JUDGMENT Bajpai, J. – 1 . Sometimes, use of inapt language due to unhappy draftsmanship creates a situation which gives rise to endless confusion amongst the litigants and occasion for conflict in the opinion of the Courts. The same is the situation in respect of the provisions of section 14 of the Hmdu Succession Act, 1958, as reproduced below: "14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property-(l) any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation-In this sub-section, 'property' includes both moveable and immoveable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance, or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance, arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by he as STRI DHAN immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree. order or award prescribed a restricted estate in such property." What is further painful to note is that despite there being serious Judicial conflict in construing the provision of sub-section (l) and (2) of section 14 of the Act, no care was taken to make a suitable amendment for providing clarity, certainty and simplicity to the law in question and to put an end to fruitless litigation arising out of the conflict in judicial opinions. The legal position, however, how stands settled by the recent decision of the Supreme Court. 2. From the perusal of the aforesaid section, it is apparent that sub-section (1) intends to enlarge the limited estate of a Hindu female in respect of the property posessed by her whether acquired before or after the coming into force of the Act. The legal position, however, how stands settled by the recent decision of the Supreme Court. 2. From the perusal of the aforesaid section, it is apparent that sub-section (1) intends to enlarge the limited estate of a Hindu female in respect of the property posessed by her whether acquired before or after the coming into force of the Act. Sub-section (2), however, has been added in the nature of a proviso for making exceptions to the scope of sub-section (1) in respect of certain properties acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument, decree or award conferring a restricted estate. By taking advantage of the language of sub section (2) which appears to be wide enough and if literally construed to include all acquisitions of property by a Hindu female under an instrument, decree or award and if sub-section (2) is construed de horse the Context and purpose of sub-section (1), it can be said that it may cover all such acquisitions whether at a partition or in lieu of maintenance if they have been recognised, incorporated in an instrument, decree or an award. In view of this, effort has-been made to contend that even if a Hindu female had acquired some property at a partition effected by a deed, decree or award and the terms of the same prescribe only a life interest in the property, she would not become the full owner by virtue of sub-section (1) because such a case was-fully Covered by the language of sub-section (2). However such a contention cannot be accepted. The reason being that if the same was accepted it would virtually emasculate sub-section (1) because: according to the aforesaid construction, a large number of cases, though governed by sub-section (1) could be excluded from the operation of the said sub-section merery for the reason that the partition at which the Hindu female got some property in limited interest happened to be effected by executing a deed or was under a decree or award. The well-settled legal position prevailing to day is that sub-section (2) has to be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large scope for operation to sub-section (1) as possible and if sub-section (2) is so construed, it would naturally confine to cases where the property is acquired by a Hindu female for the first time by way grant under a gift, will or any other such instrument, award or decree conferring a limited estate without any pre-existing right the mere fact that any pre-existing right has been simply recognised by incorporation of the same in a deed or document or has been given effect to by an instrument, decree or award, will not take away the case beyond the scope of sub-section (1). Actually this was the controversy in the suit giving rise to t he present appeal. 3. A brief calendar of relevant facts, more or less undisputed, are as under:- "The suit property comprising of a portion of a house was the one belonging to the joint Hindu family of Bal, the grand-father of the plaintiff's Balwantrao died in the year 1945 leaving behind him his widow, Janki Bai, and 5 sons, namely Kashinath, Gajendra, Manohar, Kamlakar and Dinkar. The present plaintiffs are the sons of Kashinath. The other four brothers have been impleaded as defendant Nos. 2 to 5 because they did not joint the plaintiff. On 18-3-1956, the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 to 5 and Mst. Jankibai, the widow of Balwantrao and the mother of defendant Nos. 2 to 5 agreed to partition the joint Hindu family property and referred the matter to an arbitrator. The arbitrator gave and award on 16-4-1956 and the same was made a rule of the Court as per decree in civil suit No. 11 of 1956. At the stage of partition, Mst. Jankibai was given the suit house, however, with restricted interest for her life-time. It was made clear that she will be entitled to maintain herself If from the same during her life time and after her death, the same will become available for further division amongst defendant Nos. 2 to 5 and the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the provisions of Hindu Succession Act came into force on 17-9-1956. Mst. Jankibai sold the suit house to defendant No.1 Shobharam by executing a registered deed of sale on 28-6-1962 for a consideration of Rs. 500. 2 to 5 and the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the provisions of Hindu Succession Act came into force on 17-9-1956. Mst. Jankibai sold the suit house to defendant No.1 Shobharam by executing a registered deed of sale on 28-6-1962 for a consideration of Rs. 500. Mst. Jankibai, thereafter, died on 4-3-1964. After her death, the present plaintiffs who are the sons of Kashinath, served the defendant No.1 Shobharam, the purchaser, with a notice dated 5-9-1964 asking him to handover possession of the house to them by contending that his predecesser-in-title Mst. Jankibai had only the life interest, and therefore, on 28-6-62 she could not make any transfer of the suit house in favour of anybody, creating any interest beyond her life time. Sobharam did not comply with the notice and, therefore, the plaintiffs instituted the suit giving rise to the present appeal. 4. The trial Court and the lower appellate Court had taken the view that since Mst. Jankibai, being the widow of Balwantrao and the mother of defendant Nos. 2 to 5 had a pre-existing right to have a share at the time of partition, and the suit property was given to her at the partition in lieu of maintenance with life stage, she became the full owner after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 14. According to the Courts below, since it was a case of pre-existing right and the suit property was allotted to her with restricted life-interest in lieu of maintenance, and was not acquired either by way of gift, will or any other instrument, decree or award for the first time, the provisions of section (2) were not attracted and therefore accordingly the suit was dismissed. 5. After hearing the learned counsel from both the sides and on going through the material on record this Court is of the opinion that in the context of the undisputed facts and circumstances, the view taken by the Courts below does not warrant interference and the judgment and decree impugned do not suffer with any error of law. 6. Shri V.K. Sapre, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that since Mst. 6. Shri V.K. Sapre, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that since Mst. Jankibai got the suit house under the award, which had been later on made a rule of the Court, and the terms of the said award conferred only life-interest on nor, the case was fully covered by the provisions of subsection (2) and, therefore, she did not become the full owner by virtue of provisions of sub-section (1). As already pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, the language of sub section (2) has to be read along with sub-section (1) and has to be construed in such a manlier so as to keep as large scope as possible for the operation of sub section (1). The Legislature, while creating exception by adding sub-section (2) intended to take out only such cases of acquisition of property from the operation of sub-section (1) where there was no pre-existing right and the acquisition was for the first time in the nature of grant, either by way of gift, will or any such other transaction. It was never intended to take away all such cases out of the scope of sub-section (1) where despite the right being pre-existing, the same was either implemented or recognised by incorporation in an instrument decree or award. If we would accept such a construction, the very purpose of enlarging the limited rights of a Hindu female will be frustrated. The provisions in the nature of exception sought to be incorporated by either adding a proviso or a sub-section in the nature of a proviso are to be construed in such manner that the main part of the enactment also remains operative and is not rendered absolutely inefficient and totally ineffective. 7. The contention raised on behalf of the appellants totally ignores the contents of the explanation appended to sub-section (1). The explanation makes it clear that the term 'property' includes even such property as was acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance. 7. The contention raised on behalf of the appellants totally ignores the contents of the explanation appended to sub-section (1). The explanation makes it clear that the term 'property' includes even such property as was acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance. Thus the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act will have to be construed as not referring to any such acquisition though under an instrument, decree or award which merely recognised the pro-extisting right without creating or conferring a new title arising out of a grant made for the first time Sub-section (2) has to be construed as a proviso and not in a manner so as to totally destroy the effect or sub-section (1). 8. Shri V.K. Sapre, thereafter, contended that since Hindu Women's Right to Property Act was not in force in the local area of Gwalior region, during the relevant period, i.e. 1945, when the inheritance opened, there Was nothing in the nature of a right with Mst. Jankibai as would have been the case if the provisions of Hindu Women Rights to Property Act were, applicable. He also contended that the Circular issued by the erstwhile Gwalior State that principles of Hindu law, as applicable to the area of British India would apply to the Gwalior State also, could not have the effect of making the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act applicable so as to confer or create enforceable rights. In my opinion, for the purposes of the present case, it would not be necessary to deal with this aspect of the case. It was not disputed even by Shri Sapre that according to the unamended Hindu Law, as was prevalent in the Gwalior State, Mst. Jankibai as a widow mother was entitled to a share, of course with limited estate in lieu of maintenance along with her sons in the Joint Family Property at the time of partition. It was also not disputed that the suit house was allotted to her with life-interest at the partition. These facts in themselves attract the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act and the contention about the applicability of sub-section (2) having been rejected, Mst. It was also not disputed that the suit house was allotted to her with life-interest at the partition. These facts in themselves attract the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act and the contention about the applicability of sub-section (2) having been rejected, Mst. Janki Bai became the absolute owner on coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act on 17-6-1956 and thus was fully competent to transfer the rights of an absolute owner to Shobharam, defendant No.1, in the year 1962. 9. During the course of argument, reference was made to certain decisions of Gwalior High Court and the Madhya Bharat High Court, as reported in Hardayal v. Khubchand Samwat 2002 G.L.R. 400, and Parath Singh v. Baikunthi Samwat 2002 G.L.R. 56, and Devsingh v. Bai 1952 M.B.L.J. 728. On behalf of the respondents reference was made to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Talsamma v. Sesha Reddy, AIR 1977 SC 1944 , D. Krishnadas v. Vankvya AIR 1978 SC 261 and Vajja v. Thako Bai AIR 1979 SC 993 , The legal position, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions is fully applicable to the facts of the present case and supports the stand of the respondents. Since Naraini Devi's case, (AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2198 has been over-ruled by AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1944, and it has been held that right to maintenance was undoubtedly a pre existing right which existed even in the unamended Hindu Law before the passing of Hindu women's Right to Property Act 1937, the question whether Hindu Women's Right to Property Act was applicable to the local area or not does not now remain relevant. This position has been fully discussed and explained in paragraph 3 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vafia (supra). 10. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's feel according to schedule, if certified.