JUDGMENT - Bharucha S.P., J.: - An analysis of clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865, is called for in this suit. . 2. The plaintiff lent and advanced to the defendants the sum of Rs. 35,000 upon the security of deposit of title-deeds of the defendants property situated in the State of Gujarat. The suit is for realisation of the mortgage security. In paragraph 9 of the plaint it is stated that the entire cause of action has arisen in Bombay, that the defendants are carrying on business in Bombay and that, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. 3. In the written statement, it is contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit because leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent has not been obtained. It is disputed that the plaintiff had advanced to the defendants the sum of Rs. 35,000 and that the defendants had created an equitable mortgage in favour of the plaintiff. It is contended that, by reason of section 63 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, no such equitable mortgage could, in any event, have been validly created. 4. Various issues were raised on the pleadings but Mr. Bhatt, learned advocate for the defendants, pressed only the issue of jurisdiction and that relating to the provisions of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. 5. Neither party led evidence. 6. It was Mr. Bhatts contention that leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent not having been obtained, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit because the mortgaged property admittedly a part of the cause of action in suit, lay outside the limits of its jurisdiction. In Mr. Bhatts submission. irrespective of the fact that a defendant resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain within the limits of the jurisdiction of this Court, if only a part of the cause of action in suit had arisen within those limits, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain or try the suit without first having granted leave under clause 12. 7. Mr. Mody, learned counsel for the plaintiff contended-and this is undisputed - that a suit to enforce a mortgage security was not a suit for land. 7. Mr. Mody, learned counsel for the plaintiff contended-and this is undisputed - that a suit to enforce a mortgage security was not a suit for land. He submitted that the fact that the defendant resided or carried on business or worked in Bombay was sufficient to invest this Court with jurisdiction to entertain and try a suit; no leave under clause 12 was then necessary. In the instant case it was not in dispute that the defendants carried on business in Bombay. 8. It would be well first to analyse clause 12. Broken into its component parts, clause 12 would read thus: “And we do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature ... ... . in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction shall be empowered to receive, try and determine suits of every description: 1(a) if, in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated; or (b) in all other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen: (i) either wholly, or (ii) in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the said High Court; or 2 if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain within such limits ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 9. As I read it, then clause 12 confers jurisdiction upon this Court to try and determine:(i) suits in respect of land or other immovable property if such land or immovable property is situated within the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court;(ii) all other suits in which (a) the cause of action has arisen wholly within the said limits; or(b) a part of the cause of action has arisen within the said limits and leave has been obtained under clause 12; and(iii) all suits in which the defendant, at the time of the commencement of the suit dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within the said limits. 10. 10. Therefore, in a suit which is not for land, where the defendant resides carries on business or personally works for gain in Bombay, the leave of the Court under clause 12 is not a pre-condition to the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court. In fact, my analysis would seem to indicate that this would be so even in a suit for land but since that is not directly in issue before me, I do not record a definite finding there on. 11. Mr. Bhatt drew my attention to the celebrated judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in(Hatimbhai Hassanaly v. Framroz Eduljee Dinshaw)l I.L.R. 51Bom. 516(F. B.)=A.I.R. 1927Bom. 278. In Mr. Bhatts submission, this judgment supported the proposition that where only a part of the cause of action arose within the limits of the jurisdiction of this Court, leave under clause 12 was imperative, regardless of the fact that the defendant resided or carried on business or worked for gain within these limits. 12. There were five questions before the Full Bench of which the first three are relevant for the purposes of this suit. They read thus: 1) Whether a suit brought by a mortgagee of land to enforce his mortgage by sale is “a suit for land” within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent? 2) Whether a suit by a mortgagee of land to enforce his mortgage by sale can be maintained in this Court either under clause 12 of the “ Letters Patent or under the equity jurisdiction of this Court when the mortgaged land is situate wholly outside the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court but the defendant dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within the limits of such jurisdiction at the commencement of the suit? 3) Whether such a suit can be maintained under clause 12 of the Letters Patent or under the equity jurisdiction of this Court if the mortgaged property is situate wholly outside the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court, and the defendant does not at the commencement of the suit dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain within such limits, but the cause of action has arisen wholly or in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part within the said limits?” 13. Upon the first question the Full Bench concluded(Fawcett and Mirza JJ. dissenting) that a suit brought by a mortgagee of land to enforce his mortgage by sale was not “a suit for land” within the meaning of clause 12. The second and third questions were answered thus: “Yes, under clause 12 of the Letters Patent because this suit is not a suit for land, and the cause of action has arisen partly within the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court, and the leave of the Court under clause 12 has been obtained.” It is upon this answer that Me. Bhatt lays emphasis. 14. A close scrutiny of the Full Bench judgment is necessary to garner what each learned Judge concluded in respect of the question as to whether a suit by a mortgagee for sale can be maintained in this Court under clause] 2 of the Letters Patent if the mortgaged land is situated outside the limits of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction but the defendant dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within those limits. 