JUDGMENT : 1. This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 11-11-1978, passed by the Third Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Civil First Appeal No. 23-A of 1978, confirming the judgment and decree dated 1-12-1977 passed by the Fourth Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior in Suit No. 92A/74. 2. The plaintiff has filed a suit with the allegations that she is the owner of House No. 828/40, situated at Kampoo Bus Stand, Lashkar. The defendant is a tenant at Rs. 15 per month and he has executed a rent-note on 5-4-1948 for Rs. 8 which was subsequently increased to Rs. 15. The map of the rented premises is filed with the plaint. The tenancy starts from the fifth of every month according to Gregorian calendar. Formerly, a suit for arrears of rent was filed against the defendant and it was decreed in compromise. The rent is due from 1-5-1973 towards the defendant and he has not paid that rent in spite of the notice of demand served on him. The suit shop is required for her for carrying on the business of Scientific Stores and General Merchants and for that purpose, she has no other alternative non-residential accommodation of her own in her possession in the City limits. For carrying on the above said business, she has got sufficient funds with her. 3. The next ground for eviction was that the rented premises were given to the defendant for opening a shop. Instead, he has started living in the rented premises without the permission of the landlady and in this manner, he has changed the purpose of letting. 4. The defendant has also, without any permission from the landlady, trespassed over the land shown with 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' in the plaint map and put up a 'Thela' and started a shop of Pan; that he has not vacated the portion on which he has committed the trespass in spite of repeated warnings to him and asking him to vacate the same. The notice of termination was given to the defendant on 11-11-1973 and his tenancy was terminated from 4,-1-1974 with an option clause. The notice was received by the defendant on 16-11-1973,.but he did not vacate the rented premises, nor paid the arrears of rent. Therefore, the suit for eviction and arrears of rent is filed. For the trespass committed the mesne profits at Rs. The notice was received by the defendant on 16-11-1973,.but he did not vacate the rented premises, nor paid the arrears of rent. Therefore, the suit for eviction and arrears of rent is filed. For the trespass committed the mesne profits at Rs. 10 per month were also asked for by the plaintiff. The suit is filed on 15-2-1974. So, taking into consideration the plaint, the suit has been filed on the ground under section 12 (1) (a), 12 (1) (f) and 12 (1) (o) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 5. The defence of the defendant is that it is not admitted that he has executed a rent-note on 5-4-1948. Even if it is held that he has executed that rent-note, that being in favour of a minor, it is void. The genuine requirement pleaded by the plaintiff was denied by the defendant. So also, it was submitted that as soon as the notice was received, the arrears were sent by money order, which the plaintiff has refused. That he has changed the purpose for which the shop was taken on rent, was denied and he has submitted in the alternative that right from the beginning, the house is used for both purposes. Regarding trespass, he has submitted that he has put up the Panthela on the land which was included in the tenancy. He denied that his tenancy starts from the fifth of every month and vaguely denied the legality of the notice. He also submitted that in case a decree under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act is passed against him, then he is entitled for compensation under section l2 (6) of the Act which should be paid to him according to the standard rent. The trial Court framed about ten issues and held that the amount of arrears of rent was sent by the defendant within the prescribed period allowed by law and subsequent to that, he has complied with the provisions of section 13 of the Act and, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled for a decree under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. The appellate Court has confirmed the same finding. 6. The appellate Court has confirmed the same finding. 6. Before me, the learned counsel for the appellant hesitatingly argued this point that the findings of the Courts below are not correct and that the plaintiff is entitled for a decree under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. From the evidence, it is clear that a money order for Rs. 105 was sent to the plaintiff by Ex.D/l on 11-12-1973 and this amount was refused by the plaintiff. Therefore, it is proved by evidence that the defendant tendered arrears of rent within the prescribed period after the service of notice of demand on him. It is also clear from the application given in the file for depositing the rent, that the defendant has complied with both the limbs of section 13 of the Act, even though he was not required to do so. Taking these two things together, the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff is not entitled for a decree under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act and confirmed by the appellate Court is correct and I also confirm it. 7. The next ground is regarding section 12(1) (0) of the Act. The requirements of the ground are that the tenant has taken possession of such portion or portions of accommodation which is not included in the accommodation let to him and which the tenant has not vacated in spite of a written notice of the landlord in that behalf. So, for availability of this ground would be a written notice of the landlord asking the defendant to vacate the portion of which, according to the plaintiff, the defendant has taken possession. But, looking to the notice given by the plaintiff on 11-11-1973, there is nothing to indicate that the plaintiff has asked for the possession of the portion about which she is making a grievance in the plaint. Therefore, in my opinion, for want of notice asking for the possession of the portion trespassed, the ground under section 12(1) (o) is not available to the plaintiff and I am of the opinion that she cannot get a decree under the said ground. But whether she will be entitled for mesne profits because of the trespass is a point which I will consider subsequently. But whether she will be entitled for mesne profits because of the trespass is a point which I will consider subsequently. If I come to the conclusion that the defendant has committed trespass, then from the evidence, it is clear that the mesne profits for the said trespass should be at least Rs. 10. The plaintiff and her mother have stated that the portion would fetch rent of Rs. 20 per month. 