Judgment Hari Lal Agrawal, J. 1. In this civil revision application, filed by the plaintiffs, the question falling for the decision of this Court is as to whether a defendant, against whom the suit has been dismissed, has any locus standi to maintain an application under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil procedure. 2. The facts briefly stated are as follows : One Chhatha Mahton died leaving five sons, namely, (1) Bhajan Mahto, (2) Harsahay, (3) Safan Mahto (4) Guni Mahto, and (5) Jamadar Mahto. The plaintiffs are the grandsons of Guni Mahto and defendant No.1 the grandson of Sajjan Mahto Jamadars branch became extinct some time in the year 1962. The other defen dants, namely, defendants 2 to 6 are from the branch of Bhajan Mahto and harsahay, but they are in the third decrees. In these circumstances the plaintiffs instituted a title Partition Suit no.96 of 1974 in the court of the Sub ordinate Judge, Siwan against defendant first party, claiming 2/3rd share (l/3rd each) in the estate of Jamadar Mahto which, as already stated had become extinct, on the ground that they succeeded to the same to the exclu sion of the other defendants. It was further stated in the plaint that the" members of the defendants second party had no concern with the lands in question, but they were simply impleaded to avoid any future complication. 3. On 1st June, 1974 when the suit was in the stage of service of summons etc. , defendant No.1 entered appearance. An affidavit in proof of the service of summons with respect to the other defendants was filed by the plaintiffs on the same day and a compromise petition was filed between the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 and the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs in terms of the compromise and dismissed ex parte against the other defendants. It is in these circumstances that opposite party No.1, who was defendant No.2 in the suit, filed an application under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure alleging that the decree obtained by the plaintiffs was collusive and no summon had been served on him. It is in these circumstances that opposite party No.1, who was defendant No.2 in the suit, filed an application under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure alleging that the decree obtained by the plaintiffs was collusive and no summon had been served on him. He further alleeed that the properties, which are partitioned were not of the estate of Jamadar mahto nor those were ever in their possession or their ancestor, rather the properties were in his possession and that was the reason for the collusive expyrte decree. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge by his order dated 9th December 1977 has rejected the plea of the petitioners that under rule 13 of Order IX the application was not maintainable and set aside the decree. The learned subordinate Judge has observed in his order that defendant No.2 might have raised objection to the claim, of the plaintiffs. 5. The plaintiffs have accordingly filed the present application Mr chunni Lal, appearing in support of this application contended that Order IX rule 13 contemplates an application for setting aside an exparte decree only by such a defendant against whom a decree has been passed ex parte and by nobody else. The relevant part of rule 13 reads as under : "in any case the decree is passed ex parte against "the defendant, he may apply to the court by which the decree was passed, for an order to set it aside. . . . . . . . . " although reading the above provision an impression is created that no person other than one against whom a decree is passed can apply for setting aside the ex parte decree examining it more closely, it is not possible to accept the contention. The word "decree" is defined in section 2 (2) of the Code as-" the formal expression of an adjudication, which so far as regards the Court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. " There can be no doubt that force of the compromise in question would be of a final decree and it was executable. Mr. " There can be no doubt that force of the compromise in question would be of a final decree and it was executable. Mr. Chunni Lal, however, contended that the compromise decree would not amount to res judicata against defendant No.2 and, therefore, there was no bar for him to institute a suit and get his right, if any, established and negative the force of the ex parte decree. This question, however, is not so simple. A party may be joined as a defendant in a suit merely because his presence is necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the question involved. In such a case no relief is sought against him and the matter in issue in the suit is not an issue between him and any other party. In such a situation the matter cannot operate as res judicata against him. But the fact that the party is simply described as proforma or that no relief is claimed against him is not sufficient to avoid the bar of res judicata, if the other conditions laid down in section 11 are satisfied. It is well established that a decision between co-defendants can operate as res judicata if the point decided in the suit is operative either actually or constructively. For example, if one of the defendants puts forward a right against the other, a decision given on that question will be deemed to be constructively in issue between them and any decision given on that issue will operate as res judicata. The position in this case, would not, in my view, would change, because the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 did not allow this situation to arise and before the time for the contest by defendant no.2 could reach, they hurriedly managed to obtain a compromise decree with respect to the properties said to be belonging to Jamadar. This decree would be deemed to be passed in presence of other defendants also and if any one of them felt aggrieved (as here defendant No.2 felt so) he certainly had a right to apply under Order XI, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the decree. 