JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---This petition seeks to challenge an order passed by the Court of Small Cause at Bombay in an ejectment application, being Application No. 357/E on 1973, as being without jurisdiction. The impugned order has been passed on 12th July, 1979, though the application had been filed in the year 1973. The gap between the date when the application was filed and the date of the order is only partly explained by the fact of the usual delay in the disposal of cases. There were other proceedings between the parties, whom I will now shortly proceed to describe, and this fact is also part of the cause of the delay in the passing of the final order. 2. The petitioner is occupying a flat, being Flat No. 10-A in Maitri Vijaya Co-operative Housing Society at Chembur, a suburb of Bombay. That flat is owned by the two respondents in this petition. On 15th June, 1971, there was what has been characterised as a leave and licence agreement between the petitioner and the respondents under which the petitioner was permitted to occupy the flat, hereinafter referred to as the suit premises. The rent agreed to be paid by the petitioner was Rs. 500/- per month. It has been mentioned that apart from the suit premises, the petitioner was entitled to use a garage. The leave and licence agreement was renewed subsequently on 15th of May, 1972 for a further period of eleven months. Subsequently the respondents, by a notice dated 2nd July, 1973, terminated the licence of the petitioner and on 9th of July, 1973 filed an ejectment application under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 in its application to the State of Maharashtra. The final order that is passed in this applications the subject matter of challenge in this petition. Before considering that challenge, I must briefly narrate certain other parallel proceedings which took place between the parties. 3. On 10th of July, 1973, the petitioner filed a declaratory suit under section 28 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Rent Act, for a declaration that he is a protected licensee and thus a tenant under section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act. This suit was numbered as Declaratory Suit No. 4328 of 1973. This suit was numbered as Declaratory Suit No. 4328 of 1973. The petitioner also on the same day filed an application, being R.A.N. Application No. 739/SE of 1973, for fixation of the standard rent of the suit premises. All these three cases, namely the two applications and one suit, were tried together by the Court of Small Cause and were disposed of on 18th of October, 1978. The declaratory suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed; the preliminary issue regarding the tenancy of the petitioner raised on his contention in the ejectment application was answered in the negative; the standard rent application also came to be dismissed. Shortly, the petitioner failed in the three proceedings. 4. On 13th of February, 1979, the petitioner preferred an appeal, being Appeal No. 250 of 1979, against the decision in the declaratory suit; he filed an appeal being Appeal No. 115 of 1976, against the finding of the Court on the preliminary issue regarding the tenancy; he also preferred a revision application, being Application No. 85 of 1979, against the order dismissing his application for the fixation of standard rent. In Appeal No. 115 of 1979, the petitioner was asked to deposit the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month within a particular time. Stay of the further proceedings in the ejectment application was granted subject to the condition that the petitioner paid the arrears of rent at the rate mentioned by the Court within a particular time. Admittedly there was no compliance on the part of the petitioner with this condition. They stay, therefore, became ineffective and thereafter further proceedings were taken up by the Court in ejectment application. When the Court of Small Cause took up the ejectment application for final decision two issues were raised on the pleadings of the parties and one of them was whether the Court had jurisdiction to decide the ejectment application. The contention regarding the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Small Causes raised by the petitioner was based upon the fact that the rack rent of the suit premises was more than Rs. 3,000/- per year. The learned Judge dealing with this application accepted the petitioners contention that the annual rack rent of the suit premises was more than Rs. 3,000/- and in fact held that it was Rs. 6,000/-. 3,000/- per year. The learned Judge dealing with this application accepted the petitioners contention that the annual rack rent of the suit premises was more than Rs. 3,000/- and in fact held that it was Rs. 6,000/-. On the question of jurisdiction, however, the learned Judge held that pursuant to the amendments which were made by two Maharashtra Acts, to which I will be making a reference shortly, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes had been enlarged and, therefore, despite the fact that the rack rent of the suit premises was Rs. 6,000/- the Court had jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the ejectment application. Since he had already answered the issue on the question of tenancy against the petitioner, the learned Judge proceeded to grant the ejectment application by ordering that the petitioner should remove himself from the suit premises before 30th of September, 1979. This he did by his judgment and order dated 12th of July, 1979. It is this order that is the subject matter of challenge in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. It may, however, be mentioned that in the meantime the Small Cause Court has, in appeal No. 250 of 1979, issued an injunction restraining the respondents from executing the impugned order. This injunction has been granted because the petitioner has by now deposited the entire amount of arrears. 