JUDGMENT A.R. Navkar, J.—This is an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by Third Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Civil Appeal No. 15-A of 1977, preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the Third Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior, in Civil Suit No. 11-A of 1972. 2. Madanlal and Mohanlal are the sons of Mintoolal, who are plaintiffs. Defendants are sons of Gopalsingh. The facts of the case are house, bearing Municipal No. 30/55, situate in Patankar Bazar, Lashkar, is the property of joint Hindu family of the plaintiffs and the defendants are the tenants of the portion on the ground floor and two rooms on the top floor at Rs. 115 per month. It was rented out by Mintoolal. The defendants are carrying on their business in the lower portion of the house, while it is alleged that the two rooms on the top floor were used for keeping material of the hotel. The defendants have paid rent upto 27-10-1971, accepting the plaintiffs as the landlords. On 27 January 1971, it is alleged that there was a partition inter se the plaintiffs and his father. The tenancy starts from eight of every month. A notice was given on 19-5-1971 to the defendants terminating their tenancy. It was received by defendant No. 1 on 2-6-1971 and by defendant No. 2 on 29-5-1971. The tenancy was terminated from the midnight of 8-7-1971. The notice had an optional clause also. The rent due towards the defendants was from 28-10-1971 to 12-12-1971--Rs 170.50 and notice charge of Rs. 4.50, in all Rs. 175. This amount includes the amount of mesne profits also. The suit for eviction is filed on 16-12-1971. The ground for eviction shown is that the plaintiffs want the lower portion for carrying on the business of general merchandise and they want to stay in the two rooms that are on the top floor. There was an amendment in the plaint to the effect that the purpose of letting mainly was for nonresidential purpose. But, the two rooms on the top floor are used by the defendants for residence, so that they can have control over the business which is run in the lower portion. 3. The partition-deed is a registered one which is Ex. P/1. The value of the property shown in the deed is Rs. 16,000. Mohanlal gets Rs. 8,000, Madanlal gets Rs. 3. The partition-deed is a registered one which is Ex. P/1. The value of the property shown in the deed is Rs. 16,000. Mohanlal gets Rs. 8,000, Madanlal gets Rs. 4,000, while Mintoolal gets a share of Rs. 4,000. The deed also mentions that the jewellery and cash which is with the respective parties will remain their own property. One more fact I should mention before mentioning the defence of the defendants, because this fact had been included by the defendants in their defence. A suit was filed by Ramsharan Das alias Mintoolal against the present defendants, which is numbered as 187-A/63 for eviction. The ground shown was that the non-residential accommodation is required for carrying on the business of selling timber by Mohanlal. The plaint is Ex. P/1. The written statement filed in the suit by the defendants is Ex. D/1, in which they have mentioned that formerly the non-residential portion was on rent of Rs. 21 per month and that they have invested a substantial amount in additions and alterations of the lower portion. They have also alleged that they have paid Rs. 3,300 to the sub-tenant who was in occupation of some portion of the said shop. They denied the plaint allegation which was to the effect that Mohanlal son of Ramsharandas wants to carry on the business of timber merchant in the said shop and that he is 21 years old. 4. This suit was dismissed on 2-9-1967 by the trial Judge. 5. The second fact which should be taken into consideration is that by giving interrogatories, the defendant has elucidated the history regarding the rent realised from this accommodation, it shows that when Suit No. 167/2004 was filed, the rent realised was Rs. 12 and one Ratilal was the tenant. Ratilal vacated the premises after a compromise. Then, in 1948, this accommodation was given on rent to firm Jairamdas Jain and the rent was increased to Rs. 65, but the Rent Controlling Authority fixed the rent at Rs. 21. That tenant also vacated the shop in 1953. It was again given on rent to one Govindram. Govindram was paying Rs. 40 per month and after Govindram vacated the portion, it was rented out to the present defendants. It was denied by the plaintiffs that the defendants had to pay some extra amount to get vacant possession from Govindram. 21. That tenant also vacated the shop in 1953. It was again given on rent to one Govindram. Govindram was paying Rs. 40 per month and after Govindram vacated the portion, it was rented out to the present defendants. It was denied by the plaintiffs that the defendants had to pay some extra amount to get vacant possession from Govindram. It has also come in the replies given to the interrogatories by Ramsharan Das that in the beginning, Ratilal had only one portion of the shop in his tenancy. To firm Jairamdas Jain, the rented portion was one portion which was in possession of Ratiram plus other portion of the said shop. 6. The defence of the defendants was that they admitted the tenancy. They did not admit that there was partition on 271-1971. Here, it will be better to add that Mintoolal's other name is Ramsharan Das. Then the defendants mentioned regarding the dismissal of the suit filed by Mintoolal alias Ramsharan Das which showed that Mohanlal wanted the suit premises for carrying on the business of timber; that the partition is a sham transaction. By acceptance of rent, the notice of termination has been waived. The upper portion which