JUDGMENT - Deshmukh B.n.c.j. And Mrs. Manohar Sujata, J. : - This is a petition by the petitioner who is employed as a fitier in the Transportation Engineering Department of the B. E. S. T. Undertaking, run by the respondent No. 1 Bombay Municipal Corporation, against the order of rejection of his claim, made by the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay. 2. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner is admittedly a fitter in the Engineering Department, and, for the month of March 1973, his pay packet, after all the legitimate deductions, should consist of Rs. 317. The petitioner did go to the paying counter on the pay day in April and received a packet. It also appears that the petitioner had already signed a stamped receipt for Rs. 317 while he received the payment. There appears to be some dispute as to whether the pay packet was immediately opened or after some time. That is the factual aspect, in respect of which no evidence has yet been led. According to the petitioner, when he found that bis pay was less by Rs. 100, he went back to the cash counter, complained to the paying cashier, and also lodged a complaint with the higher officers. According to the respondent Corporation, an independent enquiry was made by them which revealed that their system of payment was faithfully carried out in this case. They say that there are two persons employed for counting and verifying the cash of each workman according to the pay roll and they prepare the packet. The third person, paying cashier, makes payment against the signature of the receiver. This system, according to their rules or instructions, was properly followed and the packet did contain, according to the. Corporation, Rs. 317 when it was handed over to the petitioner. However, not being satisfied with the Corporations disposal of his grievance, the petitioner approached the Presiding Officer. First labour Court, Bombay, by application under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The simple case put before the Labour Court is that the petitioners entitlement for the month of March 1973 was Rs. 317. However, be is actually paid Rs. 100 less by the paying cashier. First labour Court, Bombay, by application under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The simple case put before the Labour Court is that the petitioners entitlement for the month of March 1973 was Rs. 317. However, be is actually paid Rs. 100 less by the paying cashier. Since it is the duty of the Corporation to see that the full salary as earned by the employee should be paid, they have failed in their duty and the petitioner wants to recover the balance of Rs. 100 under the provisions of section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 3. The defence raised before the Labour Court is that it bas no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reason why such a jurisdictional question is raised is pointed out by the factual pleadings. It is stated that the applicant employee was undoubtedly entitled to Rs. 317 and that is bis full entitlement for the month of March 1973. The Corporation does not raise any dispute in that behalf what the Corporation says is that they have made the payment to the applicant /employee. The manner in which the payment is made and the method by which disputes must be raised in that behalf are also pleaded by the Corporation in their reply. They say that two employees are employed, in the first instance, for counting the cash and putting it into the envelop as per the pay roll of all the employees and these packets are handed over to the paying cashier. There are standing instructions of the Corporation that the employee should receive the packet, open it immediately in his presence of the paying cashier and count it in his presence. If any shortage is discovered, be should immediately bring it to the notice of the paying cashier and also inform the higher officer in. that behalf. The employer should not sign the stamped receipt before counting the contents of He packet. Their allegation in the present case is that the employee received the packet, counted it and signed the stamped receipt After some time be comes back with the complaint and alleges that he received Rs. 100 less. In spite of these circumstances. that behalf. The employer should not sign the stamped receipt before counting the contents of He packet. Their allegation in the present case is that the employee received the packet, counted it and signed the stamped receipt After some time be comes back with the complaint and alleges that he received Rs. 100 less. In spite of these circumstances. the Corporation did investigate in its own way and found that at the time the packet was passed on to the employee and when he signed the stamped receipt it did contain Rs. 317. If the money is missing thereafter, the Corporation is not at all responsible for the shortage. Under the above circumstance and facts, the Corporation says that here there is no dispute about the entitlement at all. The only dispute is, whether, as a matter of fact, Rs. 317 were paid or Rs. 217 were paid. Such a dispute cannot lay under section 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. At best, this may be a dispute of short payment or unlawful deduction which will fall under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 4. This objection was treated as preliminary objection. The learned Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay, came to the conclusion that on the pleadings of the parties in this case, it had no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition under section 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The application thus came to be rejected. Being aggrieved, the petitioner employee has filed this petition. 