S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) PLAINTIFF filed the present suit for recovering possession of the suit premises under sec. 13 (1) (hh) of the Bombay Rent Act against the defendant. The learned trial Judge passed in favour of the plaintiff decree for possession. That decree was challenged by the defendant in appeal to the District Court. The appeal was dismissed. The defendant challenges this civil revision application the appellate decree passed by the Court below. ( 2 ) ON behalf of the defendant it has been firstly argued that the Tribunal constituted under sec. 13 (3b) of the Bombay Rent Act could not have granted to the plaintiff certificate under sec. 13 (3a) without giving an opportunity to the defendant of being heard. The Tribunal is constituted under sub-sec. (3b) of sec. 13. Under sub-sec. (3a) it has got the power to grant a certificate to the landlord which the landlord is required to produce at the time of the institution of the suit if he seeks possession of the premises under sec. 13 (1) (hh ). Sec. 13 (1) (hh) provides follows. "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sec 15 a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (hh) that the premises consist of not more than two floors and are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of the demolisr hing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished". When sec. 13 (1) (hh) is read in light of sec. 13 (3a) it becomes very clear that no landlord has a right to institute an action against his tenant to recover possession of the premises let out to his tenant on the ground that he wants to demolish it and construct on the site of that building a new building unless he produces a certificate from the Tribunal under sec. 13 (3a ). ( 3 ) RULES have been made under sec. 13 and sec. 49 of the Bombay Rent Act. They are called Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Tribunal) Rules Have. 13 (3a ). ( 3 ) RULES have been made under sec. 13 and sec. 49 of the Bombay Rent Act. They are called Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Tribunal) Rules Have. They were published on 22nd February 1951 in Bombay Government Gazette Part 1 at page 970. Similarly a notification was issued by the Government of Bombay one 25th January 1951 under Sec. 13 (3b) (b) (iv) of the Bombay Rent Act and was published in Bombay Government Gazette Part T. When the notification and the Rules are read together it becomes very clear that before ah Tribunal grants to the landlord a certificate under sec. 13 (3a) it is required to consider three questions. They are as follows: (I) Whether the landlord has present title to the land on which the existing premises stand; (II) Whether the landlords immediate financial resources amount to not less than 1/3rd of the estimated cost of the construction of a new building to be erected by him; and; (III) Whether the landlord has obtained the approval of the Municipality and other authorities concerned as may be necessary to the plan for the new building to be erected by him. ( 4 ) THE question which has arisen before me is whether the Tribunal is required to hear a tenant before deciding on the aforesaid three facts and granting if he so decides the certificate to the landlord. It has been argued by Mr. Naik that certificate granted by the Tribunal produces civil consequences for the tenant and that therefore it is necessary to hear the tenant before the Tribunal grants the certificate. ( 5 ) RELIANCE has been placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India and another AIR 1978 S. C. 597. The majority judgment lays down the principle that though a statute may not in positive terms provide for hearing the parties yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is a part of the rules of natural justice. Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is a part of the rules of natural justice. Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. The test which a Court is required to apply is this: Does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected ? It has also been laid down that if administrative proceeding involves civil consequences the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable to it. In that case the passport issued by the Government of India to the petitioner was impounded without hearing her. It affected her civil rights and produced civil consequences for her. Therefore it could not have been impounded unless she was heard. She had no remedy against the impounding of her passport. ( 6 ) CAN That principle be applied to section 13 (3a) of the Bombay Rent Act ? ( 7 ) IN my opinion it is not necessary to hear a tenant before the Tribunal issues a certificate under sec. 13 (3a) because the certificate granted by the Tribunal is not final. The Act or the Rules made thereunder do not provide that the certificate granted by the Tribunal under sec. 13 (3a) of the Bombay Rent Act shall be final and conclusive proof of the facts stated therein. It is said that since no finality and conclusiveness are attached to it the facts stated therein can be challenged in a Court of law. It is only a piece of evidence which a landlord is required to produce at the time of the institution of the suit and which can be challenged by the tenant like any other piece of evidence. It is open to the tenant to prove before the Court in spite of the certificate issued by the Tribunal that the landlord has no present title to the land on which the premises of which he seeks possession are situate and that he does not have sufficient financial resources to construct a new building after demolishing the old one. It is open to the tenant to prove before the Court in spite of the certificate issued by the Tribunal that the landlord has no present title to the land on which the premises of which he seeks possession are situate and that he does not have sufficient financial resources to construct a new building after demolishing the old one. It is also open to him to show that the municipality has withheld the permission and that therefore the landlord will not be able to construct any building after demolishing the old one. Since no final and conclusive character attaches to the certificate issued by the Tribunal and since the facts stated in the certificate are challengeable as any other piece of evidence it is not necessary for the Tribunal to hear the tenant before the certificate is granted. If the Tribunal is required to hear the tenant before a certificate is granted the tenant will have two opportunities to challenge the primary facts on which a certificate is founded once before the Tribunal and again before the Court. It is superfluous to enable the tenant to play two innings and to subject the landlord to greater burden than is warranted by the language of the section. ( 8 ) IT would also be unwise to hold that once the Tribunal hears the tenant and grants the certificate the tenant will not be able to challenge the facts stated in the certificate before the Court. If the statute or the rules made thereunder had provided for such a situation then the position would have been different. But in absence of any such provision it is wise and prudent to hold that not only the tenant should have one opportunity to challenge the facts stated in the certificate but that that opportunity should be given to him before the Court because by any standard the court can decide the aforesaid question better more effectively and more objectively than the Tribunal will do. Ganerally speaking the Executive Engineer Roads and Buildings in charge of a particular