Judgment :- 1. Both these Civil Revision Petitions arise out of an order passed by the Rent Control Court under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, Act 2 of 1965, hereinafter called the Act, on an application filed by a tenant who had been evicted for the purpose of reconstruction of the building, to get restored part of the reconstructed structure. The said Court passed an order directing that the applicant be put in possession of an area of 250 square feet at the south western corner in the ground floor of the reconstructed building with the amenity of a corridor of 2 feet in width for giving access to the room from the northern K. K. Road. This re-allotment and restoration of possession was to be effected within a period of one month from the date of the order failing which the applicant was given the right to recover possession through Court in which case the tenant himself was allowed to construct a corridor of the nature specified above at his own cost and under the supervision of a Commissioner after obtaining necessary sanction from the Municipality. The rent to be paid by the applicant was fixed at Rs. 437.50 per mensem. 2. The Appellate Authority on appeal by the landlord and the new tenant who had been inducted into the reconstructed building, while agreeing with the Rent Control Court that the tenant is entitled to be put back in possession, took the view that the tenant has to discharge the entire arrears of rent, interest and costs due from him on account of his earlier occupation of the building before its reconstruction (there was a decree for portion of such arrears). While dismissing the two appeals, the Appellate Authority modified the order of the Rent Controller in the following manner. The tenant was to execute a Vadakachit in favour of the landlord agreeing to pay the rent determined by the Rent Controller. He was to pay one month's rent in advance. He is to pay the entire amount covered by the decree (for arrears of rent) as well as the rent and interest that accrued due subsequent to the passing of the decree till the date of his eviction which payment had to be made within thirty days from the date of the appellate order. 3. He is to pay the entire amount covered by the decree (for arrears of rent) as well as the rent and interest that accrued due subsequent to the passing of the decree till the date of his eviction which payment had to be made within thirty days from the date of the appellate order. 3. When this order was taken in revision to the District Court under S.20 of the Act by both the landlord as well as the new tenant, the Court confirmed the same resulting in the present revision petitions before this Court under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the aggrieved parties. I have to consider the questions raised within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by S.115 CPC. which allows interference only if there is an error of jurisdiction. 4. The questions, raised before me by the counsel for the petitioners centered round the Rent Controller's jurisdiction in the matter of allotment (or re-allotment) of the newly constructed building to the old tenant and also whether the applicant-tenant had failed to exercise the option vested in him in time and how far the landlord was justified and entitled to let out the premises to a new person. It is their case that once an order for eviction was passed and directions regarding reconstruction given, the Rent Control Court becomes functus officio. By the order for eviction the landlord-tenant relationship comes to an end. The jurisdiction of the Rent Con-trot Court to put back the tenant in possession of the building comes to an end. The jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court to put back the tenant in possession of the building comes upto the demolition of the evicted building and does not extend any further. Provisos 2 and 3 of S.11(4)(iv) of the Act are indicative of this limit. In raising this contention the petitioners seek a reconsideration of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in CRP. No. 885 of 1972 which takes a contrary view. The petitioners also contend that the applicant tenant had waived his right to get the building allotted to him and is estopped from filing the present application. By his own laches and conduct he has become disentitled to seek allotment of the reconstructed building. In any event, it is urged the application is highly belated. The petitioners also contend that the applicant tenant had waived his right to get the building allotted to him and is estopped from filing the present application. By his own laches and conduct he has become disentitled to seek allotment of the reconstructed building. In any event, it is urged the application is highly belated. It is the further case of the landlord that the direction given to construct a corridor for the tenant is illegal and without jurisdiction. He is entitled to seek re-allotment of only a room "on the back side of the western block" and therefore no direction could have been given to construct a corridor. The permission given to the old tenant, the applicant to construct the corridor himself on the failure of the landlord to do it, is totally without jurisdiction. 