8. Then, the learned counsel for the appellant argued before me that rent-note dated 5-4-1978 is proved by evidence and if it is held to be proved, then the rent-note shows that the disputed portion was taken on rent for doing business and the user by the defendant for residential purpose will come under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act, namely, it will be an act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent is that the document dated 5-4-1948 is not proved by any evidence because the rent-note has no witness on it and nobody has been examined to prove the signature of the defendant on it. But, I do not accept the submission of the learned counsel, because Subhadrabai (P. W. 2) has stated in her statement that the defendant has executed a rent-note in favour of plaintiff Shivmala which is Ex. P/l and the defendant signed on the rent-note in her presence and the signatures are from A to A. Therefore, I am of the view that the signature on the document by the defendant is proved by the evidence of Subhadrabai (P. W. 2). Therefore, the finding of the Courts below that the document is not proved, I cannot accept and hold that the rent-note has been proved to have been executed by the defendant. I But that is not of much help to the plaintiff, because when the alleged rent-note was executed, it is clear from the evidence that Shivmala, the plaintiff, was a minor. The rent-note is executed in her favour and not-in favour of the guardian of the minor. Therefore, it is a contract with a minor. I But that is not of much help to the plaintiff, because when the alleged rent-note was executed, it is clear from the evidence that Shivmala, the plaintiff, was a minor. The rent-note is executed in her favour and not-in favour of the guardian of the minor. Therefore, it is a contract with a minor. According to section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, such a contract is void, because a person who is of age of majority according to law to which he is subject can enter into a valid contract. There cannot be any ratification of such a contract because that contract is void. Therefore, even after attaining the majority the defendant has paid rent to the plaintiff will not be of any avail to the plaintiff and, therefore, as the contract is void, I hold that though it is proved, it cannot create any relationship of landlady and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant. Therefore, I will have to reject that document while considering the evidence of the case. The effect of it is also that the plaintiff's allegations that the tenancy starts from the fifth of every month. I will have to reject the finding of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court that the tenancy starts from the first of every month is correct. The tenancy is admitted by the defendant ***** and receipts to show that relationship of landlady and tenant have been produced in the file and they also indicate that the tenancy starts from the first of every month. I may consider here the effect of this finding on the notice also. Even if it is held that the tenancy starts from the first of every month, as the notice contains an option clause, regarding the termination of the tenancy, the notice will not be bad even if it is held that the tenancy starts from the first of every month instead of the fifth, as alleged by the plaintiff. The finding of both the Courts below that the notice is valid is correct and I also confirm it. 9. The finding of both the Courts below that the notice is valid is correct and I also confirm it. 9. The next submission made by the learned counsel is that the finding of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court that the plaintiff has no genuine requirement of the suit premises for starting the business is not correct and the Courts below have taken into consideration irrelevant things to hold that the plaintiff is not entitled for a decree under section 12 (l)(f) of the Act. It was vehemently submitted before me by the learned counsel for the respondent that the genuine requirement is a question of fact and in second appeal, I should be very slow in disturbing that finding. He has referred to me to Mattulal v. Radhelal AIR 1974 SC 1596 =1975 J LJ 1 SC. But that Judgment itself helps me to hold that as the appellate Court has taken into consideration circumstances which are irrelevant to negative the genuine requirement in second appeal. One of the circumstances which the appellate Court has taken into consideration negativing the need of the plaintiff is that a shop belonging to the mother of the plaintiff fell vacant and if the plaintiff was so serious about starting her business, she could have started it in that shop. As she has not done so, the need of the plaintiff is not bona fide. I fail to understand as to how a shop belonging to the mother of the plaintiff can be said to be an alternative accommodation under the Act itself. The Act says "such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the City or town concerned." The show belongs to the plaintiff's