JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal against a judgment and decree of reversal. The plaintiffs instituted the suit on May 9, 1969 for recovery of possession of a piece and parcel of bastu land measuring 11 cottahs forming the demarcated portion of plot 128. Khatian 1695 and 576. Mouja Barisa, P. S. Behala being premises No. 28/16/1, Kalikinkar Road within South Suburban Municipality with a tank and two storeyed pucca building thereon with appurtenances. The plaintiffs respondents case is that the suit land with a tank and two storeyed building on part thereof was purchased by Nirod Barani widow of Surapati Roy Choudhury out of her stridhan money on February 18,1949. On October 17, 1958 a lease in respect thereof was executed between Nirod Barani as lessor and the defendant appellant as lessee for ten years at a rent of Rs. 50/- per month payable according to the English Calendar month. Nirod Barani died on October 19, 1964 and on her death, the plaintiffs got the property by inheritance, as her brother's sons' sons and daughters. The lease expired on and from October 17, 1968 and the plaintiffs by notice dated November 12, 1968 called upon the defendant to quit and vacate the premises within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. As the defendant failed to comply with the requisition the suit was instituted claiming a decree for eviction of the defendant and for mesne profits. 2. THE suit was contested by the defendant and in his written statement stated that the lease was granted by one Srish Chandra mookerjee and not Nirod Barani, who was thus a necessary party to the suit. In any event it was stated that the plaintiffs were not the legal heirs of Nirod Barani who died without leaving any legal heir. The legal validity of the notice was also challenged. It transpired in evidence that the property originally belonged to Nirod barani who sold it to Sarbeswar on December 21, 1940 for Rs. 2200/- only. On February 18, 1949 Sarbeswar sold the property to Srish Chandra Mukherjee for the same consideration. Srish it is claimed by the plantiffs, was a benamdar of Nirod Barani and as such benamder granted the said lease to the defendant. 2200/- only. On February 18, 1949 Sarbeswar sold the property to Srish Chandra Mukherjee for the same consideration. Srish it is claimed by the plantiffs, was a benamdar of Nirod Barani and as such benamder granted the said lease to the defendant. On July 3 1964 a nadabi deed was executed by Srish declaring Nirod Barani as the owner of the property and soon thereafter on October 19, 1964 Nirod Barani died leaving the plaintiffs as her legal heirs: 3. THE learned Munsif found on evidence that the custody of the sale deed was not established nor the financial capacity of Nirod Barani to purchase the property or her payment of consideration was established. The Nadabi was executed by Srishs constituted attorney but none of them was examined. It was held that the benami nature of transaction was not established end even though the defendant paid rent to Nirod Barani for few months after execution of the nadabi, no importance should be paid to the same. Further, since Surapati, husband of the Nirod Barani had a brother, even if it was assumed that she was the real owner there was no evidence to indicate that the said brother was dead or left no heirs since such heirs would be preferential heirs to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, It was accordingly held that though no notice to quit was necessary the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief and the suit in the premises was dismissed. 4. ON appeal, it was held that the lease was governed by the Transfer of property Act and Srish was a benamder of nirod Barani. It was further held that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of Nirod barani and were accepted as landlords by the defendant, depositing rent in the name of the plaintiffs. Further the defendant having recognised Nirod Barani was stopped from challenging her title to the suit property. Further by partition Surapada gave up his interest in favour of Gouripada son of Nirod Barani who inherited the property from her son on his death on october 14, 1960. The appeal accordingly was allowed and the suit was decreed. The present appeal is against this decision. From the nadabi deed it appears that property belonged jointly to Surapati (husband of Nirodbarani and father of gouri) and his brother Sibapada. The appeal accordingly was allowed and the suit was decreed. The present appeal is against this decision. From the nadabi deed it appears that property belonged jointly to Surapati (husband of Nirodbarani and father of gouri) and his brother Sibapada. Surapati died leaving Gouri as his only heir and legal representative and there was an amicable 5. partition between Gouri and Sibapada whereby the property in suit with other properties were amicably partitioned by a registered deed of Kartick 24, 1344 B. S. The suit property was exclusively allotted to Gouri who died unmarried and intestate leaving Nirodbarani as his sole heir and legal representative. Nirodbarani since then had been enjoying the suit property and sold the same with permission of Court on December 21, 1940 to Sarbeswar who resold the same to Nirod Barani on the same consideration paid by her on February 18, 1949 in the benami of Srish. Even the lease by the benamder to the defendant dated October 15, 1958 (Ext. A) provided for a permanent residence for Nirodbarani in the property during her life. By the nadabi deed dated July 3, 1964 (Ext. 4) Srish declared the title of Nirodbarani in the suit property as being hers, and himself being her benamdar only. It appears further that the defendant thereafter paid rent to Nirodbarani and on her death to the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property. In this state of affairs, the findings of the appellate court holding Nirod Barani's title to the suit property and thereafter of the plaintiffs there to suffer from no infirmity and in fact has to not been seriously challenged. 5. THE real point in controversy between the parties is on the question of the applicability of the Transfer of Property act, 1882 to the lease granted to the defendant in respect of the suit property. The finding of both courts is that the transfer of Property Act is applicable to the lease, so that the provisions of the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 is inapplicable to the tenancy of the defendant. 