5. Mr. Kapadia, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, was contended that on the finding that the learned trial Judge gave on the annual rack rent of the suit premises, it was not open to him to proceed with the hearing of the ejectment application. Under section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1976, an application for ejectment would not lie to remove an occupant from a premises the rack rent of which was more than Rs. 3,000/- per year. Since the finding on the rack rent of the suit premises given by the learned trial Judge was in favour of the petitioner, which finding is unassailable, the learned Judge usurped jurisdiction which he did not possess by proceeding with the application. Mr. 3,000/- per year. Since the finding on the rack rent of the suit premises given by the learned trial Judge was in favour of the petitioner, which finding is unassailable, the learned Judge usurped jurisdiction which he did not possess by proceeding with the application. Mr. Kapadia has been further pointed out that the amendments made in the years 1976 and 1977 do not in any way affect the contentions which he was raised, because they do not in any manner whatsoever deal with an ejectment application envisaged under section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act before its amendment of 1976. In my opinion, every one of these contentions of Mr. Kapadia is well-founded and will have to be accepted. 6. Before I proceed to decide these contentions, it is necessary to briefly refer to the relevant provisions of the different statutes because on a proper understanding of the same the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner can be appreciated. The Presidency Small Cause Courts Act 1882 has in some parts been amended in its application to the State of Maharashtra. Section 41 of the said Act provided as under : "When any person has had possession of any immovable property situate within the local limits of the Small Cause Courts jurisdiction and of which the annual value at a rack-rent does not exceed three thousand rupees, as the tenant, or by permission, of another person, or of some person through whom such other person claims and such tenancy or permission has determined or been withdrawn, and such tenant or occupier or any person holding under or by assignment from him (hereinafter called the occupant) refuses to deliver up such property in compliance with a request made to him in this behalf by such other person, such other person (hereinafter called the applicant) may apply to the Small Cause Court for a summons against the occupant, calling upon him to show cause on a day therein appointed why he should not be compelled to deliver up the property". Apart from this section, we must take notice of two more sections as they stood before the amendment of 1963. Section 47 provided that the Small Cause Court shall stay the proceedings on an application made under section 41 if the occupant bound himself in the manner mentioned in the said section that he would institute a suit without delay. Apart from this section, we must take notice of two more sections as they stood before the amendment of 1963. Section 47 provided that the Small Cause Court shall stay the proceedings on an application made under section 41 if the occupant bound himself in the manner mentioned in the said section that he would institute a suit without delay. Section 49 of the Act mentioned that recovery of the possession of any immovable property under Chapter VII of the Small Cause Courts Act shall be no bar to the institution of a suit in the High Court for trying the title thereto. 7. The effect of these provisions has been fully considered by a Division Bench of this Court in (Mohandas Vishindas Chainani v. Hiranand Assumal)1, LXXVI Bombay Law Reporter 494, wherein it has been pointed out that an order under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act was never intended to be final and if either of the parties so desired that party was permitted to file a suit. Since the order passed on the ejectment application was not intended to be final, the suit filed by either of the parties would not be barred by res judicata. In (Ramchandra Sheshgiri Kamath v. Janardan Vishwanath Hedge)2, LXX Bombay Law Reporter 376, Chandrachud J. (as he then was) has given an additional reason as to why a decision given on an application under section 41 could not operate as res judicata to a subsequent suit. In order that the principle of res judicata be applicable, a decision should have been given in a former suit. An ejectment not being a suit, a decision or a finding given would not operate as res judicata. 