is what is in a nutshell the compliance with the principles of natural justice. Unless prejudice on that account is said to have been caused to the delinquent in such proceedings because of the non-compliance with one or the other ground such a plea is not to be entertained. Unless prejudice on that account is said to have been caused to the delinquent in such proceedings because of the non-compliance with one or the other ground such a plea is not to be entertained. The Supreme Court in this connection has made the following observation in the case of E. C. Sharma v. Union of India A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 2037 :"the question whether a civil servant in a departmental enquiry against him was given a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and to be heard or not is largely a question of fact. It is only when opportunity denied is of such a nature that the denial contravenes a mandatory provision of law or a rule of natural justice that it could vitiate the whole departmental trial. Prejudice to the Government servant resulting from an alleged violation of a rule must be proved". As elaborated by the above late production of the original certificate late furnishing the petitioner with his diary of the year 1962 and the examination of a new expert on the full signature of the petitioner on the original certificate after the enquiry was initiated have caused no prejudice whatsoever to this petitioner and therefore he cannot be heard say that a reasonable opportunity was not extended to him and therefore principles of natural justice were violated. ( 14 ) MR. H. B. Shah had in this case cited three authorities. In the case of State of Punjab Bhagat Ram A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 2335 the enquiry was struck down on the ground that statements of witnesses in full were not given to the delinquent. It was found that this deprived the delinquent of an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses to the fullest extent and therefore this non-compliance was held to be violation of the principles of natural justice. The second case relied upon by Mr. Shah is the case of State of Punjab v. Dewan Chunilal 1970 S. C. 2086. That case also depicts the peculiar situation. Certain adverse remarks against the Sub-Inspector of Police were relied upon in the departmental enquiries. The officers who had recorded those adverse remarks were available and still they were not made available to the defence for cross-examination despite demand. That case also depicts the peculiar situation. Certain adverse remarks against the Sub-Inspector of Police were relied upon in the departmental enquiries. The officers who had recorded those adverse remarks were available and still they were not made available to the defence for cross-examination despite demand. Obviously a good deal of prejudice was caused to the delinquent because of reliance having been placed on those adverse remarks and consequently the enquiry was held to be vitiated. The case of Govindbhai Kalidas Patel v. Union of India and Ors. 7. G. L. R. 703 was also pressed into service by Mr. Shah. The ratio of that case only reiterates the well-known principles of natural justice. The Division Bench of this court has inter alia observed that the requirements of natural Justice are not such as can be reduced to any formula inclusive or exclusive which can have universal application to every kind of enquiry for a good deal may depend on the subject matter the nature of the enquiry itself the nature and constitution of the Tribunal or authority which holds the enquiry and the rules under which the inquiry was held. It is further observed that one of the essential elements of natural justice is that the person against whom the inquiry is being held should have a fair and proper opportunity to correct or controvert any relevant statement prejudicial to his view. ( 15 ) TO me it appears that in the facts and circumstances of this case there was no violation of any principle of natural justice and this bogey has been raised by the petitioner in this High Court as the straw of a drowning man. ( 16 ) THE result is that the petition fails and is dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged with no order as to costs. .