5. The newly inducted tenant, in his revision petition, besides endorsing the pleas taken up by the landlord would submit that the conduct of the applicant in keeping silence for a considerable period of time when work of renovation was going on in the building at his instance for the conduct of his textile trade should reinforce the contention that the applicant has really waived his right of priority to occupy the building. It is a clear case of estoppel by conduct. He also raises the contention that the Rent Control Court has no authority to pass an order of eviction of a tenant even though he might have been put in occupation in violation of the terms of the earlier order for eviction of the applicant-tenant. The eviction has to be done only under the provisions of the Act. No grounds under the Act have been pleaded, made out or pointed out in the order. According to him, acting bonafide he got possession of the rooms. He is conducting a big business in textile trade which has a total investment of Rupees ten lakhs apart from the big amount he had incurred for renovation of the building to suit him. He had not been made aware of the applicant's intention to exercise his option which in the first instance he did not do in time and the applicant stood by silently watching the incurring of such a huge expenditure. 6. He had not been made aware of the applicant's intention to exercise his option which in the first instance he did not do in time and the applicant stood by silently watching the incurring of such a huge expenditure. 6. Taking due note of the great difficulties to which the petitioners would be put to, I took rather a considerable time to come to a final conclusion on the matter in spite of the fact that at the time of hearing no deep impression had been made on me in regard to the legal validity of the petitioners' contentions. On going in depth into the questions, my first impression has only been confirmed that the courts below acted rightly in rejecting the petitioners' contentions. 7. Let me first take the question of the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller in the matter. Taking the relevant provisions of the Act into consideration, I think it is possible to state that the jurisdiction of the Accommodation Controller in the matter of allotment of a building is restricted to cases in which notice of vacancy is given to him. Under S.4 of the Act, every landlord is required to give notice of vacancy of building belonging to him. If such notice of vacancy is received by the Accommodation Controller, he can then allot the building in accordance with the rules. If the Accommodation Controller does not intimate within 15 days of the receipt of notice of vacancy, the landlord will be at liberty to let the building to any tenant or to occupy it himself. Under S.4 (6) of the Act, where a landlord has two or more residential buildings in the same city, town or village and they have not been let by him, the landlord may choose any one of such buildings for his own occupation and shall give notice to the Accommodation Controller specifying the building so chosen by him and every other building not so chosen. When giving such notice, the landlord shall also specify therein whether any building other than the one chosen by him has been continuously in the occupation of any member of his family or of any dependent of the landlord or whether he requires any such building for the occupation of any member of his family. When giving such notice, the landlord shall also specify therein whether any building other than the one chosen by him has been continuously in the occupation of any member of his family or of any dependent of the landlord or whether he requires any such building for the occupation of any member of his family. The Accommodation Controller, if he is satisfied that the occupation of the building by any member of the family, or of any dependent of the landlord is bonafide shall make an order permitting the landlord to allow such member or dependent to continue to occupy the building and if he is not satisfied shall make an order refusing such permission. In case where the landlord requires any such building for the occupation of any member of his family, the Accommodation Controller has to decide whether such building is required by any member of the family or the landlord for such occupation. If he so satisfies, he can make an order Permitting the landlord to allow such such member to occupy the building, otherwise he can refuse permission, In case where an order for eviction is made under S.11(4)(iv), then the Accommodation Controller does not come into the picture. If he so satisfies, he can make an order Permitting the landlord to allow such such member to occupy the building, otherwise he can refuse permission, In case where an order for eviction is made under S.11(4)(iv), then the Accommodation Controller does not come into the picture. I will extract here S.11(4)(iv): "(4) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, (iv) if the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction and if the landlord requires bonafide to reconstruct the same and if he satisfies the Court that he has the plan and license, if any required, and the ability to rebuild and if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction: Provided that the landlord who evicts a tenant and does not reconstruct completely the building within a time which may be fixed or extended by the Rent Control Court, shall on a petition before that Court be liable to a fine of rupees five hundred, if it is proved that he has wilfully neglected to reconstruct completely the building within such time: Provided further that the Court shall have power at any time to issue directions regarding the reconstruction of the building and on failure of compliance by the landlord, to give effect to the order in any manner the Court deems fit and in appropriate cases to put the tenant back in possession or award to the evicted tenant damages equal to the excess rent he has to pay for another building that he is occupying in consequence of such eviction: Provided further that the tenant who was evicted shall have the first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent; " Provisos in the provision are indicative of the fact that the Rent Control Court does not become functus officio as such if it passes an order for eviction. Though there is no specific provision which says that after the order for eviction under the particular clause the tenant can make an application to the Rent Control Court, if the landlord refuses to give the first option to the tenant who was evicted for the reconstruction of the building, I think it is implied that the court would have the power to entertain such application and pass orders therein. The order passed in such cases being under S.11(4)(iv) which gives the tenant the first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent, the power to pass such order should necessarily carry with it the necessary and incidental power to make the landlord to conform to such order. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, III Edition, Volume 3, S.5402, page 19 states: "Where a statute confers powers or duties in general terms, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implication... That which is clearly implied is as much a part of a law that which is expressed." Crawford in his book on Statutory Construction at page 267 gives reasons for such necessary implications in the following way: "The reason for allowing the court to give effect to necessary implications is quite apparent. Many matters of minor detail are often omitted from legislation. If these details could not be inserted by implication, the drafting of legislation would be an interminable process and the legislative intent would likely be defeated by a most insignificant omission. Many matters of minor detail are often omitted from legislation. If these details could not be inserted by implication, the drafting of legislation would be an interminable process and the legislative intent would likely be defeated by a most insignificant omission. Consequently, these minor details are considered as if included in the general terms of the enactment as well as in the purpose sought to be achieved by the Legislature, and therefore, are regarded as actually intended by the Legislature." Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, page 350 states: "Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution." Craies on Statute Law enunciates the same principle at page 111 of VI Edition: "If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers that detail to be carried out." These Authorities are quoted in Venkatesam v. Krishnaiah (ILR.1968 A.P. 706). In that case it was held that in spite of a specific provision in the statute if an order passed validly under S.11 (4) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease (Rent and Eviction Control) Act, the power to pass such an order carries with it the necessary and incidental power to execute it. 8. In Narayana v. Desika (AIR. 1933 Madras 689) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court said in reference to S.78 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act that the Court making an order under S.78 has jurisdiction to do all acts necessary for execution of such order. 9. In regard to the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller in similar circumstances, my learned brother Bhaskaran J. speaking for a Division Bench of this Court consisting of himself and Raghavan C J. said in CRP. No. 885 of 1972: "If the landlord fails to put the tenant back into possession of the accommodation in the reconstructed building or where there is dispute with respect to the fair rent, the intervention of the Rent Controller becomes necessary. No. 885 of 1972: "If the landlord fails to put the tenant back into possession of the accommodation in the reconstructed building or where there is dispute with respect to the fair rent, the intervention of the Rent Controller becomes necessary. The jurisdiction to enforce the conditions on which the Rent Controller passed the order under S.11(4)(iv) is impliedly vested in him. If the Accommodation Controller's jurisdiction is thus excluded with respect to a building reconstructed in pursuance of an order under S.11(4)(iv), and if we are to bold that the Rent Controller has also no jurisdiction to enforce the conditions imposed by him at the time of ordering the eviction, the tenant would be constrained to institute a suit for declaration of his rights and to recover possession of the accommodation. The very object of the Act is to ensure speedy settlement of disputes between the landlord and the tenant, and that will be defeated if the tenant is driven to protracted litigation in a civil court to get back the accommodation in the reconstructed building after having been evicted on the specific condition that he would be put back into possession as soon as the reconstruction is over. Moreover, for fixation of fair rent the parties may have to approach the Rent Controller who alone has jurisdiction in that behalf. The argument that the Rent Controller becomes functus officio the moment he passes an order under S.11 is fallacious on the very face of it, as provisos 1 and 2 to clauses (iv) of subsection (4) of S.11 confer power on the Rent Controller to give effect to his order even after the passing of the order of eviction." I am in respectful agreement with this view and I see no reason why the decision should be reconsidered. 10. No doubt, the learned judge then said: "We are also not in a position to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the landlord-tenant relationship comes to an end when an order of eviction is passed and, therefore, a fresh allotment by the Accommodation Controller is necessary. The landlord-tenant relationship between the parties subsists, though temporarily the tenant remains out of possession for the purpose of reconstruction. The landlord-tenant relationship between the parties subsists, though temporarily the tenant remains out of possession for the purpose of reconstruction. There is no question of a fresh lease, and presumably the word "allotted" in the third proviso to clause (iv) of sub-section (4) of S.11 is used in contra-distinction with the term "leased". With respect I may say I find it difficult to accept the statement that the landlord-tenant relationship continues in spite of the order of eviction under S.11(4)(iv). Bound as I am by this decision T would have referred the matter to a Division Bench if the acceptance of the above principle stated in the decision was essential for decision in this case. This is not so and therefore there is no question of referring this case to a Division Bench. 