K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) A frivolous, unjust and a desperate attempt made by the petitioners, who are the judgment debtors, to delay and defeat decrees for eviction made against them, as early as on 28. 11. 1973 by the trial Court in proceedings instituted under the provisions of the karnataka Rent Control Act of 1961 (Karnataka Act No- 22 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) relentlessly fought and lost before the district Court, this Court and ultimately before the Supreme Court of India, on the basis of a contention urged in these cases, which is also concluded against them by the consistent rulings of this Court, can even be rejected by just noticing their contention and the rulings of this court on the point. But, I do not propose to do so, out of deference to sri S. K. Kulkarni, learnedi counsel for the petitioners, who addressed elaborate and serious arguments on their behalf. In order to appreciate the contentions urged before me in these cases, it is necessary to notice the facts that are not in dispute in the first instance. ( 2 ) THE three petitioners are in occupation of different portions of premises bearing CTS No. 1015-A/3 situated in Ward No. III of Hubli City, dharwar District having taken their respective portions on lease from one sri K. V. Kulkarni, who was its then owner. On 28-7-1972, respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) and his father Amritlal Singala, who were carrying on autmobile business in a rented premises in the same city and were facing eviction from their landlord, purchased the premises for valuable consideration with the object of shifting their business to the premises. After exchange of notices the respondent and his father commenced actions in H. R. C. Nos. 256, 258 and 286 of 1972 against the petitioners in the Court of the Munsiff, Hubli, for their eviction which was congested by them. Before the termination of the said proceedings in the said Court, the father of the respondent died and the respondent continued the said proceedings. On 28-11-1973 the learned munsiff allowed the said applications and passed decrees for eviction against the petitioners, which was unsuccessfully challenged by them in H. R. C. Appeal Nos. 18, 31 and 32 of 1974 before the District Judge, Dharwar. On 28-11-1973 the learned munsiff allowed the said applications and passed decrees for eviction against the petitioners, which was unsuccessfully challenged by them in H. R. C. Appeal Nos. 18, 31 and 32 of 1974 before the District Judge, Dharwar. Against the said orders, the, petitioners filed; C. R. P. Nos- 1916, 1939 and 1940 of 1975 before this Court. On 20-2-1976, venkatachaliah, J. dismissed the said revision petitions granting 8 months time from that day to the petitioners to vacate the premises. Special Leave petitions Nos. 2605 to 2607 of 1976 filed by the petitioners against the said orders of this Court were rejected by the Supreme Court on 10-12-1976 after notice to the respondent. ( 3 ) ON the termination of the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the respondent sued out execution of the decrees before the Munsiff in Execution petitions Nos. 32, 33 and 34 of 1977 which were again, resisted by the petitioners. On 22-3-1979 the executing court, overruled the objections filed by the petitioners and directed the executions to be proceeded with. Against the said order, the petitioners filed C. R. P. Nos. 984, 985 and 993 of 1979 before this Court inter-alia urging the very grounds urged by them in these petitions. On 4-4-1979 mahendra, J. stayed the further proceedings of the aforesaid executions till 4-5-1979 to enable the petitioners to seek clarification, elucidation or review of the order made by the supreme Court on 10-12-1976 in S. L. P-Nos, 2605 to 2607 of 1976. Thereafter the petitioners filed review petitions before the Supreme Court seeking for review of the orders made in the said special Leave Petitions which have also been rejected and thereafter on 23-5-1979 Mahendra, J. dismissed the said revision petitions. ( 4 ) WHILE the review petitions filed before the Supreme Court and the c. R. P. Nos. 984, 985 and 993 of 1979 were pending before this Court, the petitioners on 18-5-1979, have moved this Court under Article 226 (1) (b) and (c) of the Constitution as it then stood, seeking for a writ in the nature of prohibition or order or direction to the respondents from proceeding with execution Petitions Nos. 32 to 34 of 1977 with a prayer for stay of the further proceedings in the said cases. 32 to 34 of 1977 with a prayer for stay of the further proceedings in the said cases. On the same day, Desai, J. ordered, emergent notices to the respondents returnable by one week to show cause as to why rule nisi should not be issued and an interim order sought by the petitioners should not be granted. On the service of notices on the respondents, these cases were posted before me on 8-11-1979 for preliminary hearing 'group-B' on which day I heard them. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, the decrees for eviction made against them under the Act in the absence of an express provision to execute the said decrees under that Act, are inexe- cutabie before a Civil Court and the rulings of this Court to the contrary are no longer good law or in conflict with the later rulings of this Court and the Supreme Court and therefore they have sought for a writ of prohibition to the respondents to prohibit the execution of those decrees. ( 6 ) THE jurisdiction and power to entertain an application for eviction and grant a decree thereto under S. 21 of the Act, has always been conferred on the Civil Courts of the State. The Act has not made any express provision for execution of the decrees made by a Civil Court under Section 21 of the Act. But, still the Civil Courts were executing the decrees made under the Act, as if they were decrees made by them. ( 7 ) AN execution petition filed by one Madur Ran gamma to execute a decree obtained by her under the Act in HR. C No. 222 of 1964 was resisted by one Smt. Meenakshamma, the judgment debtor in that case on the very ground on which the petitioners are resisting the execution petitions filed by the respondent, which was overruled by the Munsiff, Bangalore on 23-1-1968. Smt. Meenakshamma challenged the said order of the munsiff before this Court in C. R. P No. 225 of 1968 and; reiterated the same before this Court. On 14th August, 1968 Venkataswami, J. rejected the, said revision petition reported in meenakshamma v. Modur Rangamma. Smt. Meenakshamma challenged the said order of the munsiff before this Court in C. R. P No. 225 of 1968 and; reiterated the same before this Court. On 14th August, 1968 Venkataswami, J. rejected the, said revision petition reported in meenakshamma v. Modur Rangamma. (1) and laid down the following principle"it will be seen, from the definition of the word 'court' as reproduced earlier, that the words 'civil Court' have been deliberately used even though a provision is made wherein the State Government is empowered to constitute a 'court' by special authorisation, presumably on the ground of administrative convenience or such other reason. According to the definition, in the absence of such special authorisation, Civil Courts having territorial jurisdiction specified therein are statutorily vested with jurisdiction to deal with cases arising under the Act, which require to be dealt with by a Court. The use of the words 'civil Court' is significant. It is also not without significance that the State government can specially authorise any 'civil Court'- In the face of these indications it is difficult to accede to the contention of Sri Rama Rao thai, a Civil Court should be treated as a special Tribunal functioning under a special enactment, namely the Act. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the Court functioning for the purpose of Part V of the act functions as a Civil Court and as such, it is entitled to exercise jurisdiction under the provisions of the CFC. Once this position is reached, having regard to the preamble to the CPC. it is entitled to exercise the powers and functions indicated under that Code. The preamble to the cpc indicates clearly that it is a law relating to the procedure of courts of Civil Jurisdiction. "this above principle was followed and approved by Malimath, J. in subbanna v. B. Seethamma (2) in these words:"the Court under the Act is a civil Court. No special prevision has been made in the Act for executing the decrees or orders passed under section 21, they have to be executed as decrees passed by a Civil Court. "this above principle was followed and approved by Malimath, J. in subbanna v. B. Seethamma (2) in these words:"the Court under the Act is a civil Court. No special prevision has been made in the Act for executing the decrees or orders passed under section 21, they have to be executed as decrees passed by a Civil Court. xx xx as an order or decree passed under section 21 of the Act is one passed by a Civil Court and as no special remedy has been provided under the act for execution of such orders and decrees, it is clear that the provisions of the CPC, in regard to the execution or such- orders and decrees are attracted by virtue of the provisions of Section 141 of the CPC. "the correctness of the legal principle enunciated in Meenakshamma's (1) and Subbanna's (2) cases consistently followed by this Court has not also been doubted by the Supreme Court in any case cited before me by Sri kulkarni. But, still Sri Kulkarni urged that the rulings of this Court in meenakshamma's (1) and Subbanna's (2) cases are no longer good law or in conflict with several other rulings of this Court- I will now proceed to examine these submissions of Sri kulkarni in that order. ( 8 ) SRI Kulkarni maintained that the ruling of this Court in Meenakshamma's (1) case was solely based on the language of the definition of the 'court' ther occurring in Section 3 (d) of the Act, which inter-alia employed the term 'civil Court' which has been substituted by the Karnataka Rent