was used for non-residential purpose cannot be vacated for residential purpose. The allegation that the plaintiffs are residing with their father with his permission is false. Even today, in a shop which is opposite to the High Court, the sons and father are doing business of selling spices and their idea that they want to have a separate business is also false. The tenancy being for twenty years, the notice terminating the tenancy is not valid. The amount of rent was tendered to the plaintiffs. Then, an objection was raised to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit. The contract of tenancy also does not show the real intention of the parties. In fact, the agreement between the parties was that if the tenants will make additions and alterations for carrying on their business, then they can do so by spending their own amount without causing harm to the building itself. If that is done, then the period of tenancy will be twenty years. This was an oral agreement. The plaintiffs want to increase the rent upto Rs. 250 and as it was not acceded to, this suit has been filed. The defendants have spent about Rs. If that is done, then the period of tenancy will be twenty years. This was an oral agreement. The plaintiffs want to increase the rent upto Rs. 250 and as it was not acceded to, this suit has been filed. The defendants have spent about Rs. 10,000 in making additions and alterations in the shop. Taking into consideration all these facts, the suit of the plaintiffs is mala fide and it should be dismissed. 7. Here, it wilt be better to see the rent-note also. The rent-note is Ex. P/2. It describes the suit property as Makan and Dukan, situated at Patankar Bazar, Lashkar, that it is rented out for eleven months from 8-5-1961 for Rs. 115, that the Makan and Dukan, the tenant, will keep clean. At the time of vacating the Makan and Dukan, the defendants will pay the rent in full upto the date of vacation and will get a receipt for it. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act will not be applicable to the present lease. The water charges and electricity charges will be paid by the defendants and lastly, it describes the portion given on rent. It says that two rooms of the Makan situated on the second floor and the whole of the lower portion, which is a shop is given on rent. Before proceeding further, I would like to refer to the statement of the witnesses produced by the defendants. Darbara Singh (D. W. 1) has stated in his statement that the defendants run a hotel in the lower portion, while they stay in the upper portion. To the same effect is the statement of Kewal Krishna (D. W. 2). This fact is reiterated by Dawan Chand (D. W. 3). Even the defendant Ajeet Singh has admitted that the upper portion was taken on rent for residence, while the lower portion was taken to carry on the business of hotel. Therefore, taking into consideration, the plaint, the written statement and the statements of the witnesses of the defendants, it is borne out that the defendants took the premises mainly for non-residential purpose, but the idea was that the lower portion will be used for doing the business of hotel, while the upper portion will be used for residence. 8. The trial Court framed about six issues. They are as under, if translated into English: 1. 8. The trial Court framed about six issues. They are as under, if translated into English: 1. Whether the plaintiffs got the suit property in partition ? 2. (a) Whether the plaintiffs want the suit property bona fide for residence and doing business ? (b) Whether the plaintiffs have no alternative accommodation in their possession of their own in the city for the said purpose ? (c) Whether the two rooms on the top floor were taken for the purpose of residence ? 3. Whether the plaintiffs can recover as rent and mesne profits Rs. 172-50 and Rs. 4.50 as notice charges, in all Rs. 177.00, which the defendants have not paid in spite of the notice ? 4. Whether the notice is illegal ? 5. Relief and costs. There were additional issues framed on 6-8-1976. They read as under: 6 Whether the notice given by the plaintiffs is waived because the rent is accepted subsequent to it ? 6 (a) Whether the purpose of letting was mainly for non-residential and (b) Whether the two rooms on the top floor were taken for residential purpose ? 9. After taking evidence, the trial Court decided that the plaintiffs have received the disputed property in partition. The Court has negatived the need for residence. It has held that the plaintiffs have no other alternative accommodation for their resident. But, it seems that the main reason for disallowing the claim is that as accommodation was taken for mainly nonresidential purpose, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to get decree of the two rooms on the top floor u/s 12(1)(e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It has held that the plaintiffs can recover Rs. 177.50 from the defendants and it is not paid in spite of the notice. The notice of the plaintiffs is also not invalid. The notice also is not waived by the acceptance of rent subsequent to it. It has said, while deciding issue No. 6 (a) that the main purpose of letting was not non residential, but deciding issue No 6 (b), it has held that it was partly residential and partly non-residential, that is to say that the two rooms on the top floor were let out for residential purpose and, therefore, the suit has been dismissed. There was an appeal. There was an appeal. The appellate Court has dismissed the appeal, holding that because the main purpose of letting was nonresidential, therefore, no portion of the tenanted premises can be vacated for residence. As