JUDGMENT : Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. These applications under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have been tiled on behalf of the petitioners for quashing their prosecutions for an offence under section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) The Superintendent of Labour, Rohtas filed different petitions of complaint against these petitioners alleging therein that they have failed to implement some of the terms of the awards, given by the Tribunal constituted under the Act, on disputes being referred to it by the appropriate Government, as such, they were liable to be punished for ala offence under section 29 of the Act. 2. Petitioner no.1 in these applications was the Chairman of the Rohtas Industries Limited, Dalmianagar, who is dead, others are Directors, Executive President, Vice-president and the Chief Personnel Manager of the Rohtas Industries Limited. It appears that after the a wards in question were given by the Tribunal, the aforesaid Rohtas Industries Limited had filed writ applications before this Court for quashing the same. Most of the writ applications were dismissed. Only one was allowed by this Court. In one case, out of which Criminal Miscellaneous 4818 of 1975 arises, on special leave being granted by the Supreme Court, the award in question was set aside, and the Tribunal was directed to hear the parties and to decide the dispute afresh. As some of the terms of the different awards were not implemented, different petitions of complaint were filed and these petitioners have been summoned to stand trial, as already stated above. As common question of law is involved in all these applications, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. Criminal Miscellaneous No. 4818 of 1975 was heard as the first case. I propose to consider the questions raised on be half of the petitioners in that application first. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has challenged the legality of the order summoning these petitioners primarily on two grounds. Criminal Miscellaneous No. 4818 of 1975 was heard as the first case. I propose to consider the questions raised on be half of the petitioners in that application first. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has challenged the legality of the order summoning these petitioners primarily on two grounds. Firstly, that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate before taking cognizance and passing an order summoning these petitioners should have been satisfied on the basis of tile allegations made in the petition of complaint that not only there has been a non-implementations of the award in question but the non-implementation was intentional so as to make these petitioners criminally liable for the punishment provided under the Act. In other words, one of the requisite ingredients for an offence under section 29 of the Act, mens rea, has not been alleged in the petition of complaint, and, as such, the Judicial process of the court could not have been issued against the petitioners branding them as criminals. The other point which has been raised in support of this application is that even if the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was satisfied about the commission of the offence he should have ascertained as to who are those offenders who should be brought before the court for answering the charge. According to the learned counsel, the summons have been issued against these petitioners in a mechanical manner in absence of any specific allegation as to how they were responsible for the non-implementation of the award in question. 4. Section 29 of the Act is as follows:- "Any person who commits a breach of any term of any settlement or award, which is binding on him under this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which ay extend to six months, or with fine, or with both, and the Court trying the offence, if it fines the offender, may direct that the whole or any part of the fine refused from him shall be paid, by way of compensation, to any person who, in its opinion, has been injured by such breach'" It cannot be disputed that at common law whenever an accused is charged for an offence, the prosecution has to prove mensrea, i.e. the guilty intention before he can be convicted for the offence charged. This is one of the fundamentals of the Criminal Jurisprudence and has been recognised since ages. However, because of the industrial development, several legislations came into existence for protecting the interest of weaker section of the society and strict liability was imposed on certain categories of persons who were incharge or connected with the management of such concerns and they were liable to incur criminal liability even though they may be ignorant of one or more of the facts which rendered their conduct criminal. If section 29 of the Act imposes on these petitioner s such a strict liability that they may incur criminal liability even though they or any one of them may be ignorant of the negligence committed in implementing the award, then question of mensrea is irrelevant. However, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that although section 29 does not speak of the commission of the breach of any terms of any settlement or award "intentionally or knowing," still those words have to be read in that section and no prosecution can be launched for contravention of any terms of the award or settlement unlese it is intentional or wilful. 5. Whenever Statute makes certain acts or omissions penal without using the expressions "knowingly, intentionally or wilfully" in respect of such acts and omissions, it is not always easy to determine that the framers of the Act really meant. But, it is now well settled that even where the statute does not use the words aforesaid still those words have to be read in context of a particular statute, unless displaced by expressed words used in that statute. But, it is now well settled that even where the statute does not use the words aforesaid still those words have to be read in context of a particular statute, unless displaced by expressed words used in that statute. In English courts one of the earliest case on the point where this question was considered was Sherras V. De Rutzen where Wright J. observed :- "There is a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or be the subject matter with which it deals, and both must be considered." In the case of Lim Chin Aik V. The Queen, it was pointed out by Lord Evershed that where the subject matter of the statute is the regulation, for the public welfare, of 8 particular activity it can be and frequently bas been inferred that the legislature intended that such activities should be carried out under conditions of strict liability. It was, however, observed :- "But it is not enough in their Lordships' opinion merely to label the statute as one dealing win a grave social evil and from that to infer that strict liability was intended. It is pertinent also to inquire whether putting the defendant under strict liability will assist in the enforcement of the regulations. That means that there must be something he can do, directly or indirectly, by supervision or inspection, by improvement of his business methods or by exhorting those whom he may be expected to influence or control, which will promote the observance of the regulations. Unless this is so, there is no reason in penalising him, and it cannot be inferred that the legislature imposed strict liability merely in order to find a luckless victim." In case of Warner V. Metropolitan police Commissioner, it was observed by Lord Reid in connection with a statute which did not rule out the principles of mens rea :- "Members of both Houses are particularly interested in the liberty of the subject, and if it were intended by those promoting a Bill to extend the old but limited class of cases in which absence of mens rea is no defence I would certainly expect parliament to be so informed. If, however, the words of the Act are not crystal clear and parliament has not been told of this intention, I would bold without hesitation that it would be wrong to impute to parliament an intention to depart from its known desire to prevant innocent persons from being convicted. " Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Srinivas Mall V. Emperor, where an accused had been convicted for having contravened the provisions of the Defence of India Rules although unintentionally. The Privy Council observed :- "They see no ground for saying that offences against those of the Defence of India Rules here in question ate within the limited and exceptional class of offences which can be held to be committed without a guilty mind (see the judgment of Wright J. in (1895) 1 Q.B. 918 at p. 921). Offences which are within that class are usually of a comparatively minor character, and it would be a surprising result of this delegated legislation if a person who was morally innocent of blame could be held vicariously liable for a servant's crime and so punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years." 6. In the case of Nathulal Vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh the Supreme Court had to consider whether for conviction under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for contravention of any of the provisions of the Order framed under section 3 of that Act, mens rea is an ingredient of the offence or not. The relevant portion of section 7 at that time was as follows :- “If any person contravenes any order made under section 3 he shall (a) be punishable” As such, there was nothing in section 7 which said in so many words that the contravention must be intentional, still it was held :- "Having regard to the object of the Act, namely, to control in general public interest, among others, trade in certain commodities, it cannot be said that the object of the Act would be defeated if meas rea is read as an ingredient of the offence. The provisions of the Act do not lead to any such exclusion. The provisions of the Act do not lead to any such exclusion. Indeed, it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to impose heavy penalties lib imprisonment for a period up to 3 years and to impose heavy fines on an innocent person who carries on business in an honest belief that he is doing the business in terms of the law. Having regard to the scope of the Act it would be legitimate to hold that a person commits an offence under S. 7 of the Act if he intentionally contravenes any order made under S. 3 of the Act. So construed the object of the Act will be best served and innocent persons will also be protected from harassment." 7. Broadly speaking, in determining whether a statutory provision does or does not impose strict liability, so as to exclude the element of mens rea, the language of the provision creating the offence; whether the act is, which in the public interest, is prohibited under a penalty; the nature of mischief at which the provision is aimed, for which strict liability has to be Imposed, are to be taken into consideration, cases which strictly fall in this category are legislations relating to sale of food, drugs supply of intoxicating liquors, safety of those employed in factories, control of weights and measures, road traffic offences. The object behind them is to safeguard the Interest of public In general and to saddle liabilities on those who commit breach thereof, even unintentionally. Otherwise, before charging an accused of the criminal liability, one has to look as to whether such contravention and breach was intentional. 8. There cannot be doubt that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, including section 29 of the Act, aim at safeguarding the interest of the persons engaged in industries and maintaining industrial peace. For achieving that object, provisions have been made under the Act that whenever any industrial dispute exists or apprehended the appropriate Government may refer that dispute for settlement or enquiry to the different courts and Tribunals constituted under the Act. Such Labour Courts or Tribunals have been Vested power to adjudicate the disputes and to make a wards. Those a wards are to be published by the appropriate Government by virtue of section 17A they become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of the publication under section 17. Such Labour Courts or Tribunals have been Vested power to adjudicate the disputes and to make a wards. Those a wards are to be published by the appropriate Government by virtue of section 17A they become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of the publication under section 17. Chapter VI contains penalties for contravention mentioned therein, the sole purpose being that no person should be allowed to contravene the provisions of the Act or the awards made by the Labour Courts and Tribunals in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 29, as it is, was introduced by Act 36 of 1956 and it provides an imprisonment for a term of six months for a person who commits a breach of any term of settlement or award. Prior to this amendment any such breach was punishable with fine only. From a bare reference to the different provisions of the Act it can be said that there is no express provision from which it can be inferred that element of mens rea has been expressly excluded. In such a situation, unless the object of the Act is likely to be defeated it bas to be held that mens rea is an ingredient of the offence. 9. Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the opposite party, however, urged that although the element of mens rea has not been expressly excluded, it has been excluded by necessary implication, otherwise the object of the Act cannot be achieved. In this connection, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Mayer Hans George, In that case, the Supreme Court had to consider the legality of a conviction under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. A plea had been taken on behalf of the accused in that case that the violation of the Act was unintentional. In the majority judgment reference was made to the different provisions of the Act and then it was held that strict liability was imposed because the Act was designed to safeguard and conserve foreign exchange which whs essential for economic life of a developing country. On behalf of the opposite party reference was also made to a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of State Vs. On behalf of the opposite party reference was also made to a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of State Vs. Culfield Holland Ltd. There section 29 of the Act, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1956 itself was under consideration and it was held that no note of mens rea has to be taken, otherwise the purpose of the Act will be defeated. However in my opinion. Done of the provisions of the Act, either directly or by necessary implication, exclude the element of mens rea while holding a person guilty of an offence under section 29 of the Act. It should not be easily inferred that the framers of the Act wanted to send a person to jail for a period of six months although on materials such person can establish that any such contravention was either not known to him or was unintentional. This view of mine gets support from the language of section 32 of the Act. which is as follows :- "Where a person committing an offence under this Act is a company or other body corporate, or an Association of persons (whether incorporated or not every director, manager, secretary, agent, or other officer or person concerned with the management thereof, shall, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or consent, be deemed to be guilty of such offence." If liability of the Directors. Managers, Secretary, or persons concerned with the management of the Company was absolute, there was no question of their proving that the offence was committed without their knowledge or consent. The fact that the offence was committed without knowledge or consent of the accused, is relevant only in cases where mens rea is an ingredient of the offence. In the aforesaid Bombay case it has been observed that if element of mens rea is read under section 29, then any person can raise at trial those very questions as defence which he had raised before the Tribunal in resisting the claim. In my opinion, on face of it such plea cannot be held to be bona fide because a Tribunal or a Court of competent jurisdiction having rejected the same that very ground cannot be taken as a defence when prosecution is launched for non implementation, of the award. In my opinion, on face of it such plea cannot be held to be bona fide because a Tribunal or a Court of competent jurisdiction having rejected the same that very ground cannot be taken as a defence when prosecution is launched for non implementation, of the award. No court should accept any plea, for non-implementation, if it appears to have been raised only as an excuse for resisting the charge. In this connection reference can be made to the Halsbury's Laws of England, where it is stated thus :- "When the existance of a particular intent or state of mind is a necessary ingredient of the offence and the prima facie proof of the existence of the intent or state of mind has been given by the prosecution, the defendant may excuse himself by disproving the existence in him of any guilty intent or state of mind, for example, by showing that he was justified in doing the act with which he is charged, or that he did it accidentally or in ignorance, or that he had an honest belief in the existence of facts which, if they had really existed, would have made the act an innocent one. The existence or reasonable grounds for a belief is evidence of the honesty of that belief." So far as the question of achieving the social and is concerned, provisions of the Essential Commodities Act and the orders framed thereunder are equally wide in application, the object being to provide essential commodities to people in general. If for contravention of orders framed under that Act, guilty intention is an essential element in my view, it is difficult to hold that for section 29 of the Act it has to be ignored altogether. 10. Now the next question which has to be considered is as to whether it has to be stated in the petition of complaint itself that the breach or contravention of the terms of the award was intentional and wilful, failing which the court concerned has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. In my view, for an offence under section 29 of the Act, at that stage the court should be satisfied in a prima facie manner that there has been a contravention or breach of any term of any settlement or award which was binding on the person concerned. In my view, for an offence under section 29 of the Act, at that stage the court should be satisfied in a prima facie manner that there has been a contravention or breach of any term of any settlement or award which was binding on the person concerned. In view of Section 17A of the Act, every award becomes enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of the publication and it is binding on the parties. As a rule a party to the award has to implement the same, no sooner it becomes enforceable; non-implementation thereof may give cause of action for launching of a prosecution. Whether such non-implementation was intentional or in a bona fide manner has to be examined at the trial on the materials produced before the court concerned. The complainant is not required to state in the petition of complaint as to how the breath was intentional. He can simply make a grievance about non-implementation in terms of section 29 of the Act. In this view of the matter, I am not Inclined to accept the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that once the words wilful or intentional have not been stated in the petition of complaint, the court concerned had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. 11. It was then submitted that there is no specific allegation against these petitioners in the petition of complaint as to how they or anyone of them were concerned with the non-implementation of the award in question, and unless there is any such specific allegation, the petitioners cannot be put on trial merely because they areh Chairman, Director, Executive President, or Vice-President of the Company in question. This argument was advanced on the basis that for an offence under section 29 of the Act mens rea is an essential ingredient. 12. On a plain reading of section 32 of the Act, quoted above, it apears that when an offence is committed by a company, every Director, Manager, Secretary, Agent or other officer or person concerned with the management thereof shall, unless he proves that the offence was committed without, his knowledge or consent, be deemed to be guilty of such an offence. Therefore, before issuance of process the court concerned should be satisfied in a prima facie manner, that the accused persons named in the petition of complaint were responsible for such commission of the breach of the terms of the award. The matter would have been different if it had been held that strict liability has been imposed by the provisions of the Act on every Director, Manager, Secretary or Agent of the Company. If there is no allegation in the petition of complaint against any of the persons named as accused, in my opinion, there is no question of the court being satisfied even in a prima fade manner of their having committed the offence under section 29 for the purpose of issuing summons. No doubt, section 32 of the Act says that where the person committing an offence is a Company every Director, Manager, Secretary, Agent or other officer or persons concerned with the management thereof shall be guilty of such an offence. The section also gives a right to every Director, Manager, Secretary or Agent or other officer or person concerned to show that the offence was committed without his knowledge or consent, but that does not mean that the complainant is absolved of the responsibility of satisfying the court in a prima facie manner that the accused named in the complaint petition are responsible for non-implementation of the award. For that purpose there must be some allegation in the petition of complaint, otherwise it has been rightly pointed out on behalf of the petitioners, that in some cases a Director, who may not be the Director of the Company during the relevant period or who may be outside India during the relevant, period, will be summoned to stand trial. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath and others V. State of Haryana and others, as follows :- "We are, therefore, satisfied that the order Impugned was one which was a matter of moment and which did involve a decision regarding the rights of the appellants. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath and others V. State of Haryana and others, as follows :- "We are, therefore, satisfied that the order Impugned was one which was a matter of moment and which did involve a decision regarding the rights of the appellants. If the appellants were not summoned, then they could not have faced the trial at all, but by compelling the appellants to face a trial without proper application of mind cannot be held to be an interlocutory matter but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial. In the case of Dr. S.P. Kohli V. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana, it was pointed out :- "It is true that what the courts have to see before issuing the process against the accused is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made by the complainant to justify the initiation of proceedings against the accused and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant his conviction, but this does not mean that the courts should not prima facie be of the opinion that there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for setting the machinery of criminal law in motion against the accused. The moment this guiding principle is overlooked, the prosecution degenerates itself into persecution which often is fraught with evil consequences." Before the court taking cognizance of the offence exercises the power of issuing processes under section 204 of the Code, it has to form an opinion on the materials on record that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused persons. In-my view, for being so satisfied, the court should look into the specific allegation of non-implementation made against the accused persons. In the instant case in the petition of complaint it has been simply stated. "The accused persons named in column 2 of this complaint petition have, therefore, violated section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act." In my opinion merely on such allegation the court concerned, could not have been satisfied that there were sufficient grounds for proceeding against the petitioners. Accordingly I quash the order issuing summons against these petitioner. 13. Similar is the position so far as the other applications are concerned. Accordingly I quash the order issuing summons against these petitioner. 13. Similar is the position so far as the other applications are concerned. In the petitions or complaint filed in those cases, as well, no specific allegations have been made against any of the petitioners as to how they or anyone of them can be charged for non-implementation of the awards in question. Accordingly, the orders issuing summons on, the basis of those petitions of complaint are also quashed. 14. In the result, all the these applications are allowed and the orders summoning these petitioners to stand trial for an offence under section 29 of the Act are quashed. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate shall apply his judicial mind to the allegations made in the petitions of complaint and if he considers it desirable he may hold an inquiry under section 202 of the Code for being satisfied as to against which of the accused persons, there are sufficient grounds for proceeding. I agree. Application allowed.