control (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Karnataka Act No. 31 of 1975) (hereinafter re/erred to as the Amending act) and that ruling having regard to the change made in the Act, was no longer good law or the principle enunciated therein was inapplicable. ( 9 ) IN my view, the Amending Act in substituting the definition of one word 'court' has not made any real and substantial change to any way whittle down the principles stated in meenakshamma's (1) and Subbanna's cases- The use of the words 'civil court' in the definition of the 'court' as it stood prior to its amendment on the deletion, of the word 'civil' thereto in 1975 has little or no significance on the question. The words 'civil Court' had been used in the definition of the term 'court' in the original Act only ex abundanti cautela before the uniform the Karnataka Civil Courts Act ot 1964 came into force on 1-7-1964. The courts exercising jurisdiction and power before or after the amendment are undoubtedly the Civil Courts in the State. In reality and substance, the legislature has not made any departure in the definition of the term 'court' at any time. For these reasons, i am of the opinion, that the contention of Sri Kulkarni that on the changes in the Act, the principles enunciated by this Court in Meenakshamma's (1) and subbanna's (2) cases are no longer good law or inapplicable, is wholly misconceived and is devoid of merit. I, therefore, reject the same. ( 10 ) SRI Kulkarni next contended that the principles enunciated by this court in Meenakshamma's (1) and subbanna's (2) cases are in conflict with the principles enunciated by narayana Pai, J. as he then was, in venkataram v- P. H. Seshagiri Rao (3), malimath, J. in Mohammed Qasim v. Mohammed Mainuddin (4), "by a division Bench consisting of venkataswami and Tewatia, JJ in manju Rumakrishna Naik v. Umesh shridar (5) and another Division bench ccrsisting of Venkataramiah, J. as he then" was and Venkatachala, J. in r. Govindaswamy v C. S. Pannalal (6) and therefore, the question raised should be referred to a larger bench for resolving the conflict. ( 11 ) IN none of the cases, relied on by Sri Kulkarni, the question that has been directly decided in Meenakshamma's (l) and Subbanna's (2) cases that is apposite for the purpose of these cases, has been considered and decided by this Court. The principles decided in those cases viz. , that the court functioning under the Act is a court of exclusive jurisdiction, on which sri Kulkarni sought to derive his entire support, does not in any way touch on the principle decided in Meenakshamma's (1) and Subbanna's (2) cases. The fact that the Court exercising jurisdiction and power under S. 21 of the act, is a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, does not necessarily mean that it is not a Civil Court and a decree made by it under the Act cannot be executed by it though there is no specific enabling provision for the same. The fact that the Court exercising jurisdiction and power under S. 21 of the act, is a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, does not necessarily mean that it is not a Civil Court and a decree made by it under the Act cannot be executed by it though there is no specific enabling provision for the same. I do not see any inconsistency in the principles enunciated in these cases and Meenakshamma's (1) case followed in Subbanna's (2) case. In my opinion, the submission of sri Kulkarni proceeds on a total misapprehension of the legal position and is devoid of any merit and I do not find any justification to refer these cases to a larger bench to resolve a conflict that does not at all exist. ( 12 ) EVEN though I have held that on the authority of the rulings of this court, the matter is clearly concluded against the petitioners, I will assume that the matter is not so concluded and examine their contentions afresh. ( 13 ) AS noticed earlier the one and the only ground on which the petitioners seek to resist the execution proceedings instituted by the respondent is, that there is no specific provision enabing a Civil Court to execute its own decrees and the Court granting a decree is not a Court of general jurisdiction but is a court cf exclusive jurisdiction. Under the Act as it stood prior to its amendment or thereafter, the Court empowered to grant decrees under S. 21 of the act has and has always been a Civil court only. When a Civil Court is empowered to adjudicate a matter and pass a decree, in the absence of any express provision providing for a special mode of execution by the Act itself, it appears to me that to contend that such a decree should remain a mere paper decree and should not be executed by such court and the relief granted to the decree-holder should not be given to him by executing the same, would render the proceedings ap totally meaningless and cause hardship and injustice to a decree-holder- In my opinion, such a construction productive of grave mischief and injustice and set at naught the provisions of the Act can never be placed by a Court. On the