Judgment :- 1. In a proceeding under S.125 of the Criminal Procedure Code maintenance was granted to the wife by the trial Magistrate at the rate of Rs. 50/- and to her youngest child at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month. The Sessions Judge in revision set aside that order on the ground that the wife was leading an immoral life and the child was illegitimate. 2. The parties are Muslims. They were first married 18 years before. After five children were born to them they quarrelled. The husband took the wife to her house and divorced her Thereafter he remarried her and took her to his house, they lived together there for about four months and the wife became pregnant. There was again quarrel between them. The husband took her to her house again, and again, divorced her. It was thereafter that the last child was born. The award of Rs. 40/- as maintenance by the trial Magistrate was for that child. This revision petition is by the wife. 3. The Sessions Judge was greatly influenced by the failure to conduct an intermediate marriage between the first and second marriage of the petitioner as cutting at the root of the validity of the second marriage. In Mulla's Mahomedan Law, 17th Edition, it is stated as follows at page 319: "Where the husband has repudiated his wife by three pronouncements it is not lawful for him to marry her again until she has married another man, and the latter has divorced her or died after actual consummation of the marriage." There is no doubt about that proposition. In the present case it has come out from the evidence of the wife, pw.1, the Mullah who officiated at the second marriage, pw. 2, and an invitee of the respondent who attended the second marriage, Pw. 3, that there was really no intermediate marriage between the first and second marriages of the" parties. That was why the Sessions Judge said that the second marriage was invalid. The results following from that were also serious. Argument regarding the same by counsel for the husband was of elemental simplicity. 3, that there was really no intermediate marriage between the first and second marriages of the" parties. That was why the Sessions Judge said that the second marriage was invalid. The results following from that were also serious. Argument regarding the same by counsel for the husband was of elemental simplicity. He argued that as the husband by such second marriage was no better than a stranger the wife had to be taken as having led an immoral life when she lived with him for about four months after the first divorce and the child begotten during that period had to be taken as illegitimate. 4. Maintenance was disallowed to the wife on account of her leading an immoral life. The judge in doing that had evidently the provision in S.125(4) of the Code in view. For that provision to apply the wife should be living in adultery. If the second marriage was invalid then after the dissolution of the first marriage the wife should be taken as not having a husband at the time and her cohabitation with any man during that period cannot be termed adultery, as held in Mariyumma v. Mohammed Ibrahim 1978 KLT. 573. So the provision in S.125 (4) cannot be applied for refusing maintenance to the wife. 5. As for immorality, what is immoral has to be judged by the current standards of morality of the community. What was apparently regarded with pious horror in good old days would today hardly draw a raised eyebrow or even a gentle tut-tut The wife in this case had at no time a husband other than the respondent. I doubt whether in the present day Indian Muslim Society such a woman who cohabits with a man who was her previous husband and who has married her a second time can on account of such cohabitation be said to be immoral merely because the second marriage is technically invalid in the eye of law. I am conscious that by leaving that matter at that, I am leaving it unresolved and open for decision in the future but that is inevitable in the development of law. 6. The respondent, R. W.1, denied the second marriage. But except his interested statement, which was rightly not believed by the trial Magistrate, there is nothing to show that what he said was true. 6. The respondent, R. W.1, denied the second marriage. But except his interested statement, which was rightly not believed by the trial Magistrate, there is nothing to show that what he said was true. The Sessions Judge thought that as there was no part played by the mosque in the second marriage that remarriage was not probable. A mosque has no part to play in a Muslim marriage which is purely contractual. The evidence of the wife, pw.1, which is reliable and which is corroborated by that of pws. 2 and 3 proves that the second marriage actually took place. There was no justifiable reason for the Sessions judge to interfere in revision with the finding of fact entered by the trial Magistrate after proper appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case that the second marriage between the parties in fact took place. 7. If a remarriage, as is proved in the case, was conducted without conducting an intermediate marriage it is only an irregularity. At page 319 of Mulla's Mahomedan Law after saying that it was not lawful for a Muslim to marry his divorced wife again until she is remarried by another man and that is consummated it is stated as follows: "A marriage without fulfilment of the above conditions is irregular, not void." The effect of an irregular marriage is mentioned at page 263 of that book as follows: "If consummation has taken place (i) the wife is entitled to dower, .......................................................... It is clearly proved in the case that the youngest child was born to the petitioner through the respondent after the remarriage. So there was consummation of the remarriage, the petitioner is entitled to dower and the youngest child is legitimate. 8. A divorced wife is also entitled to claim maintenance under S.125 (1) of the Code unless she has received after the divorce the whole amount which was payable on such divorce. The respondent in the present case even denies the remarriage. There was no justifiable reason whatsoever for the Sessions judge to interfere in revision with the order passed by the trial Magistrate granting maintenance to the wife and child of the respondent after proper consideration of the evidence adduced in the case. In the result this revision petition is allowed by setting aside the order passed by the Sessions Judge and restoring that passed by the trial Magistrate. Allowed.