BOPANNA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two writ petitions are referred to a Division Bench by Malimath, J. , since they involved the question touching upon the validity of S. 21-A of the Kamataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (in short, 'the Act') which was incorporated in the Act by Amendment act 66 of 1976 (in short, 'the Amendment Act', ). ( 2 ) BY our order dated 8. 11-1979 in w. P, No. 6914 of 1977 and connected writ petitions, we have upheld the constitutionality of the Amendment act. Hence the question as to the validity of S. 21-A in the Act, is no longer res integra. But learned counsel for petitioners have contended that even if S. 21a is held to be valid, the impugned orders of the respective house Rent Controllers, Bangalore, (hereinafter referred as 'the Controllers') are unsustainable because s. 21-A is not attracted to the facts cf these two cases. ( 3 ) WE will first consider the facts in W. P. No. 1921 of 1977. The petitioner is a tenant of the entire house bearing No. 9, Benson Cross Road, Civil station, Bangalore. The 3rd and the 4th respondents purchased under two separate sale deeds;, two separate portions of this house. The 5th respondent and his wife, the 3rd; respondent, are a;t present residing at No. 61, millers Road, Bangalore. This house was allotted to the 5th respondent by the Controller under S. 5 of the Act. Admittedly, the 5th respondent is not the owner of the house in the occupation of the petitioner. Taking advantage of S. 21a of the Act, the 3rd and the 4th respondents filed an application before the House Rent controller under clause (b) of sub- section (1) of S. 21a of the Act, for eviction, of the petitioner from the house occupied by him as tenant. Their case was that the 5th respondent (who was impleaded as the 3rd petitioner before the House Rent controller by the petitioners herein) being an allottee of premises No. 61, Millers road, Bengalore, he and his wife (the 3rd respondent) were required to vacate that premises under S. 21-A (1) (a) of the Act as his wife, the 3rd respondent, was the owner of a portion of the house occupied by the petitioner as tenant. They had issued, purporting to be under the proviso to S. 21a (1) (b) of the Act, a notice of not less than four months to the petitioner to vacate the portion of the premises belonging to the 3rd respondent ( 4 ) BEFORE the Controller, the petitioner contended that the 3rd respondent who was admittedly not a tenant of the house bearing No. 61, millers Road, was not required to vacate that house and hence her application for eviction of the petitioner was not maintainable under s. 21a (1) (b) of the Act. However the controller hel'd that the petitioner was liable to be evicted. He relied on the definition of the word 'family' in clause (if) of S. 3 of the Act which was inserted by the Amendment Act. According to the Controller, the term 'family' included the wife also and therefore the 5th respondent who was an allottee of the premises bearing No. 61, Millers Road, should be regarded as owning a half share of the premises occupied by the petitioner and hence both the 3rd respondent and the 5th respondent were liable to vacate the allotted premises within one year from the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act ( 5 ) IN W. P. No. 8286 of 1977, the petitioner is, the tenant of the ground-floor of premises No. 65/14, ii Cross Road, Gandhi Nagar, Bangalore. Respondents 1 and 2 are the owners of the premises but are residing in another house which has been allotted by the Controller in favour of Hastimal sisodia who is the son of respondent-1 and husband of respondent-2. Admittedly, respondents 1 and 2 were not tenants of the allotted premises, but hasthimal Sisodia was the tenant. They are residing with him as members of his family. They had issued a notice under proviso to S. 21a (1) (b) of the act to the petitioner calling upon him to vacate the premises occupied by him so as to enable them to vacate the premises allotted to Hastimal Sisodia. As he did not vacate-'the' premises, they moved the Controller seeking for the eviction of the petitioner. The Controller noticed in his order that the allottee had not filed the petition for eviction. As he did not vacate-'the' premises, they moved the Controller seeking for the eviction of the petitioner. The Controller noticed in his order that the allottee had not filed the petition for eviction. But the Controller took the view that the word 'any person' occurring in, S. 21a cannot be construed narrowly, that it is not only the allottee but all the members of his family are bound to vacate thfc premises occupied by the allottee and that in that view any member of the family may file an application under clause (b) of S. 21a (1 ). The controller directed the present petitioner to vacate the premises occupied by him and to put the respondents in possession thereof. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of learned counsel, it is necessary to oet out the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 3 (ff) defines 'family' as follows. ,"'family' in, relation to a person means the wife or husband of such person and his or her dependent children. "the relevant part of S. 21a reads as follows:"s. 21a. Vacation of residential building in certain cases. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, on and, from the date of coming into force of this section, (a) any person who is in occupation or possession of a residential building as a tenant on allotment by the Controller, shall within one year from the said date, vacate such building if he owns in his name, or in the name of any member of his family, a residential building in the same city, town or village (hereinafter referred to as 'his own building' ). . . . . " (2) Notwithstanding anything in this Act. any person who being in occupation or possession of a residential building as a tenant on allotment by the Controller acquires or constructs on or after the 20th day ot august 1976 either in his own name or in the name of any member of the family a residential building in the same city, town or village shall within sucn time as may be prescribed'', vacate the building of which he is the tenant. " ( 6 ) EVEN after giving the word 'family' occurring in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of 8. " ( 6 ) EVEN after giving the word 'family' occurring in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of 8. 21a, the meaning contained in clause (ff) of S. 3, it is seen that what clause (a) provides is that any person who is in occupation or possession of a residential building as a tenant on allotment by the Controller should vacate; such building if he owns in his name or in the name of his spouse or his dependent children, a residential building in the same, city or town or village. The words "or in the name of any member of the family" refer, in our opinion, to benami ownership, the real owner being the allottee-tenant and the ostensible owner being a member of his family. In order to attract that clause it is necessary that the allottee tenant should himself own such residential building, whether in his own name or benami in the name of his spouse or his denendent children. That clause does not provide that even if the allottee- tenant does not himself own such building it would be sufficient if his spouse or his dependent children own such residential building. It follows that unless the allottee-tenant himself owns such building whether in his own name or benami in the name of any member of hi. s family, that clause does not require him, to vacate the allotted per- mises even if his spouse of any of his dependent children owns such building. ( 7 ) HOWEVER, learned counsel for some of the respondents, contended that the words "he owns in his name or in the name of any member of his family" occurring in clause (a) of S. 21a (1) should be understood as meaning that he or any member of his family owns. We are unable to accept such an interpretation of those words. It is significant that in the second proviso to sub-sec. (2) of S, 8 of the Act, the words used are "any person who or any member of whose family owns a residential building". It is reasonable to expect the legislature to have used similar words in clause (a) of S. 21a (1) if its intention was that an allottee should vacate the allotted premises if any member of his family owns a house. It is reasonable to expect the legislature to have used similar words in clause (a) of S. 21a (1) if its intention was that an allottee should vacate the allotted premises if any member of his family owns a house. Even so it was argued that even if a literal construction of the words "he owns in bis name or any member of his family" does not convey the meaning that he or any member of his family owns, we should depart from literal construction of those words in order to carry out the intention of the legislature. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Kanai Lal v. Parmanidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907 , the first and the primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself and if the words used are capable of only one construction, then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt the other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged policy of the act. This is not a case in which the words "he owns in his name or in the name of any member of his family" are capable of more than one construction. This is also not a case wherein a literal construction of the words "he owns in his name or in the name of any member of his family" would lead to any manifest absurdity or strange consequence or undue hardship which the legislature could not have intended. If the word? used by the legislature in a statutory provision, do not bring about or do not bring about fully the result which the legislature intended, then, it is for the legislature to amend such provision in order to achieve such result and in our opinion it is not for the Courts to adopt s strained interpretation of such statutory provision in order to bring about what the legislature should do by an amendment of such statutory provision. If it was the intention of the legislature that an allottee-tenant should vacate the allotted premises not only when he owns a residential building in the same city, town or village but also when any member of his family owns such building, it is for the legislature to carry out into effect such intension by appropriate amendment of clause (a) of S. 21a (1 ). ( 8 ) IN each of these petitions, there wa,s no finding by the Controller that the allottee owned any residential building in Bangalore either in his own name or benami in the name of any member of his family and hence the allottee in each case was not liable under clause (a) of S. 21a (1) to vacate the house occupied by him as a tenant on allotment by the Controller, nor was any member of his family, in turn, entitled under clause (b) of that sub-section, to recover possession of his (such member's) own house if it is let out to any person. ( 9 ) IN, the result, we allow both these petitions and quash the impugned orders of the. respective Controllers. ( 10 ) IN, the circumstances of these petitions, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .