JUDGMENT Mulye J.- 1. This second appeal filed by the defendants, is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Mandsaur, in Civil Regular Appeal No. 53-A of 1973, on 9th May, 1975, decreeing the plaintiffs' suit for ejectment on the grounds under section 12 (1) (a) and section 12 (1) (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, by upsetting the judgment and decree of the trial Court, which had dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for ejectment. 2. The short facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows :- The plaintiffs are partners of the firm M/s. Jamaluddin Ibrahim, M.T. Cloth Market, Indore, the plaintiffs are the owners of House No.121 situated at Kalidas Marg, Mandsaur, which they purchased from one Ahsan Ahmed and 3 others on 29-7-1908. One late Mohammad Yusuf was occupying the suit accommodation as a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 31/. Per month. After the death of Mohammad Yusuf, the defendant-appellants being his heirs, are in possession of the suit accommodation as a tenant. The previous owners Ahsan Ahmad and others, immediately after the same in favour of the plaintiffs, intimated late Mohammad Yusuf about the sale of the said house, to the plaintiffs, and asked him to pay the rent at the same rate since 1-8-1968 to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also gave a notice to Mohammad Yusuf on 10-3-1969, through their counsel intimating him that they have purchased the said house. Thus, Mohammad Yusuf became the plaintiffs' tenant, in respect of the suit accommodation at a monthly rent of Rs. 31/-, and the tenancy commencing on the 12th day of every English calender month. 3. The tenant Mohammad Yusuf had paid rent till 31-7-1968 to the Predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs. But he did not pay any rent to the plaintiffs from 1-8-1963. The plaintiffs, therefore, on 24-12-1969, sent a notice to their tenant Mohammad Yusuf through their counsel demanding arrears of rent from 1-8-1968 to 11-12-1969, at the rate of Rs.31/- per month. By the said notice, his tenancy was also terminated w.e.f. II. 2. 1970 and in the alternative, he was also given an option. This notice was served on the tenant an 31-12-1969, but, he did not pay or remit any rent to the plaintiffs. But, he sent a reply of this notice on 24-3-1970, through his counsel. 4. By the said notice, his tenancy was also terminated w.e.f. II. 2. 1970 and in the alternative, he was also given an option. This notice was served on the tenant an 31-12-1969, but, he did not pay or remit any rent to the plaintiffs. But, he sent a reply of this notice on 24-3-1970, through his counsel. 4. Subsequently, the plaintiffs came to know that their tenant Mohammad Yusuf had expired on 29-8-1969, and the defendant-appellants, who are his heirs, became the plaintiffs' tenant. Therefore, the plaintiffs through their counsel sent another registered notice Ex. P-10, on 12-8-1970, demanding a sum of Rs. 755.35 P., on account of rent at the rate of Rs. 31/- per. Month from 1-8-1968 to 11-8-1970 and by this notice, also terminated their tenancy with effect from the mid night of 11-10-1970. By this notice, the defendants had also been given an option that in case, they thought that their month of tenancy does not expire on the 11th of the English month but on some other date of the British calender month, or that the monthly tenancy commences according to the Hindi Calendar month, then they might vacate the suit portion whenever according to them their month of tenancy ends, after a month of the service of this notice on them. The said notice sent by registered post was received by the defendants on 18-8-1970. The defendants through their counsel gave reply to this notice on 13-10 1970 vide Ex. P-11, but neither paid, nor remitted the arrears of rent to the plaintiffs within the statutory period of 2 months, nor vacated the suit accommodation. By the said quit notice, the plaintiffs sought possession of the suit accommodation on the ground that they wanted to reconstruct the house. 5. The plaintiffs, therefore, filed a suit for ejectment in the trial Court on 7-12-1970, stating all these facts therein. The plaintiffs claimed Rs. 817/- on account of arrears of rent from 1-8-1968 till 11-10-1970, and mesne profits of Rs. 56 from 12-10-70 upto 7-12-1970. 6. Further according to the plaintiffs they sought ejectment of the defendants on the ground that they wanted to rebuild the house, in which the defendants are occupying the premises as a tenant. The plaintiffs claimed Rs. 817/- on account of arrears of rent from 1-8-1968 till 11-10-1970, and mesne profits of Rs. 56 from 12-10-70 upto 7-12-1970. 