mother can never be said to belong to the plaintiff. Therefore, this reasoning of the appellate Court is not supported by the Act itself. On the contrary, it is against the provisions of the law. To make my point further clear, I may refer to the former Act namely, the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (Act No. 23 of 1955). In that Act, section 4 (h) referred to non-residential accommodation and it only mentioned that he or the aforesaid person of his family is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or the town for that purpose. In that Act, section 4 (h) referred to non-residential accommodation and it only mentioned that he or the aforesaid person of his family is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or the town for that purpose. In the present Act, the words 'of his own' have been purpose-fully added and if that purpose is to be given effect to, then, in my opinion, the finding of the appellate Court that because the mother's shop was vacant and as the plaintiff has not occupied that shop, her need is not genuine cannot be accepted. I may say that the learned appellate Court has not correctly interpreted the section itself, and that being the case, I can certainly interfere with the finding given by the appellate Court. I may refer here to Damadilal v. Parashram AIR 1976 SC 2229 . Para 14 of this Judgment runs as under: "14. Mr. Gupte's last contention relates to the plaintiffs' bona fide requirement of the premises. The trial Court found on the evidence that the plaintiffs claim was unjustified. The first Court of appeal reversed that finding and held that the plaintiffs' requirement was bona fide. The High Court in second appeal agreed with the trial Court in holding that the landlords had no bona fide requirement. Mr. Gupte contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction in second appeal to up-set the finding of the lower appellate Court on this issue which, according to him, was a finding of fact. Mr. Nariman for the respondent relied on the decision of this Court in Madan Lal Puri v. Sain Das Berry AIR 1973 SC 585 , to argue that the question was a mixed question of law and fact and that it was within the jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal to examine the correctness of the finding. In answer Mr. Gupte referred to another decision of this Court in Mattulal v. Radhey Lal, which, relying on an earlier decision of this Court in Sarvate T. B. v. Nemi Chand 1966 MPLJ 26 (SC) held that such a finding was one of fact and not a finding on a mixed question of law and fact. In answer Mr. Gupte referred to another decision of this Court in Mattulal v. Radhey Lal, which, relying on an earlier decision of this Court in Sarvate T. B. v. Nemi Chand 1966 MPLJ 26 (SC) held that such a finding was one of fact and not a finding on a mixed question of law and fact. We do not think that for the purpose of this case, we need express opinion on the apparent conflict between these two decisions ..." Therefore, taking into consideration the observations, I have mentioned above and which bring out the conflict of opinion also the finding that the appellate Court has not correctly interpreted the law. I am of the view that finding is not binding on me. I have to see whether the plaintiff has proved her need. As I have said above that she has no other alternative accommodation of her own to start her business. Therefore, if I come to the conclusion that her statement supported by other evidence that she wants to start the business of Scientific stores and General Merchants is sufficient to hold that her need is bona fide, then she will be entitled for a decree under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. That she has sufficient funds; she has proved by evidence even though, in my opinion, the existence of ready money need not be proved by the plaintiff. It is only the potential capacity to raise the required funds is to be proved by the plaintiff. In the present case, the plaintiff has done so by stating that she has got about Rs. 10,000 with her to start the, business. To prove her bona fides of the need, she has produced documents Ex. P/3 (registration under Shops and Establishments Act) and P/4 (registration under Sales Tax Act) for carrying on the business. This, appellate Court has rejected by saying that the plaintiff has done this just to get the tenant evicted from the shop. I do not see any reason to attribute any motive to the plaintiff for getting these registrations done. On the contrary, in my opinion, they go to support the bona fides of the need of the plaintiff. Therefore, I differ from the finding of the appellate Court that these documents do not show the bona fides of the need of the plaintiff. On the contrary, in my opinion, they go to support the bona fides of the need of the plaintiff. Therefore, I differ from the finding of the appellate Court that these documents do not show the bona fides of the need of the plaintiff. According to Mattulal's case (supra), it is not necessary for the plaintiff to get a decree under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act that he should prove that he has done preparation for carrying on the business which he intends to carry in future. The relevant portion from the Judgment is as under: "...It is difficult to imagine how the respondent could be expected to make preparations for starting the new business unless there was a reasonable prospect of his being able to obtain possession of the Lohia Bzzar shop in the near future. It is a common but unfortunate failing of our judicial system that a litigation takes an inordinately long time in reaching a final conclusion and then also it is uncertain as to how it will end and with what result and unless the respondent could be reasonably sure that he would within a short time be able to obtain possession of the Lohiya Bazar shop and start a new business, it would be too much to expect from him that he should make