JUDGMENT M. P. Singh, J. This application by the four accused persons is for quashing the order dated 7 June 1978 of a Judicial Magistrate of Patna City in Tr. No. 1863 of 1978. The accused are the Engineer, Sinking Incharge, Chief Security Officer and watchman of Gammons India Ltd. A complaint was made by opposite party no.2 Shital Prasad Chaudhary in respect of offences under sections 307/323/324/34, Penal Code in the Court of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patna City on 22 March 1978 for an occurrence of 24 February 1978. Eight witnesses were named in the complaint. Apropos of the filing of the complaint the complainant the examined on solemn affirmation on 28 March 1978 and the case was then fixed for inquiry under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code ('the Code', for short). Inquiry was held by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate himself. During the inquiry four witnesses were examined on different dates, the last date being 10 May 1978. No witness was examined thereafter. On 7 June 1978 cognizance was taken and process was issued and the case was transferred to the Court of Mr. Upadhya, Judicial Magistrate, Patna City. According to the petitioners the complaint in question which was filed after about a month of the occurrence was a counter case as against Alamganj P. S. Case No. 18 (2) 78, (G. R. No. 218 of 1978) in which charge-sheet was submitted on 28 August 1978 against the present complainant Shital Prasad Choudhary and some others for having committed offences under sections 399, 402 and 307, Indian Penal Code and also under section 27 of the Arms Act. 2. Counsel for the petitioners bas contended that there has been non-compliance with the provisions of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 202 of the Code which provides that in a case triable by a court of Session a Magistrate shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath and hence the order of issue of process is illegal. In my opinion, the contention is sound. It must be remembered that though commitment inquiry under the old Code has been abolished, a special procedure has been provided in section 202 which serves the purpose of preliminary inquiry as was contemplated by the old Code. In my opinion, the contention is sound. It must be remembered that though commitment inquiry under the old Code has been abolished, a special procedure has been provided in section 202 which serves the purpose of preliminary inquiry as was contemplated by the old Code. The examination of witnesses as contemplated by the proviso to section 202 (2) must be done before the process is issued. In the complaint eight witnesses were named. They were, therefore, the witnesses of the complainant. Obviously, therefore, all witnesses of the prosecution were not examined in this case. Only four witnesses were examined. The Magistrate did not even call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses as enjoined by the proviso to section 202 (2). That proviso runs as under: "Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he s hall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath." On a perusal of the above it is clear that a Magistrate is bound to examine on oath all the witnesses of the complainant. He is also bound to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses. The matter may be different if the complainant gives up some witnesses or if some witnesses is or are not prepared to depose. In those cases they will cease to be his witnesses and their non-examination will be of no consequence. But barring that, all witnesses have to be examined. The Magistrate is bound to examine all his witnesses whom the complainant wishes to examine at the trial. The failure to do so is not an empty formality. In my opinion, the consequence of non compliance with the mandatory procedure will render the order of issuance of process and all subsequent orders following it illegal. More than a century ago in Tailor V. Tailor, Jassal M. R. adopted the rule that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, they must be done in that way or not at all and that other method of performance are necessarily forbidden. This rule has stood the test of time. It was applied by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed V. Emperor and later by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. This rule has stood the test of time. It was applied by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed V. Emperor and later by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. See Shiv Bahadur Singh V. State of U.P., Deep Chand V. State of Rajasthan, State of Gujrat V. Shantilal Mangalaas and Ram Chandra V. Govind. This rule squarely applies "where" indeed, the whole aim and object of legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do thing in a particular manner did not imply a prohibition to do it in any other. (Max-Well's Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn. P. 362/363)". In my opinion, this rule will be attracted with full force in the instant case because the non-compliance with the provisions of section 202 (2) will frustrate the aim and object of the legislature. I am or the considered view that there is an implied prohibition in the said provision prohibiting the Magistrate to Act, in any other manner. In Subrahmanya Iyer V. Emperor, their Lord ships or the Privy Council observed:- "The procedure adopted was one which the Court positively prohibited and it was possible that it might have worked actual injustice to the accused." The provisions of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 202, I think, are mandatory and must be complied with. It was obligatory upon the Magistrate to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and if produced to examine them. A similar language has been used in sub-section (7) or section 10 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 which is as below: "Where the Food Inspector……he shall call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and taken his or their signature." It was held by the Supreme Court in Ram Labhaya V. Delhi Municipalities, that the provisions are mandatory and it was obligatory on the Food Inspector to call one or more persons to be present at the time or taking action. On the facts of that case it was, however, held that the Food Inspector did call the neighbouring shop-keepers to witness the taking of the sample but none was willing to co-operate. From this decision it is quite clear that the authority on whom a power is conferred by the Statute to Act, in a particular manner, must Act, in that manner and in no other. 3. From this decision it is quite clear that the authority on whom a power is conferred by the Statute to Act, in a particular manner, must Act, in that manner and in no other. 