JUDGMENT : Sarwar Ali, J. - As is well known a number of Banks were nationalised in the year 1970. This was done by a Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 1970, Act 5 of 1970 (the "Act"). The United Commercial Bank Limited was one such Bank. After the said nationalisatlon it came to be called United Commercial Bank (the "Bank"). Under Section 19 of the Act the Board of Directors was authorised to make regulations. In pursuance of the powers divided under the aforesaid section the Board of Directors of the Bank framed United Commercial Bank Officers, Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (the "Regulations") Elaborate provisions have been made therein in relation to disciplinary proceedings. Regulation 18 empowers review in the circumstances, and to the extent, mentioned in the said Regulation. In this writ application the root question which has to be considered and decided is the scope or the aforesaid power of review and the manner of exercise thereof. 2. Before dealing with the questions raised in this case the relevant facts, which lie within a short compass, may be compactly stated. The petitioner, who was working in the Bank at Patna on 10.2.1976 was served on that date with the charge-sheet dated 2.2.1976. The petitioner was also put under suspension from the aforesaid date. On the basis of these charges which related to the period 12.5.1971 to 5.6.1974, when the petitioner was working as Branch Manager at Tarapur Branch of the Bank, a disciplinary proceeding was started against the petitioner. Without going into the details of the proceeding it may be stated here that the Inquiring Officer after holding an enquiry submitted a report to the disciplinary authority. In this report the petitioner was found guilty by the inquiring officer. He, therefore, recommended that suitable action be taken against the petitioner. The disciplinary authority, however, found the petitioner not guilty of all charges except one. The charge in relation to which the petitioner was found guilty was charge no. 3. But In relation to this charge as well he found that no punishment was called for. He, therefore, recommended that suitable action be taken against the petitioner. The disciplinary authority, however, found the petitioner not guilty of all charges except one. The charge in relation to which the petitioner was found guilty was charge no. 3. But In relation to this charge as well he found that no punishment was called for. It may be stated that this charge related to non submission of returns in S. T. 47 in relation to six loanees: Since the disciplinary authority found that lapse of this nature was common, as many managers had failed to submit S. T. returns, he was of the view that no action need be taken for this dereliction in duty. Consequently by a 1etter dated 27.10.1977 the petitioner was informed that he has been exonerated of the charges levelled against him by the disciplinary authority, and that he shall be re-instated with immediate effect. The letter aforesaid was issued under the signature of the Divisional Manager. The petitioner according to the direction contained in Annexure-2 joined the Divisional Office at Patna. He was paid full salary and allowance for the month of October; 1977. He continued to work till 30.11.1977 for which necessary payments were made. On 1.12.1977 the petitioner received a communication under the signature of the Divisional Manager to the effect that the ORDER :of suspension of the petitioner could not be revoked by the Divisional Manager, as the ORDER :of suspension had been passed by the Bank Deputy General Manager. The petitioner was also informed that the ORDER :of suspension passed by the then Deputy General Manager continues to be in force till the petitioner was advised otherwise by a competent authority. Copy of this communication is Annexure-3 to the writ applications. On 20.1.1978 the petitioner received a letter dated 7.1.1978 under the signature of the General Manage, and reviewing authority under Regulation 18. By this letter the petitioner was intimated that for the reasons stated in the said letter, the ORDER :dated 25.10.1977 passed by the disciplinary authority was being set aside. A fresh inquiry was to be held into the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet dated 2.2.1976. Further that as a fresh inquiry had been ORDER :ed the suspension of the petitioner from Bank's service will continue until further ORDER :s. A copy of this letter is Annexure-4 to the writ application. A fresh inquiry was to be held into the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet dated 2.2.1976. Further that as a fresh inquiry had been ORDER :ed the suspension of the petitioner from Bank's service will continue until further ORDER :s. A copy of this letter is Annexure-4 to the writ application. The petitioner challenges Annexure-3 and 4 and prays that they be quashed. He has further prayed that the respondents may be prohibited from initiating a departmental proceeding against the petitioner on the basis of charges dated 2.2.1976. 