S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revision applications arise out of two suits filed by the plaintiffs against the same defendant. The plaintiffs filed Suit No. 5154 of 1969 against the defendant to recover possession of the suit premises on the ground that the defendant had been in arrears of rent and also on the ground that plaintiff No4 required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for starting a hospital. They also pleaded that the defendant had been causing nuisance and annoyance to his neighbouring occupiers. The premises in this suit consist of groundfloor of a building situate in the Ellisbridge area of the city of Ahmedabad. The ground floor is used by the defendant for carrying on business of selling books. The plaintiffs filed Suit No. 5155 of 1969 against the same defendant on the same grounds for recovering possession of a cellar in the same building. ( 2 ) THE defendant denied the plaintiffs claim. The learned trial Judge who tried the suit negatived the plaintiffs claim based on arrears of rent and also on nuisance and annoyance. So far as reasonable and bona fide requirement of plaintiff No. 4 was concerned the learned trial Judge did not believe it. He however held that if decree for eviction was passed against the defendant greater hardship would be caused to him. He therefore dismissed both the suits. ( 3 ) THE plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes against these two decrees. Before the Appellate Bench the plaintiffs claim based on arrears of rent and nuisance and annoyance was not pressed. In other words the findings recorded against the plaintiffs on those two aspects were not challenged before the Appellate Bench. Therefore the only ground which the plaintiffs pressed was the reasonable and bona fide requirement of plaintiff No. 4 for starting a hospital. The Appellate Bench confirmed the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge both on reasonable and bona fide requirement of plaintiff No. 4 and also on the question of greater hardship. In that view of the matter both the appeals were dismissed. ( 4 ) THESE two appellate decrees are challenged by the plaintiffs in these two civil revision applications. ( 5 ) MR. Patel who appears on behalf of the plaintiffs has challenged the appellate findings recorded by the Appellate Bench against the plaintiffs. In that view of the matter both the appeals were dismissed. ( 4 ) THESE two appellate decrees are challenged by the plaintiffs in these two civil revision applications. ( 5 ) MR. Patel who appears on behalf of the plaintiffs has challenged the appellate findings recorded by the Appellate Bench against the plaintiffs. In order to appreciate the contention which Mr. Patel has raised it is necessary to note a few facts about which there is no dispute. The suit premises originally belonged to one Ishwarbhai Naranbhai Patel. He died before the present suit was filed. Plaintiff No. 1 who is his widow is the sole heir under the will Ex. 81 executed by Ishwarbhai. Plaintiff No. 2 is the daughter of Ishwarbhai and plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 4 are the sons of Ishwarbhais daughter plaintiff No. 2. Plaintiff No. 4 is a qualified surgeon. He holds the degree of Master of Surgery. ( 6 ) THE first contention which Mr. Patel has raised is that the finding recorded by the Appellate Bench that the requirement of plaintiff No. 4 is not reasonable and bona fide is not a correct finding. Ordinarily such a finding is a finding of fact. In the instant case about facts there is no dispute. The only question which arises is one of drawing inferences from those facts in order to find out whether the requirement of plaintiff No 4 is reasonable and bona fide. I have already stated hereinabove that plaintiff No. 4 is a qualified surgeon and his wife is a qualified pathologist. If he wants to start a surgical hospital in the suit premises for which he has got means (that is what the evidence shows) it cannot be said that it is merely his `desire and not `need. I am unable to understand how it can be said that if a qualified surgeon wants to establish a surgical hospital it is merely his `desire and not `need. Evidence shows that in the vicinity of the suit premises Vadilal Sarabhai General Hospital is situate and there is also the Surgical Home of Dr. Motibhai Patel which is now run by Dr. Devendra Patel. Evidence shows that in the vicinity of the suit premises Vadilal Sarabhai General Hospital is situate and there is also the Surgical Home of Dr. Motibhai Patel which is now run by Dr. Devendra Patel. Merely because a General Hospital and another surgical hospital are situate near the suit premises it cannot be said that 4th plaintiffs requirement to open another surgical hospital in the suit premises is a mere `desire or a `wish on his part and does not represent his `need. It is open to a person depending upon his subjective assessment of his own skill and intelligence to start his business anywhere. It is not for the defendant to say nor is it open