JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal filed by Mureed against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra, dated 31st May, 1975 by which the appellant was convicted under section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine to further suffer rigorous imprisonment for five months. 2. The prosecution case against the appellant was as follows, Mst. Singar is the step daughter of appellant Mureed. She was about 25 years of age. A few months before the incident Mureed took Rs. 2200/- from Sanang who was an old man and married Singar to Sarang. Mureed then tried to pressurise Singar to leave Singar refused and went to her husband at Binjsar. Mureed appellant threatened to kill Sarang, 7 or 8 days before the Diwali of 1973 Mst. Singar, her husband Sarang and Beejla were in their field. Singar and Beejla were cutting the crop and Sarang was sitting in the field. At about mid-day Mureed came there and gave 'Dhariya' below to the head of Sarang, Mureed further gave some more 'Dhariya' blows to Sarang. Singar and Beejla tried to intervene but they were threatened by appellant Mureed. Sarang succumbed to his escape from the scene of incident. The handle of 'Dhariya' was broken. A piece of the handle was left at the scene of incident and 'Dhariya' was taken away by Mureed. Beejla then went to the house Aeedan and informed him of the incident in the presence of Taru son of Sarang. Beejla then requested Aeedan to make a report in the police. Immediately Aeedan proceeded to police station Chotan on a camel and made an oral report Ex. P. 1 at 9-30 p. m. Beejla at the same time also informed of the incident to PW 5 Gaji. Police registered the case. Head Constable PW 15 Lal Singh of police station Chotan reached the scene of incident on the next day and inspected the site and prepared the site plan Ex. P. 15. He also saw the dead body of Sarang and prepared 'Furd Surat Hall Lash' Ex. P. 3. He seized and sealed blood stained clothes of deceased Sarang vide Ex. P. 4, He seized and sealed a piece of the broken handle of 'Dhariya' also from the place of incident. P. 15. He also saw the dead body of Sarang and prepared 'Furd Surat Hall Lash' Ex. P. 3. He seized and sealed blood stained clothes of deceased Sarang vide Ex. P. 4, He seized and sealed a piece of the broken handle of 'Dhariya' also from the place of incident. The Post-mortem examination of the dead body of Sarang was conducted by Dr. Mahendermal Bhandari who found the following antemortem injuries on the dead body:- 1. Incised wound 4" x 1" x 1/2" on occipital region. 2. Incised wound 8" x 1" x 1/2" on occipital and left parietal region extending upto left ear. 3. Incised wound 3" x 1" x 1/2" on left temporal region. 4. Incised wound 4" x 1" x 1/2" at the junction of occipital and left temporal bone. 5. Incised wound 1" x 1/4" x 1/4" on the right frontal region. 6. Lacerated wound 1" x 1/4" x 1/4" on the right thumb. 7. Lacerated wound 2"x 1/2" x 1/2" on right fore-arm 4" above wrist joint. 8. Incised wound 3" x 1" on the left side of lower back near vertebral column. 9. Lacerated wound 2" x 1" x 1" on the left deltoid region exposing bone. Fractures : 1. Fracture of frontal bont. 2. Fracture of left temporal bone. 3. Fracture of left parietal bone. 4. Fracture of occipital bone. 5. Fracture of left humerus at its upper ⅓rd. In the opinion of the doctor, the injuries could be caused by a 'Dhariya' and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. After completing the investigation, a charge sheet was submitted in the court of Munsif Magistrate, Barmer. Shri M. C. Purohit, Munsif Magistrate, Barmer conducted the committed enquiry and examined Mst. Singar and took down her statement Ex. P. 13. The statement was recorded in the presence of appellant Mureed who also cross examined Mst. Singar. The learned Magistrate, upon finding a primafacie case exclusively triable by the court of Sessions, committed the appellant to the court of Session Balotra. It further appears that before Singar and Beejla could be examined, during the trial, they left for Pakistan. The learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion that Mst. Singar had gone to Pakistan in May, 1974 and did not return from there. Pakistan is a foreign country and it was not possible for the prosecution to produce Mst. It further appears that before Singar and Beejla could be examined, during the trial, they left for Pakistan. The learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion that Mst. Singar had gone to Pakistan in May, 1974 and did not return from there. Pakistan is a foreign country and it was not possible for the prosecution to produce Mst. Singar for her statement in the court. The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, held that the statement of Mst. Singar recorded by the Commuting Magistrate during commital enquiry was admissible under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act and so he brought it on the record of the trail. This statement Ex. P. 13. The learned Sessions Judge believed the testimony of Mst. Singar and convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner stated above. The appellant, therefore, has preferred this appeal. 3. We have carefully perused the entire record and heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the Public Prosecutor for the State.It has been contended before us for the appellant that the prosecution could not prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt because the sole testimony of Mst. Singar was insufficient to bring home the guilt in the absence of any corroborative evidence whatsoever. More so, because Mst. Singar was not examined during the trial. On the other hand it was argued by the learned Public Prosecutor that even the sole testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict the accused if the witness is found to be of sterling worth. Mst. Singar had no reason to falsely implicate her step father and her presence at the scene of incident was most probable. The testimony of Mst. Singar is further corroborated by some facts. 4. We have considered the rival contentions. At the outset it may be stated that it was not disputed that Sarang met a homicidal death. This is otherwise well proved by the testimony of the doctor. It may further be stated that it has been well proved that before Mst. Singar could be examined during the trial she left for Pakistan. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the conduct of the S. H. O. was unnatural inasmuch as he did not challan Mst. Singar and Beejla for leaving the country without a passport. However, this is besides the point. Singar could be examined during the trial she left for Pakistan. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the conduct of the S. H. O. was unnatural inasmuch as he did not challan Mst. Singar and Beejla for leaving the country without a passport. However, this is besides the point. There is sufficient evidence available on the record of the case to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Mst. Singar has left for Pakistan before she could be examined during the trial. An application was moved by the learned Public Prosecutor in the Sessions Court that Mst. Singar has left for Pakistan and therefore, her statement recorded in the committing court may be admitted under section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. In support of the application P. W. 9 Deju was examined. He stated that Singar had gone to Pakistan with Beejla in May 1974 and had not returned since then. Deju also made a report Ex. P. 11 to this effect. P. W. 11 Khartaram took the summons Ex. P 6 for service upon Singar but he could not find her and on enquiry learnt that she had gone to Pakistan. He got an endorsement made to this effect on the back of the summons Ex. P 6. Moreover, P. W. 1 Aeedan, P. W. 2 Taru and P. W. 5 Gaji have also deposed to this effect. We have gone through the testimony of these witnesses and could find no reason to disbelieve the same. Thus in our opinion the learned Sessions Judge was rightly of the opinion that the statement of Mst. Singar recorded in the committing court was admissible in evidence under section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may further be stated that the appellant had the right and opportunity to cross examine Mst. Singar in the committing court. In fact he cross examined her. It is not very material that the appellant was not represented by a counsel and therefore, Mst. Singar could not be effectively cross-examined. It may further be stated that the appellant had the right and opportunity to cross examine Mst. Singar in the committing court. In fact he cross examined her. It is not very material that the appellant was not represented by a counsel and therefore, Mst. Singar could not be effectively cross-examined. Reference in this connection may be made to Chainchal Singh v. Emperor (1946 P. C. page 1) wherein it was thus held : "The material provisions of S. 33 are in these words : Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding is relevant for the purpose of proving in a subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is incapable of giving evidence or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case the Court considers unreasonable." Where it is desired to have recourse to this section on the ground that a witness is incapable of giving evidence that fact must be proved, and proved strictly. It is an elementary right of an accused person or a litigant in a civil suit that a witness who is to testify against him should give his evidence before the Court trying the case which then has the opportunity of seeing the witness and observing his demeanour and can thus a far better opinion as to his reliability than is possible from reading a statement or deposition. It is necessary that provision should be made for exceptional cases where it is impossible for the witness to be before the Court and it is only by a statutory provision that this can be achieved. But the Court must be careful to see that the conditions on which the statute permits previous evidence given by the witness to be read are strictly proved." In the present case it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that Mst. Singar has left for Pakistan before she could be examined and it was impossible for the prosecution to procure her attendance and, therefore, the statement of Mst. Singar in the committing court was admissible in evidence under section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may be stated that the statement Ex. Singar has left for Pakistan before she could be examined and it was impossible for the prosecution to procure her attendance and, therefore, the statement of Mst. Singar in the committing court was admissible in evidence under section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may be stated that the statement Ex. P. 13 of Singar recorded in the committing court is proved by P. W. 14 Shri M. C. Purohit Munsif Magistrate, Barmer. 6. In her statement Ex. P. 13 Mst. Singar has deposed that after the death of her natural father, appellant Mureed brought her and her mother to village Miyan ka-talan. She was then a child of 7 or 8 years. Mureed took Rs. 2200/- from Sarang and performed her marriage with him. Three or four months after the marriage Mureed took her from Sinjasar to Miyan-ka-talan. Mureed pressurised her to leave Sarang and live with him. However, on the next day Singar returned to the house of her husbund at Binjasar. 7 or 8 days before Diwali. she and her husband's brother Beejla were cutting 'Bajra' crop in the field and Srang was sitting. At about midday Mureed came there and attacked Sarang with a 'Dhariya'. He gave a 'Dhariya' blow on his head and then further inflicted 15 or 16 injuries on his body. We have considered the statement of this witness carefully and find no reason whatsoever to disbelieve her. She had no motive to falsely implicate her step father and moreover her presence at the scene of occurrence was most natural and probable. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant the none of the witnesses, who reached the scene of occurrence after being informed of the incident, has deposed about her presence at the scene of incident. Mere omission on the part of the witnesses to state that when they arrived at the scene of occurrence they found Mst. Singar there is not sufficient to discredit Singar's testimony, especially when her presence was mentioned in the F. I. R. which was lodged the very day soon after the incident. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Singar eye witness was brought forward later on as having witnessed the occurrence is untenable. 7. The next pertinent question that arises for consideration is whether corroboration of the testimony of this solitary eye witness is necessary. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Singar eye witness was brought forward later on as having witnessed the occurrence is untenable. 7. The next pertinent question that arises for consideration is whether corroboration of the testimony of this solitary eye witness is necessary. We may observe at the outset that there is no hard and fast rule in this regard and the question whether corroboration should be looked for depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Where the conscious of the court is satisfied that a solitary witness is speaking the truth it may act on as or her testimony though uncorroborated. Upon careful review of the evidence of Mst. Singar we are firmly of the opinion that she is a truthful witness and her evidence does not suffer from any infirmity and it can be safely acted upon without corroboration to hold the appellant guilty of murder. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 S.C. page 614) : "The contention that in a murder case the Court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. The Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognised in S. 134, which by laying down that "no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact" has enshrined the well recognised maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted". It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence, where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the legislature were to insist upon plurality of witness case where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the Court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an' accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution." 8. Apart from the testimony of solitary eye witness Mst. Singar connecting the appellant with the crime, there is another incriminating circumstance that the appellant absconded for about 40 days after the commission of the alleged crime and gave no plausible explanation for his absence. It is no doubt true that per absconding is not enough to prove the guilt of the person who has absconded. But it comes in as an important place of corroborative evidence, if there is other evidence to prove the connection of the accused with the crime. In the instant case there is evidence of Aeedan P.W. 1 and Shumar P. W. 4 that the appellant ran away to Pakistan after the commission of the crime and came back from there after 40 days. P.W. 10 Daulat Singh also deposed that he was deputed to arrest the appellant and was given warrant of his arrest but he could not execute the warrant as murdered was not available in his Village. The appellant could not afford any plausible explanation for his disappearance soon after the commission of the alleged crime. 9. The prosecution has succeeded in proving motive on the part of the appellant to commit the murder of Sarang. There is evidence of PW 2 Taru, PW 3 Amba, PW 4 Shumar, PW 5 Gaji and Mst. Singar on the record that Mureed wanted to take away Singar from the house of Sarang but Singar was not prepared to leave her husband. Mst. Singar in her statement Ex. P. 13 stated that Mureed asked her to leave Sarang but she refused. Singar on the record that Mureed wanted to take away Singar from the house of Sarang but Singar was not prepared to leave her husband. Mst. Singar in her statement Ex. P. 13 stated that Mureed asked her to leave Sarang but she refused. Mureed gave her a threat that he would kill Sarang. PW 2 Taru stated that appellant Mureed wanted to to take away Singar from the house of Sarang and to marry her elsewhere. PW 3 Amba stated that Mureed used to say that he would abduct Singar and also threatened Sarang that he would murder the latter. PW 5 Gaji testified that Mureed wanted to take away Singar and again marry her with somebody else for money. We have considered the evidence of these witnesses and find no reason to disbelieve the same. These witnesses have stood the test of cross examination which could not shake their credibility. Thus it is well proved that Mureed wanted to take away Singar and marry her elsewhere for money. Thus the motive to commit the murder of Sarang is proved by cogent and convincing evidence. 10. It was argued by the learned counsel .for the appellant that adverse presumption should be drawn against the prosecution inasmuch as it failed to produce Beejla. No summon was taken out for compelling his presence in the trial. The argument has no substance as PW 1 Aeedan, PW 2 Taru, and other witnesses have stated that Singar with Beejla had gone to Pakistan. We have already believed the evidence of witnesses that Singar with Beejla went to Pakistan before the trial commenced in the court of Sessions. 11. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the medical testimony is in conflict with the statement of Mst. Singar, who stated that Mureed gave 15 or 16 blows to Sarang. From the medical evidence it is apparent that Sarang received only 9 to 13 injuries. The argument is untenable. When a victim is given blows in quick secession, it is hardly possible for a witness to precisely count the number of blows. We, therefore, find no conflict between the medical evidence and the testimony of Mst. Singar. 12. From the medical evidence it is apparent that Sarang received only 9 to 13 injuries. The argument is untenable. When a victim is given blows in quick secession, it is hardly possible for a witness to precisely count the number of blows. We, therefore, find no conflict between the medical evidence and the testimony of Mst. Singar. 12. The appellant has taken a plea of alibi which has been rightly disbelieved by the learned Sessions Judge and was not verified by the learned counsel for the appellant in the course of argument before us. In any case we have gone through the evidence produced by the appellant in support of his plea alibi and are unable to accept the same for the very reasons which were relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge in disbelieving it. We fully concur with the reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge and the same need not be reproduced here. The solitary statement of Mureed as DW 1 is utterly insufficient to establish that a few days before the murder of Sarang he had left for Buhal and returned 40 to 45 days after the murder.In the result we find no force in this appeal and dismiss the same.Appeal dismissed. *******