6. Further according to the plaintiffs they sought ejectment of the defendants on the ground that they wanted to rebuild the house, in which the defendants are occupying the premises as a tenant. It was further averred that for purpose of rebuilding they have got the plans and estimates prepared obtained necessary permission from the Municipality for re-construction and have also arranged for the necessary funds. According to them looking to the dilapidated condition of the existing house, instead, of repairs it is more economical to re-construct the same for protecting the same from the floods. This re-building was not possible without vacating the house. They further stated that the proposed re-construction will not radically change the purpose of the house, after re-construction. They thus, put forward their bona fide need for re-construction. Thus, the plaintiffs sought ejectment on the ground of default i.e., section 12(1) (a) and for bona fide re-construction under section 12(1) (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act of 1961. 7. In the written-statements filed by the defendants they raised the dispute about the date of commencement of tenancy, that they were not in arrears of rent, as prior to the quit notice, they had sent the rent to the plaintiffs several times but the same was refused by the plaintiffs. Thus plaintiffs alone were responsible for the refusal, and, therefore, there being no arrears, as such, the defendants were not bound to remit the rent again after the receipt of the quit notice, and, consequently, they have not committed any default. They also denied that the building requires any reconstruction, as it was in good condition. 8. The trial Court, on evidence found that the tenancy of the defendants commenced on the 12th of every English month. It also found t hat the defendants were in arrears of rent from 1-8-1968, but it came to the conclusion that for these arrears, the defendants were not at fault. 8. The trial Court, on evidence found that the tenancy of the defendants commenced on the 12th of every English month. It also found t hat the defendants were in arrears of rent from 1-8-1968, but it came to the conclusion that for these arrears, the defendants were not at fault. It also found that the plaintiffs wanted to re-build the house and for that purpose they had got the proper plans and estimates ready, had obtained permission from the Municipality and that funds were also available with them for that purpose, but, it also found that the plaintiffs' requirement for re-construction is not bonafide, and as a result of re-construction of the house there will be a radical change in the purpose. It, therefore, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for ejectment, but decreed the same only for arrears of rent. 9. The lower appellate Court, also confirmed the finding of the trial Court, that the tenancy commenced on 12th of every English month. He also found that the defendants have failed to prove that as per postal coupons Ex. D-4, Ex. D-5, Ex. D-6 and Ex. D-7, any money-orders were sent to the plaintiffs, and that they were refused by them. He also found that the defendants have failed to prove that rent was also sent by a demand-draft Ex. D-l. He, therefore, decreed the plaintiffs' claim for ejectment on the ground of section 12(1) (a) of the Act, as the defendants bad also committed defaults in regularly deposing the monthly rent in the Court, by the 15th of each month, and thus, lost the benefit under sub-section (3) of section 12 of the said Act. So far as the ground of re-construction is concerned he found that the plaintiffs requirement for re-construction is bonafide, and even though, there will be change due to the re-construction, it will definitely be in public interest. He, therefore, also found that the plaintiffs are entitled to the eviction decree, on the ground of section 12(1) (h) also. He, also held that as plaintiffs have succeeded on two grounds, provisions of section 18 of the said Act are not attracted, and, consequently, question of giving option to the defendants does not arise. 10. He, therefore, also found that the plaintiffs are entitled to the eviction decree, on the ground of section 12(1) (h) also. He, also held that as plaintiffs have succeeded on two grounds, provisions of section 18 of the said Act are not attracted, and, consequently, question of giving option to the defendants does not arise. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants, Shri S.L. Garg raised the following contentions :- (1) That, as the plaintiffs had refused to accept rent sent from time to time by money-orders as also by demand-draft, the defendants were not bound to pay or remit the rent that was demanded by the quit notice Ex. P-10, as it could not then be said to be arrears of rent, and, consequently, the defendants could not be styled as a defaulter. (2) That, the ground of bona fide re-construction was not available to the plaintiffs, as they have failed to prove, that the existing condition of the building is dilapidated and its demolition. Is absolutely necessary, as the lower appellate Court has not taken into consideration the evidence about the condition of the existing house, more so, when the plaintiffs did not press the ground of repairs; (3) That the quit notice is invalid. 11. As regards the first contention, about the tender of arrears of rent, it may be stated, at the out-set that there has been no dispute so far as the rate of rent and the quantum of rent, demanded by the plaintiffs is concerned. It is not the case of the defendants that after the receipt of the quit notice the arrears of rent claimed in the notice were personally tendered by them to the plaintiffs within the statutory period, or that they refused to accept the same. Thus, there is no case of personal tender, after the service of the quit notice. It is also not the defendants' case, in the written-statement that after the receipt of the quit notice, they remitted the arrears of rent, by money order within the statutory period, and that the same was refused. Thus there being no controversy, about the arrears of rent on this point, the trial Court framed issue No.2 as under:- ^^D;k fnukad ƒ@Š@ˆŠ ls fdjk;k izfroknh x.k dh xyrh ls cdk;k jgk gS \^^ the burden of proving this issue was obviously upon the defendants. Thus there being no controversy, about the arrears of rent on this point, the trial Court framed issue No.2 as under:- ^^D;k fnukad ƒ@Š@ˆŠ ls fdjk;k izfroknh x.k dh xyrh ls cdk;k jgk gS \^^ the burden of proving this issue was obviously upon the defendants. I may also mention here, that the defendants in their written statement have nowhere given any details or particulars about the alleged remittance of rent by money orders, either before the receipt of the quit notice or after the service of the quit notice. They have only stated vaguely that they had sent the rent, but the same was not accepted by the plaintiffs. 12. The learned lower appellate Court, has given valid reasons for not placing any reliance on the money order coupons Ex. D-4. D-5, D-6 and D-7 and the demand-draft Ex. D-1., Out of these, even according to the defendants, the demand draft Ex. D-1 dated 20th March 1970, for Rs 620/-was sent to the plaintiffs prior to receipt of the quit notice. Similarly, the postal coupons Ex. D-4, and D-5 under which rent was said to have been remitted by money orders, were also sent prior to the receipt of the quit notice. It is also clear that the name of the addressee on these postal coupons Ex. D-4 and D-5 is mentioned as "M/s Jamaluddinji Abrahimji and M/s Jamaluddinji Abrahimji" without specifying them, giving any address of these payees. The payee's name mentioned in these money orders coupons is not the personal name of any of the plaintiffs. That apart, the postal receipt by which these money-orders are said to have been remitted by the defendants, have also not been filed and proved in order to connect these postal coupons with the postal receipts, which is the primary evidence. Besides these postal coupons Ex. D-4 and D-5 do not bear any postal stamp. The postman who took these money-orders, has also not been examined to prove 4 that these money-orders were handed over to him by the postal authorities, to whom they were tendered, and by whom they were refused. And on what dates? Similar is the position, so far as the postal coupons Ex. D-6 and D-7 are concerned. It appears that Ex. D-6 and D-7 relate to the same money-order of Rs. 806/-, but the postal coupon Ex. And on what dates? Similar is the position, so far as the postal coupons Ex. D-6 and D-7 are concerned. It appears that Ex. D-6 and D-7 relate to the same money-order of Rs. 806/-, but the postal coupon Ex. D-6 does not bear any postal stamp, nor the defendants have filed the original postal receipt of the Post-Office, wherefrom this money-order was sent. It is also not in dispute that the person, who is said to have gone to the Post Office to send all these money-orders on behalf of the defendants has also not been examined as out of the defendants the only defendant examined Mohammad, Ishaq (D.W. 1) has also produced them. He has admitted, in cross-examination that all these money-orders were sent before the receipt of the quit notice, and that he has filed the original postal receipts pertaining to these coupons, though they have not been exhibited, nor actually filed in the Court. He has further admitted that it was his brother Mohammad Hussain, who had been to the Bank to prepare the draft