JUDGMENT T. U. Mehta, C. J —The petitioner, who was recruiced in toe Postal Department as a Clerk in the year 1964 and who has been dismissed from his service in the year 1973, has preferred this writ petition challenging the relevant orders passed by the concerned authorities. 2. Short facts giving rise to this petition are that on 25-2-1964 the petitioner was temporarily appointed as a clerk in the Kangra Postal Division and was thereafter made quasi-permanent from 4-9-l967 by order —-Annexure "B" which is dated 30-10-1967. When the petitioner was recruited, he made a representation that in his Matriculation examination he had obtained 586 marks out of the total of 700 and that his Roll Number was 28206 of the Punjab University. He also produce a certified copy of a certificate showing that his Roll Number was as above and the marks which he had obtained were 586. 3. In the year 1971 it was revealed that the petitioner had obtained his service in the Postal Department on altogether false statements because in fact he had obtained 286 marks and his Roll Number was 172013, It is an admitted position that the petitioner appeared in Matriculation Examination conducted by the Punjab University in March 1960, from Government High School, Rakkar. 4. On 15-24971. the petitioner was charge-sheeted and was served with the articles of charges found at Annexures-D 1 and D-2. The petitioner denied these charges with the result that at a regular departmental enquiry was held. The report of the enquiring officer was against the petitioner because he found that the petitioner had obtained service in the Postal Department on altogether false representation as regards the number of marks he obtained and even as regards his Roll Number. This enquiry report was accepted by the then Superintendent of Postal Services, Dharamsala, one Shri S. S. MIDHA, Second notice was given to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed. This notice was dated 19-7-1972. However, on 23-7-1972 the disciplinary authority awarded the punishment of reduction of the pay of the petitioner to the minimum of the time scale in the clerical cadre for three years without having the effect of postponing his future increments. This order is found at Annexure T. It is one of the impugned orders. 5. This notice was dated 19-7-1972. However, on 23-7-1972 the disciplinary authority awarded the punishment of reduction of the pay of the petitioner to the minimum of the time scale in the clerical cadre for three years without having the effect of postponing his future increments. This order is found at Annexure T. It is one of the impugned orders. 5. Thereafter the Director of Postal Services, finding that the Punishment awarded to the petitioner was not adequate, took up review proceedings contemplated by rule 29 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 and gave notice to the petitioner as found at Annexure K-l dated 2942-1972 to show cause why the punishment awarded to him should not be enhanced. The petitioner showed cause, but ultimately the said Director pass the final order on 14-3-1973 as found at Annexure K-5. Thereafter the petitioner was relieved from service on 21-3-1973. 6. The petitioner, however, preferred an appeal before the Chairman Post and Telegraph Board, as found at Annexure L, but the said appeal was dismissed on 5-12-1974 with the result that the petitioner has preferred this writ petition. 7. The first point which is raised in this writ petition is that the petitioner asked for permission to engage a legal practitioner to defend him during the departmental proceedings, but this permission was not granted by the concerned authorities. 8. At Annexure E-l, is found the application made by the petitioner to the Superintendent of Post Offices on 16-4-1971 in this connection. At Annexure E-3 is found the order of the Superintendent of Post Offices dated 24-5-1971 saying that the assistance of a legal practitioner would not be allowed during the course of the departmental enquiry. It is, however, found that the petitioner was allowed to avail of the services of one of his colleagues to defend him during the course of the enquiry. Rule 14(8) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Is65 provides that a Government servant may take the assistance of another Government servant to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the presenting officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner or the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. This rule, therefore shows that the delinquent official cannot, as of right, avail the services of a legal practitioner for the purpose of his defence during the course of a departmental enquiry, though, he has a right to take assistance of another Government servant to present his defence before the enquiry officer. In fact, the petitioner has availed of the assistance of one of his colleagues to defend himself during the course of the departmental enquiry. 9. It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that in CX. Subra-maniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin reported in 1972 Labour & I. C. 1049, the Supreme Court has observed that according to rule 15(5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 the representation of a government servant by another government servant, or, in appropriate cases, by a legal practitioner, is mandatory. In my opinion, this decision is of no help to the petitioner in this case because the petitioner has availed such a representation through the assistance of one of his colleagues. Since he had no right to be represented by a legal practitioner, no provision of the rules can be said to have been infringed on account of the drpartments refusal to allow him to avail of the services of the legal practitioner. 