Short Note : This appeal by special leave at the instance of the tenant of certain premises in town of Vellure was heard by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of seven judges to resolve a cleavage of opinion between the various High Courts in India as also between several decisions of the Supreme Court, on the question as to whether in order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act it is necessary to give a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Held : We shall presently refer to the various decisions of the High Court and this Court taking contrary views. But before we do so we may make some general observations. It is well known that after the second world war to give protecti0n to a tenant against unnecessary, undue or unreasonable eviction and in the matter of being exploited for payment of exorbitant rent all States in India at one time or the other passed Building Rent and Control Acts. Amendments in them were brought about from time to time. The languages and the scheme of the Acts varied and differed from State to State. Even though there was no basic or fundamental difference in regard to the law of eviction of a tenant in any of the State statutes, different constructions were put in regard to them and principles were culled out in varying manners to arrive at the conclusions in come cases that a notice to quit in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary and in some cases it was held that it was not necessary. The gravemen of the underlying principles seems to have been overlooked in many cases. 2. It was plain and clear that if the lease of immovable property did not stand determined under any of the clauses (a) to (g) of section 111 of the T.P. Act, a notice to determine it section 106 was necessary. But when under the various State Rent Acts, either in one language or the other, it has been provided that a tenant can be evicted on the grounds mentioned in certain sections of the said Acts, then how does the question of determination of a tenancy by notice arise? But when under the various State Rent Acts, either in one language or the other, it has been provided that a tenant can be evicted on the grounds mentioned in certain sections of the said Acts, then how does the question of determination of a tenancy by notice arise? If the State Rent Act requires the giving of a particular type of notice in order to get a particular kind of relief, such a notice will have to be given. Or, it may be, that a landlord will be well advised by way of abundent precaution and in order to lend additional support to his case, to give a notice to his tenant intimating that he intended to file a suit against him for his eviction on the ground mentioned in the notice. But that is not to say that such a notice is compulsory or obligatory or that it must fulfil all the technical requirements of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Once the liability to be evicted is incurred by the tenant, he cannot turn round and say that the contractual lease has not been determined. The action of the landlord in instituting a suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in any State Rent Act will be tentamount to an expression of his intentions that he does want the tenant to continue as his lessee and the jural relationship of lessor and lessee will come to an end on the passing of an order or a decree for eviction. 3. (After referring to various conflicting views of the High Courts their Lordships held) Such a cleavage of opinion cropped up in the various High Courts because of some observations of this Court in some decisions which will be presently alluded to. It was so on an erroneous assumption, if we may say so with great respect, that the difference in the phraseology of the different State Rents Acts justifies this difference of views. In our considered judgment on the question of requirement of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act there is no scope for taking different views on the basis of the difference in the phraseology of the various Rent Acts. In this regard, the difference in language does not bring out any distinction. In our considered judgment on the question of requirement of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act there is no scope for taking different views on the basis of the difference in the phraseology of the various Rent Acts. In this regard, the difference in language does not bring out any distinction. In all the States the law should be uniform, viz., that either a notice is necessary or it is not. It was high time, therefore, that this larger Bench was constituted to lay down a uniform law for the governance of the whole country and not permit the unjustified different trend of decisions to continue (After discussing the previous views of the Supreme Court the Bench laid, down). Determination of a lease in accordance of the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and is a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination the tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Appeal dismissed.