Judgment On the basis of an application filed by the opposite party to the present Rule and the police report in respect of the same, the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, Diamond Harbour passed an order drawing up a proceeding under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure thereinafter referred to as the Code). attached the land in question and appointed a Receiver in respect thereof. Against the said order, the petitioners, who figured as opposite parties in the proceeding, moved this Court in revision but did not pursue the matter on being advised to file an application under S. 145(5) of the Code. Accordingly, the petitioners filed an application before the learned Magistrate for cancellation of the proceeding on the ground, inter alia, that no dispute existed concerning the land. By his order dated March 10, 1979 the learned Magistrate rejected the aforesaid application and decided to continue with the proceeding. Hence this Rule. 2. It was argued by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners that the two prerequisites for initiating a proceeding under S. 145 of the Code were :(i) the satisfaction of the Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water and (ii) recording the grounds of such satisfaction and since in the initial order drawn up by the learned Magistrate, those conditions have not been fulfilled the entire proceeding is without jurisdiction. The opposite parties on the other hand submitted that the contentions of the petitioner can not be entertained at this stage as their grievance in the present Rule was not against the order drawing up the proceeding but against the order rejecting the application under S. 145(4). The opposite parties further submitted that even if the petitioners were allowed to urge their grounds challenging the order drawing up the proceeding the same were devoid of any merit having regard to the fact that non-compliance with the requirements of S. 145(1) is only an irregularity and since no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners, the proceeding should not be quashed. 3. To appreciate the respective contentions of the parties it will therefore be necessary first to ascertain the requirements for drawing up a proceeding under S.145 of the Code and whether failure to comply with such requirements make the proceeding void ab initio. 3. To appreciate the respective contentions of the parties it will therefore be necessary first to ascertain the requirements for drawing up a proceeding under S.145 of the Code and whether failure to comply with such requirements make the proceeding void ab initio. From a plain reading of S. 145(1) it would appear that before initiating a proceeding the Magistrate Just satisfy himself that a dispute regarding land or water exists and that such dispute is likely to cause a breach of peace. It is only when the Magistrate arrives at his satisfaction of those two conditions that the Magistrate assumes jurisdiction to make an order under the said section. The other requirement of the section is to record the grounds for such satisfaction in the initiatory order. In other words, while the satisfaction gives the jurisdiction to the Magistrate to pass al1 order, the recording of such satisfaction is the mode of exercise of such jurisdiction. It necessarily follows that if the learned Magistrate records an order without the satisfaction he wrongly assumes the jurisdiction but if the satisfaction is there but the grounds of satisfaction are not stated in the initial order he wrongly exercises the jurisdiction If the former is absent the order and all further proceeding which follows the order, will be therefore without jurisdiction. 4. In the case of Jatindra Nath Sikdar & Ors. v. The State reported III 1967 Cr. L.J. page 1716 this Court held: "the foundation of the Magistrate's order for a proceeding under S. 144 or 145 of the Code is his satisfaction on materials before him that there is an apprehension of breach of the public peace. Unless he is satisfied in that regard he would have no jurisdiction to draw a proceeding under either of those two sections. In order to give the Magistrate the jurisdiction to draw up the proceeding concerned. there will have to be his satisfaction in the above matter and if the learned Magistrate does not mention about this satisfaction his jurisdiction is lost." 5. I respectfully agree with the said decision and hold that an order drawing up a proceeding under S. 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure without the requisite satisfaction makes the entire proceeding void ab initio and without jurisdiction. 6. I respectfully agree with the said decision and hold that an order drawing up a proceeding under S. 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure without the requisite satisfaction makes the entire proceeding void ab initio and without jurisdiction. 6. The next question that falls for determination is whether omission to state the grounds of the satisfaction in the order also bas the effect of rendering the entire order and subsequent proceeding null and void. This Court had occasions to deal with this question and it would be profitable to refer to those decisions. In the case of Nittyanund Ray v. Paresh Nath Sen. reported in 9 Calcutta Weekly Notes page 621 a Division Bench held that in instituting proceeding under S. 145 of the Code of Crin;1inal Procedure the Magistrate was bound to state in his initiatory order the grounds on which he was satisfied that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace and even where a Magistrate acted on a police report or other information he was still bound to state the grounds upon which he was satisfied that there was likelihood of a breach of the peace. Another Division Bench of this Court. disagreeing with the above view referred the following and two other ancillary questions to a Full Bench for decision : "Whether an initial order made by a Magistrate under S. 145. Cl. (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is defective because it is not self contained and does not state in express terms the grounds upon which he is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists, when such grounds appear in the police report on which the order is founded and to which it makes reference." The Full Bench answered the question in the negative and did not answer the other two ancillary questions referred to it as they did not arise in view of the answer to the above question (Khosh Mahomed Sircar & Ors v. Nazir Mohamed, 9 CWN page 1065). This question again fell for decision before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Khudiram Mandai v. Jitendra Nath Mandai. This question again fell for decision before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Khudiram Mandai v. Jitendra Nath Mandai. reported in 56 Calcutta Weekly Notes page 608 and Chakraborty, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed : "It is true that S. 145(1) requires the grounds of the Magistrate's satisfaction to be stated in the initiatory order and that in the present case the order merely stated that it appeared to the Sub-divisional Officer that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed between the parties. Such an order is undoubtedly a defective order and if challenged in proper time, i.e. about the time when written statements are required to be filed or evidence led, it will be corrected or set aside, as was done in the case of Mahesh Sowar v. Narain Bag (ILR 27 Calcutta 981). But I am unable to agree that if an omission to state the grounds' occurs, but the proceeding is nevertheless allowed to go on without challenge, it must still be held invalid even after its conclusion and the final order must be set aside, on account of such omission alone, whether or not any prejudice has been caused. In my opinion such opinion is only an irregularity in the proceedings and does not affect the Magistrate's jurisdiction and therefore when it is complained of at the end of proceeding the validity of the final order must be judged by the test of prejudice." 7. From the foregoing discussions therefore the following principles are deducible : i) To assume jurisdiction to initiate a proceeding under S 145 of the Code, the Magistrate must obtain satisfaction that a dispute regarding an immoveable property exists and that such dispute is likely to cause breach of the peace. As the foundation for the proceeding is such satisfaction absence there If will make the proceeding without jurisdiction and void ab initio. ii) If the Magistrate initiates the proceeding with the requisite satisfaction but omits to state the grounds of his such satisfaction the order will be a defective one and the validity of such order will have to be judged by the test of prejudice. ii) If the Magistrate initiates the proceeding with the requisite satisfaction but omits to state the grounds of his such satisfaction the order will be a defective one and the validity of such order will have to be judged by the test of prejudice. iii) Whether prejudice has been caused or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case and for determining the same the fact whether the objection could and should have been 'raised at the earliest possible opportunity will be required to be considered. 8. Coming now to the instant case I find that the learned Magistrate has not indicated any satisfaction that a dispute likely to cause breanch of the peace existed concerning the land in respect of which the proceeding was drawn up As the foundation of the Magistrate's jurisdiction is lacking, the entire proceeding must be held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently any discussion or decision on the other questions raised by the parties will be an exercise in futility. 9. In the result. the application succeeds and the Rule is made absolute the order dated January 13, 1978 initiating the proceeding and all subsequent orders pissed in connection therewith are hereby set aside. 10. The application of the opposite party should be dealt with according to law as indicated above, unless the Magistrate considers, that there is now, eighteen months after the application, no likelihood of breach of peace in which case he will refuse to take any further steps on the application, Rule made absolute.