JUDGMENT H.N. Agrawal, Member. - This is a reference made by the additional Commissioner Allahabad Division, Allahabad recommending that the revision filed by Juggi Lal against the order dated January 24, 1974 passed by Judicial Officer Soraon, district Allahabad setting aside the ex parte decree in suit under Section 229-B of the UPZA and LR Act may be dismissed. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. Juggilal had filed a suit for declaration of Sirdari rights in plot No. 686/2 in village Chatwa Tappa Chaurasi. Vinodanand, Gaon Sabha and State of U.P. were impleaded as defendants. On November 28, 1969 Juggilal and Vinodanand compromised the suit and admitted the claim of Juggilal. On the basis of this compromised the trial court decree the suit on December 1, 1969. Thereafter the District Government Counsel moved an application on March 26, 1970 on behalf of the State of U.P. for setting aside the ex parte decree and restoring the suit so that the State could file the written statement and contest. The trial court by its order dated January 24, 1974 allowed his application and set aside the ex parte decree. This order has been challenged in the present revision. 3. The grounds urged in the revision are firstly that the application for setting aside ex parte decree was moved beyond the period of limitation prescribed and the trial court acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction and with material irregularity in allowing the said application, secondly the summons have been served on the DGC(R) on November 3, 1969 and the summons having been properly served there was no question of lack of knowledge to the DGC(R) or he State, thirdly, the period of limitation for setting aside the ex parte decree after service of summons is 30 days from the date of the decree and lastly that the trial court has failed to consider the legal position. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist has cited Devta v. Ishwar Dutt 1970 RD 290 in which this court had held that the trial court committed gross illegality and material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in allowing a belated application even when no sufficient cause either for the non-appearance or for the condonation of delay has been shown. 5. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist has cited Devta v. Ishwar Dutt 1970 RD 290 in which this court had held that the trial court committed gross illegality and material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in allowing a belated application even when no sufficient cause either for the non-appearance or for the condonation of delay has been shown. 5. The provision for passing an ex parte decree in the absence of defendant is contained in Order IX, rule 6, CIP which reads as follows :- "Procedure when only plaintiff appears -(1) where the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing then - When summons duly served 1(a) if it is proved that the summons was duly served, the court may make an order that the suit be heard ex parte; When summons not duly served - (b) if it is not proved that the summons was duly served the court shall direct a second summons to be issued and served on the defendant; When summons served, but not in due time - (c) if it is proved that the summons was server on the defendant, but not in sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer on the day fixed in the summons, the Court shall postpone the hearing of that suit to a future day to be fixed by the Court, and shall direct notice of such day to the defendant. (2) Where it is owing to the plaintiff's default that the summons was not duly served or was not served in sufficient time the court shall order the plaintiff to pay the costs occasioned by the postponement." Thus the requirement of an ex parte decree according to the rule are :- 1. It must be proved that the summons was duly served. 2. The defendant does not appear when the suit is called on the hearing even after due service and 3. The suit will be heard ex parte and a decree will be only in accordance with law i.e. when the plaintiff has duly proved his claim. It is common misconception to presume that an ex parte decree can be passed merely when the defendant is absent. The correct position is that all the three ingredients must be present before an ex parte decree can be passed. It is common misconception to presume that an ex parte decree can be passed merely when the defendant is absent. The correct position is that all the three ingredients must be present before an ex parte decree can be passed. Where any of the above 3 ingredients is missing, the ex parte decree is nullity. 6. I may now proceed to apply the above three ingredients to the present case. Though the Gaon Sabha was on e of the defendant no summons for the Gaon Sabha is on record and it has not been proved at all that the Gaon Sabha was duly served. There is indeed a summons for the State of Uttar Pradesh through the Collector which was received by the DGC(R) on June 3, 1969 but this summons is a suspicious document. It does not bear the signature of the Presiding Officer of the Court. Moreover the name of the parties was given on the top of the summon and this has been mutilated and substituted by the words Juggilal v. Vinodanand. This gives rise to the suspicion that the summons was not for this case at all but for some other case. This suspicion is confirmed by the fact that on November 15, 1969, the order sheet of the final court reads that the summons had not been received. 7. Apart from the fact that the due service on the defendants has not been proved, the their ingredient has also not been fulfilled. The plaintiff did not prove his claim at all. According to the extract of the Khatauni filed by the plaintiff himself the land in suit is recorded as a Talab. There is no mention of Vinodanand, defendant No. 1 in any capacity. Thus this Vinodanand did not have any authority to compromise the case and admit the suit conferring the Sirdari rights on the plaintiff over the land of public utility which vested in the Gaon Sabha, only the State or the Gaon, had the legal authority to admit the suit. Thus the alleged compromise between Juggilal and Vinodanand is not a lawful compromise but is a clear attempt of fraud and collusion. It is an established principle of law that fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings. In the present case the ex parte decree is a fraud and nullity. Thus the alleged compromise between Juggilal and Vinodanand is not a lawful compromise but is a clear attempt of fraud and collusion. It is an established principle of law that fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings. In the present case the ex parte decree is a fraud and nullity. The learned trial court had acted in the interest of justice in setting aside the ex parte decree and restoring the suit for proceeding according to law. Both the trial courts and the Additional Commissioner has rightly held that the service on the defendant was not sufficient and the trial court has rightly set aside the ex parte decree under O. IX, Rule 13, CPC. 8. The revision has no force and is hereby dismissed. While dismissing the revision I would observe that it is highly undesirable that attempt be made to misuse the process of the court for obtaining a fraudulent decree. Both Jugilal and Vinodanand as well as the two lawyers identifying them are parties to this fraudulent transaction. The conduct of the Presiding Officer of the court who decreed the suit in terms of compromise on December 1, 1969 also calls for strictures. The matter is, therefore, brought to the notice of the Collector, Allahabad for taking appropriate action against the delinquent persons in accordance with law.