3. In order to appreciate the importance of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of section 202 of the Code it is necessary to understand the principles underlying therein. In Rajnarain V. Indira Gandhi. Hegde, J said:- "Provisions of law are not mere formulas to be observed as rituals. Beneath the words of a provision of Jaw, generally speaking there lies a juristic principle. It is the duty of the Court to ascertain that principle and implement it." What then is the principle underlying section 202 (2) proviso. It is to be noticed that copies of the statements of witnesses examined by the Magistrate have to be supplied to the accused free of cost (section 208 and amended section 209 of the Code) and this shows that the intention of the legislature was that the accused may be able to prepare his defence. If all the witnesses whom the complainant wishes to examine in support of his allegations are not examined, the accused will be deprived of the statutory light to get adequate information about the allegations made by the prosecution and will not be able to defend himself properly. At the stage of inquiry under section 202 the accused has no right to cross-examine the witnesses and he can never be aware of the totality of tae evidence which the complainant intends to adduce at the mal. The accused will not be able to get an overall picture of the prosecution case unless all the Witnesses of the complainant are examined. The provisions contained in the aforesaid proviso therefore, is of paramount importance and the same cannot be ignored. If ignored, there will be a failure of justice. The accused shall be deprived of the full and fair opportunity to defend himself In that case there would not be a fair trial. The accused would be unable to point out discrepancy, if any, in the evidence given in the Court of Session. The statement may provide important materials for cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses in the Court of Session. The object underlying the provision aforesaid is to give adequate opportunity to the accused for proper defence. The accused would be unable to point out discrepancy, if any, in the evidence given in the Court of Session. The statement may provide important materials for cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses in the Court of Session. The object underlying the provision aforesaid is to give adequate opportunity to the accused for proper defence. As observed by the Supreme Court in Gurubachan Singh V. State of Punjab, the object of supplying copies of statements of witnesses and other documents is to put the accused on notice of what he has to meet at the inquiry or trial. I am, therefore, of the opinion that it is obligatory upon the Magistrate concerned to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them. The word 'all' used in the proviso means what it says. It can never mean that only some of the witnesses of the complainant should be examined. As said by Lord Heward, C. J. in Spillers Ltd. V. Cardiff (Borough) Assessment Committee, K. B. "It ought to be the rule and we are glad to think that it is the rule that words arc used in an Act, of Parliament correctly and exactly, and not loosely and in exactly, upon those who assert that rule has been broken the burden of establishing their proposing lies heavily. And they can discharge it only by pointing to some thing in the context which goes to show that the loose and inexact meaning must be preferred." The context in the instant case, I think, is against the complainant. The word 'provided' followed by the word' shall clearly indicates that the provisions are mandatory. The words have to be interpreted keeping in mind the intention or the legislature. The intention of the legislature in enacting this provision was to make the trial fair. When mandatory provisions have been violated and there has been manifest illegality and the accused has been deprived of certain statutory rights i.e. to get adequate information of the prosecution allegations for enabling him to cross examine the prosecution witnesses at the trial, this Court can, in my opinion, set aside the order in exercise of the inherent power under section 482 of the Code. The view which I have expressed above is supported by a Division Bench case of the Calcutta High Court Kamal Krishna Dev. v. State and another. The view which I have expressed above is supported by a Division Bench case of the Calcutta High Court Kamal Krishna Dev. v. State and another. The same view was taken in Paranjothi Udayar V. State. This Court also in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 3338 of 1974 decided on 31st August 1977 held that the provisions are mandatory. 4. Counsel appearing for the complainant strongly relied on Daroga Choudhary Vs. Kunti Baitha. That case, however, is distinguishable because after perusing the orders beet of that case it was held by P. S. Sahay, J. that the Magistrate had called upon the Complainant to produce his witnesses and that there was substantial compliance with the provisions contained in the proviso to section 202 (2) of the Code. The following is the observation made in that case: ...therefore, it is absolutely clear that the Magistrate had called upon the complainant to produce his witnesses. Thus, in my opinion, there is substantial compliance of the law". The Calcutta case (1977 Cri. L. J. 1492) Supra) was cited be Core P. S. Sahay, J. It was not dissented from. It was rather observed: "But in that case has been clearly stated that after three witnesses had been examined on behalf of the complainant, the Magistrate did not even call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses, which is not the case hero. As I have said opportunity had been given to the complainant to produce his witnesses and the complainant failed to do so. Therefore, the facts of the instant case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case reported in 1977 Cri. L J. 1492 (Supra)". I am, therefore, of the opinion that this case is of no help to the complainant. 5. Before parting with this judgment I would like to point out that the complainant, namely, opposite party no. 2 is not prepared to give up his remaining witnesses. I asked the learned counsel appearing for him whether the complainant is prepared to give up other witnesses, he said 'no'. He said that the complainant will examine other witnesses as well at the trial. So that position bore is quite different. If the complainant would have given up the remaining witnesses, the non-examination of the given-up witnesses may not be construed as non-examination of his witnesses and then it will not vitiate the order. He said that the complainant will examine other witnesses as well at the trial. So that position bore is quite different. If the complainant would have given up the remaining witnesses, the non-examination of the given-up witnesses may not be construed as non-examination of his witnesses and then it will not vitiate the order. After all it is for the complainant to decide bow many witnesses he will examine in the case in support of his allegations. In that event the accused will not be prejudiced because he will have opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements have already been recorded by the Magistrate during the 202 inquiry and, therefore, it will not be possible to say that there has been infringement of the proviso. 6. My concluded opinion is that it is a fit case where inherent power should be exercised to secure the ends of justice. 7. For the foregoing reasons the order of the Magistrate dated 7 June 1978 issuing the process against the petitioners and all subsequent orders following it are quashed and the Magistrate is directed to begin from the stage prior to the order issuing processes and proceed in accordance with law. The application is, accordingly, allowed. Application allowed.