other hand all canons of construction of statutes would support that the Court that has passed a decree, which, is a civil Court, can execute the decree exercising all the powers it can otherwise exercise as if it is a decree made by it in accordence with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In these circumstances, even if the matter was not res-integra, I have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of Sri kulkarni, ( 14 ) IN Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others (7) the majority speaking through Krishna iyer, J. applied the principle of implied powers in interpreting Section 98 of the Representation of the People act and ruled that an election Court was competent to grant all effective reliefs. On that question, Krishna Iyer, j. obseerved thus: law transcends legalism when life is baffled by surprise situations. In this larger view and in accordance with the well-established doctrine of implied powers we think the Court can - and if justified, shall - do, by its command, all that is necessary to repair the injury and make the remedy realisable, Courts are not luminous angels beating their golden wings in the void but operational authority sanctioning everything to fulfil the trust of the rule of law- that the less is the inarticulate part of the larger is the jurisprudence of power. Both Sri Sorabjee and Sri phadke agree to this proposition and sri Rao, in the light of the election petition filed and is pending, cannot but assent to it. By way of abundant caution or otherwise, the appellant has sought declaration of the 3rd respondent as challenged in his election petition, the returned candidate. He has also prayed for his being declared the duly elected candidate. There is no dispute - there cannot be - that the corner stone of the second constituency-wide poll is the cancellation of the first. If that is set aside as invalid by the High Court for any good reason then the second poll falls and the third respondent too with it. This question of the soundness of the cancellation of the entire poll is within the Courts power under S. 98 of the Act. All are agreed on this. In that eventuality, what are the follow -up steps? This question of the soundness of the cancellation of the entire poll is within the Courts power under S. 98 of the Act. All are agreed on this. In that eventuality, what are the follow -up steps? Everything necessary to resurrect, reconstruct and lead on to a consummation of the original process. May be to give elective relief by way of complation of the broken election the commissioner may have to be directed to hold fresh poll and report back together with the ballots. A recount of all or some may perhaps be required. Other steps suggested by other developments may be desired if anything integrally linked up with and necessitated by the obligation to grant full relief has to be undertaken or ordered to be done by the election machinery, all that is within the orbit of the Election Court's power 88. Black's Law Dictionary ex-plains the proposition thus:"implied powers are such as are necessary to make available and carry into effect those powers which are expressly granted or conieired, and which must therefore be presumed to have been within the intention of the constitutional or legisl itive grant" (p. 13 34 Black's Legal Dictionary 4th Edn.) 89. This understanding accords with justice and reason and has the support of Sutherland. The learned additional Solicitor General also cited the cases in Matajog Dubey v h. C. Bhari (1955) 2 SCR 925 at p. 937: ( AIR 1956 SC 44 at pp 50, 51) and Commissioner of Commercial taxes v. R. S. Jhaver (1968) 1 SCR 148 at pp. 154, 155, ( AIR 1968 SC 59 at pp. 62, 63) to substantiate his thesis that the doctrine of implied powers clothes the Commissioner with vast incidental powers. He illustrated his point by quoting from sutherland (Frank E. Horack Jr. Vol. 3 ). "necessary implications: Where a, statute confers powers or duties in general terms, all powers and duties incidcnlal and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implication. Thus it has been stated, ''an express statutory grant ot power or the imposition of a defmite duty carries with it by implication, in the absence of a limitation, authority to employ all the means that are usually employed and that are necessary to the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty. . . . . . Thus it has been stated, ''an express statutory grant ot power or the imposition of a defmite duty carries with it by implication, in the absence of a limitation, authority to employ all the means that are usually employed and that are necessary to the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty. . . . . . That which is clearly implied is as much a part of a law as that which is expressed". The reason b ( hind the rule is to be found in the fact that legislation is enacted to establish broad or general stand- ards. Matters of minor detail are frequently omitted from legislative enactments, and"if these could not be supplied