3. It would be appropriate here to state that the ORDER :of review has been passed by the General Manager (respondent no. 2) on a perusal of the charge-sheet aforesaid, the proceeding of the inquiry; the report of the inquiring officer, and the findings of the disciplinary authority. Before passing the aforesaid ORDER :of review the petitioner was not heard and no opportunity was given to the petitioner to have his say before the reviewing authority. It would also be appropriate to mention here the reasons on the basis of which the ORDER :of the disciplinary authority was set aside and fresh inquiry ORDER :ed. I might as well put it in the words of the reviewing authority itself in the communication addressed to the petitioner: "From the records I find that the enquiry held into the charges levelled against you suffers from certain procedural lapses and other infirmities. No witnesses were examined and relevant documents were also not produced before the Enquiry Officer. By and large the Enquiry Officer has based his findings on the report of the Central Bureau of Investigation produced before the said enquiry. The disciplinary authority while giving his findings and passing his ORDER :dated 25th October, 1977 had noted the above defects in the enquiry but he held the view that the witnesses did not appear before the Enquiry Officer as they were not in a position to prove the charges levelled against you and that to avoid any further delay in the matter he did not think it fit to remit the case back to the Enquiry Officer and draw his conclusions on the documents exhibited and other circumstances, I have carefully considered the matter and am of the view that a fresh enquiry in the matter is needed...." 4. I first read Section 19 of the Act. I first read Section 19 of the Act. That being the source of power under which the regulation was framed. The relevant provision is as follows:- "19 (1) The Board of Directors of a corresponding new bank may, after consultation with the Reserve Bank and with the previous sanction of the Central Government, make regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or any scheme made thereunder, to provide for all matters for which provision is expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the forgoing power, the regulations may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- XXX XXX XXX (d) the conditions or limitations subject to which the corresponding new bank may appoint advisers, officers on other employees and fix their remuneration and other terms and conditions of service." Regulation 18 is as follows:- "Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, the Reviewing Authority may call for the record of the case within six months of the date of the final ORDER :and after reviewing the case pass such ORDER :s thereon as it may deem fit : Provided that- (i) If any enhanced penalty; which the Reviewing authority proposes to impose, is a major penalty specified in Clauses (e) (f), (g) or (h) of regulation 4 and an enquiry as provided under regulation 6 has not already been held in the case, the Reviewing Authority shall direct that such an enquiry be held in accordance with the provisions of regulation 6 and thereafter consider the record of the enquiry and pass such ORDER :s as it may deem proper : (ii) If the Reviewing Authority decides to change the punishment but an enquiry has already been held in accordance with the provisions of regulation 6, the Reviewing Authority shall give show cause notice to the officer employee as to why the enhanced penalty should not be imposed upon him and shall pass an ORDER :after taking into account the representation, if any submitted by the officer employee." It is not in dispute that the regulations have been framed under the statutory power vested in the Directors under Section 19 of the Act. It is, therefore, clear that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in (1) Sukhdev Singh and others v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and another (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1331), this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain and give appropriate relief to the petitioner, provided the petitioner satisfies this court that this is a fit case in which the impugned ORDER :should be quashed and consequential relief should be given to the petitioner. Also see 1977 (1) L. I. C. 1031, 1978 L. I. C. 425 and 1271. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Balbhadra Prasad Singh contended that the power of review under regulation 18 can only be exercised in the circumstances similar to those mentioned in ORDER :47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was further contended that if the power of review had no limitations it would amount to conferment of uncanalised and unqualified power without laying down any standard or Policy. This would make the regulation void. It was, therefore, suggested that the power of review should, in ORDER :to make it valid, be read as analogous to power of review as envisaged under the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned Advocate General appearing for the Bank, on the other band, contended that in its true nature the power conferred under regulation 18 was a revisional power. In any event; the doctrine of excessive delegation or infirmity on the ground of conferment of uncanalised power had no place in the present context. He contended that the Regulations lay down the conditions of service. It was upto the employee to accept employment or not on these conditions. The position would not be different even if the terms and conditions of service have been laid down after the employee enters into service. The power to make Regulations is derived by the Board under Section 19(2)(d) of the Act. The only limitation on the power is as envisaged in the section itself. The power as conferred under Section 19 (2) (d) is wide enough to make a provision of the nature as contemplated under Regulation 18. 6. The power to make Regulations is derived by the Board under Section 19(2)(d) of the Act. The only limitation on the power is as envisaged in the section itself. The power as conferred under Section 19 (2) (d) is wide enough to make a provision of the nature as contemplated under Regulation 18. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a number of cases of Indian Courts including a case of our court in (2) Bibi Nazma Khatoon and another v. R. P. Sinha, Custodian of Evacuee Properties Bihari and another (A.I.R. 1954 Patna 43), and contended that the expression review has a definite connotation in law. Even in statutes other than Code of Civil Procedure where power of review has been conferred. It has been held that the expression review has the same legal meaning as in ORDER :47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel also pointed out that even in England the expression review has the same legal significance. In my view, however, the nature and extent of power has to be determined with reference to the scheme of the Regulations. The occasion on which the power of review is to be exercised is of particular importance. It would be seen that Regulation 17 provides for appeal against the ORDER :of a disciplinary authority. The right of appeal is only available to "an officer employee". The management has no right of appeal. The power of review under Regulation 18 envisages the review of the ORDER :passed by a subordinate authority. It does not envisage the reconsideration of the ORDER :by the same authority. In the scheme of the Regulations the power conferred under Regulation 18 is essentially, and in its true nature, a power to revise an ORDER :passed by a subordinate authority and is thus a power of provision. Such being the position the limitation in relation to power of review by an authority of its own decision is neither relevant nor helpful in interpreting the scope of power under Regulation 18. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the power of review can in no case authorize the passing of an arbitrary ORDER :, and that in the circumstances of this case the ORDER :passed by the reviewing authority cannot but be held to be arbitrary. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the power of review can in no case authorize the passing of an arbitrary ORDER :, and that in the circumstances of this case the ORDER :passed by the reviewing authority cannot but be held to be arbitrary. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the power of review being uncanalised and undefined. Regulation 18 must be held to be void. Learned Advocate General pointed out that where there was a question of infringement of a citizen's right the doctrine relied upon by the petitioner may have application (without conceding that the power was uncanalised). In the instant case, however, the terms and conditions of service conferred wide discretion on reviewing authority. Such wide discretion could not be held to be illegal on the ground that the power was not specifically defined or circumscribed. In my opinion, however, the power under Regulation 18 cannot be said to be undefined and uncanalised power. The Regulations lay down the circumstances in which disciplinary action can be taken against an employee. Extensive provisions have been made in relation to a departmental proceedings which may be started against an employee. The decision of disciplinary authority is subject to appeal. It is, therefore, implicit that the power of review can only be exercised in relation to the disciplinary proceeding and on fulfilment of the conditions and circumstances in which disciplinary jurisdiction is attracted. In this view of the matter, the larger issues that were canvassed need not be examined. It would not be inappropriate to point out that the power of first authority is well defined. There is no necessity to further define the power or appellate, revisional or reviewing authority, as the latter power's can only be exercised in the context of and in the circumstances in which the power or first or original authority was exercisable. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that, in any event, the power under Regulation 18 cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner and in the circumstances of the present case, it was arbitrary exercise of power. Learned Advocate General contended that the regulation being a valid regulation, gives wide and unrestricted power. No limitation can be read into that power. What the regulation permits becomes a term or condition of service and any decision arrived at cannot be judicially reversed. 9. Learned Advocate General contended that the regulation being a valid regulation, gives wide and unrestricted power. No limitation can be read into that power. What the regulation permits becomes a term or condition of service and any decision arrived at cannot be judicially reversed. 9. In my view, it would be legitimate, as a matter of construction of Regulation 18, to hold that where it is stated, that the reviewing authority may pass such ORDER :s as it may deem fit, it does not envisage the passing of an ORDER :which is illegal or arbitrary. It would be difficult to hold that persons or authorities exercising statutory powers would envisage conferment of arbitrary powers under the statutory rules they have framed or have power to frame. It is also well-settled that where a discretion is concerned on a statutory authority, however, wide may be the expression used, they do not envisage conferment of unrestricted power. A discretion has to be exercised lawfully and fairly. A statutory authority exercising discretion cannot become a law unto itself. Neither can it take into account irrelevant matters nor omit the relevant matter from considerations nor can it misdirect itself in law. This matter need not, however, be pursued further, as in my view, Annexure-4 is liable to be set aside on the ground which I shall presently deal with and that relates to the violation of the principles of natural justice. 10. The question whether the reviewing authority was exercising quasi judicial power or administrative power is not of much importance in the instant case. It is now firmly established that even in exercise of administrative powers the principles of natural justice are attracted. If I may say so with respect this aspect has been elaborately dealt with by Bhagwati, J. In (3) Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597) it has been held that there can be no distinction between quasi judicial function and an administrative function so far as the applicability of rules of natural justice are concerned. If I may say so with respect this aspect has been elaborately dealt with by Bhagwati, J. In (3) Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597) it has been held that there can be no distinction between quasi judicial function and an administrative function so far as the applicability of rules of natural justice are concerned. "The (Sic) aim", says the learned Judge, "of both administrative inquiry as well as quasi judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if the rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice, or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both". It has also been held following (4) A. K. Karaipak Vs. Union of India (A.I.R. 1970 (1) S.C.R. 457 , and (5) Suresh Koshy George Vs. University of Kerala ( 1969 (1) S.C.R. 317 ) that the rules of natural justice are not embodies rules:- "What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame work of the law under which the inquiry was held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of person appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principles of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case". 11. It may not be out of place to mention that in (6) M/s Radhakrishna Agarwal and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1496, 1503) it was observed by Hamidullah Beg, C. J. speaking for the Bench: In Additional District Magistrate; Jabalpur Vs. Shivkant Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207 at P. 1288 it was pointed out (at P. 1288). "The principles of natural justice which are so implied must always hang; if one may so put on pegs of statutory provisions or necessarily follow from them. Shivkant Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207 at P. 1288 it was pointed out (at P. 1288). "The principles of natural justice which are so implied must always hang; if one may so put on pegs of statutory provisions or necessarily follow from them. They can also be said sometimes to be implied as necessary parts of the protection of equality and equal protection of laws conferred by Art. 14 of the Constitution where one of the pillars of Dicey's principles of the Rule of law is round embodied. Sometimes, they may be implied and read into legislation dealing with rights protected by Article 19 of the Constitution. They could at times, be so implied because restrictions on rights confined by Article 19 of the Constitution have to be reasonable." But in England, I find, that the rules of natural justice have been held to be attracted even in some situations where exercise of power does not appear to be under statutory provisions. This is clear from the following observation of Lord Denning, M. R. in (7) Breen Vs. Amalgamabe Engineering Union (1971 I.A.E.R. 1148, 1154). "Does all this (principles of natural justice) apply also to domestic body ? I think it does, at any rate when it is a body set up by one of the powerful associations which we see nowadays. Instances are readily to be found in the books, notably the Stock Exchange, the jockey club, the Football Association, and innumerable trade unions. All these delegate power to committees. These committees are domestic bodies which control the destinies of thousands. They have quite as much power as the statutory bodies of which I have been speaking. They can make or mar a man by their decisions. Not only by expelling him from membership, but also by refusing to admit him as a member, or, it may be, by a refusal to grant a licence or to give their approval; often their rules are framed so as to give them a discretion. They then claim that it is an 'unfettered' discretion with which the Courts have no right to interfere. They go too far. They claim too much. The Minister made the same claim in the Padfield case, and was roundly rebuked by the House of Lords for his impudence. So should we treat this claim by trade unions. They are not above the law, but subject to It. They go too far. They claim too much. The Minister made the same claim in the Padfield case, and was roundly rebuked by the House of Lords for his impudence. So should we treat this claim by trade unions. They are not above the law, but subject to It. Their rules are said to be a contract between the members and the union. So be it. If they are a contract, then it is an implied term that the discretion should be exercised fairly. But the rules are in reality more than a contract. They are a legislative Code laid down by the council of the union to be obeyed by the members. This code should be subject to control by the courts just as much as a code laid down by Parliament itself. If the rules set up a domestic body and give it a discretion, it is to be implied that the body must exercise its discretion fairly. Even though its functions are not judicial or quasi-judicial, but only administrative still it must act fairly. Should it not do so, the courts can review its decision, just as it can review the decision of a statutory body. The courts cannot grant the prerogative writs such as ceretiorari and mandamus against domestic bodies; but they can grant declarations and injunctions which are the modern machinery for enforcing administrative law." But this is of no importance in the instant case as the power here exercised is under the Regulations which have statutory force. 12. Learned Advocate General emphasized the master and servant aspect between the petitioner and the Bank. But, as pointed out by Lord Wilberforce in (8) Malloch Vs. Aberdeen Corporation [1971 (1) Weekly Law Report 1587 at 1795] : "The argument that, once it is shown that the relevant relationship is that a master and servant this is sufficient to exclude the requirements of natural justice is often found, in one form or another; in reported cases. There are two reasons behind it. The first is that, in master and servant cases, one is normally in the field of the common law of contract inter parts so that principles of administrative law, including those of natural justice have no part to play. There are two reasons behind it. The first is that, in master and servant cases, one is normally in the field of the common law of contract inter parts so that principles of administrative law, including those of natural justice have no part to play. The second relates to the remedy : it is that in pure master and servant cases the most that can be obtained is damages, if the dismissal is wrongful, no ORDER :for reinstatement, can be made, so no room exists for such remedies as administrative law may grant, such as a declaration that the dismissal is void. I think there is validity in both of these arguments, but they, particularly the first, must be carefully used. It involves the risk of a compartmental approach which, though convenient as a solvent; may lead to narrower distinctions than ale appropriate to the broader issues of administrative law. A comparative list of situations in which persons have been held entitled or not entitled to a hearing; or to observation of rules of natural justice, according to the master and servant test, looks illogical and even bizarre. A specialist surgeon is denied protection which is given to a hospital doctor, a University Professor, as a servant, has been denied the right to be heard, a dock labourer and an undergraduate have been granted it, examples can be multiplied (see Barber V. Manchester Regional Hospital Board (1958) 1 W. L. R. 181, Palmer V. Inverness Hospitals Board of Management, 1963 S. C. 311, Vidyodaya University Council V. Silva (1965) 1 W. L. R. 77, Vine V. National Dock Labour Board (1957) A.C. 488, Glynn V. Keele University (1971) (1) W. L. R. 487). One may accept that if there are relationships in which all requirements of the observance of rules of natural justice are excluded (and I do not wish to assume that this is inevitably so), these must be confined to what have been called "pure master and servant cases", which I take to mean cases in which there is no element of public employment or service, no support by statute, nothing in the nature of an office or a status which is capable of protection. If any of these elements exist, then, in my opinion, whatever the terminology used, and even though in some inter partes aspects the relationship may be called that of master and servant, there may be essential procedural requirements to be observed..."(underlining is mine)." It is patently clear here that it is in exercise of the statutory power that the impugned ORDER :has been passed. In passing ORDER :of this nature, I have no doubt, the rules of natural justice are attracted. 13. It only now remains to examine whether in circumstances of the case it be said that the impugned ORDER :contained in Annexure-4 is not in accordance with the requirements of the rules of natural justice. Although in Maneka Gandhi case there is no specific reference to the case of (9) B. Surendra Singh Kanda V. Government of Federation of Malay (1962 Appeal cases 322) I find that the principles enunciated at page 337 has been accepted in paragraph 57 of Maneka Gandhi's case. In my opinion another principle brought out in Surinder Singh Kanda's case would be of assistance in the instant case. It was observed by Lord Denning:- "If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him; and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them. This appears in all the cases from the celebrated JUDGMENT : of Lord Loreburn L. C. In Board of Education V. Rice down to the decision of their Lordships' Board in Ceylon University V. Fernando. It follows, of course, that the judge or whoever has to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive representations from one side behind the back of the other. The Court will not inquire whether the evidence of representations did work to his prejudice, sufficient that they might do so. The court will not go into the likelihood of prejudice. It follows, of course, that the judge or whoever has to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive representations from one side behind the back of the other. The Court will not inquire whether the evidence of representations did work to his prejudice, sufficient that they might do so. The court will not go into the likelihood of prejudice. The risk of it is enough." Although these observations were made in the content of enquiry at the first stage, I am of the view that if at the review stage, which here really means revisional stage, there is real likelihood of prejudice on account of non representation of the person affected a case of violation of principles of fairness may be made out. I must emphasize that no hard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case depends on its own circumstances and no general rule can be laid down to cover every case. Differing situations may require application of different procedures. In the language of Lord Denning "Everything depends on the task in hand". The position has been neatly summed up by Lord Morris in (10) Wiseman V. Borneman and others (1971 A. C. 297) in these words : "We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What they comprehend has been analysed and described in many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration than any precision of definition or precision as to application. We do not search for prescriptions which will lay down exactly what must, in various divergent situations be done. The principles and procedures are to be applied which, in any particular situation or set of circumstances, are right and just and fair. Natural justice, it has been said, is only "fair play in action." Nor do we wait for direction from Parliament. The common law has abundant riches; there may be find what Bytes J. called "the justice of the common law." I may incidentally mention that the Central Government (which exercises quasi-judicial power) in exercise of revisional power under the Mineral Concessions Rules, makes known to the applicant the comments of the appropriate state Government so that the same may be made or explained, if possible, by the petitioner who has filed a revision. 14. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that there were no procedural lapses in the proceeding before the inquiring officer nor was there any other infirmity. He pointed out that the observation in Annexure 4 that no witnesses were examined loses sight of the fact no witnesses were really available. He referred to the Annexures annexed to the reply to the counter-affidavit and on the basis thereof contended that no witnesses were available or forthcoming to substantiate the charge against the petitioner. It was not a case where the management was prepared to examine witnesses and on account of some procedural lapses an opportunity was denied to the management. In fact, he contended the inquiring officer had asked the Management's representative if there was any further evidence which he wanted to produce and on his negative reply the inquiring officer took the case as closed on behalf of the management (see paragraph 30 of the writ application and Annexure at page 195 of the brief). He further contended that neither the ORDER :nor the counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents shows that there were any relevant documents which were capable of production and were not produced before the inquiring officer. He further pointed out that the office, of the Central Bureau of Investigation, who had conducted investigation, could not make any statement which was true to his knowledge. It is not necessary to give any positive finding on the correctness of these contentions. What is, however, important is that had the petitioner been given an opportunity of having his say before the reviewing authority before the ORDER :was passed, he could have reasonably contended before the reviewing authority that there was no procedural defect or Infirmity to the inquiry so as to justify setting aside the ORDER :of disciplinary authority and ORDER :ing fresh inquiry. The petitioner could, the learned counsel says, disabuse the reviewing authority of the wrong impression and mistaken notion which is the basis of the ORDER :. The sheet anchor of the ORDER :, he says, are considerations which the petitioner had no opportunity to contradict. I find substance in these contentions. The petitioner could, the learned counsel says, disabuse the reviewing authority of the wrong impression and mistaken notion which is the basis of the ORDER :. The sheet anchor of the ORDER :, he says, are considerations which the petitioner had no opportunity to contradict. I find substance in these contentions. In the circumstances of the instant case, I am of the view that the procedure adopted in this case, namely, the exercise of suo (sic) motu power of review without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to have his say in relation to the proposed action has worked to his real prejudice. The procedure adopted is thus such as cannot be said to be fair in the circumstances of the case. For this reason alone Annexure-4 is fit to be quashed. 15. Lest what has been held by me in the peculiar circumstances of this case may be applied to situations not under contemplation, I would clarify that it is not in every case of exercise of appellate or revisional powers that the petitioner must be given an opportunity to know beforehand what matters are going to weigh with the authority in passing the ORDER :. For instance where a person appeals or goes in revision against an ORDER :which is adverse to him, the grounds of appeal of revision set forth his objection to the ORDER :. Any ORDER :passed on consideration of his grounds of objection may meet the requirement of natural justice. Of course, if the final ORDER :suffers from an infirmity it may be possible to challenge it before an appropriate forum, but not on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. 16. So far as Annexure-3 is concerned, the contention is that the ground for holding that the ORDER :of withdrawing suspension was not a valid ORDER :is erroneous in law. Our attention was drawn to Regulation 15(1) which authorises the competent authority to pass ORDER :s in relation to pay, allowance, and treatment of service on termination or suspension. Competent authority means, as defined in Regulation 2(f), the authority appointed by the Board for the purpose to the Regulation. It is not in dispute that in relation to branch manager, the competent authority is Divisional Head (see Schedule to the Regulations at page 40). Competent authority means, as defined in Regulation 2(f), the authority appointed by the Board for the purpose to the Regulation. It is not in dispute that in relation to branch manager, the competent authority is Divisional Head (see Schedule to the Regulations at page 40). In the instant case, therefore, it appears that although the initial ORDER :of suspension was passed by the Deputy General Manager, the Divisional Head was competent under Regulation 15 to pass suitable ORDER :s on termination of departmental proceeding against the petitioner. It cannot, therefore, be said that just because the initial ORDER :of suspension was passed by the Deputy General Manager, (who was at the time of passing the ORDER :competent authority), the Divisional Head could not pass ORDER :on termination of the disciplinary proceeding. The basis on which Annexure-3 proceeds, is an erroneous interpretation of the powers of the competent authority and the Regulations. Annexure-3, therefore, has also to be quashed. 17. In the result, I would quash Annexure 3 and 4, but in the circumstances I would make no ORDER :as to costs. I am not expressing any opinion whether it is open to the authorities concerned to take further steps in relation to the disciplinary proceeding.