JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This is a landlord's writ petition filed against a judgment of Second Additional District Judge, Nainital, dated August 31, 1976, accepting an appeal of Ram Chandra (deceased respondent 1). 2. An application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 was filed by Smt. Gindori Devi, landlord, for the release of the shop No. R-4/12, Commercial Area, Bhagat Singh Chowk, Rudrapur, district Nainital on the ground of her personal requirement. The petitioner claimed that the premises was bonafide required for her son for the purposes of commercial business. She claimed that the first storey and the remaining portion of the ground floor of the said building was in possession of the petitioner and she has large family consisting of 11 members, she was required to augment the income of the family by getting her sons settled in some business. She alleged that the ground floor in the occupation of respondent 1 was sufficient for meeting requirement of her sons of starting a business. According to the petitioner, respondent 1 was a rich man and had a number of buildings at Rudrapur, and that she was not likely to suffer greater hardship. One of the buildings possessed by respondent 1 was situated by the side of the aforesaid shop. It was alleged that respondent 1 could shift his business to that shop. 3. The application contested by respondent 1. He denied that the need of the petitioner was bonafide, and claimed that the petitioner in all had thirteen shops in her name, besides the shop in question, & that the premises was not genuinely required by her. According to the case of respondent 1, the main business of the petitioner and her husband was to realise rent from the tenants and that the petitioner did not intend to settle her sons in business. 4. Before the Prescribed Authority, the parties adduced evidence and filed affidavits. The Prescribed Authority found that the shop in question was suited for the need specified by the petitioner in her application and that the petitioner was likely to suffer greater hardship from the rejection of the application than what was likely to be caused to respondent 1 by its acceptance. The Prescribed Authority found that the shop in question was suited for the need specified by the petitioner in her application and that the petitioner was likely to suffer greater hardship from the rejection of the application than what was likely to be caused to respondent 1 by its acceptance. The Prescribed Authority found that the petitioner was possessed of some other premises, but those premises were not suitable for the business which the petitioner wanted to start for his sons. 5. In appeal, the learned Additional District Judge set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority holding that as the petitioner had failed to establish her absolute need to occupy the premises in dispute, the application was liable to be rejected. He observed that in order to succeed in an application for release, the need of a landlord must be backed by extreme want or destitution, and as the landlord had failed to establish that he had absolute necessity for the shop, the application was bound to be rejected. it may be worthwhile noting that the Appellate Authority also found that the petitioner was possessed of several properties in the township of Rudrapur and that she did not genuinely need the shop in question. On these findings, the appeal was accepted and the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was set aside. 6. Against the aforesaid judgment of the Appellate Authority, the present writ petition was filed by the petitioner. 7. The first question that requires to be considered is whether the petitioner's requirement was bonafide. It is undisputable that a question as to whether a landlord has succeeded in establishing that his need is bonafide, is one of fact. But, in the present case, it appears that the finding recorded against the petitioner was solely based on the erroneous approach which was made by the Appellate Authority to the controversy in issue. The view of Appellate Authority was that as the landlord failed in showing that her need was backed by extreme want or destitution her application could not succeed. Clause (a) of Section 21(1) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 uses the expression "bonafide required". The term "bonafide" has been a subject-matter of judicial decision, in several cases. It is not necessary to make a reference to those cases here. Clause (a) of Section 21(1) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 uses the expression "bonafide required". The term "bonafide" has been a subject-matter of judicial decision, in several cases. It is not necessary to make a reference to those cases here. It would suffice to mention that a person is said to need a premises bonafide if he requires it honestly. Similarly, the word 'required' has also been interpreted in several cases, and the connotation of the said word shows that the landlord must need the premises. In order to succeed in such an application, it is not necessary that the landlord must be on the streets. The connotation of the word "need" or "requirement" should not be unnecessarily or artificially extended so as to give it meaning that a landlord cannot get a premises released unless his requirement is absolute. No doubt, the question of need of a landlord is to be decided objectively and its decision should not be based on the ipso dixit of a landlord, but that does not mean that he must stand on extreme need before he could succeed. 8. As the decision arrived at by the Appellate Authority against the petitioner got coloured by the wrong approach made to the term, the finding given on the question of bonafide requirement cannot be sustained. It is, therefore, necessary that the Appellate Authority is directed to decide the appeal afresh. In deciding the said question, the comparative, hardship of the landlord and the tenant shall also be considered. The Appellate Authority will also permit the parties to adduce evidence, if they so desire. 9. For all these reasons, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned Second Additional District Judge, Nainital dated 31.8.1976 is quashed. The District Judge is directed to decide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made above. There shall be no order as to costs.