area in the State has been constituted as a Tribunal for that area. For the city of Ahmedabad the Housing Commissioner is the Tribunal constituted under sec. 13 (3b ). Ganerally speaking the Executive Engineer Roads and Buildings in charge of a particular area in the State has been constituted as a Tribunal for that area. For the city of Ahmedabad the Housing Commissioner is the Tribunal constituted under sec. 13 (3b ). In my opinion therefore the decree passed by the court below is eminently correct because the grant of a certificate by the Tribunal to the landlord causes no prejudice whatsoever to the tenant and deprives him of no rights because it is open to him to challenge the certificate and the facts upon which it is based before the Court. ( 9 ) NEXT the certificate does not produce any civil consequences for him because the certificate does not lead to passing of the decree for possession against him. The certificate merely enables a landlord to institute the suit and nothing more. It is more in the nature of a disability to which the landlord has been subjected than a disability to which the tenant has been subjected. The suit which may be filed on the production of the certificate can be contested by the tenant as effectively on all issues as it can be contested by him if the suit was instituted without producing the certificate. Therefore while on one hand the certificate does not produce any civil consequences for the tenant on the other hand it subjects the landlord to an additional obligation which he must discharge before instituting the suit the object of which is to prevent the institution of useless and unwarranted litigation. In other words it is a check against the institution of frivolous suits by the landlord. That check does not cause any harm or injury to the tenant. In my opinion therefore it is not necessary for the Tribunal to hear the tenant before the Tribunal grants certificate to the landlord under sec. 13 (3a) and a certificate granted by the Tribunal without hearing the tenant is as valid as it otherwise can be. ( 10 ) MR. Shukla who appears on behalf of the plaintiff has invited my attention to a Division Bench decision of this Court recorded in Civil Revision Application No. 1213 of 1973 and Civil Revision Application No. 1211 of 1973 decided by common judgment on 14th October 1977 by Mr. Justice A. D. Desai and Mr. Justice N. H. Bhatt. Shukla who appears on behalf of the plaintiff has invited my attention to a Division Bench decision of this Court recorded in Civil Revision Application No. 1213 of 1973 and Civil Revision Application No. 1211 of 1973 decided by common judgment on 14th October 1977 by Mr. Justice A. D. Desai and Mr. Justice N. H. Bhatt. The Division Bench has taken the same view which I have taken in this decision. The question in fact has been concluded so far as this Court is concerned by the Division Bench judgment of this Court referred to above. It was in fact not necessary for me to write this reasoned judgment. However I have done so because I have stated a few more reasons in support of the conclusion. ( 11 ) THE next contention which has been raised by Mr. Naik is that under the rules referred to above the Tribunal was required to grant the provisional certificate and that inasmuch as no provisional certificate was granted the final certificate was bad in law. I do not agree. Issuance of a provisional certificate is for the benefit of the landlord and creates no disability for the tenant. Therefore the tenant cannot make any grievance on this count. The provision which has been made in the rules is intended to minimise the passage of time and the difficulties for the landlord. If the landlord wants to take advantage of it he may do so. If he does not want to take advantage of it he may not do so. If he does not take advantage of the provisional certificate it does not mean that the final certificate is vitiated as if grant of a provisional certificate is something which operates in favour of the tenant. I therefore find no substance in this contention which Mr. Naik has raised before me. ( 12 ) THE third contention which Mr. Naik has raised is that the plaintiff was required to give the undertaking within the meaning of sec. 13 (3a) of the Rent Act at the time of the institution of the suit and that he had given no such undertaking. According to him the undertaking given by the plaintiff at the appellate stage before the lower appellate Court was of no consequence at all. I do not agree. 13 (3a) of the Rent Act at the time of the institution of the suit and that he had given no such undertaking. According to him the undertaking given by the plaintiff at the appellate stage before the lower appellate Court was of no consequence at all. I do not agree. If an undertaking is required to be given in the suit or at the institution of the suit it may as well be given at the appellate stage. In the undertaking which a landlord is required to give he is required to state that the new building which he proposes to erect shall contain not less than two times the number of residential tenements and not less than two times the floor area contained in the premises sought to be demolished. This undertaking is intended to be given for the benefit of the tenant and for serving public interest. If such an undertaking is given at the appellate stage it serves the same purpose which it serves if it was given at the time of the institution of the suit. Therefore if an undertaking is given subsequent to the institution of the suit either in the Court of the first instance or in the court of appeal it serves the public interest and the tenant as effectively as it would serve if it was given at the time of the institution of the suit. No prejudice is caused to the tenant by the undertaking which is given at the appellate stage. The third contention raised by Mr. Naik therefore fails and is rejected. ( 13 ) LAST contention which Mr. Naik has raised is that the defendant is not the only tenant living in the building in question but there is one more tenant occupying another part in the building in question. According to him therefore continued occupation by another tenant of another part of the building in question will militate against the demolition of the building. It has been found by the courts below that the situation of the building in question is such that the suit premises alone can be demolished without affecting in any manner whatsoever the other part which is occupied by another tenant. It has been found by the courts below that the situation of the building in question is such that the suit premises alone can be demolished without affecting in any manner whatsoever the other part which is occupied by another tenant. It cannot be gainsaid that if a landlord has right to seek the demolition of the entire building he has also got a right to demolish a part of the building without affecting the other half if it is necessary for his purpose to do so. Similarly he can also seek the demolition of more than one house if the circumstances of the case so warrant. ( 14 ) SIMILAR view has been expressed by Mr. Justice Deshpande in Badrinarayan Ramsukh Rathi v. Nichaldas Tejbhandas Sindhi 70 Bom. L. R. 481 Since in the instant case it has been found that the suit premises can be demolished without affecting the other part of the building occupied by another tenant the last contention raised by Mr. Naik fails and is rejected. ( 15 ) SINCE all the contentions raised by Mr. Naik fail and are rejected the civil revision application fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. .