6. Mr. This decree would be deemed to be passed in presence of other defendants also and if any one of them felt aggrieved (as here defendant No.2 felt so) he certainly had a right to apply under Order XI, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the decree. 6. Mr. Chunni Lal, however, placed reliance upon two decisions of the allahabad High Court, namely, (1) Babu Ram V/s. Emperor, (XI Indian Cases 141) corresponding to 8 Allahabad Law Journal 674 ; and (2) Lala Ajodhya prasad V/s. Mst. Katori (LXI Indian Cases 484 ). In the first case, the question was as to whether a prosecution could be initiated under s section 475 of the code of Criminal Procedure against a plaintiff who had made false statements in a proceeding which was restored after setting aside an ex parte decree against the defendant whose application for rehearing was granted and the suit was being reheard. That suit was for recovery of rent against a tenant. The co-lessor was also impleaded as a pro forma defendant. The suit was decreed against the tenant and dismissed against the pro forma defendant, who had not appeared. On an application by the proforma defendant, the ex parte decree was set aside and in the rehearing of the suit the question arose for institution of a criminal procedure. In these circumstances it was observed by the learned Single Judge that the suit against the proforma defendant having been dismissed, he had no right to apply under Order IX, rule 13 and therefore, the whole proceeding was ultra vires in which no charge for purgery could be framed. In the latter case, which was before a Division Bench some persons were added as proforma defendants, who had on the finding, no concern with any of the properties and it was found as a fact that the person who made the application as proforma defendant was not at all hurt by the decree and" therefore, he could not be benefited by the order setting it aside. There is yet another decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of man Singh and another V/s. Sanghi Dal Chand, (AIR 1934 All 163), where it was observed that the words "against a defendant" in rule 13 do not necessarily imply that the only defendant against whom relief has been in terms granted by the decree, can apply for an order to set it aside and that they are comprehensive enough to include a case in which the decree adversely affects the rights of a contesting defendant. In this case the plaintiff had instituted a suit for recovery of a heavy sum against defendant no.1, but had also impleaded other defendants. In the written statement those defendants took the stand that the money claimed from defendant No.1 was payable to them. The suit was however decreed in favour of the plaintiff against defendant no.1 and dismissed ex pane against the other defendant as they failed to appear on the date of hearing. These defendants then filed an application under Order IX, rule 13 for setting aside the said decree. A similar plea was taken by the plaintiff that inasmuch as no decree was passed against defendant nos.2 and 3, they had no right to maintain any application. On reference to the definition of the term decree the learned Judges observed that there could be no doubt that among other question the decree determined the right of the plaintiff to recover the sum claimed as-against defendants Nos.2 and 3 it clearly implied an adjudication that the plaintiff, and not defendants Nos 2 and 3, was the real creditor in respect of the sum in question in the suit and therefore, that decree clearly adversely affected their rights. The application under rule 13 was held to be maintainable. 7. I feel myself in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judges in this case, as on the facts of the case stated above, it is clear that defendant no.2 and other defendants, who might have set up a title in themselves in the subject-matter of the suit ware deprived of that right and have been adversely affected by the compromise decree, ex pane of course, as it is, against them. 8. 8. To sum up the conclusion to which I have reached on examining the scope of Order IX, rule 13 and the above authorities is that if exparte decree passed in a suit does not affect the interest of any other defendant who has been exempted or against whom the suit has been dismissed, he has got no right to make an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil procedure, but if his interest has bsen affected thereby, then certainly he has the locus siandi to make an application under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and if he successfully makes out a case for setting aside the said decree, it has got to be set aside. 9. For the reasons discussed above, I do not find any error of jurisdiction in the order and would dismiss this application with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs.55 only. Application dismissed.