to the genuine requirement regarding the business, the appellate Court also negatived it, saying that it is not proved by the plaintiffs that they have sufficient funds with them; that formerly a suit on the basis of genuine requirement of the plaintiff for carrying on the timber business was filed and it was dismissed. Now, somersault is taken by the plaintiffs, that the accommodation in question is required by them for doing the business of general merchandise, it clearly shows their mala fide. It has also held that the plaintiffs are not doing business for a long time and if the plaintiffs are taking Rs. 300 and Rs. 400 from their father for maintaining themselves, then the submission of the plaintiffs that they require the shop for carrying on new business, is not worth believing. So also, the statement of Mohanlal that formerly he was sitting on the shop belonging to the father, but now he has left that business, cannot be accepted. Therefore, holding that the plaintiffs have failed to prove genuine requirement for starting their business, the appeal is dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gwalior. Against that, this second appeal has been filed. 10. While admitting this appeal, the substantial questions of law which are framed by this Court are: 1. Whether the suit premises being composite in character, viz., the residential as well as nonresidential and being required for composite purpose, is suit for ejectment non-maintainable u/s 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act ? 2. Whether the defendant tenant has any locus standi to challenge the registered deed of partition whereby the partition was effected of the suit property ? 3. Whether the dismissal of an earlier suit for ejectment can be relevant consideration for adjudicating the question of the requirement after partition was effected ? 4. Whether non-availability of funds to the landlord can be a relevant consideration ? 11. 3. Whether the dismissal of an earlier suit for ejectment can be relevant consideration for adjudicating the question of the requirement after partition was effected ? 4. Whether non-availability of funds to the landlord can be a relevant consideration ? 11. Learned counsel Shri G. M. Chaphekar, appearing on behalf of respondents, submitted before me that according to sub-section (4) of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court, if satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question and so, while admitting this appeal, the substantial questions have been formulated by this Court. Under sub-section (5) of section 100, Civil Procedure Code, the respondent, at the time of hearing of the appeal, will be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question and, therefore, I have to decide only the question which are formulated in this appeal only and he submitted that in fact, the question which are formulated in this appeal do not arise for decision at alt. Consequently, he further submitted, that the appeal should be dismissed. But, there is a proviso to this sub-section which says that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of Court to hear for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it if it is satisfied that the case involves such a question. Taking into consideration the submission of the learned counsel on both sides and the Proviso to sub-section (5) of section 100, Civil Procedure Code, I heard the appeal in detail. I will decide this question whether any substantial question of law is involved in the appeal which is not formulated while admitting the appeal. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants Shri N. K. Jain, submitted before me that the evidence clearly proves that the upper portion is used for residential purpose and if genuine requirement for that purpose is made out by the plaintiffs, then a decree should have been granted in their favour at least for that portion. To this, the reply of the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents was that as the purposes of letting is for non-residential one, the finding given by the appellate Court is correct. I do not accept this submission of the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents. To this, the reply of the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents was that as the purposes of letting is for non-residential one, the finding given by the appellate Court is correct. I do not accept this submission of the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents. The trial Court, on the basis of evidence, has found that the two rooms which were on the top floor, were used for residential purpose. It is also proved by the plaintiffs that they are not in possession of any accommodation of their own. There is no need to mention here that as soon as there is a partition between the members of a joint Hindu family, their shares become separate and they become full owners of their respective shares. Therefore, taking into consideration the partition itself it is beyond doubt that the plaintiffs have no alternative accommodation of their own in their possession. Only because they are living with the father it cannot mean that that accommodation in possession of the plaintiffs is their own. Therefore, I hold that the plaintiffs have proved genuine requirement for residential purpose and they have also proved that they are not in possession of any alternative accommodation of their own. As such, they are entitled for a decree of eviction for residential purpose, of the two rooms which are on the top floor. When some-portion is used for residential purpose and the other is used for non residential purpose and if both the