preparations for starting the new business. Indeed, from a commercial and practical point of view, it would be foolish on his part to make arrangements for investment of capital, obtaining of permits and receipt of stocks of iron and steel materials when he would not know whether he would at all be able to get possession of the Lohiya Bazar Shop, and if so, when and after how many years..." Therefore, if the plaintiff produces before the Court and shows to the Court that she has already done preparation for carrying of business, then I think, to reject such evidence by saying that it is done just to get the tenant evicted from the shop and, therefore, it is not genuine, I think, it will not be a correct approach to the problem. Added to Ex. Added to Ex. P-3 and P-4, the plaintiff has also stated that she had done correspondence with M/s. Sarabhai Ltd., Baroda and S. D. S. Company, Bombay and both the Companies have agreed that they will supply the necessary goods for her to do the business. Nothing adverse has been taken out from the plaintiff in her cross-examination against these averments given on oath. I may add here also that it is the bona fides of the need which are to be seen and not the bona fides of the plaintiff. Therefore, applying this dictum, the finding of the appellate Court also, l think is bad in law. The Court has considered the bona fides of the plaintiff and not those of her need. 10. It seems from the judgment of the appellate Court that the main consideration which weighed with it is that the plaintiff is a married lady and that she has applied to the Court that her statement should be taken on commission, because she does not appear in public (observes Pardah). The third point which weighed with the appellate Court is that the plaintiff is residing with her husband on Fort, Gwalior and, therefore, she cannot do the business. I will consider these grounds of the appellate Court one by one. Because the plaintiff is residing on the Fort, Gwalior, she will not be in a position to carry on the business at the Bus Stand, Lashkar, cannot be accepted. I do not see any difficulty for a person who is residing at Fort, Gwalior to carry on the business in the shop which is owned by her which is situated near the Bus Stand. It is not as if the Gwalior Fort is outside the City limits. There are persons who come from Morar, Gwalior and transport their Business at Bada which is at a greater distance than the Gwalior Fort. Therefore, this ground cannot be a ground for rejecting the claim of the plaintiff. 11. The second ground on which the claim is rejected is that she is a married lady. I do not see any reason to hold that a married lady cannot do the business and also look after her family. In the statement it has come that she has got only two children and her husband gets a good sum of salary. The second ground on which the claim is rejected is that she is a married lady. I do not see any reason to hold that a married lady cannot do the business and also look after her family. In the statement it has come that she has got only two children and her husband gets a good sum of salary. Therefore, in my opinion, she can look after her family and also do the business. Therefore, this ground also, I am not in at position to accept. For doing business, under section 12 (1) (g) of the Act, it is not necessary to do the business personally. It can be done through the servants also. To this, the grievance of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent was that the plaintiff has not stated in her plaint or in her statement that she will do the business through servants. I think, that is not necessary. When she says that she will do business, it will include the business which she will do personally or through her servants under her supervision. 12. The third ground for rejecting the needs is that Shivmala, the plaintiff is a 'Purdanashin' lady and much stress was laid by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant on this aspect of the case that as the plaintiff is a 'Purdanashin' lady, her statement that she will do her business should be rejected outright and the case of the plaintiff should be deemed to be false. I was referred to an application dated 21-4-1975 in support of the submission made by the learned counsel for the defendant.That application states that the plaintiff and Subhadrabai (P. W. 2), according to the social custom, observe 'Purdah' and they do not go to public places or attend Courts. Subhadrabai (P. W. 2) is aged 80 years and she also has a weak eye-sight. Therefore, both these witnesses should be examined on commission. This application was allowed and the plaintiff and her witness were examined on commission. Therefore, the grievance is that when the plaintiff is not willing to go to the Court to give her statement, she should be held to be not in a position to do business and transact with persons who are not known to her. Before proceeding further, let us see what the plaintiff and her witness stated in their statements. Therefore, the grievance is that when the plaintiff is not willing to go to the Court to give her statement, she should be held to be not in a position to do business and transact with persons who are not known to her. Before proceeding further, let us see what the plaintiff and her witness stated in their statements. For observing 'Purdah', Subhadrabai has stated that in their caste, i.e. in Marathas, they have a custom of 'Purdah' and usually, they do not appear in public. The next question asked to her was whether Shivmala wants to do business. To this she has replied that she wants to do the same. If these sentences are taken together, it will mean that even though there is Purdah system in their community, Shivmala will do the business and that the Purdah system will not come in her way for doing the said business. This is the statement given by a lady who is about 80 years of age. I am mentioning here the age of the lady, so as to