5. The only question that we have to consider is that whether the petition of the present type lies before the Labour Court or the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition. At some earlier stage of the hearing of this petition, it appears that the Corporation has become willing to make payment of Rs. 50 as ex-gratia payment provided, by a speaking order, the question raised for the consideration of the Court is decided by the Court. The Corporation is anxious to know whether, in the facts and circumstances mentioned above, it will have to face applications under the lndustrial Disputes Act, or it will have to defend such a claim under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. It is also alleged by the respondent Corporation that it employs almost 8000 employees in this Department alone. It is also alleged by the respondent Corporation that it employs almost 8000 employees in this Department alone. The Corporation is therefore anxious to know its liability and responsibility in relation to a short payment of the present type alleged. The employee was willing, at one stage. to receive the amount ot Rs. 50 with mere permission to withdraw the application without adjudication. The offer did not materialise because the undertaking does not want to pay without speaking order of the Court. We are, thus required now to decide whether such an application can lie under the provisions of section 33.C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 6. Some judgments of this Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Supreme Court were cited before us and we will make a cursory reference to all these judgments, but, we think that the question which is pointedly raised before us is not answered in any of those decisions because, such a restricted point was never raised before. Before we refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (The Central Bank of India Limited v. P. s. Rajagopalan etc.)1 A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 64. reference to the language of section 33.C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, may be appropriate. It says that: “Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Govern ment.” It has been so often pointed out that under this section a complicated dispute is not to be investigated at all. The provisions of section 33-C are more or less in the nature of an execution proceedings. At the same time, the language of subsection(2) of section 33-C does contemplate two kinds of claims and some kind of enquiry or computation by such Labour Court as the Government may specify in that behalf. What therefore, is the scope of the enquiry under section 33-C(2), when certain disputes to the claim are raised by the parties? At the same time, the language of subsection(2) of section 33-C does contemplate two kinds of claims and some kind of enquiry or computation by such Labour Court as the Government may specify in that behalf. What therefore, is the scope of the enquiry under section 33-C(2), when certain disputes to the claim are raised by the parties? Their Lordships point out that: “The claim under section 33-C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by subsection(2).” When a claim is therefore ascertained and the entitlement to that claim or the manner of computation of that claim at a certain figure is disputed, some kind of enquiry must precede before the amount is decided and adjudicated upon. Taking a cue from this reasoning, Mr. Gokhale, the learned counsel for the petitioner employee argued that here is a claim for Rs. 100 by the employee. The Corporation may not dispute as to what is the entitlement of the employee for the month of March 1973. It does dispute whether the present claim of Rs. 100 is still due. It may allege payment in a certain manner. If that is proved, it may be a complete reply to the claim. But in law and in principle, is this not an employee raising a dispute about his entitlement to the balance of Rs. 100 for the month of March 1973, and which claim is being disputed by the Corporation? If that is so, let there be the incidental enquiry and let the Labour Court find out whether this amount is still due. He, therefore, says that on the parity of reasoning or approach suggested by the Supreme Court, his claim is entitled to adjudication at the hands of the Labour Court and the pronouncement, after evidence, if any, as to whether Rs. 100 have reached the hands of the petitioner or not. 7. Mr. Gokhale also brought to our notice a judgment of this Court, in (Lal Co v. Kulkarni(R. N.) and others)2. A Division Bench of this Court was considering facts which were entirely different. 100 have reached the hands of the petitioner or not. 7. Mr. Gokhale also brought to our notice a judgment of this Court, in (Lal Co v. Kulkarni(R. N.) and others)2. A Division Bench of this Court was considering facts which were entirely different. A claim was raised with respect to the wages for weekly holidays payable under section 18(2) of the Shops and Establishments Act. As the claim was made before the Labour Court under section 33C(2), an objection was raised to the claim on two grounds; one was that the claim under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act were wages recoverable under the Payment of Wages Act, and that under section 22(d) of that Ad the authority under the Act was the Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction and that application under section 33C(2) was not maintainable. It was further argued that an application which would lie under the Payment of Wages Act would not be entertained under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reasoning in this judgment would show that the jurisdiction under the Pay ment of Wages Act can overlap sometimes with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The mere fact that the application under the Payment of Wages Act would have been made is no bar to the application being entertained under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. We may at once note here that the claim involved is the determination, in the first instance, with regard to the weekly holidays and the payment thereof. Some kind of adjudication had to precede before the claim was pronounced. The Supreme Court judgment, which we had referred to earlier, does say that the provisions under section 33C(2) are not averse to some kind of enquiry being made, in the first instance, before the claim is determined. The judgment therefore, proceeds to lay down that the claim could Legitimately be considered under section 33C(2) of the lndustrial Disputes Act 8. Reliance is also placed upon the Supreme Court judgment in (Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Labour Court, Hubli, and others)3. In this case one of the questions, which was raised before the Supreme Court was, whether the claim in question would fall under section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act. Reliance is also placed upon the Supreme Court judgment in (Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Labour Court, Hubli, and others)3. In this case one of the