10. Relying upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Director General of Post and Telegraphs v. N. G. Mazumdar reported in 1974 Labour &I. C. 1484, the learned Advocate of the petitioner contended that even when there is no legal practitioner nominated on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary authority is bound to consider the facts and circumstances of the case before it can refuse permission to engage legal pracitioner to assist the government servant in enquiry proceedings. It was contended that before refusing permission to the petitioner to engage a legal practitioner, the disciplinary authority has not considered the facts and circumstances of the case and, therefore, a serious prejudice is caused to the petitioner. I find no substance in this contention because there is nothing to show that the disciplinary authority has refused the permission sought for without considering the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. Thus it is found that the authoritys refusal to grant the permission to the petitioner to engage the services of the legal practitioner during the departmental enquiry is not fatal. 12. 11. Thus it is found that the authoritys refusal to grant the permission to the petitioner to engage the services of the legal practitioner during the departmental enquiry is not fatal. 12. The next contention was that though on 29-6-1971 the petitioner applied for taking the photo-stat copies of certain documents as per Annexure *F\ the said request was rejected as per Annexure F-l, F-3. 21-5-1979 (contd.) 13. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition, the petitioner has contended that without the photo-stat copies of the documents relied on by the Department, and especially without the photo stat copy of the certified copy of the said certificate which was in dispute, it was not possible for him to meet the case of the Department effectively and, therefore, he was not able to avail of an adequate and sufficient opportunity to put forward his defence. Reply filed by the department with regard this allegation of the petitioner shows that according to the Department, taking of photo-stat copies of the relevant documents was not allowed as there was no such provision at the relevant time, but the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to inspect the documents and take extracts for preparing his defence. In his rejoinder the petitioner has referred to Rule 73 of Posts and Telegraphs Manual, Volume III, which provides that if the documents of which photo-stat copies are sought for, are vitally relevant to the case, as for example, where the proof of the charge depends upon the proof of the hand-writing, or a document the authenticity of which is disputed, the disciplinary authority should itself consider the question of taking photo-stat copies thereof to supply the same to the accused official. Thus according to this Rule 73, if the documents in question are found to be vitally relevant to the case, then it is for the disciplinary authority to obtain the photo-stat copies of the documents for the purpose of supplying the same to the concerned delinquent. Since this rule has been relied upon by the petitioner for the first time in his rejoinder, the Department has filed a reply stating that this particular rule was not in existence at the relevant time. Since this rule has been relied upon by the petitioner for the first time in his rejoinder, the Department has filed a reply stating that this particular rule was not in existence at the relevant time. Thus it is apparent that the first dispute between the parties is whether rule 73 above referred to, which provides for taking of photo-stat copies of vitally relevant documents, was in existence at the relevant time or not. I have referred to Volume III of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual, but it is not possible to know from this Volume as to when exactly rule 73 was incorporated in the instructions given by this Volume to the concerned officials for the purpose of conducting departmental enquiries. Under the circumstances, there is nothing in the record to show that at the relevant time rule 73 was applicable. 14. However, appart from that, I find that it is not possible to say that non-furnishing of the photo-stat copies has, in any manner, prejudiced the case of the petitioner. It should be noted here that the charge against the petitioner is that while obtaining his appointment in the Postal Department, he made false statements as regards the marks which he had obtained in the Matriculation examination as well as regards his Roll Number. These false statements were made by him not only in his application for getting the appointment, but also by production of a false certificate containing the facts on which he put reliance. Now, the purpose of obtaining photo-stat copies of the certificate which he produced in support of his application, was to prove that the signatures and handwritings found in the certificate were genuine. Believing for the sake of argument that they were genuine, that particular fact would not, in any manner, help the petitioner if eventually it is found that the marks which he had obtained in the Matriculation examination were not 586 as claimed by him but only 286 and that his genuine Roll Number was not 28206 as claimed by him, but was 172013. In other words, if the Department was able to prove that he obtained his appointment in the Postal Department by making