to a Court of law to decide that he will not succeed in his business in a particular area if he establishes his private hospital there. Such a question cannot be left to be decided on what the defendant says. Success in future is a matter of great uncertainty. No one can predict it with precision. Therefore neither the prediction of plaintiff No. 4 nor the prediction of the defendant can be relied upon in such a case. Whether a person will succeed in his business if it is established at a particular place must be left only to his own judgment. Since he thinks that he will succeed in his business in a particular area (which proposition in my opinion is not open to challenge) a Court of law is required to decide only two questions in a case of this type:- (i) whether he is qualified to undertake the professional career and (ii) whether he has got means to do what he proposes to do. In the instant case there is no dispute about the fact that he is fully qualified as a surgeon and that he has got means to start his surgical hospital. On this aspect therefore the question must be answered in favour of the plaintiffs. ( 7 ) MR. Trivedi who appears on behalf of the defendant has further argued that plaintiff No. 4 had been serving in the hospital at Borsad as a surgeon and that he resigned that post subsequently and started his own surgical hospital at Borsad. He has also brought to my notice that his wife who is a qualified pathologist has started her pathological laboratory at Borsad. He has also brought to my notice that his wife who is a qualified pathologist has started her pathological laboratory at Borsad. Merely because plaintiff No. 4 and his wife have started their professional activities at Borsad it cannot be said that they do not `need the suit premises for his professional activities in Ahmedabad if he wants to shift to this city. Whether Borsad will yield lucrative practice to plaintiff No. 4 and his wife or whether Ahmedabad will do so is a matter which again should be left to the subjective determination of plaintiff No. 4. A Court of law cannot deny an opportunity to a qualified person to start his profession at a place where he wants to start. Merely because he has started it somewhere else whether a qualified person justifiably wants to shift from one place to another or otherwise is not a matter to be decided by a Court of law in a case under the Rent Act. It is a matter which must be left to the subjective determination of the person concerned. ( 8 ) IT is clear from the facts on record that plaintiff No. 4 wants to start a surgical hospital in the suit premises. Since he is a qualified surgeon and since he has got means to establish a surgical hospital in the city of Ahmedabad his need is beyond all doubts established. It is not a mere wish or a desire as the Courts below have held. In my opinion therefore plaintiff No. 4 requires the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for starting a surgical hospital in Ahmedabad. The finding recorded by the Courts below to the contrary is therefore set aside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 9 ) MR. Patel has argued that while considering the question of greater hardship the Court should not consider what amount a tenant would be required to pay if he purchases alternative premises or if he pays pugree or premium and takes them on rent. According to him they are irrelevant factors. I am not able to uphold this contention. In my opinion they are very relevant factors. What denies to a tenant the availability of alternative accommodation is a material factor to be considered by the Court. According to him they are irrelevant factors. I am not able to uphold this contention. In my opinion they are very relevant factors. What denies to a tenant the availability of alternative accommodation is a material factor to be considered by the Court. If it is a question of economic resources then the Court is also required to consider whether the tenant has sufficient economic resources to purchase alternative business premises or to pay pugree for taking them on rent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 10 ) MR. Patel has further argued that the defendant has got his own bungalow from where he can carry on his business. According to him the defendant can do it because the defendant generally supplies books to institutions like Public Libraries Universities Colleges and sells his books in retail only to the extent of about 25%. In my opinion while considering the question of comparative hardship residential premises of the defendant cannot be taken into account in order to decide whether he can shift his business there. Firstly residential premises cannot be converted into non-residential premises. That is what sec. 25 of the Bombay Rent Act provides. Secondly business must be run in a business locality and not in a residential area. It is not in dispute that the defendants house is in a residential locality. In this view of the matter I am unable to come to the conclusion that the finding as