Ex. D-1, but, he has not been examined. That apart, there is no evidence to prove that this draft Ex. D-1 was, infact, ever sent to the plaintiffs, and that they returned it. He has also admitted that, his written statement is silent on this point. It is also note-worthy that though the name of the plaintiffs' firm is M/s Jamaluddin Ibrahim, still, these money order coupons and the draft are not addressed in the proper name, and it is not shown, how the name mentioned in these coupons and the draft has got any connection with the plaintiffs. It further appears that in the money-order coupon Ex. D6 in between the lines, name of the payee, where it is mentioned 'Jamaluddinji Abrahimji' and the line below in words ^vkB lkS NS% #i;kA The address ^^‡†&,eñ Vhñ DyksFk ekdsZV bUnkSj & „^^ have been inserted in small letters, which clearly indiCates that anyhow to connect this money-order coupon with the plaintiffs, this address has been subsequently inserted in small letters, in the open space found between the 2 lines, referred to above. No 'Rokad' entries or account-books have also been tendered in evidence to prove the money order charges incurred for sending these money orders. The money order coupon writing Ex. No 'Rokad' entries or account-books have also been tendered in evidence to prove the money order charges incurred for sending these money orders. The money order coupon writing Ex. D-7 also does not bear any date on the basis of which it could be known, on what date the said money-order for Rs. 806/- was sent. The postman, who is said to have made an endorsement of refusal on the coupon Ex. D-7 has also not been examined by the defendants. The plaintiff Hafiz Ibrahim P.W. 1, has clearly denied that the alleged money• orders or demand draft was ever tendered or sent to him, and that he refused to accept the same. He has categorically stated that these money orders or demand draft never reached him, nor, after their tender he refused them. Therefore, there being no evidence about the despatch and tender of these money orders and the demand draft, question of drawing any presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act, that they were tendered and refused, does not arise at all, in absence of any satisfactory and convincing evidence adduced by the defendants. If the address had been properly and correctly written on these money order coupons, it could be presumed that the amount sent by these money orders, was refused by the plall1tiffs only and not by anyone else. If these documents do not bear any address, much less, the correct address of the plaintiffs, then how can it be presumed that the money payable under this money order was tendered to the plaintiff, and, he refused to accept it. When the plaintiffs have denied any tender of the money orders as also the demand draft, then it was the defendants' duty to lead evidence to show that it were these money orders and the demand draft, which were tendered to the plaintiffs and that, it were the plaintiffs who had refused to accept it. In order to draw a presumption it must be proved that the money-order properly addressed to the person to whom it is meant to be delivered, was handed to the postal authorities, and that the postal authorities issued the postal receipts in token of the money thus received. In order to draw a presumption it must be proved that the money-order properly addressed to the person to whom it is meant to be delivered, was handed to the postal authorities, and that the postal authorities issued the postal receipts in token of the money thus received. But all that material evidence is wanting in this case, and, therefore, it cannot be held that the defendants either, before or after the receipt of the quit notice, ever sent t he arrears of rent to the plaintiffs, and that they refused it. Similar is the Case about the demand draft. There is absolutely no evidence how and when it was sent to the plaintiffs, and when they returned it. Merely because the defendants got the demand draft prepared, does not necessarily mean, that it was despatched to the person concerned, unless, there is some evidence to that effect. That apart, if the defendants ever felt that the plail1tiffs are deliberately refusing to accept the rent, sent by money-orders demand draft, he could have under section 25 of the said Act deposited the rent with the Rent Controlling Authority to enable him to get a full discharge from his liability as a tenant to pay rent to the landlord. Therefore, the authorities cited on behalf of the appellants AIR 1923 PC p. 26 (Venkatarayanim v. Subadrayamma), AIR 1972 Bombay, p. 273 (Suka Ishram v. Jamnabai) and AIR 1973 Rent Control Journal (Naubatram v Mangalsingh), are not of any assistance to the defendants. These authorities have relevancy to a particular statute, and it is in that context that they will have to be read and considered. They are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. 