Order This revision by the accused-petitioner is directed against the judgment dated 3rd January, 1979 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mudhol, in C.C. No. 865 of 1977 on his file convicting the accused for offences under sections 3 and 4 read with section 12 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 which will hereinafter be called “the Act” and sencencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 100 in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three days and further directing him to pay a tax of Rs. 2,817.40 within 15 days. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the accused is the registered owner in possession and control over the tractor and Trailor No. MYJ 3831 and 3832 and that he has failed to pay the tax for the period commencing from 1st July, 1970 to 31st December, 1976 at the quarterly ate of Rs.183.70 in all amounting to Rs.2,817.40. The accused having failed to pay the said tax for every quarter, the Regional Transport Officer, Bijapur, has charge-sheeted the accused for non-payment of the aforesaid quarterly taxes under sections 3 and 4 read with section 12 of the said Act and the charge-sheet was filed on 23rd November, 1977. 3. The defence of the accused is that he had filed an application before the Regional Transport Officer, under section 16(3) of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act of 1957 and as such he is exempted from the payment of the said tax under the said provision of law and in the above circumstances he has not committed any offences and that he is therefore innocent. 4. The prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused examined the Regional Trans-part Officer, P.W.1 and produced 3 documents in support of its case. The accused did not enter into the witness box but, however, filed three documents Exhibits D-1, D-3 in support of his defence. The learned Magistrate after assessing the evidence of the prosecution, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has established the guilt against the accused, as he has not paid tax even though he was in possession and control over the said vehicle, beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly proceeded to convict him and sentenced him as aforesaid’ The legality, propriety and the correctness of the said judgment is being challenged by the accused in this revision petition. 5. 5. Sri C.M. Desai, learned Advocate for the accused, submitted that the learned Magistrate has erred in convicting and sentencing the accused solely relying upon the evidence of P.W.1 without considering the main issue before him viz., that the prosecution of the accused for the aforesaid offences was barred by limitation under section 468, Criminal Procedure Code. Elaborating his contentions, what he submitted was that the offences alleged against the accused are punishable with fine only in which case provisions of section 468(2), Criminal Procedure Code is applicable to the facts of the case with regard to taking cognizance of the offences. The allegations in the charge sheet are that the accused has not paid the taxes payable in respect of the Tractor and Trailor at the quarterly rate of Rs. 183.70 for each quarter from 1st July, 1970 to 31st December, 1976 in all amounting to Rs.2,817.40 and that the tax has to be paid in respect of these two vehicles in advance for each quarter commencing from 1st July, 1970. Therefore as soon as the advance tax is not paid for the specified quarter from 1st July, 1970 immediately after the expiration of the said quarter, the said quarter period is complete and the the next quarter period begins for which again the accused has to pay advance tax for the commencing quarter period. In the above manner if the accused has not paid the advance tax as contemplated under the Act for each quarters then the failure on his part at the end of the quarter completes the said period and also the offence comes to an end and the fresh period for payment of the quarter tax begins. In other words, what he submitted was that failure on the part of the accused for payment of the advance tax for each of the quarters makes distinct and separate offence and it cannot be said that it is a continuing offence. It cannot be said that the offence continues as long as or till the payment of the quarterly tax is paid by the accused. It cannot be said that the offence continues as long as or till the payment of the quarterly tax is paid by the accused. Therefore, the Magistrate has erred in holding that the non-payment of the advance quarterly tax for the periods from 1st July, 1970 to 31st December, 1976 is a continuing offence and therefore, the Court could take congnizance of the offence even if it violates the provisions of section 468 , Criminal Procedure Code and that the case on hand squarely falls under section 472 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, as a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at the every moment of the time during which the offence continues. 6. There is considerable force in the submissions made by Sri C.M. Desai, learned Counsel for the petitioner. For proper appreciation of the points raised by the learned Counsel, it would be necessary to advert to few provisions of the Act. Section 4(1) of the Act read thus: “The tax levied under section 3 shall be paid in advance by the registered owner in person having possession or control of the motor vehicle, for a quarter, half-year or year, at his choice, within ten days from the commencement of such quarter, half-year, or year as the case may be. Provided that where the tax payable in respect of a motor vehicle for a year does not exceed three hundred rupees, the tax shall be paid annually.” Section 12 of the Act deals with the penalties for non-payment of the tax. It is therefore clear that the registered owner has to pay the tax levied under section 3 of the Act in advance for a quarter, half-year or year at his choice within ten days from the commencement of such quarter, half-year or year as the case may be. If the registered owner fails to pay the advance tax for the quarter or for the specified period as the case may be, he shall be committing an offence which is punishable under section 12 of the Act viz. for non-payment of the tax due for a specified period. In case he commits default of payment for further period either quarterly or half-yearly or yearly, then again he shall be contravening the provisions of the Act and again will be liable for prosecution under section 12 of the Act for the aforesaid period. for non-payment of the tax due for a specified period. In case he commits default of payment for further period either quarterly or half-yearly or yearly, then again he shall be contravening the provisions of the Act and again will be liable for prosecution under section 12 of the Act for the aforesaid period. The accused in the instant case is said to have been a defaulter from 1st July, 1970 to 31st December, 1976 and he had opted to pay the tax every quarter at the rate of Rs. 183.70. It is therefore clear that the accused had to pay the tax from 1st July, 1970 to the end of September, 1970 being the quarter month. If he fails to pay in advance the said quarterly tax, then he would have contravened provisions of the Act and would be therefore liable for prosecution. Immediately after the end of the quarterly month of September, the offence is complete and if he continues to be a defaulter for the next quarter i.e., if he fail to pay the advance tax due beginning from 1st October, again he would be a defaulter. In the same way, if he is a defaulter in payment of the advance tax for each quarter, he would be committing a separate and independent offence by itself which cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed as a continuous offence. This is much more so because of the fact that the period is stipulated and the amount of advance tax to be paid is also stipulated and if there is a default of payment of such advance tax for that particular period, the offence for that period is complete and the offence cannot spill over to the next quarter also making it a continuing offence. This is clear from section 4 itself wherein it is stipulated that the registered owner has to pay the advance tax for the period he has undertaken i.e. either quarterly, half-yearly or yearly. 