consider the custom she must be observing for the last eighty years. Now, when I consider the statement of the plaintiff, whether she observes such a strict Purdah, I will first have to mention her age. She is aged 27 and she has stated regarding the system as under (if translated in English): "They have custom of Purdah in their community, but it is wrong to say that they do not appear in public places. The only thing she has stated is that the ladies belonging to their community do not appear in the Court." The two statements-one given by Subhadrabai and the other given by the plaintiff clearly show that the strict observance of the Purdah is now not maintained in the generation to which Shivmala belongs. She has also stated that she looks after the property. She recovers rent and she keeps tenants and gives receipts of rent to the tenants also. She has also stated to show her bona fides that excepting the income of pay of her husband and the rent which she receives, she has no other income and it can be gathered from her statement that she wants to start the business as an additional item of income. 13. She has also stated to show her bona fides that excepting the income of pay of her husband and the rent which she receives, she has no other income and it can be gathered from her statement that she wants to start the business as an additional item of income. 13. The fact that when the statement was recorded, the Commissioner who is an Advocate was present, so also, the Advocate on behalf of the defendant was also present and the Advocate on behalf of the plaintiff was also present, clearly shows that Shivmala does not observe Purdah so strictly as not to give the statement by appearing before strangers or to come before the persons who are not known to her are there. 14. Now I will turn as to what is the meaning of 'Purda Nashin' lady and whether the plaintiff can be termed as 'Purda Nashin' lady in the strict sense of the word. A pardanashin woman has been defined as a woman of rank, Hindu or Muhammadan, who lives in seclusion, shut in the zanana, and having no communication except from behind the parda or screen with any male person save a few privilege d relations or dependants and that being the case certain protections were given to such ladies. For that, I may refer to Farid-un-nisa v. Mukhtar Ahmed AIR 1925 PC 204 . That judgment says: "The law of India contains well-known principles for the protection of persons, who transfer their property to their own disadvantage, when they have not the usual means of fully understanding the nature and effect of what they are doing. In this it has only given the special development, which India's social usages make necessary, to the general rules of English law, which protect persons, whose disabilities make them dependent upon or subject them to the influence of others, even though nothing in the nature of deception or coercion may have occurred. This is part of the law relating to personal capacity to make binding transfers or settlements of property of any kind. But, this proposition will not be applicable to a lady who is literate with certain amount of education who subscribes to newspapers and ranges her affairs. Nor, to a woman who communicates with strangers, collects rent from tenants. This is part of the law relating to personal capacity to make binding transfers or settlements of property of any kind. But, this proposition will not be applicable to a lady who is literate with certain amount of education who subscribes to newspapers and ranges her affairs. Nor, to a woman who communicates with strangers, collects rent from tenants. This protection has been given in view of social conditions of the times and it is presumed that they have imperfect knowledge of the world, as by the pardah system they are practically excluded from social intercourse and communication with the outside world. (See Kharbuja Kuer v. Jang-bahadur AIR 1963 SC 1203 . Therefore, looking to the evidence in the file, I am not in a position to hold that the plaintiff comes under the category of parda Nashin lady as mentioned above. On the contrary, she comes in public. She gave her statement in this case when the strangers were present. She also collects rent, looks after the property and she is also an educated lady. Therefore, looking to all these facts, the finding of the appellate Court that because she is observing Purdah, she will not be in a position to do business, I cannot accept. I may say, for running the business of Scientific stores, she has only to talk with the strangers regarding the usefulness of the articles she is selling and she has to say regarding the price of it. I may say so that lady observing partial Purdhah, can transact such type of business in a beneficial manner. Even according to social customs now prevalent, I think, the Purdah system is losing its importance day by day, because of spread of education and because of economic conditions. Therefore, I hold, differing from the appellate Court, that the plaintiff is in a position to do the business she has mentioned in her plaint and also in her statement. Therefore, I set aside the finding of the appellate Court that the plaintiff has not proved her need. On the contrary, I hold that she has proved that she had made preparations for doing the business, she has got funds with her and, therefore, there is nothing to hold that her need is not genuine. Therefore, I set aside the finding of the appellate Court that the plaintiff has not proved her need. On the contrary, I hold that she has proved that she had made preparations for doing the business, she has got funds with her and, therefore, there is nothing to hold that her need is not genuine. That being the case, I will have to decree the claim of the plaintiff under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act and I decree the same. 15. One more ground which was put forward by the plaintiff for getting the decree for eviction is inconsistent user