Judgment Medini Prasad Singh, J. 1. The revision application, Ishwar Lal Modi, was sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment in addition to a fine of rs 1500/- (fifteen hundred) in default to undergo further three months rigorous imprisonment under section 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration act, 1954 (briefly the Act) for having adulterated Haldi. It appears that on 3rd october (sic) Om Prakash Gupta (P. W. I), the Food Inspector of Jhanja Block, purchased 600 grams of Haldi as a sample from the grocery shop of the applicant in village Dhamana within Police Station Jhanja in the district of monghyr. He divided the sample into three equal parts. He sent one part to the Public Analyst for chemical examination, gave another part to the accused and kept the third with himself. On analysis it was found that the sample of haldi was adulterated due to its containing lead chromate and excess of lead. The report of the Public Analyst is Ext.4, dated 13th November, 1975. After that, sanction was obtained on 27th December, 1975 from the Administrator-cum-Development Authority of Monghyr and thereafter the prosecution was instituted by the Food Inspector as having been authorised by the Administrator. Cognizance under section 16 (1) (a) of the Act was taken by the S. D. J. M. , jamui on 27th March, 1976. Thereafter the petitioner was placed upon trial and was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. The applicant denied guilt. 2. The point raised on behalf of the petitioner is that sanction was invalid because it was not granted by a competent authority and hence the prosecution launched in contravention of section 20 of the Act and as such the trial was illegal and without jurisdiction and, therefore, the conviction and sentence should be set aside. In my opinion the contention is sound. Prior to the amendment in 1976 the relevant portion of section 20 of the Act was as below : "section 20. Cognizance and trial of offences.- (1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order by the Central Government or the State government or a local authority. Cognizance and trial of offences.- (1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order by the Central Government or the State government or a local authority. " The words "a local authority" occurring in section 20 (1) of the Act were omitted by the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act 1976 (No.34 of 1976) The effect of the amendment, therefore, is that the local authority shall no longer have power to institute complaint nor shall have any authority to authorise any person to institute complaints and the power now has been vested only in the Central Government or the State government or a person authorised by any of them. The amendment Act, 1976, came into force on 1.4.1976. In the present case the sanction to institute the case was given by the Administrator of the District Board. The question it whether the Administrator of the District Board had authority to give consent to the institution of the prosecution. On 6th June, 1956 all District Boards were declared as local authority within the meaning of section 2 (viii) of the Act by the State Government by a notification no. V/e2-04/56-165 dated the 6th June, 1956 in the official Gazette. By another notification No. S. O.128, dated 24th January, 1973 published in an issue of the Bihar Gazette on 27th january, 1973 all Chairman and Administrators of all District Boards were declared by the Governor of Bihar to be "local authorities". But in Suleman mian V/s. The State, 1975 BBCJ 352 , it was held by a Division Bench of this court that neither the District Boards nor the administrators could be held to be "local authorities" within the meaning of the Act because they were not declared as such by any rules prescribed under the Act as required by law. By another notification no. S. C.1451, dated 24.11.1975 the State Government amended the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1958 in exercise of the powers conferred by section 24 of the Act and added rule 2-A after rule 2. The newly inserted rule 2-A runs as under : 2-A (i) "local authority" means in case of - (a) A District Board. . S. C.1451, dated 24.11.1975 the State Government amended the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1958 in exercise of the powers conferred by section 24 of the Act and added rule 2-A after rule 2. The newly inserted rule 2-A runs as under : 2-A (i) "local authority" means in case of - (a) A District Board. . .- The District Board (h) Patna Municipal. . . . . . The Administrator, Patna corporation Municipal Corporation. (i) All actions taken, orders passed, proceedings commenced in pursuance ot the Bihar presentation of Food Adulteration Act and the rules frained thereunder by the local authorities specified above shall he deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of powers conferred by or under these rules as if these rules were in force on the day on which such things or action was done or taken or passed or commenced. " Rule 2-A (ii) gives retrospective operation to rule 2 A. In Virendra Prasad singh V/s. The State of Bihar, 1976 BBCJ 659 it was held that rules cannotbe made retrospective and that sub-rule (ii) of rule 2-A of the Rules as amended on ,4th November, 1975 was beyond the competence ot the State Government and as such that part of the rule 2-A was struck down as invalid It was further observed that rule 2-A was struck down as invalid It was further observed that rule 2-A (i) by itself, if otherwise valid, must be held to have prospective effect only. So far as rule 2-A (i) is concerned, it is to be noticed that under clause 16 a) "local authority in the case of a District Board"means the District Board It does not say that the Administrator also will be local authority. Simply because the District Board worked through the Administrator in 1975 as observed by the lower appellat court- I am not inclined to hold that the Administrator was local authority". In Pursottam Dass v The state, air 1935 (N. OC) 455. Simply because the District Board worked through the Administrator in 1975 as observed by the lower appellat court- I am not inclined to hold that the Administrator was local authority". In Pursottam Dass v The state, air 1935 (N. OC) 455. it was held that the Special Officer appointed under section 386 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 in a case where the commissioners of a municipality were superseded was not a local authority within the meaning of section 21 (h) of the Bihar Prevention of Food adulteration Act, 1958 In my opinion similar view should be taken in the case of Administrator of the District Board also I. therefore hold that the administrator was not a local authority and he had no authority to accord sanction to prosecute. Moreover it is to be noticed that the offence in the present case was committed on 3rd October, 1975, The report of the Public analyst is dated 13th November, 1975. Rule 2-A was inserted in the 1958 rules on 24.11 1975. The rule being prospective cannot apply to the offence committed earlier. It can operate only in cases or on facts which came into existence after the rule was framed. The law existing at the date of an offence will apply and not the amended law. It is only in relation to an offence that one speaks of enforcing the. law. The filing of a complaint is merely a mode for bringing the offender before the court. Consequently rule 2- A though in existence on the date of giving sanction (27-12 75) and on the date of the filing ot the complaint, will not apply to the offence in question which was committed on 3rd October, 1975, Clearly, therefore, the sanction was accorded by an authority not competent to accord it. Hence the sanction must be held to be invalid In the view I take, it is not. necessary to go into other points raised bythe petitioner 3 For the foregoing reasons the revision application is allowed The conviction and sentence of the petitioner are set aside.