false statements as regards the total number of his marks and his Roll Number, then the question whether the certificate on which he put reliance was forged or not, is totally irrelevant. In other words, if the Department was able to prove that he obtained his appointment in the Postal Department by making false statements as regards the total number of his marks and his Roll Number, then the question whether the certificate on which he put reliance was forged or not, is totally irrelevant. It is, therefore, apparent that even if rule 73 was existing at the relevant time and that the Department was not justified in not furnishing the required Photo-stat copies of the documents in question it is apparent that the said refusal of the Department has not resulted in any prejudice to the petitioner. I, therefore, see no substance even in this contention of the petitioner. 15. It was next contended that the petitioner has been prejudiced as he was not allowed to examine certain witnesses and especially a witness named Nasib Singh who dealt with the Matriculation certificate produced by him. I-was also contended that the petitioner was not allowed to avail of the oppors tunity to see the original complaint which initiated the departmental proceeding against him. The allegations regarding this are contained in paragraph 7 of the writ petition. At Annexure G is the copy of the application by the petitioner to the enquiry officer dated 28-6-1971 giving the list of witnesses. There is nothing in the record to show that the Department had not summoned the witnesses named therein, At Annexure G-l is another application of the petitioner dated 3-6-1972 wherein several witnesses were proposed to be summoned. At serial No. 7 is the name of witness Nasib Singh about whom the petitioner has made a grievance. It is said that Nasib Singh was at the relevant time Inspector of Post Offices who took Matriculation certificate submitted by the petitioner. Now reference to the reply filed by the Department with regard to this contention shows that the Circle Complaints Officer of the office of the Post Master General, Punjab and Head-clerk of the Post Master Generals Office were summoned and examined by Department. As regards witness Nasib Singh, it is stated that he had since expired and, therefore, he could not be produced. Reference to this paragraph 7 of the reply further shows that whatever requests of the petitioner in this connection were permissible, were granted. As regards witness Nasib Singh, it is stated that he had since expired and, therefore, he could not be produced. Reference to this paragraph 7 of the reply further shows that whatever requests of the petitioner in this connection were permissible, were granted. I find that there is nothing in the record of the case to show that any legitimate demand of the petitioner to examine a particular witness has been rejected wrongly by the department. So far as Nasib Singh is concerned, he had already expired and, therefore, it is not understandable how the petitioner could make a grievance of the non-examination of this witness. 16. As for the original complaint, reference to Annexure G-4, which is the order of the enquiry officer dated 144-1972, shows that the said document was found to be irrelevant and, therefore, the petitioner was not allowed to have access to it. I find myself in agreement with the view taken by the enquiry officer in this connection, because inspection of the original complaint by which the department proceedings are initiated against the petitioner, would not have thrown any light on the question except as to who initiated these proceedings. 17. It was then contended that Mr. S. M. Chopra was a witness of the department as the statement of the petitioner found at Annexure R-3 which was recorded before the departmental proceedings were started, was recorded in his presence. It was contended that Mr. Chopra being a witness for the department could not have taken any action against the petitioner as a disciplinary authority. I find absolutely no substance in this contention because it is found that the disciplinary action which is taken against the petitioner, as found at Annexure J has not been taken by Mr. Chopra, but by one Shri S. S. Midha who was at that time working as the Superintendent of Post Offices, Kangra at Dharamsala. 18. Lastly it was contended that the punishment which was awarded to the petitioner has been reviewed by the Director under rule 29. But before going into this question the Director was obliged under the terms of the proviso to rule 29 to hold a fresh and de novo enquiry under rule 14. 18. Lastly it was contended that the punishment which was awarded to the petitioner has been reviewed by the Director under rule 29. But before going into this question the Director was obliged under the terms of the proviso to rule 29 to hold a fresh and de novo enquiry under rule 14. It was pointed out that since no such de novo enquiry has been held, the ultimate order of punishment passed by the Director, as found at Annexure K-5, is illegal, 19. Rule 29 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the rules, the concerned authority may at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under the rules, after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary, and may confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order or impose any penalty where no such penalty has been imposed. This rule, therefore, empowers the concerned authority to enhance the penalty imposed by the order under review. The Director has in this case exercised his powers of enhancement of penalty under these