portions are rented out by one rent-note and if the plaintiffs proves his need for residential purpose, whether he should be given a decree for the same was considered in Firm Panjumal Daulatram Vs. Sakhi Gopal, This was an appeal from Madhya Pradesh and in which section 12(1)(e) and section 12(1)(f) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was considered. The point decided in that was whether the composite purpose of the lease would put it out of the grounds set out for eviction u/s 12 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and in that it was held as under: (After quoting section 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(f)-- The residential portion is a part of the building and is an accommodation by definition. The non-residential portion is also a part of the building and is an accommodation by definition. The lease has been given for residential as well as non-residential purposes. The non-residential portion is also a part of the building and is an accommodation by definition. The lease has been given for residential as well as non-residential purposes. The landlord is entitled to eviction of the residential portion if he makes out a bona fide residential requirement. It also negatived the contention raised before it that if such a decree is given, it will amount to splitting up the contract. This case is applicable to the present case and, therefore, I hold that the finding of the appellate Court that as the purpose of letting is non-residential, therefore, the residential portion in possession of defendants covered by the same rent-note cannot be got vacated by the plaintiffs even if they have proved their genuine need for residence, cannot be accepted. I hold that they have proved their genuine need for residence and relying on Firm Panjumal Daulatram's case (supra). I hold that they are entitled for the decree of the same. This question is covered partly by substantial question No. 1 formulated in the appeal. 13. It was submitted before me by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the question of requirement is a question of fact. Whether the finding regarding genuine requirement is a finding of fact and whether I can go into that finding will be the main question in this appeal. He referred to me to Mattulal v. Radhelal 1974 M P L J 752 : 1975 J L J 1 but the learned counsel Shri N. K. Jain, appearing on behalf of the appellants, submitted before me that a finding of genuine requirement is a mixed question of fact and law. He referred to me to Madan Lal Puri Vs. Sain Das Berry, and Damdilal v. Parasram 1976 M P L J 526: 1976 J L J 655. He also referred me to in Idol Shriji Lakherapura, Bhopal Vs. Gappulal and another, . In Madan LaVs case (supra), it was held, relying on Smt. Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra Civil Appeal No. 2150 of 1966, decided on 26-9-1969 as under: ... whether on the facts proved the requirement of the landlord is bona fide, within the meaning of section 14(i)(e) is a finding on a mixed question of fact and law... In Madan LaVs case (supra), it was held, relying on Smt. Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra Civil Appeal No. 2150 of 1966, decided on 26-9-1969 as under: ... whether on the facts proved the requirement of the landlord is bona fide, within the meaning of section 14(i)(e) is a finding on a mixed question of fact and law... In Damadilal's case, it is held: (supra) It is well established that if a finding of fact is arrived at ignoring important and relevant evidence, the finding is bad in law. In Radha Nath Seal (dead) by his legal representatives Vs. Haripada Jana and Others, It is held as under: The High Court has pointed out that certain material evidence in the shape of documents was not considered by the first appellate Court and a good deal of assumptions of fact were made. Apart from that on proved and admitted facts it was open to the High Court to find what the nature of the tenancy was. In Mattulal v. Radhelal (supra), it is held as under: It is obvious that the issues whether the landlord required the suit premises for the purpose of starting a new business and if so, whether his requirement was bona fide are both questions of fact. Their determination do not involve the application of legal principles to the facts established in the evidence. The finding of the District Judge on these issues are no doubt inferences from other basic facts, but that does not alter the character of these findings and they remain findings of fact. Such findings of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal unless it was shown that in reaching it, a mistake of law was committed or it was based on no evidence or was such as no reasonable man could reach. 14. From the rulings cited above, the question of genuine requirement can be considered by this Court if some material evidence has not been considered by the appellate Court. Secondly, there can be interference by this Court if the Court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the appellate Court is not the view which a reasonable man will take. Thirdly, if the appellate Court has not applied correct principles of law in coming to a finding regarding genuine requirement, then also that finding can be interfered with. Thirdly, if the appellate Court has not applied correct principles of law in coming to a finding regarding genuine requirement, then also that finding can be interfered with. Keeping these points in my mind, I will see whether the finding given by the appellate Court can be disturbed or not in second appeal. The appellate Court has negatived the finding of bona fide requirement of the plaintiffs by saying that