JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been filed by Ananda Ram under Art 226 of the Constitution of India praying that the order (Ex.3) of respondent No. 2 Deputy Locust Entomologist, jodhpur, dated 8-7-1978 as endorsed to him by respondent No. 3 Assistant Locust-Entomologist in-charge, Barmer Circle, Barmer, on 14-7-78 may be quashed. It has also been prayed that the writ may also be issued to the respondents directing them to continue him in service as before paying him all arrears of pay & other benefits permissible to him. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition may briefly be stated as under. The petitioner was appointed as a Chowkidar in the year 1965. As per orders of respondent No.2 contained in his letter No. F-1-2/6/69 Adm. dated November 19, 1969 addressed to respondent No. 3 in connection with regularisation of the petitioner's service, his salary was fixed at Rs. 82.00 per month with effect from October 1, 1969. Photostat copy of the aforesaid memorandum as endorsed to the petitioner by respondent No 3 vide No.F-I- 8/69 Adm. dated November 25, 1969 was submitted along with the petition. Vide office order No F-1-20/90 Adm. (Ex.1) dated April 9, 1970, the petitioner was appointed as Chowkidar (payable from contingencies) at Locust Outpost, Barmer, retrospectively with effect from September 30, 1967. As he had completed more than two years' continuous service, he was allowed to draw consolidated wages at Rs. 82,00 per month with effect from March 1, 1970 The petitioner continued in service thereafter However, respondent No.2, vide his No. F. 1 8/78 Adm. dated July 8, 1978 addressed to respondent No.3, conveyed that the petitioner may get himself sponsored by the Employment Exchange Barmer, failing which, his services may be terminated and new person may be engaged through the Employment Exchange. The case of the petitioner is that though he was not obliged to approach the Employment Exchange, still met the officer concerned who told him that he had become overage for the Central Government Services & as such, cannot be registered and sponsored for it. Respondent No.3, without any notice or written order, orally told him not to come on duty from November 1, 1978 and thus, his services stood terminated from November 1, 1978. He has challenged the order (Ex. Respondent No.3, without any notice or written order, orally told him not to come on duty from November 1, 1978 and thus, his services stood terminated from November 1, 1978. He has challenged the order (Ex. 3) of respondent No.2 dated July 8, 1978 as endorsed to the petitioner by respondent No.3 on July 14, 1978 on various grounds which will be discussed hereafter. 3. The respondents submitted their reply to the writ petition on February 9, 1979. It was stated by them that the petitioner applied to be appointed as a Chowkidar vide his application (Ex. R/2) dated 13-9-1967. In response to his application, the petitioner was engaged as daily paid Mazdoor vide memorandum (Ex.R/1) dated October 9, 1967 at Rs. 2.00/- per day at Barmer with effect from September 13, 1967 as Chowkidar & the appointment was purely temporary and did not confer any title for permanent employment As regards memorandum (Ex.1; dated November 19,1969, it was stated that it only related to consolidated wages and not to the regularisation of the petitioner's services, Same was said with respect to office order (EX.2) dated April 9, 1970. According to the respondents, the petitioner continued to remain on daily wages only. It was pleaded by the respondents that at the time of review of the cases of daily paid employees for regular appointments during 1978, it was detected that the initial appointment of the petitioner was irregular as he was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange as required under the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, (for short 'the Act of 1959' hereafter) 1959 and Rules made thereunder and It was also contrary to the terms laid down in the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs O.M. No. F.6/52/60-Est (A) dated February 16, 196l(Ex.R5); No. 16/10/66- Estt (D) dated December 2, 1966 (Ex.R6) and No. 14/22/65.-Estt (D) dated June 12, 1966 (Ex.7). It was therefore, submitted that all the appointments of casual labour were to?be made only through the Employment Exchange and as the appointment of the petitioner was irregular, it could not be regularised unless he got himself sponsored by the Employment Exchange. In these circumstances, order dated July 8, 1978 was issued asking the petitioner to get himself sponsored by the Employment Exchange failing which he could not continue in service. In these circumstances, order dated July 8, 1978 was issued asking the petitioner to get himself sponsored by the Employment Exchange failing which he could not continue in service. As he failed to get himself sponsored by the Employment' Exchange, his services were terminated with effect from October 31, 1978 after noon. The copy of the order doted 21.1.1978 showing that his services were terminated from 31.10.1978 after- noon has been filed with the reply marked Ex R/8. It was pleaded that the petitioner was a daily wage labour getting daily wages per month paid from contingency and, therefore, he had no right to the post and his services could be terminated. It was, therefore, prayed by the respondents that the writ petition filed by the petitioner may be dismissed. 4. Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the effect that as the services of the petitioner were terminated with effect from October 31, 1978 afternoon, and in this place another person sponsored by the Employment Exchange was engaged and since that person has not been impleaded as a party in the writ petition, it should be dismissed for failure to implead a necessary party. In para 8 of the reply, it is stated that other person sponsored by the Employment Exchange has been engaged. This para is conspicuously silent with respect to the name of the person, his date of appointment and the terms on which the alleged appointment has been made. No specific objection to the effect that the writ petition is not maintainable in the absence of the person who has been engaged in place of the petitioner has been raised. In these circumstance, I do not agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that the writ petition is not maintain- able on account of non-joinder of such person, Apart from this, the petitioner