questions, which was raised before the Supreme Court was, whether the claim in question would fall under section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act. Since that question was not answered, a larger question of law, whether a claim which lies under section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act could be agitated by application under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and was left open and not decided. However, it has been observed that there may be a case where a claim could legitimately be made under section is of the Payment of Wages Act as also under section 33C(2). Where the Payment of Wages Act does not provide adequate remedy, resort may be had under the provisions of section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Most of these judgments cited before us do not seem to specifically reply the pointed issue that is raised before us. There must be some conflict between the employer and the employee with regard to the calculation and payment of wages. It is also not being seriously doubted that some claims would be agitated under more than one Act A point that Mr. Damania wants us to specifically decide is whether a dispute of the present type raised before us can legitimately go before the Tribunal under the Provisions of section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. That being a limited issue, let us analyse the nature of the dispute between the parties. 9. The petitioners gross pay as well as net pay is not at all a matter of dispute. It is ascertained by the petitioner and admitted by the Respondents that Rs. 317 must be paid to the petitioner for the month of March 1973. The Respondents have urged that they have a large organization and they have evolved a method of payment. If the cash were to be counted at the counter it will involve enormous time and it may not be a very convenient procedure. Substantial number of the staff are therefore engaged earlier for the purpose of the counting the money and preparing and filling up packets with the appropriate amount belonging to each workmen. The paying cashier merely hands over the packet against the signature of the workman. Substantial number of the staff are therefore engaged earlier for the purpose of the counting the money and preparing and filling up packets with the appropriate amount belonging to each workmen. The paying cashier merely hands over the packet against the signature of the workman. Under the procedure advertised by the Corporation and directed to be followed by the workman, they must count the cash in front of the paying cashier alone before signing the register Once they sign, the presumption is that they have counted the amount and the cash is correct. The undertaking therefore pleads that there being a signature of the petitioner on their pay roil on a revenue stamp, they have discharged the obligation reposed upon them by law by paying the correct amount to each of their workman. There is, therefore, no dispute in this case regarding the entitlement of the Petitioner. Mr. Damania therefore, wants us to read the provisions of sub-section(2) of section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, from that point of view. Subsection(2) of section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act says that: “Where any workman is entitled “to receive” from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * etc.” This section contemplates two types of payments. One is the agreed cash amount and the other is the computation of the amount. We are not concerned with the second question. So far as the cash payment is concerned, this section contemplates that the question involved relates to the question of the entitlement of the workman to receive certain amount and a question should have arisen as to the amount of money. Mr. Damania argues that none of these questions arise in this dispute. The entitlement is Rs. 317 which is admitted, and as against the net amount to which he is entitled, there is no dispute raised as to what is due to him. The dues are admitted to be Rs. 317. Not only that, but the undertaking asserts that they have paid the workman accordingly. 10. The workman however says that in the packet delivered to him across the counter by the paying cashier, be received Rs. 217 and not Rs 317. The dues are admitted to be Rs. 317. Not only that, but the undertaking asserts that they have paid the workman accordingly. 10. The workman however says that in the packet delivered to him across the counter by the paying cashier, be received Rs. 217 and not Rs 317. It is further asserted that the workman is not concerned with the Corporations approach as to whether the staff has properly filled in the packets or not. He has also not to consider whether after the very packet was filled in, the paying cashier or someone else removed Rs. 100 from that packet. The argument of the workman is that the Undertaking was obliged to reach Rs. 317 to bis bands. It Rs. 100 are paid less, that amount is still due from the Undertaking out of the entitled amount. This is how the dispute is sought to be brought under sub-section(2) of section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. As against that, Mr. Damania argues that in the absence of a dispute as to the entitlement there is no question of calculating what is due under that section. On the contrary, the provisions of Payment of Wages Act, 1936 are more appropriate in the case of a dispute of the present type. The Payment of Wages Act defines “Wages” in the first instance, in Clause(vi) of section 2. It is an apprehensive definition and all kinds of payments which must be paid to the workman at the end of certain period are covered by this definition of “wages.” The more important provision to which our attention is drawn, is contained in section 3. This section says” that every employer shall be responsible for the payment to persons employed by him of all wages required to be paid under this Act. It casts responsibility on the employer to make payment of all wages to the employee. Section 15 which provides the remedy of application before the Payment of Wages Authority, also defines the jurisdiction of that authority. That authority has to hear and decide for any specified areas all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of wages of persons employed or paid in that area including all matters incidental to such claims. Mr. That authority has to