rules. This rule is, however, governed by a proviso which runs as under:— "Privided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any reviewing authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed and where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified in clause (v) to (ix) of rule 11 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be reviewed to any of the penalties specified in those clauses, no such penalty shall be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in rule 14 and after giving a reasonable opportunity to the Government servant concerned of showing cause against the penalty proposed on the evidence adduced during the inquiry and except after consulation with the Commissioner where such consultation is necessary." The contention of the learned Advocate of the petitioner was that this proviso contemplates a fresh inquiry under rule 14, even though one has already been made at a prior stage, in all cases in which it is proposed to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be reviewed. It was pointed out that since in this case the Director bad proposed to enhance the penalty imposed by the order reviewed by him, it was obligatory on him to order a de novo inquiry under rule 14 even if the said inquiry was once made. 20. I find that the above contention of the learned Advocate of the petitioner is not acceptable, because, in my opinion, reference to the inquiry contemplated by rule 14, which is made by the above quoted proviso, is with regard to only those cases in which such an inquiry under rule 14 was, for some reason, not made. In this connection it would be pertinent to note that rule 11 contemplates two categories of penalties, namely (1) minor penalties and (2) major penalties. Minor penalties are those which are mentioned in clauses (i) to (iv) while major penalties are those which are mentioned in clauses (v) to (ix). It is an admitted position that so far as the cases of minor penalties are concerned, the detailed inquiry contemplated by rule 14 is not necessary, because rule 14 applies only to the cases wherein major penalties are imposable. Now there would be cases wherein the matter is as the one governed by the minor penalties. Obviously in such cases no procedure of inquiry contemplated by rule 14 would be adopted. In such a case, if the concerned authority reviews the order of punishment and enhances the penalty awarded to the delinquent to one of those covered by clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 11, the proviso which is attached to rule 29 says that inquiry contemplated by rule 14 should be made before any of the penalties mentioned in clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 11 is imposed by the reviewing authority. It is, of course, true that the language of the proviso is not quite happy, and prima facie seeks to cover even those cases wherein the original proceedings have been initiated under rule 14 with a view to impose any of the major penalties covered by clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 11. I find that on proper reading of the proviso as fresh and de novo inquiry under rule 14 is not necessary if such an inquiry is once held by the Department. I find that on proper reading of the proviso as fresh and de novo inquiry under rule 14 is not necessary if such an inquiry is once held by the Department. The clause "or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be reviewed to any of the penalties specified in those clauses" prima facie covers even those cases in which inquiry under rule 14 has been made on the basis that a major penalty is impossible and the reviewing authority acting under rule 29 thinks that the penalty imposed is not adequate. But I find that unless it is noticed that the enquiry officer had no jurisdiction in the matter or that the inquiry conducted by him suffers from some basic and intrinsic defect which would totally vitiate the same, there would be absolutely no purpose served in ordering a de novo inquiry. The fact of the matter is that the question about the enhancement of sentence comes into consideration only in cases in which the finding as regards the merits of the case is to be confirmed. In that view of the matter, it is difficult to understand what tangible purpose would be served by a de novo and fresh inquiry which would obviously result in a colossal waste of time and money. 21. Viewed from this angle, I am of the opinion that the words "after an inquiry in the manner laid down in rule 14" found in the proviso should be read as meaning "after an inquiry in the manner laid down in rule 14 is made". In my opinion these words are used to suggest that if the inquiry contemplated by rule 14 is not made in the matter and if still any of the major penalties is proposed to be imposed, then before imposing such a major penalty an inquiry contemplated by rule 14 should be made. But it is already made, a fresh and de novo inquiry need not be made, 22. The above view which I am taking regarding the interpretation of the proviso attached to rule 29 finds support from the decision given by the Delhi High Court in B. L. Kohli v. Union of India and others, reported in 1974 (2) SLR 679 and the decision given by the Kerala High Court in T. L. Anantharaman v. Union of India, reported in 1979 (1) SLR 196. I, therefore, find that there is no substance even in the last contention which is raised on behalf of the petitioner regarding de novo inquiry. 23. There is no other point raised or argued on behalf of the petitioner in this writ petition. The writ petition, therefore, fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed