JUDGMENT - Pratap S.C., J.: - Order dated 18th September 1979 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Gondia below defendants application (Ex. 15) in Civil Suit No. 308 of 1979 is challenged in the present revision. 2. Original suit by the plaintiff was one for dissolution of partnership and accounts. Plaintiff is the son of defendant No. 1 and the brother of defendant No.2. In the said suit, the petitioners herein (original defendants) filed the above application (Ex 15) under section 8 of the Bombay Court Fees Act read with Order 7, Rules 10 and II, and sections 151 and 9-A, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Submission of the defendants in the said application was that the plaintiff had not valued the claim for court-fees and jurisdiction correctly, that on the averments in the plaint itself, the valuation would be more than Rs. 25,000 and, hence, the instant trial Court would have no jurisdiction to hear and try the said suit. The valuation of Rs. 1000 as put by the plaintiff was undervaluation. This application was opposed by the plaintiff. The learned trial Judge by his impugned order dated 18th September 1979 rejected the said application. Hence, this revision therefrom. 3. The petitioners are represented by their learned Advocate, Mr. A. D. Vyawahare The opponent is represented by his learned Advocate, Mr. V. G. Bhangde. 4. After hearing the rival submissions of the respective Advocates and going through the impugned order, I am of the view that the order is not sustainable. The approach of the learned trial Judge is wrong in law. He has also acted with material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction. When an application as of the instant nature is made for an enquiry relating to valuation for the purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction and if materials on record prima facie do go to indicate that the valuation set up by the plaintiff appears to be on the face of it gross undervaluation, a case for an appropriate enquiry is made out. To even so reject the application and refuse an inquiry would be almost equivalent to denial of justice and in a given case may even result in assumption of jurisdiction not otherwise vested in the trial Court. 5. The present case is one where ex facie a case for enquiry under section 8 is established. To even so reject the application and refuse an inquiry would be almost equivalent to denial of justice and in a given case may even result in assumption of jurisdiction not otherwise vested in the trial Court. 5. The present case is one where ex facie a case for enquiry under section 8 is established. The plaintiff himself was the managing partner of the suit partnership firm. He continued to be in the management as late as till 20th July 1979. As indicated, he is the son of the defendant No.1 and brother of defendant No.2. The instant suit was filed by him on 4th September 1979, i. e., within 2 few weeks of his expulsion. In paragraph 10 of this plaint plaintiff avers that on 20th July 1979, there was a cash rokad of about Rs. 22,000 with defendant No.1 and that there must be stock to the tune of about Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 60,000 in the shop premises of the firm, in addition to goods worth about Rs. 70,000 to Rs. 80,000 in the three godowns of Goshala ward and in addition thereto further goods of about Rs. 20,000 in the fourth godown pledged with the Bank. These circumstances indicate plaintiffs knowledge of the working and management of the firm and at least its extensive assets. Undisputed position is that the plaintiff has 1/4th share, defendant No, I has half share and defendant No 2 has the remaining I 14th share. In spite of all these glaring circumstances within his own knowledge, the plaintiff has in paragraph 16 of the plaint thought fit to value the suit for dissolution and accounts tentatively at only just Rs 1000. 6. The learned trial Judge took the view that since plaintiff was not in possession of the account-books and since the plaintiff has been expelled from the partnership business, it would not be possible for the plaintiff to arrive at even an approximate amount which can be estimated for the purposes of his claim in the suit. It is extremely difficult to appreciate this reasoning and approach. For, this is not a case where plaintiff can be said to be totally ignorant of the partnership business in question nor is this a case where plaintiff was, for some years together, out of the said business. It is extremely difficult to appreciate this reasoning and approach. For, this is not a case where plaintiff can be said to be totally ignorant of the partnership business in question nor is this a case where plaintiff was, for some years together, out of the said business. This is also not a case where plaintiff can be said to have no knowledge at ail regarding the assets and liabilities of the partnership of which be himself was in active management till just a few weeks prior to the suit. Merely because at the time of institution of the suit plaintiff was not in physical possession of the account-books, inference, in facts and circumstances of this case, cannot arise that the plaintiff is, totally ignorant of the financial position. The reflected situation supra is indeed per contra. Indeed, it was the plaintiff who was in effective control and management of the partnership firm and its business. 7. I have no doubt in my mind that the plaintiff was aware, at least to a great extent, of the assets and liabilities of the partnership firm qua which he has filed the present suit and yet he has, for reasons of his own, chosen to deliberately undervalue his claim. This, as indicated, is pre-eminently a fit case for an appropriate enquiry as contemplated by section 8 of the Bombay Court Fees Act. It would of course be open to the plaintiff to ask for inspection of account books and I have no reason to doubt that the defendants will not give it. It would also be open to both the parties to lead such evidence in the intended enquiry as they may desire. The trial Court will upon an appropriate enquiry as contemplated by section 8 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, come to its own decision on the question of valuation for tile purposes of court fees and jurisdiction, and consistent with its said decision, will then pass an appropriate order in that behalf. This enquiry shall be expeditiously disposed of and concluded. 8. At this stage, Mr. Vyawahare submitted that before the learned trial Judge certain interim applications had been heard and decided, one of them being an application for attachment before judgment and other being an application for appointment of receiver. This enquiry shall be expeditiously disposed of and concluded. 8. At this stage, Mr. Vyawahare submitted that before the learned trial Judge certain interim applications had been heard and decided, one of them being an application for attachment before judgment and other being an application for appointment of receiver. He submitted that further proceedings relating to both these applications should be stayed pending the holding of the enquiry as directed aforesaid. Mr. Bhangde, the learned Advocate for the opponent, opposes this submission. Considering these rival submissions, I am of the view that so far as attachment proceedings are concerned, it would be for the learned trial Judge himself to consider whether further proceedings in that behalf should be stayed or should be permitted to go on. The trial Court in that behalf would be the best judge of the situation. However, so far as receiver is concerned, I direct that if receiver who, I am told, is already appointed, has not taken charge prior to the date of this order, he should stay his bands till the disposal of the valuation enquiry directed aforesaid and will thereafter proceed further in the matter only after prior reference to the trial Court which will then pass appropriate directions in the matter in the light of its decision on the question of valuation. 9. In the result, this revision application is allowed. The impugned order dated 18th September 1979 is set aside and the matter is sent back to the trial Court for hearing and disposal of the defendants application (Ex. 15) on its own merits and in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment. 10. Rule earlier issued on this petition is made absolute. Costs of this petition will be costs in the suit. Rule made absolute. -----