they have failed to prove the availability of funds with them and secondly, a former suit was dismissed when it was filed by the plaintiffs' father, saying that he has genuine requirement for his son to start the business of timber. When the first suit was filed, the need was shown to be that of Mohanlal alone, but in the present suit, the need shown is of both the plaintiffs. One of the plaintiffs, when the former suit was filed, was a minor and u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act, is the need of the major son which is to be considered while deciding the case. Secondly, it is just possible that in 1963, the plaintiff might be having a genuine need for his son Mohanlal, but it will be hard to say that even after a lapse of fourteen years, if the plaintiffs say that they have a genuine need to carry on business, it is not a bona fide need, because prior to 14 years, father of the plaintiffs filed a suit, saying that he needs the shop to carry on the business of one of his sons who has become major. Therefore, in my opinion, the finding of the former suit that at that time, the plaintiffs' father had no need, will not come in the way in deciding whether the plaintiffs have a genuine need when the present suit is filed. Therefore, the appellate Court has taken into consideration the evidence which is, in my opinion, not relevant to decide the present need of the plaintiffs. In the former suit, the Court was considering the genuine requirement of Mohanlal who was the major son of Mintoolal. The plaintiffs in the present suit say that both of them have the genuine need of the present shop to carry on their business. When the first suit was filed by the father, plaintiff No. 2 was a minor and he was not a party to that suit. The plaintiffs in the present suit say that both of them have the genuine need of the present shop to carry on their business. When the first suit was filed by the father, plaintiff No. 2 was a minor and he was not a party to that suit. Therefore, the Court had no occasion to take into consideration the genuine need of Madanlal. He being a minor, his need could not have been considered u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act and, as stated above, he was not even a party to that suit. But, after attaining majority, if both the plaintiffs filed the suit u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act, then the real consideration before the appellate Court was that to negative the need of the present plaintiffs, whether the finding given in the former suit negativing the genuine requirement of one of the plaintiffs is sufficient to hold that in the present suit as well, both the plaintiffs have no genuine need of the present shop. Therefore, in this suit, I will have to consider whether the plaintiffs have proved their need. The plaintiff, in his statement have stated that they want to do business of general merchandise. It has also come in evidence that they are assisting their father in his business also. Therefore, they have an experience of carrying on the business is proved from the evidence on record. Presently, they are not engaged in any activity is also clear from the evidence. Therefore, they want to start their business, I will have to accept. They have no other alternative accommodation is also proved from the evidence produced by the plaintiffs and, there-lore, their asking for a decree for the shop (Non-residential) accommodation which is in possession of the defendants is also justified. One more aspect to decide the genuine requirement of the plaintiffs, the appellate Court has not taken into consideration is that after partition, the plaintiffs have become owners in their own right of the disputed property and in my opinion, the defendants have no right to challenge the partition effected between the plaintiffs and their father. The partition under Hindu law, is a mode of changing the enjoyment of the property. The partition under Hindu law, is a mode of changing the enjoyment of the property. Before partition, every member of the joint family is owner of every part of the property, but as soon as there is partition, the mode of enjoyment is changed, that is to say, the separated members become the owners in their own right, of the share which is allotted to them and they are held to be in exclusive possession of their share. This result which is brought about by the members of the joint Hindu family, a stranger to the joint Hindu family, like a tenant has no right to challenge. If a stranger to joint Hindu family is given a right to control the mode of enjoyment of members of the joint Hindu family, it will lead to drastic results. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the defendants have no right to challenge the partition effected by the plaintiffs and their father. This finding is covered by the substantial question No. 1 framed by this Court. 15. As to question No. 3, I find that the dismissal of the earlier suit for ejectment cannot be a relevant consideration in this case for adjudicating the question of requirement after the partition was effected. The reason, I have already given above. 