8. In the year 1963, however, certain substantial amendments were made in Chapter VII of the Small Cause Courts Act by Maharashtra Act No. XLI of 1963. By the said Act, section 42-A was inserted in Chapter VII and it provided that if in any application under section 41, the occupant claims that he is a tenant of the applicant within the meaning of the Bombay Rent Act, then that question shall be decided by the Small Cause Court as a preliminary issue. Any decision given by the Court on that preliminary issue was appealable under sub-section (2) of section 42-A of the Act. Certain consequential amendment was also made in section 49. Any decision given by the Court on that preliminary issue was appealable under sub-section (2) of section 42-A of the Act. Certain consequential amendment was also made in section 49. It has already been noted by me above that prior to the amendment of 1963, a suit based upon title was not barred by any decision given on an application for ejectment filed under section 41 of the Act. Section 49, as amended by Maharashtra Act No. XLI of 1963, provided that an order made for recovery of possession on an application under section 41 shall bar the institution of a suit in any Court except a suit in which relief is claimed on the basis of title. However, a suit based upon the title as a tenant within the meaning of the Bombay Rent Act was also barred by the amended section 49. In other words, where on an application under section 41 an order has been passed after the coming into force of Maharashtra Act No. XLI of 1963, then that order will be bar to a suit based upon the title as a tenant. This was so because the issue of tenancy was to be decided in the ejectment application itself and an appeal had been provided from a decision on that issue. Legislation, therefore, debarred further proceedings on the same question. It must be noted that the bar to the subsequent suit on the basis of the title as a tenant is not barred by section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code because the ejectment application still remains an application and is not a suit to attract the provisions of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The bar is provided by section 49 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. 9. It is worth repeating that section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act, as it stood on the statute before the amendment of Chapter VII by Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976, envisage an application for ejecting an occupant of the immovable property, the rack rent of which did not exceed Rs. 3,000 per year. The said provision does not in any way mention the pecuniary value of the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Cause. A suit is a normal remedy for obtaining possession of immovable property which is in the possession of another person. 3,000 per year. The said provision does not in any way mention the pecuniary value of the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Cause. A suit is a normal remedy for obtaining possession of immovable property which is in the possession of another person. An application of the type mentioned in section 41 is an exception. It must, therefore, follow that such an application, if it is to be competent, under section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act, can be filed only when the other conditions mentioned in that section are strictly complied with. Among the conditions mentioned in the said section is one regarding the annual rack rent of the immovable property in possession of the occupant. This point needs to be emphasised because some arguments based upon a total misconception of both this provision and the provision of the amending Acts have been advanced before me. 10. I must now proceed to consider the amending Acts on which great reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents before me and also before the trial Court. The Presidency Small Cause Courts (Maharashtra amendment) Act, which is Act No. XIX of 1976, totally replaces the original Chapter VII in the said Act by an altogether new Chapter. Section 41 in Chapter VII, as introduced by the amending Act of 1976, is as follows :--- "41. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the Court of Small Causes shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try all suits and proceedings between a licensor and licensee, or a landlord and tenant, relating to the recovery of possession of any immovable property situated in Greater Bombay, or relating to the recovery of the licence fee or charges or rent therefore, irrespective of the value of the subject matter of such suits or proceedings. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to suits or proceedings for the recovery of possession of any immovable property or of licence fee or charges or rent thereof, to which the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act 1955, the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948 or any other law for the time being in force, applies." It is clear from the language used in section 41 that the owner of an immovable property will have to file a suit in the Court of Small Cause for recovering the same irrespective of the value of the immovable property. Even a licensor who desires to obtain possession of immovable property in possession of a licensee has to file a suit in the Small Cause Court and not in any other Civil Court which was the position prior to the amendment of 1976. For certain suits the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court has been fixed at Rs. 3,000/-. Section 41 newly introduced says that irrespective of the value of the subject matter of the suit or the proceedings, any suit or proceedings between a licensor and a licensee shall be tried only by the Court of Small Cause. Certain exceptions mentioned in sub-section (2) need not be noticed by us as they are not relevant for the disposal of this petition. 11. Section 42 now provides for an appeal from a decree or order made by the Small Cause Court under section 41. Section 43 says that the Small Cause Court shall as far as possible and except as otherwise provided follow the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. A provision had been made relating to the Court fees payable in section 44 of the Act which itself has been subsequently repealed by Maharashtra Act No. LIX of 1977. Thereafter section 45 proceeds to say that nothing contained in Chapter VII shall be deemed to bar a party to a suit or appeal or proceeding mentioned in the said Chapter in which a question of title to any immovable property arises and is determined from suing in a competent Court to establish his title to such property. Thereafter section 45 proceeds to say that nothing contained in Chapter VII shall be deemed to bar a party to a suit or appeal or proceeding mentioned in the said Chapter in which a question of title to any immovable property arises and is determined from suing in a competent Court to establish his title to such property. In other words, any decision given in suits filed under section 41 or in proceedings under the said section will not debar a party from filing a suit in a competent Court to establish his title to the immovable property involved in proceedings under section 41. I must now proceed to notice a provision, namely section 46, which is vital to the determination of the question involved in this petition. It is in the following terms :--- "46(1) All suits and other proceedings cognizable by the Small Cause Court under this Chapter and pending in the High Court or the Bombay City Civil Court, on the date of coming into force of the Presidency Small Cause Courts (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1975, shall be continued and disposed of by the High Court or the City Civil Court, as the case may be, as if this Act had not been passed. (2) All applications and other proceedings filed in the Small Cause Court under this Chapter and pending in that Court, on the date aforesaid, shall be continued and disposed of by the Small Cause Court, as if this Act had not been passed." The second sub-section is relevant for our purposes. The language of the said provision is, in my opinion, clear and is not capable of any two interpretations. Section 46 follows section 41 and provides that all applications which were pending in the Small Cause Court under Chapter VII before the coming into force of the amending Act shall be disposed of as if this Act had not been passed. In other words, an application which had been filed and which was pending on 1st of July, 1976, which is the date of the coming into force of the amending Act, was to be disposed of as if the amending Act had not been passed. In other words, an application which had been filed and which was pending on 1st of July, 1976, which is the date of the coming into force of the amending Act, was to be disposed of as if the amending Act had not been passed. If this is so, if an application had been made prior to the amendment of 1976 under section 41, then that application was necessarily to relate to immoveable property the rack-rent of which did not exceed three thousand rupees. If such as application made before the amending Act of 1976 related to an immovable property the rack-rent of which exceeded three thousand rupees, that application would be incompetent and would be dismissed on that ground. Such an application would not be saved by the new provision contained in section 41 because sub-section (2) of section 46 says that the application had to be disposed of as if the amending Act of 1976 had not being passed. In other words, section 41 introduced by the amending Act of 1976 has to be totally ignored while deciding an application under section 41 filed before the amendment of 1976. 12. The fact that the new section 41 mentioned that all suit and proceedings between a licensor and a licensee shall be within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court irrespective of the value of the subject matter of the proceeding will not make competent an application which was originally incompetent because sub-section (2) of section 46 insists that we must ignore the provisions contained in section 41 as also the other provisions in the newly inserted Chapter VII. It is no answer to this legal position to say that the opening words of section 41 exclude the application of section 46(2). The non obstante clause in section 41 cannot control the effect of section 46(2) which is the enacting part of the statute. 13. Mr. Rane, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, urged that there is a conflict between the provision contained in section 41 and the provisions contained in section 46 and that the conflict must be harmoniously resolved. According to Mr. Rane, section 41 today says that irrespective of the value of the subject matter a suit or proceeding between the licensor and licensee has to be tried by the Court of Small Cause. According to Mr. Rane, section 41 today says that irrespective of the value of the subject matter a suit or proceeding between the licensor and licensee has to be tried by the Court of Small Cause. The application out of which the present petition has arisen had been filed in the year 1973 and it has been found that the value of the subject matter of the immovable property, namely the annual rack rent of the suit premises, is Rs. 6,000/-. Since section 41 invests the Court of Small Cause with jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding between a licensor and a licensee irrespective of the value of the subject matter today, that application could be and has been rightly decided by the Court of Small Cause. Here I may straight away point out that to say that the annual rack rent of a property is Rs. 6,000/- is not the same thing as to say that the value of that property is Rs. 6,000/-. 