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1979 DIGILAW 247 (ALL)

Ramnarain v. Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur

1979-02-28

H.N.AGARWAL

body1979
JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated March 4, 1972 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division confirming the order dated December 10, 1970 passed by the Assistant Collector, First Class, Kanpur in a case under Sections 229/209, UPZA and LR Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur had filed a suit seeking a declaration that Ram Narain who was recorded as a Sirdar of plots No. 1392, 1393 and 1394 and village Budhpur Machhariha was not a Sirdar but merely a trespasser, and seeking his ejectment. The defendant contested the suit by claiming that the land was leased out to him by the Land Management Committee of Budhpur Machhariha on June 2, 1957 and that since the date of the lease he was in cultivatory possession as a Sirdar and had been regularly paying land revenue to the State. The courts below have decreed the suit. Ram Narain has now come up in second appeal. 4. A number of grounds have been taken in this second appeal. The first ground urged is that a suit under Sections 229/209, UPZA and LR Act at the instance of the Nagar Mahapalika is not maintainable and that the Nagar Mahapalika is merely empowered to protect its property but is not empowered to institute a suit under Sections 229/209 of the Act. This interpretation cannot be accepted. Both an individual landholder as well as the Gaon Samaj are empowered to file suits under Sections 219/209 of the Act. The Nagar Mahapalika has both these capacities. 5. The second ground taken is, however, much more formidable. It has been contended that the Nagar Mahapalika being a successor-in-interest of the Gaon Sabha was bound by the lease executed by the Land Management Committee, and that the appellant could not be termed as a trespasser as he was in possession in pursuance of the lease executed by the Land Management Committee. Moreover, as proceedings under Sec. 198 of the UPZA and Land Reforms Act were not taken to cancel the lease, the lease could not be cancelled in the present proceedings. There is conclusive and unrebuttable evidence of the fact that the Land Management Committee has indeed granted a lease to the appellant. Moreover, as proceedings under Sec. 198 of the UPZA and Land Reforms Act were not taken to cancel the lease, the lease could not be cancelled in the present proceedings. There is conclusive and unrebuttable evidence of the fact that the Land Management Committee has indeed granted a lease to the appellant. This consists of, firstly, a copy of the Qabuliat in ZA Form No. 59 stating that Ram Narain had taken the plots in question from the Land Management Committee, Budhpur Machhariha on lease as a Sirdar, on an annual land revenue of Rs. 5/- with effect from June 2, 1957. Secondly, there is an extract from the proceeding register of Gaon Samaj dated June 2, 1957. In this extract item 23 is the effect that the application of Ram Narain was considered and 2 bighs 17 biswas area of land was given to him on lease with a premium of Rs. 50/- at an annual land revenue of Rs. 5/-. Though plot numbers have not been mentioned in the proceedings, the area and the land revenue tally. Thus it has been abundantly proved that the land in suit was leased cut to the defendant-appellant by the Land Management Committee. 6. The question of validity of lease granted by the Land Management Committee and its cancellation have been discussed at length in Similesh Kumar v. Gaon Sabha 1977 RD 408 . In this case a learned Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Hon'ble Satish Chandra, A Banerji and K.C. Agrawal, JJ. have held as follows :- "In the beginning the legislature did not provide for any right of a suit or for a further proceeding challenging the order of allotment, after it had been cancelled or maintained by the Sub-Divisional Officer in the proceedings initiated under sub-section (2) of Section 198. By U.P. Act No. XXXVII of 1958, however, the legislature for the first time provided for a suit laying down that an order of Sub-Divisional Officer would be subject to the decision of a suit. This position contained in operation till sub-section (4) of Section 198 was amended by U.P. Ordinance No. 18 of 1970. By U.P. Act No. XXXVII of 1958, however, the legislature for the first time provided for a suit laying down that an order of Sub-Divisional Officer would be subject to the decision of a suit. This position contained in operation till sub-section (4) of Section 198 was amended by U.P. Ordinance No. 18 of 1970. By this Ordinance the right to challenge an order of cancellations by the Sub-Divisional Officer or Assistant Collector, First Class, was taken away, and that it was specifically provided that every order passed by the Collector under sub-section (3) shall, subject to the provisions of Section 333, be final. Thus, an order could be the subject of a revision alone and not to any suit. The same position continues still now. This would show that although at one time the legislature had conceded the remedy of a suit to an aggrieved person, but the same has been taken away. When a right of a suit was given, the same became subject to a decision of the suit. It would thus be noticed that the legislature provided for the question relating to the validity of a lease executed under Section 198 of the Act to be decided in accordance with a special procedure either through an application to the Officer concerned or thereafter by a suit. The right to file a suit has, however, been taken away by U.P. Ordinance No. 18 of 1970. As a result thereof, now the validity of a lease deed or admission of a person as a Sirdar has to be decided by the Collector and thereafter the same can be taken up by means of a revision under Sec. 33 of the Act. Sub-sec. (4) specifically lays down that every order of the Collector shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (4) be final. A decision is said to be final when so far as the court rendering it is concerned it is unalterable. It eliminates the litigation between the parties on the merits and leaves nothing to be done excepting to execute the judgment. In the instant case also it appears that the legislature has deliberately used the words 'final' in this sense with a view to end the proceedings relating to the cancellation of lease deeds. It eliminates the litigation between the parties on the merits and leaves nothing to be done excepting to execute the judgment. In the instant case also it appears that the legislature has deliberately used the words 'final' in this sense with a view to end the proceedings relating to the cancellation of lease deeds. It appears to me that the Act conferred the right on the Land Management Committee to let out land and laid down the exhaustive machinery of cancelling the same in case it was not done in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. As stated above, it was thought by the legislature that the expediency required nothing further to be determined by the court or to be done by any authority, and that it was with that end in view that in 1970 by U.P. Ordinance No. 18 of 1970 the provision of even filing the suit which had been previously provided by U.P. Act XXXVII of 1958, was taken away. It is, therefore clear that after the amendment made by U.P. Ordinance No. 18 of 1970, the right to decide the question arising in connection with the cancellation of lease deeds is exclusively that of the Collector, which of course is subject to revision, provided by Sec. 333. Since the machinery provided is exclusive, it is not possible to hold that the consolidation authorities created by the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act could also investigate into the legality or otherwise of the question of the validity of the lease." The above Full Bench decision lays down a very sound principle that the jurisdiction of cancellation of a lease granted by Land Management Committee is exclusively that of the Collector subject to revision by Board of Revenue under Sec. 333. This jurisdiction is exercised in proceedings under Sec. 198 of the UPZA and LR Act. Neither the consolidation authorities nor an Assistant Collector, 1st Class (not conferred with the powers of the Collector) and nor even the Additional Commissioner have the jurisdiction to cancel a lease granted by the Land Management Committee. Further the jurisdiction to cancel a lease could not be exercised in proceeding under Sections 229/209 of the UPZA and LR Act. 7. In view of the legal position, the Nagar Mahapalika was not entitled to the decree of ejectment against the appellant. Further the jurisdiction to cancel a lease could not be exercised in proceeding under Sections 229/209 of the UPZA and LR Act. 7. In view of the legal position, the Nagar Mahapalika was not entitled to the decree of ejectment against the appellant. If the Nagar Mahapalika wished to get the lease granted to the appellant by the Land Management Committee cancelled it should take appropriate action under law before the competent authority. 8. The result is that I hereby allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the courts below.