to greater hardship recorded by the Courts below is perverse. I therefore see no reason to interfere with it. It is therefore confirmed. ( 11 ) THE last question which has been raised is that plaintiff No. 4 is Pot a member of the family of plaintiff No. 1 to whom the suit premises indisputably belong and that therefore his requirement cannot be taken into account. It has been argued by Mr. Patel that reversionary interest has been bequeathed upon plaintiff No. 4 under the will of Ishwarbhai and that therefore he is one of the owners of the suit premises. I am unable to accept this contention because under the will of Ishwarbhai life estate in the building in question vests in plaintiff No. 1 It is only upon her death that the property will go to plaintiffs Nos. I am unable to accept this contention because under the will of Ishwarbhai life estate in the building in question vests in plaintiff No. 1 It is only upon her death that the property will go to plaintiffs Nos. 2 3 and 4. Therefore until the death of plaintiff No. 1 it cannot be held that plaintiffs Nos. 2 3 and 4 have become the present owners of the building in question. ( 12 ) IT has been argued by Mr. Trivedi who appears on behalf of the defendant that plaintiff No. 4 is not the `dependant of plaintiff No. I and that therefore his `need cannot be the `need of plaintiff No. 1 who indisputably is the owner of the properly in question. I have already stated that plaintiff No. 2 is the married daughter of plaintiff No. 1 and the late Ishwarbhai and that plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 4 are the sons of plaintiff No. 2. A married daughter ordinarily cannot be regarded as a member of her parental family. With the marriage of a daughter the bonds of her membership of her parental family are snapped and new bonds of membership of her matrimonial family are created and established. Mr. Patel who appears on behalf of the plaintiffs has cited before me the decision of Mr. Justice T. U. Mehta in SHAH and MAKATI BROS. (THROUGH ITS MANAGER HIRALAL MAGANLAL SINCE DEED BY HIS HEIRS and LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES SURESH HIRALAL MAKATI and ORS.) V. SADURAO HUSEINRAO 14 G. L. R. 936. While considering the expression for occupation by himself used in Clause (g) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 the learned Judge has held that Occupation by a landlord includes the occupation of all those with whom the landlord usually resides including those who are treated by him as his family members and those whose presence in his household is found necessary. He has further observed that while considering who are the members of a landlords family in order to decide the said landlords requirement under clause (g) the Court should take into account not only the landlords wife and children but also his parents his other relatives and servants who usually reside with him and whom he is treating as members of his own family. Proceeding further the learned Judge has observed that occupation of particular premises to accommodate all those with whom the landlord usually shares a common residence and kitchen and whom he treats as members of his family of household must be considered as the landlords own occupation because of the identity of his interest with those persons. The real criterion according to him is whether looking to the social economic and physical needs of a landlord the residence of a particular person as a member of his household is justified or not. The first test which the learned Judge has evolved in order to determine who is a member of the family of the landlord is the test of identity of interest between the person claiming to be a member of the family of the landlord and the landlord. The second test which he has evolved is how the landlord treats a particular person; whether he treats him as a member of his family or not. I am unable to agree to this two-fold test which the learned Judge has evolved because in my opinion it is much wider than what it should be. To leave to the subjective determination of a landlord whether a particular person for whose need possession of the premises let out to a tenant is claimed is treated by him as a member of his family or not is to open flood gates of mischief against the tenants. If such a test is applied landlords would go on stating to the Court in suits for possession against their tenants that particular persons for whose occupation possession of leasehold premises is required are treated by them as members of their families irrespective of whether they are the members of his family whether they are his dependants whether they are his relatives whether they are his distant relatives or whether they are not his relatives. Similarly the test of identity of interest which the learned Judge has laid down is also a nebulous test. In mischievous actions against tenants landlords will go on adducing evidence to show identity of interest between them and those for whose benefit the possession of leasehold premises is claimed. In my