16. The last point which survives for consideration is that whether the finding of the appellate Court that because the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they have funds, therefore, their requirement is not bona fide, is correct or not. To my mind, this finding is also not correct. When the availability of funds is a necessary requisite for getting a decree under the grounds mentioned u/s 12 of the Act, it specifically mentions so. For example, take the ground u/s 12(1)(h) of the Act. Section 12(7) of the Act says that: "No order for eviction of a tenant shall by he made on the ground specified in clause (h) of sub-section (1),......and that necessary funds for the purpose are available with the landlord." There is no need of saying that section 12(1)(f) of the Act does not mention that the funds are necessary. Section 12(7) of the Act says that: "No order for eviction of a tenant shall by he made on the ground specified in clause (h) of sub-section (1),......and that necessary funds for the purpose are available with the landlord." There is no need of saying that section 12(1)(f) of the Act does not mention that the funds are necessary. The non-mention of availability of funds in section 12(1)(f) of the Act clearly shows that it is not necessary to get a decree u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act that the plaintiff must come and prove that he has liquid assets with him to carry on the business. To my mind, if it can be inferred from the circumstances proved by the plaintiffs that they have sufficient means to raise the necessary funds required for carrying on the business, then also they are entitled for a decree, if they prove that they have liquid assets, it is still better. But, if they prove, instead of liquid assets, that they have sufficient means to raise the funds, that will also be sufficient, in my opinion, for granting a decree in their favour. This distinction also, the appellate Court has not considered. The aspects which I have mentioned and which have not been considered by the appellate Court are the legal aspects of the case and because they have not been considered, I am of the view, that I can interfere in second appeal in the finding given by the appellate Court regarding genuine requirement. For deciding the question of availability of funds, the appellate Court has not considered, in my opinion, the partition-deed itself. The partition deed shows that the value of the property which has fallen to the share of the plaintiffs is to the extent of Rs. 12,000. It has come in evidence also that the plaintiffs take part in the business carried on by their lather. The partition-deed says in one of the paragraphs of the deed that the cash and the jewellery which is in possession of the respective parties to the partition deed will remain with the said party and the other parties will have no right or title over them. The partition-deed says in one of the paragraphs of the deed that the cash and the jewellery which is in possession of the respective parties to the partition deed will remain with the said party and the other parties will have no right or title over them. This statement and the value of the property was not taken into consideration by the appellate Court while judging whether the plaintiffs are in a position to raise the necessary funds they require to start the new business. The appellate Court is impressed with one fact only. The plaintiffs, in their statement, have stated that whenever they require any amount for their expenses, then they take it from the father. Secondly, the appellate Court has said that it is not proved by the plaintiffs that the amount is deposited with their aunt by calling in evidence their aunt. Similarly, the appellate Court has held that the entries made by the plaintiffs father in their account books that certain amount is to be paid to the plaintiffs is false and, therefore, the plaintiffs have not proved that they have ready money with them to start the business. I think that it would have been better if the plaintiffs would have proved that their amount is lying with their aunt, by examining the aunt herself. As the plaintiffs have not examined their aunt, I do not see any perversity in the finding of the appellate Court in not believing the statement of the plaintiffs regarding the deposit of the amount with their aunt. Similarly, to the entries in the account books made by the father also, I am not willing to give much importance to them. But, I cannot hold that taking into consideration the value of the property which has fallen to the share of the plaintiffs, that they have no potential capacity with them to raise the required money to carry on the business they want to do. I may refer here to in Babu Hari Singh Vs. Ratanlal, . But, I cannot hold that taking into consideration the value of the property which has fallen to the share of the plaintiffs, that they have no potential capacity with them to raise the required money to carry on the business they want to do. I may refer here to in Babu Hari Singh Vs. Ratanlal, . That Judgment supports the view I have taken above that the surrounding circumstances, the property belonging to the plaintiffs, their capacity to get a financer if they so want, should be considered to come to a conclusion whether they have got means or not, I may add here that it is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiffs are indebted to somebody else. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents referred to me to a Judgment of the Supreme Court in Damadilal v. Parashram and submitted that the financial capacity of the plaintiffs is a point to be considered when judging the alleged genuine requirement put forward by the plaintiffs. But in that case, the Supreme Court only held that the question of bona fide requirement of landlord can be interfered with by the High Court when the lower appellate Court has overlooked a very material part of evidence bearing on the question. Finding of fact arrived at ignoring important and relevant evidence is bad in law and, therefore, the High Court was justified in selling aside such finding. But that suit has no relevance in deciding the question which is raised in the present case. In that case, there was a clear evidence that when the first suit for eviction was filed, the plaintiff compromised the suit and did not ask for eviction of the tenant when he agreed to pay an increased rent. In my opinion, this clearly shows the mala fides of the plaintiff. Therefore, that case, in my opinion, cannot be applied to the present situation. The ratio of that case also, as I have already stated above, clearly shows that I can interfere in the finding of the appellate Court if it has overlooked a material part of evidence having a bearing on the material question. Therefore, the finding of the appellate Court that because the plaintiffs have not proved the availability of funds to start their business, they are not entitled for a decree u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act, I do not accept. Therefore, the finding of the appellate Court that because the plaintiffs have not proved the availability of funds to start their business, they are not entitled for a decree u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act, I do not accept. I reverse the finding and hold that the plaintiffs have in their possession enough property to raise the necessary funds to start their business and as such, they are entitled for a decree u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act. This covers the substantial point No. 3 framed by this Court and the remaining part of substantial question No. 1 also. As these are the substantial points which really arise in the case, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that these questions do not arise for decision of this appeal cannot be accepted and I reject it. 17. Shri M. L. Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of one of the respondents, drew my attention to the history of the shop, which I have already mentioned above. He showed to me how the shop changed from man to man and at every change, the plaintiffs increased the rent. He also submitted before me that the defendant has invested about Rs. 10,000 in the said shop and it is one of the best hotels possible in the best locality of the town. He has made a very queer submission against the grant of decree of eviction in favour of the plaintiffs, but I do not propose to state that submission here because of its queerness and I reject it I have already mentioned the history of the shop itself. I do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel Shri Gupta, when he submits that the rent of the shop was increased from time to time. When the rent increased, the accommodation also increased. Therefore, that increase has no bearing while considering the genuine requirement of the plaintiffs. As to the investment made by the defendant to the tune of about Rs. 10,000, there is no evidence on record to prove it. Similarly, no permission from the plaintiffs has been proved. Therefore, as the defendants have not proved their investment, I cannot decide that point at all. Neither it is necessary to decide that point in the present case, because defendants have not asked for any relief against the plaintiffs for the same. Similarly, no permission from the plaintiffs has been proved. Therefore, as the defendants have not proved their investment, I cannot decide that point at all. Neither it is necessary to decide that point in the present case, because defendants have not asked for any relief against the plaintiffs for the same. The disputed property on the ground floor is a nonresidential one and if the owner wants to start business of general merchandise in the best locality of the town as submitted by the learned counsel, I see nothing wrong in it. If it is a best locality in the town, then I think, that is the best ground for starting the general merchandise business in the shop. Therefore, the suggestion of the learned counsel, I reject and I see nothing wrong in starting the business of general merchandise by the plaintiffs in the disputed premises. 18. The defendants have taken a place in their written statement that the tenancy was for twenty years. I do not find any evidence to substantiate that plea, nor a tenancy for twenty years can be created without a registered document. Therefore, that objection also cannot be given effect to. As to the notice, I think, that after the period mentioned in the rent-note has come to an end, there is no need of giving a notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. For that purpose, I may refer to Firm Sardarilal Vishwanath and Others Vs. Pritam Singh, . In that case it is held as under: A statutory tenant is not entitled to notice as envisaged by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act before an action in ejectment is commenced against him under any of the enabling provisions of the relevant Rent Restriction Act. Therefore, that submission also, I cannot accept. 19. The result, therefore, is that the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act. The suit of the plaintiffs is decreed against the defendants for the premises which are in occupation of the defendants as shown in the plaint map, namely, the lower portion which is used for hotel and the upper portion, i. e., two rooms, which are in possession of the defendants. For vacating the premises, the defendants are given time upto 31st December 1979. For vacating the premises, the defendants are given time upto 31st December 1979. According to section 12(6) of the Act, before getting possession of the non-residential accommodation, the plaintiffs will have to pay compensation to which the defendants are entitled. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 200, if certified. Final Result : Allowed