by the defendant. But, as the rent-note I have held, is not admissible in evidence, there is nothing to show that at the time of giving out the premises on rent, there was a condition that the defendant will use the premises only for shop and for nothing else. That being the case, if the defendant uses a part of the premises for residence, I do not think that will amount to an inconsistent user, I may refer to Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal, in which it was held that: "Held (i) that it could not be held that the purpose was exclusively commercial and incompatible with any residential use, even of a portion. The legal inference to be drawn from the lease deed was conditioned by the prevailing circumstances. The intention of the parties from which the purpose of the lease was spelled out was to be gathered from the the social milieu. (ii) It is impossible to hold that, if a tenant, who takes out petty premises for carrying on a small trade, also stays in the rear portion, cooks and eats, he so disastrously reverts the purpose of the lease. A different 'purpose' in the context is not minor variation but majuscule in mode of enjoyment. This was not a case of a man switching over to a canteen business or closing down the cobbler shop and converting the place into a residential accommodation. On the other hand, the common case is that the cobbler continued to be cobbler and stayed in the shop at night on days when he was running his shop but left for his home on shop holidays. A sense of proportion in social assessment is of the judicial essence. On the other hand, the common case is that the cobbler continued to be cobbler and stayed in the shop at night on days when he was running his shop but left for his home on shop holidays. A sense of proportion in social assessment is of the judicial essence. The irresistible inference was that the provision of section 13 (2) (ii) had not been attracted." This ruling is a complete answer to the submissions made by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, I hold that the plaintiff's claim for a decree under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act cannot be accepted. 16. The evidence of the plaintiff is to the effect that only three rooms were given on rent, but not the open space which is in front of the accommodation given on rent. The trial Court also had found to that effect, but it has basis that when these three rooms are given on rent, it will be presumed that the open space which is in front of these rooms is also given for the use of the tenant. Similar view is expressed by the appellate Court also. But the question is whether keeping a Panthela can be said to be an user which was contemplated when the accommodation was given on rent and whether it could be said that this is a legal user of open space of land which is in front of the portion given on rent. The usual user of such an open piece of land is for coming and going to the rented portion, but keeping of Panthela over it, I am certainly of the view is not the user which can be said to be a natural use of the said land. The defendant has kept this Panthela on it is clear from the evidence. He has produced licence to show that he has kept it for a pretty long time. Keeping the Thela for pretty long time will not give him any right to use the land in such a manner which was never contemplated when the portion was rented out to him. He has produced licence to show that he has kept it for a pretty long time. Keeping the Thela for pretty long time will not give him any right to use the land in such a manner which was never contemplated when the portion was rented out to him. Therefore, in my opinion, this will amount to an illegal use of the said piece of land and as it is an illegal use of the land and as defendant is getting benefit out of it, the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits for such a use by the defendant. I have already said that the plaintiff has claimed only Rs. 10 per month as mesne profits and that amount is reasonable looking to the evidence of the plaintiff. Therefore, differing from the Court below, I am of the view that the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for the said amount till the Panthela is not removed from that place. 17. As the plaintiff is getting decree under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act, the defendant is entitled to get compensation according to section 12 (6) of the Act. He is a tenant more than ten years old, which is admitted by the plaintiff. Therefore, before getting vacant possession of the suit premises, the plaintiff will have to pay compensation as contemplated under section 12 (6) of the Act and then alone, she will be entitled to get the possession. According to the said section, the defendant must get two months time to vacate the premises. I think if I give time for vacating the premises upto 30-11-1979, that will fulfil the condition given under the said section. 18. The result is that the appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 150, if certified. The plaintiff is granted decree for eviction under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. The plaintiff will get mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 15 fifteen per month till she recovers the possession of the disputed property. She will also get mesne profits for the use of the open land on which the Panthela is kept by the defendant at the rate of Rs. 10 per month from 1-11-1973 up to the date of removal of Pan Thela from the said open piece of land. The defendant is given time to vacate the rented premises up to 30-11-1979. 10 per month from 1-11-1973 up to the date of removal of Pan Thela from the said open piece of land. The defendant is given time to vacate the rented premises up to 30-11-1979. The defendant will be paid compensation under section 12 (6) of the Act. Till the compensation is paid, the plaintiff will not be entitled to get the possession.