13. Section 12 (1) (a) of the said Act specifically contemplates that the tenant is duty bound to pay or remit the arrears of rent, within 2 months from the date of the service of notice of demand by the landlord, and, if he fails to pay or tender the same within that statutory period, the landlord gets the right to evict the tenant on this ground. Even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the tenant might have sent the rent prior to the receipt of the quit notice and the same might have also been refused by the landlord. Even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the tenant might have sent the rent prior to the receipt of the quit notice and the same might have also been refused by the landlord. still, the arrears do not cease to be arrears of rent, and his liability to pay the rent is not extinguished and diminished. The liability continues and in order to get the protection under the Act, he is bound to pay the arrears of rent within the statutory period given to him by the said Act. Section 13 of the said Act gives one more chance to the defendants-tenant, and, in case, he fully complies with the provisions of section 13 (1) of the Act, he gets the benefit under section 12 (3) of the said Act. But, it has also been found that after the initial deposit the defendants have not regularly deposited the rent in the Court, by the 15th of each succeeding month. Rent for the month of March 1971 has not been fully paid in the month of April 1971. Instead, of depositing Rs.31/-, the defendants have deposited only. Rs. 30/- on 6-4-1971 and this deficit of Re l/- has been made up on 7-5-1971 when along with the rent for the month of April 1971, it has been deposited. Again the rent for the month of May 1971, has been deposited on 22-6-1971, when it should have been deposited on 15-6-71, after which date the Civil Courts had re-opened after Summer Vacations. These two defaults are admitted by the defendants Again the plaintiffs have pointed out third default, when the rent for the month of July 1973 to December 1973 has been deposited on 17-8-1973, though, 17-8-1973 was a Court working day, 15th being a holiday on account of Independence Day. To justify this default, the defendants have filed affidavits to indicate that he could not deposit the rent on the 16th, as he was informed that the Presiding Officer would be on leave on that day. But, by this very affidavit, he has admitted that the Presiding Officer of the Court was working on that day. To justify this default, the defendants have filed affidavits to indicate that he could not deposit the rent on the 16th, as he was informed that the Presiding Officer would be on leave on that day. But, by this very affidavit, he has admitted that the Presiding Officer of the Court was working on that day. The plaintiffs have also filed an affidavit and reply to the affidavits filed by the defendants, and I am satisfied that the Presiding Officer of the Court was working on the 16th and there was absolutely no justification for the defendants not to deposit the monthly rent on the 16th of August 1973. Thus, there are these three clear-cut defaults, and the defendants have lost the protection of the benefit of section 12 (3) of the Act, as it has been found established that they have failed to pay or tender the undisputed arrears of rent, within the statutory period of two months after the receipt of the quit notice. Therefore, the contention advanced on behalf 01 the appellants has to be rejected. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants, in the alternative, also halfheartedly contended, though this ground does not find any mention in the Memo of Appeal, that in this case, certain defendant-tenants are minors and even though the summons of the suit was served on all the defendants on 21-12-1970 and even though in accordance with the first part of section 13 (1) of the said Act, the arrears of rent due till then were not deposited within one month thereof, but were deposited on 9-2-1971, beyond the prescribed time of thirty days, still it also cannot be said that the defendants have failed to comply with the first part of section 13 (1) of the said Act, as for the minor defendants, a guardian, namely Shri Kavishwar, was appointed by the Court on 8-12-1971 and. therefore, the minor defendants cannot be held responsible for not depositing the rent in the Court within the statutory period. I am not persuaded to agree with this submission as the learned counsel was unable to substantiate this by any provision of law under the