has prayed for declaring the order of termination of his services ill gal and invalid. In this view of the matter, the relief can be granted in the presence of the respondents and the person who was appointed in his place is not at all a necessary party I, therefore, over rule the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. In this view of the matter, the relief can be granted in the presence of the respondents and the person who was appointed in his place is not at all a necessary party I, therefore, over rule the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was a "workman" within the meaning of Sections 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Art (No. XIV of 1947) (for short, 'the Act' hereinafter) employed in Anti Locust Department, which is an 'Industry' as defined in section 2(j) of the Act and termination of his services will amount to retrenchment. As before retrenching his services, procedure for retrenchment laid Clown in section 25 G of the Act was not followed and conditions precedent to retrenchment provided in section 25 F of the Act were not complied with, it was contended, that the order terminating his services was illegal and void. Mr. Vyas, the Central Government standing counsel, strenuously contended that the Anti -Locust Department dots not come within the definition of the term 'Industry' for, it is a Central Government Department and the activities of the organisation are not analogous to any trade or business and, therefore, the provisions of the Act are not at all applicable. 6. The first question that, therefore, crops up for determination is, whether the Anti-Locust Department Organization, where the petitioner had served as a Chowkidar for eleven years, is an 'Industry' within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Act. It will be useful here to read section 2(j) of the Act. "2. Definitions:- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. (j) "industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or a vocation of workmen ; 7. It is not necessary to discuss the attributes of 'Industry' in detail because the definition of 'Industry' given in section 2(j) of the Act has been the subject matter of various decisions of the Supreme Court. After overruling the decisions reported in National Union of Commercial Employees v. N.R. Meher, AIR 1962 SC 1080 , The University of Delhi v. Ramnath, AIR 1963 SC 1873 , Madras Gym. After overruling the decisions reported in National Union of Commercial Employees v. N.R. Meher, AIR 1962 SC 1080 , The University of Delhi v. Ramnath, AIR 1963 SC 1873 , Madras Gym. Club Employee's Union Management, AIR 1968 Ex 554 and other rulings whose ratio runs counter to the principles laid down in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548 , in which it was observed in para 161 as under, 'Industry' as defined in Sections 2(j) and explained in Banerji ( AIR 1953 SC 58 ) has a wide import, (a) Where (i) systematic activity, (ii) organised by co-operation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is chimerical) (iii) for the production and or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss i.e. making, on a large scale prasad or food) prima facie, there is an 'industry' in that enterprise. (b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private or other sector. (c) The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations. (d) If the organisation is a trade or business it does not cease to be one because of philanthrophy animating the undertaking ......." It was further held that, "....... all organised activity possessing the triple elements in I (supra), although not trade or business, may still be 'industry' provided the nature of the activity, viz. the employer-employee basis, bears resemblance to what we find in trade or business. This takes into the fold 'industry' undertakings, callings and services, adventures analogous to the carrying on of trade or business......." The Anti-Locust Department of the Government of India falls within the definition of the term 'Industry' in as much it carries on systematic activity. Its functional activity is to survey the Scheduled desert area and to control the influx of locust and its activities. The activity of the Anti. Locust Department is to eradicate lecuit and for that purpose, it keeps vehicles, power dusters, nozzle sprayers, hand dusters, wireless sets etc. Its operations are to check growth of locust and to destroy then. All this is organised by the Anti Locust Department of the Government of India (employer) and the employees. The activity of the Anti. Locust Department is to eradicate lecuit and for that purpose, it keeps vehicles, power dusters, nozzle sprayers, hand dusters, wireless sets etc. Its operations are to check growth of locust and to destroy then. All this is organised by the Anti Locust Department of the Government of India (employer) and the employees. The nature of the activities of the Anti Locust Department Organization is to protect growing crops by taking appropriate steps for eradication of locust. The tests laid down in Bangalore Water Supply's case, AIR 1978 SC 548 are, thus, satisfied and I hold that it is an 'Industry' within the meaning of Sections 2(j) of the Act. 8. The next question is : whether the petitioner, who was employed In the Anti-Locust Department as a Chowkidar, was a 'workman, within the meaning of Sections 2(j) of the Act. Material portion of Sections 2(j) reads as under; "2. Definitions. In this Act, unless there is any thing repugnant in the subject or context. (s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include..........The petitioner being employed in the Anti-Locust Department (Industry) as Chowkidar, was doing unskilled manual work for which monthly wages were paid to him. He was, therefore, a 'workman' It is not in dispute that the petitioner has been in continuous service in the Organization since September 30, 1967 until his services were terminated with effect from October 31, 1978 (A.N.) vide order Ex. R/8. He had completed about 11 years' service and, therefore, before retrenchment, the conditions precedent to retrenchment provided in Sec 25-F of the Act should have been fulfilled. R/8. He had completed about 11 years' service and, therefore, before retrenchment, the conditions precedent to retrenchment provided in Sec 25-F of the Act should have been fulfilled. The requirements of a valid retrenchment laid down in Sections 25-F are, (a) One month's notice in writing, indicating the reasons for retrenchment, or wages for the notice period in lieu of such notice; (b) Payment of compensation equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) Notice to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner. In this case, there is no dispute that the conditions precedent, as required by Sections 25-F of the Act, were not complied with and, therefore, termination of the petitioner's services was invalid. 9. In Parumal v. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2070 of 1973, decided on July 11, 1977), D.P. Gupta, J., observed as under,- "It is well established that the requirement to pay compensation for retrenchment is mandatory condition as provided in Sections 25-F and it is also implicit therein that the amount of retrenchment compensation has to be paid "at the time of retrenchment". If the workman is asked to go and his services are terminated by the expiry of one month's notice of retrenchment or on payment of one month's emoluments in lieu thereof, but the retrenchment compensation is not paid or offered to be paid simultaneously along with the termination of his service, then the order of retrenchment is bad in law and is invalid and inoperative..." As conditions precedent mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Sections 25-F of the Act are mandatory, which were not occupied with. the older terminating the services of the petitioner is in contravention of the provisions of Sections 25 F of the Act and, it is, therefore, invalid and inoperative. 10. It wait next contended by Sori M.L. Shreemali learned counsel for the petitioner, that the services of the petitioner were terminated as is clear trim Ex.3 dated July 8, 1978, on the ground that he did not get himself sponsored by tie Employment Exchange, Barmer end that the provisions of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act (No. XXXI of 1959), 59 are not applicable so far as be services of the petitioner as a Chowkidar are concerned. According to Mr. According to Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the respondents at the time of review of the cases of the daily paid employees for regular employment during 1978, it was detected that the initial appointment of the petitioner was irregular as he was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange as required by the Act of 1959, said the rules made thereunder and that it was contrary to the terms indicated by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs vide Office Memorandum No F5/52/60 Est (A) dated February 16, 1961 (Ex R/5) and copy or letter No. 16/10/06. Est (D) dated December 2, 1977 Ex. R/6) Learned Counsel contended that as the appointment of the petitioner was irregular and could not be regularised unless be got himself sponsored by the Employment, Exchange, he was advised by the letter No. F 18/78 Adm. dated July 8, 1978 to get himself sponsored by the Employment Exchange failing which he could not continue in service. The petitioner was employed its a Chowkidar (watchman) Sections 2(1) of the Act of 1959 defines 'unskilled office work'. It provides that unskilled office work means work done in an establishment, inter alia, by a watchman (Chowkidar). Sec 3 (d) of the Act of 1959 lays down that it will not apply in relation to vacancies in airy employment to do on killed office work' Therefore, the provisions of the Act of 19.9 do wit apply to a watchman (Chowkidar) as it falls within the category of unskilled allies work under Sections 2 (1) of the Act of 1959. The basis of the order terminating the services of the petitioner was that initially when he was appointed, he was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange and when subsequently asked to get him elf sponsored by lie Employment Exchange, he failed to do so. The order to this effect is, therefore, clearly bad in law. On this count also it deserves to be quashed. It was not necessary for the petitioner to have himself sponsored by the Employment Exchange. 11. Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the respondents also urged that the petitioner was a casual labour and was paid from contingency fund and, therefore, he had no right to hold the post and his services could be terminated In other words, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that a casual labour means purely temporary employee. 11. Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the respondents also urged that the petitioner was a casual labour and was paid from contingency fund and, therefore, he had no right to hold the post and his services could be terminated In other words, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that a casual labour means purely temporary employee. I regret, I cannot agree for the simple reason that the petitioner was appointed with effect from September 30, 1967 to perform duties of a Chowkidar and on completion of more that two years' service, he was allowed to draw consolidated amount of Rs. 821/- pm with effect from March 1, 1970. Subsequently, he continued as such. This shows that he had put in more than eleven years' service. In these circumstances, there is no justification for be Learned Counsel to contend that he was a daily paid mazoor and purely temporary. The argument is futile and is, therefore, rejected. 12. No other point was argued. 13. In view of the findings. I have arrived at that there was non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act as aforesaid. The order of termination of the services of the petitioner with effect from October 31, 1978 afternoon, was in contravention of Sections 25-F of the Act and that as the provisions of the Act of 1959 ate rot at all applicable, its follows that the termination of the services of the petitioner is clearly bad, invalid and inoperative 14. I therefore, allow this writ petition. The order of termination of services of the petitioner passed in pursuance of the order (Ex 3) of respondent No. 2 dated July 8, 1978 as endorsed to the petitioner by respondent No. 3 on July 14, 1978, is quashed. It is. declared that the petitioner continues to hold his post of the Chowkidar. Tar petitioner will be entitled to get emoluments and all cider benefit of the entire period horn the date of illegal termination of his services upto the date he is restored to the original post i.e. Chowkidar. 15. In the circumstance of the case, the parties are left to hear their own costs.Writ allowed. *******