opinion the correct test is the test of dependence. Under sec. In mischievous actions against tenants landlords will go on adducing evidence to show identity of interest between them and those for whose benefit the possession of leasehold premises is claimed. In my opinion the correct test is the test of dependence. Under sec. 13 (1) (g) a landlord can recover possession of his leasehold premises from his tenant provided it is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by his dependants. To introduce in this concept any one else is to unduly and unnaturally expand the connotation of the expression landlord and to subject the tenants to unwarranted hardships. The expression landlord has been defined by sec. 5 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act. The latter part of the definition is inclusive and states that the landlord includes any person not being a tenant who from time to time derives title under a landlord. On the question which has been raised before me this definition does not throw much light. On the contrary if it has any indication it is in favour of the tenant in the sense that it confines the connotation of the expression landlord to landlord himself and to those who derive title under him. For the purpose of sec. 13 (1) (g) it cannot be applied because members of the landlords family irrespective of whether they are going to derive title under him or not must be included within the connotation of the expression landlord. So also the landlords dependants must be included within the meaning of the expression given in sec. 13 (1) (g ). ( 13 ) IN KUMBHAR PRAGJI BECHAR V. PAREKH HARILAL JAGJIVAN 15 G. L. R. 133 it has been held by Mr. Justice Dave that while considering the bona fide and reasonable requirement of a landlord under sec. 13 (1) (g) bona fide and reasonable requirement of all the members of his family can be taken into consideration. He applied the test of division of estate and came to the conclusion that the requirement of the grandson who was separated from his grandfather could not be taken into account while judging the requirement of the grandfather under sec. 13 (1) (g ). ( 14 ) THERE is one more decision to which it is necessary to refer. He applied the test of division of estate and came to the conclusion that the requirement of the grandson who was separated from his grandfather could not be taken into account while judging the requirement of the grandfather under sec. 13 (1) (g ). ( 14 ) THERE is one more decision to which it is necessary to refer. In INSTITUTE OF RADIO TECHNOLOGY AND OTHERS V. PANDURANG BABURAO AIR 1946 BOMBAY 212 a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay has interpreted the expression his own occupation which occurred in sec. 11 of Bombay Rent Restriction Act 1939 The proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 11 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act 1939 inter alia laid down that possession of leasehold premises could be ordered to be given to the landlord if they were reasonably and bona fide required for his own occupation. The expression his own occupation was construed by the High Court of Bombay as meaning occupation of himself and all persons who are dependent on him. In my opinion the test laid down by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay is a correct test. The language used in sec. 11 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act 1939 and in sec. 13 (1) (g) of the present Act is largely pari materia. Whereas sec. 11 used the expression his own occupation sec. 13 (1) (g) uses the expression for occupation by himself. ( 15 ) IT was strictly not necessary for me to deal with this aspect because on the finding recorded by me on the question of greater hardship I am able to confirm the decrees passed by the two Courts below and dismiss these civil revision applications. However I have dealt with this aspect because the principle laid down by Mr. Justice T. U. Mehta has not appealed to me. Since I am finally deciding these revision applications on other points I have thought fit not to refer these revision applications to a Division Bench for fuller consideration of this aspect. What I have stated on this asp ct therefore represents my tentative view and it is intended to open a debate on the subject in future. Since I am finally deciding these revision applications on other points I have thought fit not to refer these revision applications to a Division Bench for fuller consideration of this aspect. What I have stated on this asp ct therefore represents my tentative view and it is intended to open a debate on the subject in future. In view of the fact that I have confirmed the finding recorded by the Courts below the greater hardship would be caused to the defendant if decrees for possession were passed against him these revision applications must be dismissed. ( 16 ) IN the result both the revision applications are dismissed. Rule is discharged in each one of these revision applications with costs. Applications dismissed. .