by implication the drafting of legislation would be an interminable process and the true intent of the legislature likely to be defeated. "the rule whereby a -statute, is by necessary implication extended has been most frequently applied in the construction of laws delegating powers to public officers and administrative agencies. The powers thus granted involve a multitude of functions that are discoverable only through practical experience- xx xx a municipality, empowered by statute to construct sewers for the preservation of the public health, interest and convenience was permitted to construct a protecting wall and pumping plant which were necessary for the proper working of the sewer, but were essential to public health,. A country school superintendent, who was by statute given general supervisory power over a special election, was permitted to issue absentee ballots. The power to arrest has been held to include the power to take finger prints, and take into custody non-residents who were exempted from the provisions of a licensing statute". 90. Having regard to statutory setting and comprehensive jurisdiction of the Election Court we are satisfied that it is within its powers to direct a repoll of particular polling stations to be conducted by the specialised agency under the election Commission and report the results arid ballots to the Court. 90. Having regard to statutory setting and comprehensive jurisdiction of the Election Court we are satisfied that it is within its powers to direct a repoll of particular polling stations to be conducted by the specialised agency under the election Commission and report the results arid ballots to the Court. Even a re-poll of postal ballots, since those names are known can be ordered taking care to preserve the secrecy of thq vote' The Court may, if necessary, after setting; aside the election of R-3 (if there are good grounds therefor) keep the case, pending, issue directions for getting available votes, order recount and or partial re-poll, keep the election petition pending and pass final order holding the appellant elected if only if valid grounds are established. Such being the wide ranging scope of implied powers we are in agreement with the learned additional Solicitor General that all the reliefs the appellant claims are within the Court's powers to grant and Sri Rao's alarm is unfounded. la my view on the application of the above principles, I will not be justified in holding that a Civil Court that has made the decree, cannot exeeute its decree and that a void should be created as contended for the petitioners. ( 15 ) SO far I have dealt with the merits of the case and found against the petitioners. I now propose to examine whether these are fit cases in which this Court should exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction, even if there is any merit in the contentions of the petitioners. ( 16 ) IN the original proceedings, this court had granted as much as 8 months time to the petitioners to vacate the premises. In C. R. P. Nos- 984, 985 and 993 of 1979 the petitioners while urging a similar ground among various other grounds, had stated before this Court that they would not file any further application, for extension of time if the execution proceedings are stayed till 4-5-1979 to enable them to move, the Supreme Court for review of its orders, which was not objected tc by the respondent and was, therefore, granted by this Court. After the Supreme Court rejected the review petitions, this Court dismissed the said revision petitions virtually as not pressed by the petitioners. After the Supreme Court rejected the review petitions, this Court dismissed the said revision petitions virtually as not pressed by the petitioners. With the order of this Court in the aforesaid revision petitions, the order made by the executing Court on 22-3-1979 has become final and binding on the parties. In these circumstances, it could be wholly unjust and inequitable, if not illegal for this Court to grant the prayer of the petitioners in these cases. In my opinion, the previous orders of this Court, the Supreme Court and the conduct of the petitioners disentitle them for any relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, even if there is any merit in any of their contentions. ( 17 ) A narration of the facts and the contentions urged for the petitioners reveal the frivolous, unjust and inequitable nature of the proceedings instituted by them and persisted with unwarranted vehemence with the sole object of delaying and defeating the execution of the decrees that have become final. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion, that these are fit cases in which I should levy exemplary costs of Rs, 500/ -. ( 18 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I reject these writ petitions at the preliminary hearing stage with exemplary costs of respondent No. 1. Advocate's fee Rs. 500/ -. ( 19 ) LET a copy of this order be communicated to the II Additional Munsiff, hubli, within 10 days from this day. --- *** --- .