15. Marten C. J. held that clause 12 should be divided into two branches made up of:(a) jurisdiction Re: subject matter, and(b) jurisdiction Re: residence and place of business. He held that the former would apply to suits for land where the land lay within the jurisdiction and to all other cases where the cause of action arose wholly or in part within the jurisdiction; the latter would apply in all cases where the defendant was within the jurisdiction. Fawcett J. took the view that the words in all other cases” in clause 12 governed the words or if the defendants at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain within such limits. In his view, the suit before the Full Bench being a suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 and the land being situated outside the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Court, it could not be maintained. In his view, the suit before the Full Bench being a suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 and the land being situated outside the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Court, it could not be maintained. Keep J. construed Clause 12 to confer jurisdiction in three cases: (1) in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, a jurisdiction depending on the situation of the land within the jurisdiction or, If the previous decisions were correct, of a part of it within the jurisdiction where Leave to sue had been obtained; (2) in all other suits a jurisdiction depending on the calise of action or, with the leave of the Court, part of it arising within the jurisdiction; and (3) in any suit, a jurisdiction depending on the defendant dwelling or carrying on business within the limits of the original civil jurisdiction. He said he was driven to the construction that the defendants residence or place of business within the jurisdiction furnished a separate ground in every kind of suit entertainable by the High Court. Mirza J. answered the second question in the negative for, in his opinion, so far as a mortgage decree for sale was concerned, the residence of the defendant within the jurisdiction made no difference. Blackwell J. said that on the plain and natural grammatical construction of clause 12 the sentence beginning with the words “or if the defendant” was clearly an alternative to the preceding sentence beginning with the words “if in the case of suits for land”. He answered the second question in the affirmative. Patkar J. held that a mortgaged suit was “not a suit for land” but fall within the category of suits “in all other cases” and the Court has jurisdiction under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, as part of the cause of action has arisen within jurisdiction and leave of the Court has been obtained. I do not think it necessary to assume either ... that such a suit is a suit for land or that no part of the cause of action has arisen within jurisdiction, and then consider whether residence of the defendant within jurisdiction would be a separate and independant ground for the exercise of jurisdiction”. I do not think it necessary to assume either ... that such a suit is a suit for land or that no part of the cause of action has arisen within jurisdiction, and then consider whether residence of the defendant within jurisdiction would be a separate and independant ground for the exercise of jurisdiction”. in the view of Taleyarkhan J., clause 12 supported the contention that the High Court bad jurisdiction to try suits of every description when the defendant dwelt or carried on business or worked personally for gain with the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. 16. Upon their constructions of clause 12, Marten C. J., Kemp, Blackwell and Taleyarkhan 11., took the view, then, that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try even a suit for land where the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain within its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Quite clearly, the Full Bench decision does not support Mr. Bhatt in his contention that, irrespective of the fact that the defendants carry on business in Bombay, since only a part of the cause of action had arisen in Bombay, leave under clause 12 was imperative and the suit was not maintainable without it. 17. Mr. Bhatt drew my attention to a judgment of a learned sigle Judge of this Court in(Manalal Rikhbaji v. Mohanlal Harilal Rathi)2 1962 N.L.J. 80=63 Bom..L R 969. The suit before the Court was for enforcement of an English mortgage of property situated outside Bombay. The mortgagor-defendant resided outside the jurisdiction and did not carry on business or work for gain within the jurisdiction. A material part of cause of action had arisen in Bombay. No leave under clause 12 had been obtained. The Court held, following the Full Bench judgment, that the suit was not a suit for land It was also held that since only a part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction and no leave had been obtained under clause 12, the suit was not maintainable. The judgment does not advance Mr. Bhatts argument before me. 18. In the result, I hold that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. 19. The other contention that was advanced by Mr. The judgment does not advance Mr. Bhatts argument before me. 18. In the result, I hold that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. 19. The other contention that was advanced by Mr. Bhatt on behalf of the defendant was that no equitable mortgage could be created of the agricultural lands in suit by reason of the provisions of section 63 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act because according to his submission, the transfer of an interest in agricultural lands was prohibited thereby. He placed reliance upon section 63(b). Under the provisions thereof, no mortgage of any land or interest therein, in which the possession of the mortgaged property is delivered to the mortgagee, is valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist or who being an agriculturist, cultivated personally land not less than the ceiling area, or who was not an agricultural labourer. Me. Bhatt also relied upon the third proviso of the section which stated that nothing in the section would apply to a mortgage of any land or interest therein effected in favour of a co-operative society. As I read the provision of section 63(b), it applies only to mortgages of land or of an interest in land where possession of the land is delivered to the mortgagee. The proviso cannot alter the substance of the main clause. It is no one case that possession of the land in suit has been delivered by the defendants “ 10 the plaintiff. Me. Bhatt has not been able satisfactorily to explain to me how this provision can apply to the mortgage in suit. In the result, this point must also be decided against the defendants. I answer the issues thus :- 1) This Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. 2) Not pressed. 3) Not pressed. 4) In the negative. 5) Not pressed. 20. There shall, therefore, be a decree in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants in terms of prayers(a) to(c) of the plaint. In regard to prayer(a), advocates fees are quantified at Rs. 2800. In regard to prayer(c), the period of redemption is fixed of 6 months. Directions under the prayer(d) are reserved. Suit decreed. -----