hear and decide for any specified areas all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of wages of persons employed or paid in that area including all matters incidental to such claims. Mr. Damania, therefore argues that if he is right in saying that there is no dispute about the entitlement, and therefore, there is no need to adjudicate upon the entitlement regarding the amount due under section 33C(2) of the industrial Disputes Act, this is a simp1e question of paying less than what is admitted to be the liability of the employer. It would, at best, be a deduction from the wage packet. What deductions can be made are also laid down by the terms of the contract as also the provisions of laws. If there is any unjustified deduction, the Payment of Wages Authority is the specific authority provided fox investigation as to the correctness of that deduction from wages. Assuming therefore the workman here is right in saying that he received Rs. 100 less, it is the case of admitting his entitlement but deducting something from that while actually he was paid. Such a case must fall under the provisions of section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act. This being the real nature of the dispute in the present case, the remedy for resolving such a dispute is by approaching the Payment of Wages Act and not by raising dispute under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This precisely is the question to be answered in the facts of the case. 12. Assuming therefore, that there can be a claim which will legitimately fall under section 15 ot the Payment of Wages Act as also under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, can it be said that this kind of claim before us is covered by both, and therefore, an application under section 33C(2) could not be said to be bad? Having given our anxious consideration to the arguments on either side and the interpretation of section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Supreme Court, we are of the view that the nature of the present dispute is such that it falls under section 15(l) of the Payment of Wages Act squarely. and therefore, there is nothing to be investigated under the provisions of sub-section(2) of section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act. and therefore, there is nothing to be investigated under the provisions of sub-section(2) of section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reason is obvious. What is due to the workman is never the subject-matter of controversy whether he is paid full amount due or there has been some deduction is the only narrow question to be considered and answered in the present case. Such a dispute, being of a very narrow nature or of a limited character, would, legitimately fall under section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act. That authority having been created specifically for certain claims which must be raised within the period of limitation, we think that a marginal or a narrow dispute of that type must be confined to the provisions of section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act. Such a dispute cannot be taken to the forum contemplated under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for the simple reason that neither the entitlement nor the amount due and payable to the workman is in . doubt. In our view, therefore, the present dispute should have been lodged before the Payment of Wages Act Authority, and the Presiding Committee of the Industrial Court or Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It cannot be said that the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act as also the provisions of section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act are common for every type of Claim regarding payment between the employer and the employee. Though some claims may be overlapping and may legitimately fall under either of these provisions, so far as the dispute of the present type is concerned, we are of the view that it squarely fall under section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act alone and does not seem to have any legitimate place for the enquiry contemplated by section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court bas thus taken a correct view of the matter and has lawfully rejected the application filed by the workman before him. 13. While we are reaching this conclusion, we would indicate that the time for filing a fresh application under the Payment of Wages Act by the petitioner has long passed by. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court bas thus taken a correct view of the matter and has lawfully rejected the application filed by the workman before him. 13. While we are reaching this conclusion, we would indicate that the time for filing a fresh application under the Payment of Wages Act by the petitioner has long passed by. However, the point which has been raised in this dispute was not free from doubt and it cannot be said that the workman was following the remedy without any reasonable excuse. If therefore, the present petitioner desires to file an application for recovering the balance amount of Rs. 100 before the Payment of Wages Authority, it will be for that authority to consider whether the delay should be condoned on the ground that a remedy was being pursued legitimately in some other wrong Court. However, so far as the employers are concerned, Mr. Damania makes a statement before us that they will not only not raise the question of limitation, but would fairly state before that authority that the point being not free from doubt, pursuing of the remedy in the wrong Court can be legitimate reason for condoning the delay. However, it is ultimately for the authority to take an appropriate decision and we cannot pre-judge that point. Mr. Damania further states on behalf of the employers that the earlier offer of the employers will stand viz., that if the petitioner does not want to raise his claim before the Payment of Wages Authority, the employers would pay him Rs. 50 as ex-gratia, the moment he gave up his right and that he does not want to pursue his remedy. However, it is open to the petitioner if he wants to raise such a claim before the Payment of Wages Authority. If he does that, the offer of the undertaking would be of no use to him. 14. We thus reject this Writ Petition, and discharge the rule. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Rule discharged. -----