7. The expression “continuing” offence has acquired a well recognised meaning in criminal law. If in act committed by an accused constitutes an offence and if that act continues from day-to-day then a fresh offence is committed by the accused so long the act continues. 7. The expression “continuing” offence has acquired a well recognised meaning in criminal law. If in act committed by an accused constitutes an offence and if that act continues from day-to-day then a fresh offence is committed by the accused so long the act continues. Normally and in the ordinary course an offence is committed only once but, there may be offences which may be committed from day-today and these offences are falling in the latter category that are described as continuing offences. In State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and another1 the Supreme Court has succinctly defined “what a continuing offence” is. Their Lordships have observed thus: “Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and therefore, constitutes afresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all.” Their Lordships in that case were considering section 66 of the Mines Act, 1952 wherein it was provided that any person omitting inter alia to furnish any return, notice etc., in the prescribed form or manner or at or within the prescribed time required by or under the Act to be made or furnished shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000. 1,000. Section 79 of the said Act provided that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under the said Act unless a complaint thereof has been made within six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed or within six months from the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector, whichever is later. The Explanation to the section provides chat if the offence in question is a continuing offence, the period of limitation shall be computed with reference to every point of time during which the said offence continues. In the said case there was failure to furnish the annual returns in the prescribed form and within the time prescribed i.e., 21st January, in the succeeding year. A complaint for the said offence has to be filed under section 79 of the said Act within six months from the date of such default i.e. 21st January, 1960. While adverting to the same, their Lordships observed that on every occasion when such disobedience or noncompliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an or occasion on which it continues. Therefore, it is made clear that in the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all. The Supreme Court ultimately held by holding that the infringement occurs on 21st January, of the relevant year and was complete on the owner failing to furnish to the annual returns by that day and as such the complaint was time barred as the offence in question fell within the substantive part of section 79 of the Mines Act and not under the Explanation attached to it. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also adverted to few illustrative cases to bring on the distinction between the two types of offences which is more fully discussed in paras.7 and 8 of the said judgment. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also adverted to few illustrative cases to bring on the distinction between the two types of offences which is more fully discussed in paras.7 and 8 of the said judgment. Following the interpretation laid down by the Supreme Court and applying the said principles to the facts on hand, it is clear that the non-payment of the advance tax for the quarter is complete immediately there is a default on payment and it is a complete offence by itself and further if the registered owner continues to be a defaulter for the next quarter also, again he will be committing another offence which is again complete by itself. So much so, non-compliance of the provisions of section 4 would create an independent offence itself for each specified period and cannot be called a continuing offence. 8. In M/s. Wire Machinery Manufacturing Corporation Limited v. The State and another1 their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court following the interpretation laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above observed in that case that the infringement for the failure to do so therefore, occurs on the close of the fifteenth day of the month and is complete on the employer failing to make the payment to the Fund by that date. Therefore, in the instant cases once the defaults were made the offences were committed once and for all and became complete on the close of the due date and as such there could not be any ingredient continuance in the offence to make it a continuing offence. In the said case, their Lordships were interpreting the contravention of section 14 of the Employees’ Provident Fund Family Pension Fund Act of 1952 and section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 9. The said interpretation further gains support from a decision in V. Seetha v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, Madras2 wherein the single Judge of the Madras High Court reiterated the principles laid down in the cases adverted to above. 10. It is therefore clear that on every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. When such an act or omission which continues constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. 10. It is therefore clear that on every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. When such an act or omission which continues constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. Applying the said principles to the facts of the case, it is clear that the accused is alleged to have not paid the advance tax from 1st July, 1970 to 31st December, 1976 at the quarterly rate. At the completion of each quarter fur which there, is non-compliance with the provisions of section 4 of the Act, the offence is complete. Therefore, the charge is in respect of several offences starting from 1st July, 1970 to 31st December, 1976 and the period prescribed for the Magistrate to take cognizance of each of the offences is six months if the offence is punishable with fine only as stipulated under section 468, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Admittedly, a consolidated charge-sheet has been filed on 23rd November, 1977, in respect of all the offences said to have been committed from 1st July, 1970 to 31st December, 1976. It is therefore clear that even the consolidated charge-sheet is beyond the period of six months stipulated under section 468, Criminal Procedure Code. If that is the position, then the charge for offences beginning from 1st July, 1970 onwards for each quarter which constitutes a separate and independent offence by itself are clearly barred by limitation. Therefore, the submissions of Sri C.M. Desai, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has to be upheld and the complaint has to be dismissed as being barred by time. In view of this finding, it may not be necessary for the Court to dwell upon the another submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner viz., that the accused has made several applications before the Regional Transport Officer under section 16(3) of the Act claiming exemption from tax payable in respect of the Tractor and the Trailor. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the Court below is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. 12. In the result, the revision petition is allowed and the conviction of the accused petitioner for offences under sections 3 , 4 read with section 12 of the Act and the sentence imposed on him are hereby set aside and the accused-petitioner is acquitted of the said offences. 12. In the result, the revision petition is allowed and the conviction of the accused petitioner for offences under sections 3 , 4 read with section 12 of the Act and the sentence imposed on him are hereby set aside and the accused-petitioner is acquitted of the said offences. S.V.S. ----- Revision petition allowed.