6. THE appellate court has held that the defendant did not file any cross objection to the trial courts finding about the non-applicability of the Premises Tenancy Act. 6. THE appellate court has held that the defendant did not file any cross objection to the trial courts finding about the non-applicability of the Premises Tenancy Act. It is however not necessary or permissible in law for a successful litigant to file cross-objection against findings when the decree or order is not challenged or sought to be set aside by him. In Ganga Bai Vs. Vijay Kumar AIR 1974 S.C. 1126 (para 17) it has been laid down that while appeal lies only against a decree and also against such orders allowed by order 43 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, no appeal can lie against a mere finding for the simple reason that the code does not provide for such appeal. The same principle will be applicable to cross-objections and the decree or order under appeal can be supported by the respondents on other grounds other than those on which the judgement or order is founded as also observed in State of Mysore Vs. C, N. Viyendra Rao, AIR 1976 S.C. 477 (Para 7). Such right extends to challenging findings therein which may be against the respondents when an appeal has been preferred. There is therefore no impediment in law for the defendant to urge against a finding of the trial court without filing any cross objection. The provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 in section 2 clause (f) defines "premises" as follows ; "2. (f) "premises" means any building or part of a building or any hut or part of a hat let separately and includes. (i) The gardens, grounds and out houses if any, appertaining thereto. . . . . " in the lease deed, the demised property was mentioned as eleven cottahs of bastu land with tank, two storeyed building and other appurtenances. The lease was for the residence of the lessee and the lessee was made entitled for convenience of his residence to effect repairs, alterations and construction of new structures not exceeding Rs. 5000/ -. A right of residence of the lessor was also reserved during her life time in one specified room of the building. 7. THE lease was thus obviously for residence of the lessee in the building with the tank and land appertaining thereto. 5000/ -. A right of residence of the lessor was also reserved during her life time in one specified room of the building. 7. THE lease was thus obviously for residence of the lessee in the building with the tank and land appertaining thereto. Under the definition "premises" in the Act includes, and not means, gardens, grounds and outhouses, These in view of the inclusive definition, do not exhaust all categories mentioned therein but extends to others as appurtenant to the building leased for residence. As was held in S. K. Gupta Vs. K. P. Jain AIR 1979 S.C. 734 (para 25) an inclusive definition enlarges the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the statutes when it is so used. So that the words are to be construed as comprehending not merely things which they signify according to their natural import but also those which are similar as appurtenant to buildings or houses under the tenancy. If the lease was of the tank or for viniculture with the building, if it were possible, as a place for storing fish or other articles connected therewith the position might have been otherwise. But in view of the purpose of the lease which is manifest in the deed itself as being for residence at several places there is no escape from the conclusion that the lease was neither of the land or of the tank but of the building for residence with tank and land as appurtenant thereto. The right of additional construction or of Nirod Barani's residence are matters of contract which does not detract the purpose of the lease or affect the leased property. Accordingly it is held that the lease was of the premises as contemplated in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and its provisions are applicable to the parties concerning the tenancy in respect of the suit property. 8. THE word 'tenant' has been defined in the West Bengal Premises Act, 1956 in Section 2, Clause (h) is as follows : "2. 8. THE word 'tenant' has been defined in the West Bengal Premises Act, 1956 in Section 2, Clause (h) is as follows : "2. (h) Tenant means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf, the rent of any premises is, or but for a special contract would be, payable and includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy or in the event of such person's death, such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a Court of competent jurisdiction. " This definition of a word as meaning something, as has been said in S. K. Gupta's case, implies that whenever the word is used in the statute it shall mean what is stated in the definition unless the context otherwise requires. The defendant here was a tenant under the registered lease for a term which expired on and from October 17, 1968. In view of the definition of tenant under the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 the defendant continues to be a tenant after the termination of his tenancy which in this case is outside the ambit of the provisions of section 3. The defendant is also not a statutory tenant having no estate in the premises but as we have seen, a tenant as defined in section 2 (h). In considering the status of a tenant continuing in possession after determination of his tenancy, where in Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 a tenant is defined in terms similar to ours, A.C. Gupta, J. speaking for the court observed in Damadilal -v-Parashram AIR 1976 S.C. 2229 (Para 12) as follows : "the definition makes a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy a tenant unless a decree or order for eviction has been made against him thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual, tenancy still subsists. The incidents of such tenancy and a contractual tenancy must therefore be the same unless any provision of the Act conveyed a contrary intention. " In this case, though the tenant after determination of his tenancy continues to be a tenant, it can not be said that he is in the same position he was under a contract of term lease. " In this case, though the tenant after determination of his tenancy continues to be a tenant, it can not be said that he is in the same position he was under a contract of term lease. The lease having expired by efflux of time, the tenant must be deemed to be a tenant under a lease renewed from year to year or month to month according to the purpose for which the property was leased as provided in section 106. The lease here being for residential purpose, a propose other than agricultural or manufacturing, becomes one from month to month terminable in accordance with the provisions thereof but also subject to the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, in respect of eviction of the tenant. 9. IN this case, by operation of law in the context of the attending circumstances the defendant became, on the expiry of the term lease on October 17, 1968, a monthly tenant from October 18, 1968. Such tenancy could be determined with the expiry of the month of the tenancy and subject also to the provisions of subsection (6) of section 13 of the Act the plaintiffs will be entitled to a decree on any of the grounds provided in section 13, sub-section (1) of the Act. As the notice here is not one terminating the tenancy with the expiry of the month of tenancy nor a notice required under section 13 (6), the contention of Mr. Mitter appearing for the defendant appellant that notice was invalid must be upheld. 10. THE appeal accordingly is allowed and judgment and decree under appeal are set aside and those of the trial court for reasons indicated -in this judgment, are restored. There will be no order for costs in the circumstances appeal allowed, no costs.