14. According to Mr. Rane, the non obstante clause contained in section 41 dilutes the rigour of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 46. The latter provision must be confined to only those applications which cannot be tried under section 41. What those applications could be has not been spelt out. Mr. Rane intended to point out that if the instant ejectment application is rejected on the ground that the value of the subject matter was more than Rs. 3000, it will have to be returned to the applicant who will have to re-present it to the Court of Small Cause in view of the provisions contained in the new section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act. What is given by the Small Cause Court by one hand is being taken back by the same Court by another hand. In my opinion, there are several fallacies in this argument advanced by Mr. Rane. One based upon the concept of value of the subject matter has already been pointed out by me. Secondly section 41 newly introduced does not deal with ejectment applications of the type envisaged in the old section 41. It deals with suits and proceedings arising thereafter. Earlier, I have mentioned that an ejectment application is not the normal procedure for ejecting an occupant of the immovable property. Secondly section 41 newly introduced does not deal with ejectment applications of the type envisaged in the old section 41. It deals with suits and proceedings arising thereafter. Earlier, I have mentioned that an ejectment application is not the normal procedure for ejecting an occupant of the immovable property. Such an application will lie only when it is provided by particular statute. Section 41, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1976, provided for such an application; section 41, as it now stands, shows that if the licensor has to obtain possession of the immovable property from a licensee, he will have to file a suit for the said purpose. An application for ejectment filed under the pre-amendment section 41 found to be incompetent will have to be rejected. Since the order of rejection would be made on an application and not in a suit, that order will not debar the applicant in that application to file a suit if he so desires under section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act as it now stands. Any other interpretation would nullify the effect of sub-section (2) of section 46. 15. In my opinion, there is no conflict apparent or otherwise between section 41 and section 46 as they now stand. Even if there is any conflict, that conflict has to be resolved by regarding the two apparently conflicting sections as dealing with distinct matters or distinct situations, section 46 must be held to deal with all suits, proceedings and applications mentioned therein which were pending on the date of the coming into force of the amending Act of 1976; section 41 must be held to deal with suits and other proceedings which will arise after the amending Act of 1976. A procedural law, no doubt, is usually retrospective but where the legislature has specifically made a provision saving the pending proceedings, it is the duty of the Court to give effect to that intention of the legislature and not to defeat the same by imagining conflict between two provisions. 16. I will now show how the argument advanced and accepted, unfortunately, by the Court below based upon the amending Act of 1977 is totally bereft or any substance. The Maharashtra Civil Courts (Enhancement of Pecuniary Jurisdiction and Amendment) Act, 1977, hereinafter referred to as Maharashtra Act No. XLVI of 1977, increases the pecuniary jurisdiction of Civil Courts. 16. I will now show how the argument advanced and accepted, unfortunately, by the Court below based upon the amending Act of 1977 is totally bereft or any substance. The Maharashtra Civil Courts (Enhancement of Pecuniary Jurisdiction and Amendment) Act, 1977, hereinafter referred to as Maharashtra Act No. XLVI of 1977, increases the pecuniary jurisdiction of Civil Courts. Sections 4 to 9 (both inclusive) seek to amend certain provisions of the Small Cause Courts Act. In none of the said sections reference is made to section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act either before or after the amendment. For certain purposes, the pecuniary jurisdiction under the presidency Small Cause Courts Act has been increased from Rs. 3,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-. The amendments brought about by sections 4 to 9 of Maharashtra Act No. XLVI of 1977 have nothing to do with the maintainability of an application which had already been filed prior to this Act or prior to the amendment of 1976. Moreover, the said provisions in the Maharashtra Act No. XLVI of 1977 do not touch the values of rack rent of the immovable property mentioned in the original section 41, because that section 41 had ceased to exist when the Act of 1977 was passed. No argument based upon Maharashtra Act No. XLVI of 1977, therefore, will save an application such as the one with which we are concerned and which was incompetent ab initio. The provisions contained in section 46(2) require the Court of Small Cause to dispose of an application which was pending on 1st of July, 1976 as if the amending Act of 1976 has not been passed. If this mandate is followed, the present application was patently incompetent because, as has been found by the lower Court, the rack-rent of the immovable property involved in the application was more than Rs. 3,000/-. 17. Reliance has been placed Mr. Rane on two judgments of this Court. One is an unreported decision given by Chandrachud, J., (as he then was) in (Civil Revision Application Nos. 412 of 1965 and 430 of 1965, decided on 15th of December, 1965)3. 3,000/-. 