said Act or any authority in support of this proposition. Section 2(i) of the said Act defines a tenant. I am not persuaded to agree with this submission as the learned counsel was unable to substantiate this by any provision of law under the said Act or any authority in support of this proposition. Section 2(i) of the said Act defines a tenant. According to this definition, a tenant means a person by whom or on whose account or behalf, the rent of any accommodation is, or, but for a contrary, express or implied, would be payable for any' accommodation and includes any person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act; but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made. In the present case, admittedly, no application under section 13 (1) was ever made on behalf of these minor defendants nor they have deposited the rent for any month in the Court throughout. This definition does not make any distinction between a major and minor tenant and the rent deposited by the major tenant shall be deemed to have been deposited on behalf of all the tenants, who have inherited the tenancy from the original tenant as in the present case and in these circumstances, the minor defendants cannot take any advantage of the fact that a guardian was appointed for them in the suit on 8-12-1971. The appointment of a guard an is for the purpose of the suit as contemplated by provisious of Order 32 Code of Civil Procedure; and it has nothing to do with the provisions of section 13(1) of the said Act. Therefore in my opinion, the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants, being without any substance, must be and is hereby rejected. 15. As regards the ground of re-construction, relying upon the decisions reported in A IR 1971 SC page 942 (M/s P.N. Shency v. R.V. Sheney,) AIR 1963 SC 499 Netaram v. Jiwanlal). 1969 Rent Control Journal p.81 (S.C Mitter v. M/s, Auto Service) AIR 1954 Calcutta p. 80 T.D. Nandi v. Sim Co. (1970 Rent Control Journal p. 464) P.K. Nairv. The Othodox Syrium, it was contended that the condition of the building has to be taken in to consideration. 1969 Rent Control Journal p.81 (S.C Mitter v. M/s, Auto Service) AIR 1954 Calcutta p. 80 T.D. Nandi v. Sim Co. (1970 Rent Control Journal p. 464) P.K. Nairv. The Othodox Syrium, it was contended that the condition of the building has to be taken in to consideration. If the building is in good condition, then the landlord cannot issue eviction decree on the ground of reconstruction But, I am unable to agree with this submission as the authorities cited on behalf of the appellants, which are distinguishable, do not help the appellants' contention. In the decision reported in 1977 JLJ p. 449 Abdul Hamid v. Hakeem Ahmed Ulla Khan, it has been clearly laid down that the condition of the building is not a relevant factor, so far as the ground under section 12 (1) (h) of the Act is concerned. This apart in this case, there is sufficient evidence to show that the building in question being quite old, and dilapidated, it is not economical to repair the same. The plaintiff, have not at all set up the ground of repairs as contemplated by section 12 (1) (g) of the Act, but they have merely stated why re-construction is necessary. therefore, it is not a case, where the plaintiffs had taken up the ground under section 12 (1) (g) and have given it up It has been found established that as a result of the re-construction, it would be more beneficial in public interest, as more shops would be available after re-construction, and that plaintiffs have got the plans and estimates properly prepared and have got the necessary funds available with them, for the purpose of re-construction This finding of the lower Court was not challenged before me, and this is a pure finding of fact, in which I see no reason to interfere. Relying upon the decision reported in 1966 JLJ Note 64 Rampraksh v. Kapoorchand, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that in the existing shop of the defendants, after reconstruction, there will be a radical change as in the proposed plan, a major portion of the shop will be taken away and utilised as a passage, leading to the shops inside, as the proposed building to be constructed, would be of 'U' shape. It is not disputed on behalf of the plaintiffs that as a result of the proposed re-construction some portion of the appellants' existing shop will no doubt be not there in the same form and shape, but it was urged that in view of the wording of section 18 of the said Act, as a result of reconstruction, which is also in public interest, there is bound to be some change in the new construction, and in such a case, the tenant may not get back the same shop or premises in the same condition, as section 18 also refers to a part of the accommodation, indicating there by that, in such a situation when ejectment is sought on the ground of section 12 (1) (g) or (h) of the Act, the tenant might lose a part of the old accommodation, and therefore, in the present case, it cannot be said that there is a radical change, which is not in public interest. Therefore this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, being without substance, has also to be rejected. 