Judgment CHOUDHARY SIA SARAN SINHA, J. 1. This matter has been referred to Division Bench by order No. 15 dated 13-12-1976 without specifying the point for decision by the Division Bench. 2. This second appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the judgement and decree confirming the decision of the trial court by the lower appellate court. namely, the second Additional District Judge Champaran in a suit in which the plaintiff sought for a declaration that the defendants-first party had only a right of maintenance in the subject-matter of the suit and they had no right to alienate any part of the same, the further and consequent relief sought for by the plaintiff being that the two sale-deeds executed by defendants-first party with respect to the lands described in Schedule 4 to the plaint in favour of defendants-second party were illegal and not binding on him. 3. In view of the limited contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, the relevant facts may be stated thus :- One Lachhuman Thakur had three sons - Jiwan Thakur, Jangi Thakur and Achutanand Thakur. Defendant No. 3 Janardan Thakur is the son of Jiwan Thakur. Defendant No. 1 Godami Kuer is one of the four wives of Achuta Nand Thakur. One Rajendra Thakur is the son of Achayuta Nand Thakur by his third wife and Radhika Devi, Defendant No. 2, is the widow of Rajendra Thakur. While there was no issue to Achayuta Nand Thakur from his second wife, From his first wife he had two sons and one daughter. The sons were Dwarika Thakur, husband of Lakhpati, and Dukhit Thakur the plaintiff of the suit. The daughter was named Lalita Devi. 4 The case of the plaintiff was that after the death of Achayuta Nand Thakur some time in the year 1943, his son Rajendra Thakur, having pre-deceased him, a dispute cropped up among the widows of Achayuta Nand Thakur which culminated in a panchayati. The panches allotted certain properties to the widows by way of their maintenance during their lifetime, the widows being given a restricted right therein namely that they were not entitled to transfer any of those properties Ext. 4, as stated in the plaint, was said to be a memorandum of the decision of the panches. 5. The suit was contested by two sets of defendants. Defendants-first party described Ext. 4, as stated in the plaint, was said to be a memorandum of the decision of the panches. 5. The suit was contested by two sets of defendants. Defendants-first party described Ext. 4 as a forged and fabricated document and they disputed their thumb impressions thereon. Defendants-second party, the purchasers from defendants-first party, supported the case of the latter in their written statement. Among other findings, with which we are not very much concerned in this second appeal. the trial court found that Ext. 4 was not a genuine and valid document and as such defendants-first party had perfect title over the disputed land and were entitled to alienate them. The trial court, therefore, dismissed the plaintiffs suit. 6. The plaintiff took up the matter in appeal. The lower appellate court found that Ext. 4 was a genuine document and not forged one. Relying, however, on the provisions of Sub-Section (1) of Sec.14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the appellate court concurred with the finding of the trial court regarding the defendants-first party having absolute title to the disputed properties including the right to alienate them. The result was that the appeal was dismissed. This is how the plaintiff has come up in second appeal before this court. 7. The sole contention of Sri Sankat Haran Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, before this court, was that the proper provisions applicable to the instant case were those laid down in Sub-Section (2) of Sec.14 of the Act and the lower appellate court committed an error of law by dismissing the plaintiffs suit relying on Sub-Section (1) of Sec.14 of the Act. 8. None appeared on behalf of the defendants to contest this appeal. After going through Ext. 4, looking to the provisions of Sec.14 and hearing the counsel for the appellant, I must say at once that there is no substance in the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant. The document Ext. 4 came into existence in the month of April, 1944, obviously long after the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937. It is also not in dispute that Achuta Nand Thakur died after the coming into force of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act. The document Ext. 4 came into existence in the month of April, 1944, obviously long after the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937. It is also not in dispute that Achuta Nand Thakur died after the coming into force of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act. Sub-Section (2) of Sec.3 of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act (Act XVIII of 1939) provides that when a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in Hindu joint family property, Achuta Nand Thakur admittedly being such a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, his widow shall, subject to the provision of Sub-Section (3) have in the property the same interest as he himself had. The limitations provided by Sub-Section (3) of the Act XVIII of 1937 were that any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this Section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu Womens Estate provided, however, that she will have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. The very first line of Ext. 4 shows unambiguously that though the parties to this document had partitioned their properties earlier, the said partition not having been put in black and blue, the document Ext. 4 was being prepared for remembrance (Yadgari). It is, thus, obvious that Ext. 4 does not create any right in the widows in respect of the properties already allotted to them on partition, but it simply records in black and blue what properties had fallen to the share of the parties in the oral partition which had taken place earlier. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed to the two endorsements in Ext. 4 purporting to be in the pen of Godami Kuer and Radhika Devi, above named, which substantially stated that whatever lands were allotted to them on partition, obviously, effected earlier to the date of the execution of Ext. 4, were without any right of alienation and for the purpose of maintenance during their lifetime. If widows were entitled to partition the properties left by their husbands according to provisions of the Act XVIII of 1937, they would acquire interest in those properties, subject to the provisions of Sub-S. (3) of the Act XVIII of 1937. 4, were without any right of alienation and for the purpose of maintenance during their lifetime. If widows were entitled to partition the properties left by their husbands according to provisions of the Act XVIII of 1937, they would acquire interest in those properties, subject to the provisions of Sub-S. (3) of the Act XVIII of 1937. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the deed (Ext. 4) came into existence as a family arrangement deed, his simple case being that the widows got the lands in question by virtue of Ext. 4, which is unsupported by the terms of Ext. 4 itself. 10. It was also not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the widows, named above, were in possession of the property allotted to them on partition at the time when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 , came into force. Sub-Section (1) of Sec.14 of this Act states that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as limited owner. The Explanation to Sub-Section (1) of Sec.14 indicates the sweeping nature of these provisions inasmuch as it states, inter alia, that the properties as mentioned in Sub-Section (1) of Sec.14 will include both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, as in the instant case, or in lieu of maintenance etc. It is well settled by now that Sub-Section (1) of Sec.14 of the Hindu Succession Act is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of this Act, she would become the full owner of the property, Sub-Section (1) of Sec.14 of the Hindu Succession Act, therefore, clearly supports the view taken by the lower appellate court. 11. 11. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, however, was that the provisions that would be applicable to the instant case would be those mentioned in Sub-Section (2) of Sec.14, which states, inter alia, that nothing contained in Sub-Section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree order or award prescribe a restricted state in such property. The lands in question which were allotted to the two widows in this case cannot be said to have been acquired by them under the deed (Ext. 4) as those properties fell into their share on a private partition by virtue of the right created by Act XVIII of 1937. This being the position, the question of application of Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec.14 cannot arise in the instant case. It is not the contention of Shri Singh that the endorsement in Ext. 4 will act as estoppel against the defendants as obviously there can be no estoppel against statute. The sweeping nature of the provisions of Sub-Section (1) of Sec.14 and the restricted sense in which the provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Sec.14 were to apply were the subject-matter of consideration by the Supreme Court in the case of Vaddeboyina Tulasamma V/s. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi, AIR 1979 SC 1944. In the above case their Lordships observed that Sub-Section (2) of Sec.14 is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to Sub-Section (1) : It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of Sub-Section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of woman in Hindu society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in Sub-Section (1). Their Lordships further observed that Sub-S. (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of Sub-S. (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to Sub-Section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, decree. order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. In the facts and circumstances; of this case it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the widows got the property in question by Ext. 4 and that too for the first time without any pre-existing right. The contention raised by the appellant, therefore, fails and is negatived. No other contentions having been raised, it must be held that there is no merit in this second appeal which is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs of the second appeal. SHIVESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, J. 12 I agree.