11. The other contention raised by the petitioners is that there has been waiver by the applicant of his right of priority. It is also stated that he is estopped by conduct from filing the present application which has given rise to these revisions. I do not find any merit in these contentions apart from the fact that these contentions are based on facts of the case in which all the courts below have come to a concurrent decision. I might also state that even if this Court has jurisdiction to go into a question of fact in the face of the concurrent decisions, I would not have interfered in the matter. When an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building is allowed under S.11 (4) (iv), the tenant has the option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent. This right is also expressly reserved in the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court. In this case a notice was issued to the tenant by the landlord when the reconstruction was about to be completed. In the reply the tenant expressed his intention to re-occupy the building thereby exercising his option to get the reconstructed building allotted to him. It will be useful to quote the relevant portion of the reply notice, Ext. BI, which is as follows: In the face of this communication it is not possible to say that the tenant has waived his right. Nor in the circumstances it could be said that the application was belated. It will be useful to quote the relevant portion of the reply notice, Ext. BI, which is as follows: In the face of this communication it is not possible to say that the tenant has waived his right. Nor in the circumstances it could be said that the application was belated. It might be noted here that in Ext. BI it is stated that the landlord's communication does not disclose when the reconstruction work will be completed and there is no indication as to the area of the accommodation that would be allotted to the tenant and the date on which the agreement had to be executed. The tenant had also stated in his reply that if no reply is sent within 30 4 1972 the tenant will be going over to the site to take possession of the building on the 30th April. Ext. BI further stated regarding the suits for arrears of rent pending between the parties, that the monthly transactions can be settled through court and the pendency of the suits need not stand in the way of entering into a lease transaction. Though, on equitable principles the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority were right in directing the payment of the entire arrears of rent and interest by the tenant, the fact that there are such arrears is no ground for inducting the tenant into possession by the landlord No doubt, he could have insisted when the tenant makes the application for getting back the room that before the tenant is put into possession, the arrears etc. should be paid and that has been done in this case. As far as the new tenant is concerned, he cannot sustain his right on the plea of ignorance of the earlier order for eviction. In the light of the statutory rights given to the tenant for getting back the reconstructed room he is quite helpless. If the landlord had misled him he can claim against the landlord for damages. However the old tenant's right cannot be defeated by the wrongly inducted tenant being allowed to continue in possession. There is also no justification in the landlord's plea that the applicant is entitled only to get re-allotment on the back side of the western block and he cannot be given entrance to the K. K. Road by construction of a corridor. There is also no justification in the landlord's plea that the applicant is entitled only to get re-allotment on the back side of the western block and he cannot be given entrance to the K. K. Road by construction of a corridor. In the circumstances I see no reason to interfere with that direction as such. The tenant being entitled only to get the back room he should have access to the room from the northern K. K. Road. If the landlord finds any difficulty in complying with that part of the order of the Rent Controller he can move the Rent Controller for the appointment of a Commission to point out the best possible way in which the tenant can be given access to the room from the nearby public road, and access to which road the tenant had before the order for eviction. Therefore, while dismissing the revision petitions, I would further direct that the re-allotment and restoration of possession as ordered by the Rent Controller shall be effected by the landlord within a period of three months from this date. In regard to the nature of access, if the direction given by the Rent Control Court creates any difficulty the landlord or the applicant-tenant could approach that court for the appointment of a Commission for indication of the access to the K.K. Road in the best possible manner and with least inconvenience to the parties and also at the minimum cost. The court can direct construction of the corridor on the basis of the Commissioner's report. The necessary sanction from the Municipality will also have to be obtained. With the modification indicated above, the orders of the Rent Controller as confirmed by the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority are hereby confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs Dismissed.