16. So far as the third ground about the validity of the Quit Notice is concerned, it may also be noted, at the outset, that the defendants in their written statement have not at all challenged its validity, nor have they given any particulars, as to how the Quit Notice is invalid. Pleadings on this point have to be specific, and this being a question of fact, without there being any pleading, ordinarily such pleas cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in this appeal. That is why there is no issue about the validity of the notice. That apart, it is clear from the rent note Ex. P-3, that the tenancy of Mohammad Yusuf commenced on the 12th of each English calender month. Basides, an option has been given to the defendants in the Quit Notice. They have no where stated or proved that their tenancy commenced on any other day' or "mitti". The Quit Notice has to be liberally construed, not with the view of finding fault with it, but to find out whether the tenant has understood the import of the same. In this case, defendants thoroughly understood the purpose of the notice. They have no where stated or proved that their tenancy commenced on any other day' or "mitti". The Quit Notice has to be liberally construed, not with the view of finding fault with it, but to find out whether the tenant has understood the import of the same. In this case, defendants thoroughly understood the purpose of the notice. They have given reply to the same, never challenged its validity in the lower Courts, and, therefore, now for the first time they could not be permitted to raise this point. If no specific ground or requisite facts are pleaded, validity of Quit Notice could not be challenged by merely urging that the Quit Notice is bad in law. That apart, both the lower Courts have found, as a fact proved that the tenancy commenced on the 12th of each English month, and this cuncurrent finding of fact cannot be interfered, and disturbed for the first time in second appeal. Besides, there are numerous authorities, taking the view that if an option is given in the Quit Notice, the same cannot be discarded or rejected as invalid. (Please see: AIR 1963 Allahabad p. 54 Bhagwan Sri Krishanji Maharaj Virajman Mandir, Kanpur v. Chuttanlal, 1961 JLJ p. 80 Pyarelal v. Ramdayal, 1965 JLJ p. 366 Tularam v. Ayaldas 1974 JLJ Note 124 Motilal v. Ramesh Kumar 1965 JLl Note 105 Babulal v. Ganpatrao, 1951 JLJ Note 47, Dhoolchand v. Vasudeo and 1961 MPLJ Note 189 (Nathusingh v. Laxmanrao). Therefore, I find that the Quit Notice is quite valid and no interference with that finding is called for. 17. As the decree for ejectment is granted in favour of the respondents, on the ground of section 12 (1) (a) as also on the ground of section 12 (1) (h) of the Act, the appellants are not entitled to avail of the benefit of section 18 of he said Act, and, therefore, even though there might be some change to the existing premises after re-construction, still the appellants can not get any advantage, as a result of the chance on account of re-construction. 18. 18. This brings me to an application I.A. No.1394 of 1968, filed by the appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 Civil Procedure Code, stating therein that as per their information, the plaintiffs are intending to dispose of the suit house, through some 'dalal' and, therefore, this subsequent event be taken into consideration, while considering the respondents' bonafide requirement for re-construction. This application, which is supported by an affidavit, has been strongly refuted by the respondents, by their reply, who have also filed an affidavit, emphatically denying the appellants' allegations. After going through these applications and affidavits, I see no reason to allow them, as this just appears to be an after-thought, and in my opinion, no reliance can be placed on the averments made in such types of applications, as the intention of the appellants, is apparent to delay and protract the proceedings. The alleged averment even otherwise does not come in the way of the plaintiffs, and I do not find any valid ground to allow this application. It is, therefore, rejected. 19. In the result, there being no merit in this appeal, the same is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/-, if certified.