17. Reliance has been placed Mr. Rane on two judgments of this Court. One is an unreported decision given by Chandrachud, J., (as he then was) in (Civil Revision Application Nos. 412 of 1965 and 430 of 1965, decided on 15th of December, 1965)3. The facts of the case disclose that one Zulfikarali Shah Nawaz Khan Bhutto was the owner of a plot and a building on it situated in Bombay and after he migrated to Pakistan that property was decided evacuee property and, as such, it became vested in the Government of India under the law applicable to such property. That property was auctioned on 31st of December, 1955 and the plaintiffs in that suit purchased the same. However, sale certificate remained to be issued for some time. Before that was done, the plaintiffs filed a suit for possessions against the occupants of the said building under the Rent Act. During the pendency of the suit, namely, on 31st of July, 1963, the certificate was issued to the plaintiffs who thus become the legal owners of the property. It had contended on behalf of the defendants in that suit that the plaintiffs who had no title to the suit property and who were, therefore, not the landlords could not have originally filed the suit under the Rent Act. A suit which was thus incompetent, according to the defendants therein, could not become competent by the subsequent acquisition of the title by the plaintiffs. It was therefore, prayed that the suit ought to be dismissed. Chandrachud, J., rejected this contention and pointed out that if an order were to be passed after the plaintiffs obtained the title, the plaint would have to be returned for presentation to the proper Court and the proper Court on that day was the Small Cause Court itself. Proceeding further, Chandrachud, J., then pointed out that the Small Cause Court will be returning the plaint with one hand and accepting the same plaint with the other. Proceeding further, Chandrachud, J., then pointed out that the Small Cause Court will be returning the plaint with one hand and accepting the same plaint with the other. He thereafter mentioned as follows : "I do not suppose that procedural rules are required to be enforced with such rigorous formality." Chandrachud, J., further pointed out that admittedly the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction to try the suit on that day no useful purpose could be served by driving the plaintiffs to refile the same plaint in the same Court, I do not see how this judgment helps the respondents in this petition. I have already held that the law, as it stands today, does not provide for an ejectment application. Therefore, the question of re-presenting the ejectment application which is returned does not arise at all. 18. For the same reasons I have also to reject the argument of Mr. Rane based upon the judgment of this Court in (Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v. Onkarmal Ishar Dass and others)4, A.I.R. 1952 (Bombay) 365. In that case, the subject matter of the suit which had been filed under the Original Jurisdiction of this Court was situated at Vikhroli which was outside territorial limits of the original jurisdiction of this Court when the suit had been filed. During the pendency of the suit the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this Court were extended to include the area where the suit property was situated. This Court held that with the subsequent, inclusion of the area in which the suit property was situated, this Court had jurisdiction to try the suit, though originally when the suit had been filed this Court could not have dealt with that property. In other words, by the subsequent amendment this Court was invested with the jurisdiction to try a suit which it did not possess originally. This again is a decision which is wholly irrelevant to the facts of this case. In the present case, by subsequent amendments, jurisdiction which originally the Small Cause Court possessed has in fact been taken away, though a different type of jurisdiction has been given by the amendment of 1976. I have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contentions of Mr. Rane based upon these two decisions. 19. Mr. In the present case, by subsequent amendments, jurisdiction which originally the Small Cause Court possessed has in fact been taken away, though a different type of jurisdiction has been given by the amendment of 1976. I have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contentions of Mr. Rane based upon these two decisions. 19. Mr. Rane also made a faint attempt to challenge the finding of the Court below regarding the value of the rack-rent of the suit premises. He pointed out that the respondents are themselves members of a Co-operative Housing Society and they are paying certain amounts to the society and the annual total of those amounts should be regarded as the annual rack rent of the suit premises. It is not possible to accept this contention. It is true that in (Lakhamshi Hiralal Co. v. Damji Khimji Co.)5, 70 Bombay L.R. 394, it has been held that the amount paid by way of rent by the licensor to his land-lords should be considered for calculating the rack-rent under section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act and the rent changed by the licensor to the licensee was not relevant. However, in this case the respondents are not paying rent to their landlord because there is no landlord. The rent which they are charging to the petitioner will, therefore, have to be taken as the basis for calculating the annual rack-rent of this suit premises. So calculated the Court below has rightly come to the conclusion that it is Rs. 6,000. 20. In the result, this petition must succeed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) with costs. -----